R. Balasubramanian

the naiṣkarmyasiddhi of sureśvara



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Dr R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

THE NAIṢKARMYASIDDHI OF SUREŚVARA

The sculptural image of Śrī Sureśvarācārya
installed inside the *maṭha* of *Kāmakoṭi-pīṭha* at Kāñcī

THE NAIṢKARMYASIDDHI OF SUREŚVARA

EDITED WITH
INTRODUCTION, ENGLISH TRANSLATION
ANNOTATION, AND INDICES

BY
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PREFACE

The study of the writings of Sureśvara has been one of the focal points of the research work of the Radhakrishnan Institute. Professor T.M.P. Mahadevan, the first Director of the Radhakrishnan Institute brought out *The Sambandha-vārtika of Sureśvarācārya* with text in *Devanāgarī*, English translation, introduction, notes and transliterated extracts from three unpublished commentaries in 1958 (republished in 1972). Following the same pattern my study of *The Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika of Sureśvara* with text in *Devanāgarī*, English translation, introduction, and annotation was published in 1974 (republished in 1984). Dr. Mahadevan wanted to bring out an English translation of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* with annotation, but he could not. He had also a plan to complete the translation of the entire *vārtika* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya*.

This volume of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* contains the text in *Devanāgarī* with English translation and annotation. Since there is already a comprehensive study of the various aspects of the Advaita of Sureśvara in Part I: Introduction (pp. 1-209) of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika* published earlier, I have given in the introduction of this book only a brief account of the essentials of the philosophy of Advaita as expounded by Sureśvara in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. However, my annotation on the text is elaborate. I have closely followed Jñānottama's brilliant and lucid commentary called *Candrikā* on the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* in my annotation, amplifying the doctrines and arguments as set forth by Jñānottama. But for Jñānottama's commentary, the comprehension of certain portions of the text is very difficult. I have been benefited by Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati's commentary called *Kleśāpahāriṇī* on the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (Adhyatma Granthavali series, Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarsipur, 1968). There are already two English translations of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Professor S. S. Raghavachar's edition of the text in *Devanāgarī* with

English translation and notes came out as a publication of the University of Mysore in 1965. A. J. Alston brought out his translation along with the text in the romanized form (Shanti Sadan, London), in 1971 under the title, *The Realization of the Absolute*. These two translations were helpful to me in my work.

I have followed M. Hiriyanna's edition of the text (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1925) with the *Candrikā* of Jñānottama, preferring a few changes in the readings. The differences in readings have been indicated in the appropriate places.

I have been studying the Vedānta texts sitting at the feet of my teacher, Bhāṣyabhāvajña Śrī Varahūr Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī. I read the text of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* with the *Candrikā* more than once under his guidance. To him I owe my knowledge of Advaita. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to him for his help and guidance.

I am thankful to my colleagues, Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan, Reader in Vaiṣṇavism and Dr. G. Mishra, Lecturer in Sanskrit, for their help in all aspects of the press work connected with the publication of this book. I must also express my thanks to M/s. Avvai Achukkoodam for their co-operation and neat execution of the work.

I thank the Vice-Chancellor and other authorities of the University of Madras for providing funds for the publication of this book.

Madras
March 14, 1988

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

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ABBREVIATIONS

BG, *Bhagavad-gītā*
BS, *Brahma-sūtra*
BU, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
CU, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*
H, Hiriyanna's edition of *NS*
ĪU, *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad*
KU, *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*
KE, *Kena Upaniṣad*
MB, *Mahābhārata*
MK, *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*
MS, *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra*
MU, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*
NS, *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*
PU, *Praśna Upaniṣad*
ṚV, *Ṛg-veda*
ŚU, *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*
TĀ, *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*
TU, *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*
US, *Upadeśasāhasrī*

INTRODUCTION

I

The-life history of Sureśvara is quickly told. It is the story of a life of polar opposites. Being the story of a Mīmāṁsaka-turned-Advaitin, it presents opposite pictures of two stages of life, one following the other, as a result of philosophico-religious conversion — that of a fervent champion of the philosophy of action on the one hand and that of an ardent advocate of the philosophy of knowledge on the other, that of a zealous householder on the one hand and that of a committed renunciate on the other. According to tradition, Sureśvara was known in his *pūrvāśrama* as Maṇḍana and also as Viśvarūpa before he became a *sannyāsin*-disciple of Śaṅkara. In the course of his *digvijaya*, Śaṅkara met Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated teacher of Mīmāṁsā, who was about to burn himself for expiating his sin of betraying his teacher. Śaṅkara vainly tried to dissuade him from self-destruction. Kumārila directed Śaṅkara to meet and hold discussion with Maṇḍana-miśra, a great Mīmāṁsaka and the husband of the former's sister. Accepting defeat after a prolonged debate with Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana gave up the life of a householder, embraced the life of a renunciate, and became a disciple of Śaṅkara, championing the philosophy of knowledge which was imparted to him by the latter. The saving knowledge which he obtained was the fruit of his devotion to, and service of, his Master, Śaṅkara, whom Sureśvara characterizes as "a treasure of excellent qualities,"[1] as "the revered Teacher of teachers."[2] Comparing himself to Bhagīratha, Sureśvara tells us that he obtained the liberating knowledge from Śaṅkara in the same way as Bhagīratha obtained the all-purifying *Gaṅgā* from Śiva.

Anantānandagiri's *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* states in Canto 55 that Kumārila told Śaṅkara of Maṇḍana as his sister's husband and

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1. *NS*, IV. 76.   2. *NS*, IV. 77.

advised him to hold discussion with Maṇḍana.[3] It is also stated that Maṇḍana, after being convinced of the greatness of Śaṅkara, became a *sannyāsin* with a new name of Sureśvara. Cidvilāsa in his *Śaṅkaravijayavilāsā* identifies Maṇḍana with Sureśvara. We are told that the change of name from Maṇḍana to Sureśvara was because of the change of *āśrama*.[4] According to the *Guruvaṁśakāvya*, Kumārila directed Śaṅkara to meet Viśvarūpa who, after becoming a *sannyāsin*, was known as Sureśvara. The information contained in Vidyāraṇya's *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* is very significant. Kumārila, Vidyāraṇya tells us, instructed Śaṅkara to defeat Maṇḍana who was a reputed householder (*mahāgṛhī*), who scrupulously adhered to the path of action (*karmaṭhaḥ*), who opposed the path of renunciation, and who was a great scholar in the different branches of learning (*sārvāsu śāstrasaraṇiṣu sa viśvarūpaḥ*). This is stated in verses (111) to (117) of Canto VII of this work.[5] Vidyāraṇya also tells us that Maṇḍana became a *sannyāsin* when he was defeated by Śaṅkara according to the promise given to the latter and that he assumed the name of Suresvara. This is described in verses (74) and (75) and verses (104) to (106) of Canto X of this work.[6] It is quite evident from what has been stated above that, according to the tradition known to Vidyāraṇya and others, Maṇḍana is identical with Viśvarūpa and Sureśvara and that Maṇḍana, when defeated by Śaṅkara, renounced the world, was initiated into *sannyāsāśrama*, and became a devoted disciple of Śaṅkara under the new name of Sureśvara.

The *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* is one of the valuable works composed by Sureśvara. There are four works of great importance in what is known as the *siddhi*-literature of Advaita. Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* is one of them, the other three being the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana, the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātam, and the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. There is a traditional story connected

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3. N. Veezhinathan (Ed.), *Śrī Śaṅkaravijaya of Anantānandagiri* (Madras: University of Madras, 1971), p. 174.

4. *Vide* Introduction to the *Śloka-vārtika* (Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 13), p.x.

5. *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series), pp. 292-293.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400, and p. 410.

with the writing of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddi* by Sureśvara. When Śaṅkara wanted Sureśvara to write a *vārtika*, a metrical commentary, on his *bhāṣya* on the *Bṛahma-sūtra*, it was not liked by the other disciples who thought that Sureśvara might not have been sincere in his conversion and that, if he was entrusted with the writing of a *vārtika* on the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, he might misinterpret it. Śaṅkara, therefore, directed Sureśvara to write an independent work on Advaita; and Sureśvara carried out the Master's order. In the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* Sureśvara tells us that he expounds the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman which remains "concealed in the interior of the *Vedānta*, which destroys bondage, and which reveals the Real" "in obedience to the command of my Teacher"[7] (*gurvanusikṣayā*). The *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* is an independent work on Advaita, terse in style, but profound in thought and authoritative in its pronouncements. It is a compendium of the essence of the entire *Vedānta* (*aśeṣa-vedāntasāra-saṅgraha-prakaraṇam*), for it deals with all the essential features Advaita Vedānta.[8]

Sureśvara wrote metrical commentaries called *vārtikas* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Before writing his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, Śaṅkara wrote a brief introduction to this *Upaniṣad*. Sureśvara's *vārtika* on this introduction is known as *Sambandha-vārtika*. Like the *Taittirīya-vārtika*, the *Sambandha-vārtika* too contains more than one thousand verses. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika* is approximately ten times the size of the *Sambandha-vārtika*. Sureśvara's *vārtikas* on Śaṅkara's commentaries on the *Taittirīya-* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* constitute a valuable source book of Advaita; and Sureśvara is at his best in his exposition and vindication of Advaita as well as in his criticism of the rival doctrines.

Two other works of Sureśvara's to which reference must be made are the *Mānasollāsa* and the *Pañcīkaraṇa-vārtika*. While the former is a metrical explanation of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* of Śaṅkara, the latter is a commentary on a prose work of Śaṅkara's by name *Pañcīkaraṇa*.

Sureśvara who was one of the direct disciples of Śaṅkara is important in the school of Advaita for two reasons. Before he

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7. *NS*, I. 3.

8. *NS*, *sambandhokti* to I. 1.

became a *sannyāsin*-disciple of Śaṅkara, he was a committed householder and a respected Mīmāṁsaka. The ochre robes that he put on meant a great deal more than mere change in external appearance. His switch over to Advaita from Mīmāṁsā was neither easy nor emotional. The fire-baptism he underwent made him emerge as a spiritually regenerate person. It brought a new awakening to him. His defence of Advaita and his criticism of Mīmāṁsā and other schools arise from his new enlightenment. Secondly, he is respected and honoured as one of the foremost teachers of Advaita. In the school of Advaita, he is popularly known as the *Vārtikakāra*, *i.e.* the author of the *Vārtika*, a term suggestive of respect and authority, in the same way as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is known as the *Vārtikakāra* in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā school. A spokesman of Śaṅkara, he has been frequently quoted as an authority by many reputed teachers of Advaita, noted for their doctrinal exposition and dialectical skill. Though next only to Śaṅkara, he has been provided a prominent place in the galaxy of Vyāsa and Śaṅkara.

II

The *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, which consists of four chapters, is partly in prose and partly in verse. Though the verses by themselves provide a complete account of Advaita in all its aspects, the prose part called the *sambandhokti* cannot be ignored or dismissed as unimportant or superfluous. Sureśvara makes use of the *sambandhokti* for different purposes — to introduce a problem for discussion, to formulate an introduction to the verse or verses following it, to explain the relation between the verses, to state an objection of the opponent and the reply thereto, and to summarise the points at a particular stage for the purpose of recapitulation. The prose part is, therefore, very helpful for the easy and proper comprehension of the doctrines and arguments set forth in the verses. There are 100 verses in Chapter I, 119 verses in Chapter II, 126 verses in Chapter III, and 78 verses in Chapter IV.

After giving the reasons for writing the book at the commencement of Chapter I, Sureśvara quickly identifies the central problem of the book — liberation from transmigratory existence and the means thereto. He declares that *avidyā*, *i.e.* ignorance of the Self, is the cause of bondage and that it can be removed only by the knowledge of the Self which can be obtained from *śruti* texts such as "*tat tvam asi*." Therefore, the main discussion in the first

chapter is about *karma v. jñāna*. Sureśvara examines at great length the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara views according to which liberation can be attained by *karma* alone and rejects them. Also, the views of Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana who plead for *bhāvanā* for the purpose of attaining *aparokṣa-jñāna* and insist on the practice of *karma* along with meditation are set forth and refuted by Sureśvara. After this, Sureśvara examines the tenability of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* in the context of *bhedābheda* of Bhartṛprapañca and rejects it. Reverting to the central problem with which he started the discussion, Sureśvara says by way of conclusion in this chapter that liberation can be attained by all only through knowledge and not by "the deeds of speech, mind, and body."[9] It does not follow from this that *karma* has no place in the scheme of discipline leading to liberation. Sureśvara points out that the performance of *karma* in a spirit of dedication to the Lord leads to the purification of the mind and the development of dispassion, which are indispensable for turning the mind inward towards the Self.[10] In other words, *karma* is a remote means to liberation.

The focus of Chapter II is on the distinction between the Self and the not-Self. Since the import of the *mahāvākya* cannot be comprehended unless one knows first of all the distinction between the Self and the not-Self, Sureśvara explains in detail how, by the application of the different kinds of the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, the Self could be distinguished first from the gross body and then from the subtle body. In the course of the elucidation of the distinction between the Self and the not-Self, Sureśvara highlights the nature of the Self as *svaprakāśa*, *nirguṇa*, and *kūṭastha*, and shows how the entire not-Self which is a projection of *avidyā* is dependent on the Self, the sole reality. In the context of the distinction between the Self and the "I", Sureśvara takes up for consideration the interpretation of the *mahāvākya*, "I am Brahman," and shows how the "I" or the ego, though different from the Self, can and does signify it in three ways through primary sense, secondary sense, and similarity. The Self which is outside the scope of *pramāṇas* such as perception can be known, declares Sureśvara, only through *śruti* which, being different from the Self, is also *mithyā*. An ignorant person is awakened to truth by *śruti* in the same way as one who is asleep is awakened by the

9. *NS*, I. 99.

10. *NS*, I. 47-50

dream object. The Self *per se* is free from the "I" and its modifications, the body and its characteristics, the factors of action and the fruits thereof. The latter are superimposed on it. What is falsely superimposed on the Self alone can be negated through reasoning and *śruti*. If superimposition itself is not real, then negation, too, is not real. Though from the *pāramārthika* point of view there is neither superimposition nor negation, they are intelligible at the *vyāvahārika* level, which is the standpoint of *avidyā*. That is why Sureśvara says that negation too is a superimposition on the Self.[11]

Chapter III begins with the discussion of the locus and the content of *avidyā*. Sureśvara holds the view that the Self alone is both the locus and the content of *avidyā*. Since the knowledge of the non-sentential sense alone obtained from the scriptural sentence can terminate *avidyā*, Sureśvara explains the three stages one has to go through in construing the non-sentential sense from the *mahāvākya*, "*tat tvam asi*." One must pay attention to (1) the grammar of words, (2) the semantics of words, and (3) the logic of the relation of the implication and the implied in construing the non-sentential import of the text, "*tat tvam asi*." After establishing the validity of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*, Sureśvara points out that the assertive *śruti* texts such as "*tat tvam asi*" are valid on their own independently of injunctive texts, and that they do not enjoin *prasaṅkhyāna*. Also, the immediate knowledge of the Self, argues Sureśvara, cannot arise from *prasaṅkhyāna*, but only from the text itself. The work and the limitation of the *anvaya-vyatireka* reasoning are brought out to emphasize the need for *śruti* for obtaining the saving knowledge.

After summarising the teaching of the first three chapters, Sureśvara explains in Chapter IV why there is the need to cite the views of recognized authorities in support of what he has stated, and quotes illustrative passages from Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* and Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. After stating the fruit of knowledge, Sureśvara explains how the *jīvanmukta* who is not subject to scriptural injunction and prohibition leads a life free from the sense of "I" and "mine", free from conceit and enmity, till the body falls off when *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted.

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11. *NS*, II. 117.

III

Advaita Vedānta may be characterized as "transcendental phenomenology" and "metaphysics of experience." These two characterizations suggest that Advaita is seized with five issues: a basic problem, a method for analysing the problem, a transcendental principle whose evidence is apodictic, a metaphysical thesis to which it is committed, and a plan of action.

The Self which is consciousness is ever free and never bound. It is the sole reality. Though it has no transmigratory existence, it appears as if it has such an existence and becomes a journeying self equipped with the body and presented with a world of objects for its experience. What is bodiless becomes embodied; what is pure subjectivity, free from the world, is surrounded by the world. So, the basic problem is connected with "the embodied self", "the enworlded subjectivity". There is, on the one hand, the dichotomy between consciousness and the world of objects presented to consciousness; there is, on the other hand, the involvement of consciousness in the objects of the world. How is it possible, Advaita asks, that the Self or consciousness which is essentially different from everything else presented to it as its object, gets itself involved in the objects of the world surrounding it, losing its identity in such a way that it is not even reckoned as an entity in its own right along with other objects? This is the problem of "the embodied self" or "the enworlded subjectivity". At the commencement of his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, Śaṅkara invites our attention to this problem. The dichotomy between consciousness and what is presented to consciousness shows that whatever is presented to consciousness is "transcendent" to it and is, therefore, an *object* of consciousness, whereas consciousness which reveals whatever is presented to it is the *subject*. The distinction between consciousness and what is presented to consciousness is what Śaṅkara calls the distinction between "*asmad*" and "*yuṣmad*", the subject and the object, the Self and the not-Self. Absorbed as we are in our daily life under the overwhelming influence of an attitude which is naive and natural, we fail to notice the radical distinction between the subject and the object, between the Self and the not-Self, and confuse and mix up the one with the other. The naive and natural mode of thinking and its resultant activity are due to our ignorance of the Self, the pure consciousness, the transcendental

subjectivity. One could see the "natural attitude" fully manifest in the worldly life (*lokavyavahāra*) comprising all kinds of activities—cognitive, affective, and conative — in which the Self becomes the subject of knowledge, the agent of action, and the enjoyer of the consequences of action.

Śaṅkara states the problem as follows:

> It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject which are signified by the terms '*yuṣmad*' and '*asmad*' (*i.e.* the not-Self and the Self) and which are opposed to each other like light and darkness, cannot be identified. In the same way, their respective attributes also cannot be identified. Hence, it follows that it is wrong to superimpose upon the subject, which is of the nature of consciousness and which is referred to as *asmad*, the object which is spoken of as *yuṣmad*, and the attributes of the object; it is also wrong to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this, it is quite natural, owing to wrong knowledge, not to distinguish the two entities (*i. e.* the object and the subject) and their respective attributes ... and carry on the worldly life by saying "That I am," and "That is mine."[12]

Therefore, the most important question is: "How can the Self, the transcendental subjectivity, be identified with, or be the owner of, anything that is transcendent to it, be it the mind, or the sense organ, or the body, or any external object outside one's mind-sense-body complex?" It means that the Self without remaining aloof becomes worldly and is entangled in the affairs of the world giving rise to the problem of enworlded subjectivity.

The method of Advaita consists in a rigorous inquiry into the given world, the world of lived experience, as presented to consciousness. The given world as presented to consciousness comprises not only the outer world of external objects, but also the inner world of the cogitations of the mind. The inner world of the mind comprising the various mental operations is as much

12. See the beginning of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.1.

transcendent to the Self, the pure consciousness, as the outer world is. Since the worldly life is due to "lack of inquiry" (*avicāritasiddha*),[13] an expression frequently used by Sureśvara, there is the need for an inquiry into both the outer world and the inner world in order to find out their source, the principle which provides meaning and validity to the inner mental world of perceptions and the outer physical world of daily life, the principle which is the presupposition of all experience, of all knowledge at all levels. Śaṅkara amplifies the notion of enworlded subjectivity by speaking about the Self which, though one only, appears to be many when it is associated with a plurality of mind-sense-body complexes, the epistemological distinction between the knower and the known, the means of knowing and the experience of the empirical world, the state of ignorance when one does not know the Self and the state of knowledge when one knows it in the following passage.[14]

> The Self within is one only; two inward Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct, the one Self is practically treated as if it were two, just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence, there is scope for scriptural texts which set forth the distinction between the knower and the known, for perception and other means of knowledge, for the experience of the empirical works and for scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. So the scriptural text, "Where there is duality as it were, there one sees another," declares that the whole practical world exists only in the state of ignorance; while the subsequent text, "But when the Self only is all this, how should one see another?"[15] declares that the physical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.

Noticing the outer world of activities, secular and scriptural, and the inner world of mental operations, Advaita undertakes a regressive inquiry from the "outer world" to the "inner world", and from the "inner world" to the "source" of both.

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13. See *NS*, I. 1. *sambandhokti*.
14. See Śaṅkara's commentary on *BU*, 1.2.20.
15. *BU*, 4.5.15.

Advaita holds the view that the evidence of consciousness is apodictic. If we say that something is such-and-such and that something is not such-and-such, it is on the basis of the evidence of consciousness. Advaita maintains that whatever is affirmed by consciousness through its intentional performance can never be rejected and that whatever is denied by consciousness through its intentional performance can never be accepted. There is no other principle than consciousness for the acceptance or rejection of anything. Consciousness by its very nature is revelatory. It reveals objects on its own; it also reveals through the mind, the internal organ.[16] It is with reference to the latter that Advaita speaks of the intentionality of consciousness. The intentional performance is not ascribed to the Self or consciousness as such, but only to consciousness associated with the ego or the "I" which is transcendent to consciousness. The distinction which Advaita makes between the pure consciousness and the ego-consciousness (mind-consciousness) is very subtle, but profound and crucial. Keeping this important distinction between the seeing of consciousness (*i.e.* the seeing of the pure Self) and the seeing of the ego-consciousness (*i.e.* the empirical self), Śaṅkara speaks of two kinds of seeing or vision (*dṛṣṭi*) and the distinction between them. To quote Śaṅkara:

> Seeing is of two kinds, ordinary and real. Ordinary seeing is a function of the mind as connected with the visual sense; it is an act, and as such it has a beginning and an end. But the seeing that belongs to the Self is like the heat and light of fire; being the very essence of the witness (Self), it has neither beginning nor end...The ordinary seeing, however, is related to objects seen through the eye, and of course has a beginning... The eternal seeing of the Self is metaphorically spoken of as the witness, and although eternally seeing, is spoken of as sometimes seeing, and sometimes not seeing...[17]

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16. Advaita holds the view that any "object," whether known or unknown, must fall within the scope of consciousness. An oft-quoted statement conveys this basic standpoint as follows: "*sarvaṁ vastu jñātatayā vā ajñātatayā vā sākṣicaitanyasya viṣaya eva.*"

17. Śaṅkara's commentary on *BU*, 3.4.2.

Advaita holds that the evidence of consciousness is the only one that is certain and apodictic for any claim that we make — claim that we know something as well as the claim that we do not know something. Every source of knowledge is dependent on consciousness: whatever be the source of consciousness, be it perception, or inference, or scripture, it presupposes consciousness as its ultimate source. That which is the presupposition of every kind of knowledge and of every source of knowledge cannot be validated by any other principle. Advaita maintains that whatever is cognized must be admitted to be existent. Every cognition has a cognitum; and this is as much true of erroneous cognition as it is true of veridical cognition. In the well-known example of the rope-snake error, a person first of all cognizes the object in front as a snake and says, "This is a snake." Subsequently, he corrects the mistake and says, "This is not a snake, but a rope." While the initial cognition affirms the existence of the snake in front, the subsequent cognition which sublates the earlier cognition denies it by affirming the existence of the rope in front. Negation presupposes affirmation: that is to say, what is initially affirmed alone can be denied subsequently.[18] The fact is that "snake" was presented to consciousness as an object and that it was cognized by the person concerned at that time in that place. What is cognized cannot be dismissed as non-existent.[19] At the same time, since the subsequent cognition has sublated what was claimed earlier, it cannot be said to be existent or real.[20] On the basis of the evidence of the intentional acts of consciousness we have to say that the rope-snake has a peculiar ontological existence such that it cannot be characterized as non-existent or existent. Advaita, therefore, says that the rope-snake has to be accorded some kind of reality, what it calls phenomenal reality (*prātibhāsika-sattā*). It examines the objects of the external world such as table and tree by applying the same method. These objects, like the rope-snake, are not only cognized, but also are sublated. While they are affirmed by our waking experience, they are denied by our dream experience. What is seen in the daily waking experience gets sublated when someone is fortunate

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18. The principle is: "*prasaktasya pratiṣedhaḥ.*"
19. "*pratīyamānatvāt na asat.*"
20. "*bādhyamānatvāt na sat.*"

enough to realize the transcendental Self as the sole reality. As in the case of the rope snake, the objects of the external world must be accorded some reality, since they are both cognized and sublated. Noticing the difference between an object of erroneous cognition and an object of normal waking consciousness,[21] Advaita says that objects such as table and tree have empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*). The Self or consciousness is not an "object" which can be cognized like a rope-snake or a tree. Since it is self-luminous, it is always known; or, as Śaṅkara would put it, it does not remain unknown. Nor is there any possibility of sublation to it. What is other than consciousness is "object" which is dependent on consciousness for its meaning, validity, and existence; and so the question of sublation by "object" does not arise. Since there is no plurality of consciousness, its sublation by another consciousness does not arise. So Advaita maintains that the Self or consciousness possesses absolute reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*). The phenomenological method which Advaita pursues results in the theory of the levels of reality — what is phenomenally real, what is empirically real, and what is absolutely real. It must be borne in mind that the real *per se* has no levels or degrees; on the contrary, our experience as it progresses from stage to stage has levels. The transcendental Self or consciousness which is autonomous and absolutely real is one and non-dual. There is nothing else, similar or dissimilar to it, which is autonomous. It is homogeneous and indivisible. It cannot be seen; nor can it be sublated. It is, therefore, unique. Its nature being what it is, Advaita, following the Upaniṣadic lead, characterizes it as "one only, without a second" (*ekameva advitīyam*).[22]

Advaita exemplifies the unity of theory and practice. The rigorous regressive inquiry which one should undertake aims at the removal, stage by stage, of the not-Self, *i.e.* the removal of the physical, objective world first of all and then the removal of the mental, subjective world, with the help of reasoning and *śruti*. Since the failure to discriminate the Self from the not-Self

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21. For example, a dream object is "private", whereas an object of waking consciousness such as table is "public." Gauḍapāda mentions other differences as well in his *MK*, 2.4, 13-15.

22. See *CU*, 6.2.1.

arises because of ignorance, it is necessary to remove the latter; and this could be done only by the knowledge of the Self. In order that a person is fit enough to perform this rigorous regressive inquiry Advaita formulates a scheme of discipline which is both moral and spiritual. The Self which is no other than Brahman and which remains concealed by the not-Self in the business of daily life (*lokavyavahāra*) in which we are engaged has to be discovered. And this dis-covering of the Self can be done only by knowledge, for the attainment of which moral and spiritual discipline is necessary. Subscribing as it does to the theory of universal salvation (*sarva-mukti*), Advaita holds that anyone who has made himself/herself eligible for the practice of the rigorous regressive inquiry possessing the requistite qualifications therefor can dis-cover the Self here and now. Self-realization which is liberation is not a promise of a future state, but an achievement in the present. The liberated-in-life (*jīvanmuka*) has no attachment to the mind-sense-body complex and is, therefore, free from the sense of "I" and "mine". He knows the *lokavyavahāra*, but he is not a part of it. In the language of Sureśvara, he accepts everything connected with the *lokavyavahāra* from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint, but rejects everything as not real from the *pāramārthika* standpoint.[23] In him all the virtues find spontaneous manifestation[24] for the benefit of others. The world looks to him for his guidance, as he is no more wrestling with words and meanings, as he is no more tormented by desires and deeds, as he remains "the still point of the turning world."

IV

According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman which is the ultimate reality is one and non-dual. The pluralistic universe of our day-to-day experience which appears to be real is illusory. It is rooted in *avidyā* which conceals the real and projects the false. Sureśvara says: "Thus, it should be known through reasoning that (the world of duality which is a false appearance, which has no reality (of its own), which is caused by *avidyā*, and which defies understanding, is different from the Self."[25] The elucidation of the nature of the Self as distinguished from the not-

23. *NS*, IV. 51. 24. *NS*, IV. 69.
25. *NS*, II, 44.

Self constitutes the central theme of the entire second chapter of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Sureśvara explains the distinction between the Self and the not-Self not only on the basis of scriptural authority, but by means of reasoning as well. Brahman-Ātman, says Sureśvara, is eternal witness (*sadāvilupta-sākṣi*);[26] it is devoid of attributes (*nirguṇa*);[27] it is trans-empirical (*nāmādibhyaḥ paraḥ*);[28] it is infinite (*bhūmā*)[29] and partless (*niṣkalaḥ*);[30] it is not an instrument of action (*akārakaḥ*);[31] it is actionless (*akriyaḥ*.)[32] It is absolutely changeless (*kūṭastha*).[33] The not-Self, on the contrary, is what is perceived; having name and form, it is endowed with attributes; it is finite and composite; it is involved in action as a factor therein; it is subject to change.

For the purpose of distinguishing the Self from the not-Self Sureśvara lays emphasis on three aspects of the Self. They are: (1) the Self, being of the nature of consciousness, is self-established; (2) it is devoid of attributes; and (3) being immutable, it has no changes like origination, destruction, etc.

The Self is of the nature of consciousness. It is through consciousness that everything, whether it is an object in the external world or one's own body, whether it is a mental state like pleasure or mind itself, is known. By itself the internal organ which is material cannot illumine anything. If it gets the status of a knower (*jñātā*), it is because of the fact that consciousness which is the Self is reflected therein. The internal organ, carrying the reflection of consciousness, knows itself as "I" (*aham*); in the same way it knows other objects which are presented to it as "this" (*idam*). Starting from the internal organ which is material and which is other than the Self, every object is known only through consciousness. It is not possible to prove the existence of anything in the absence of consciousness. Consciousness which is presupposed in all acts of knowing is the basis of all knowledge. While other objects are proved or established through consciousness, the latter is self-established, for it is self-luminous by its very nature. The Self which is consciousness is said to be self-

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26. *NS*, II. 36.
27. *NS*, II. 46.
28. *NS*, II. 57.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *NS*, II. 84.

luminous in the sence that, while it is not illumined or made known by any other means or agency, it illumines other objects.[34]

The argument that the Self can be known through some other agency cannot stand examination. What is that, it has to be asked, which knows the Self? The not-Self which is insentient and which is dependent on the Self for its illumination cannot be the knower of the Self. Nor can it be said that the Self knows itself. One and the same Self cannot be both the knower and the known, the subject and the object, at the same time in the same act of cognition. It is no argument to say that it is known through *another* Self or consciousness, for the Self is one and non-dual. Since every thing other than the Self is insentient, it is absurd to suggest that some factor other than the Self knows the Self. It has, therefore, to be admitted that, while the not-Self is established through the Self, the latter is self-established. That is why Sureśvara says that the Self is self-established (*svatas-siddha*) and that what is presupposed by all means of knowledge cannot be established through them.[35]

We shall now consider the view that the Self is devoid of attributes (*nirguṇa*). According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman is pure, undifferentiated consciousness (*nirviśeṣa cinmātram*). Though in reality the Self is free from attributes, the attributes of the body, the senses, and the mind are superimposed on the Self, as for example when we say, "I am stout," "I am blind," "I am happy." Stoutness is a characteristic of the body; blindness is a feature of the visual sense; happiness is an attribute of the mind. None of these belongs to the Self, though in our day-to-day experience we mistakenly attribute them to the Self. Sureśvara says: "After differentiating the gross body (from the Self) through reasoning in this way, just as blueness is differentiated from the sky, the subtle body also should be differentiated from the Self through reasonings."[36] And also, "The notions of 'I' and 'mine', effort and desire, are not the attributes of the Self, because they are perceived as objects like leanness and also because they disappear like a garment."[37]

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34. "*ananya avabhāsyatvam, anya avabhāsakatvam.*"
35. *NS*, II. 36, 57.
36. *NS*, II. 21.
37. *NS*, II. 22.

Critics of Advaita do not accept the view that Brahman is devoid of attributes. The scriptural text which says that "Brahman is existence, knowledge, and infinitude" is interpreted by them to mean that Brahman *has* existence, knowledge, infinitude, etc. as its attributes. They argue that there is no object which is devoid of attributes. Every object is known as "such and such", that is, as possessing certain attributes. This is, according to the critics, as much true of Brahman as it is of any other object. In determining the nature of any object we are guided by the evidence of *pramāṇa*. Neither perception (*pratyakṣa*) nor inference (*anumāna*) nor verbal testimony (*śabda*) lends support to the existence of an object which is devoid of attributes. If so, how could it be said that Brahman is devoid of attributes? The truth is, according to the critics, that Brahman is not pure, undifferentiated Being, but is what is characterized by *satyatva*, *jñānatva*, etc.

It is necessary to examine at some length this argument of the critics as it is directed against the central thesis of Advaita according to which Brahman, the ultimate reality, is one and non-dual, and is devoid of *sajātīya- vijātīya-* and *svagata-bheda*. It is through reasoning (*yukti*), according to Sureśvara, that we have to discriminate the Self from the gross and subtle bodies. Here also we may resort to the process of reasoning for the purpose of vindicating that Brahman is devoid of attributes (*nirviśeṣa*).

First of all, the distinction between substance and attribute is not possible in the case of the Self. Sureśvara says that the Self is "unchanging, immediate awareness which is self-existent."[38] It is partless (*niravayava*), one (*ekarasam*) and non-dual (*abhinnam*). And so we cannot treat the Self as a substance and consciousness, existence, etc. as the attributes thereof. Such a distinction is possible in the case of the mind which being known is an object of knowledge. The mind by its very nature is insentient (*jaḍa*). It gets the power of illumination on account of its proximity to the Self which is unchanging consciousness.[39] It is subject to modification inasmuch as it assumes the form of the object which is presented to it. We must, therefore, dissociate the mind

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38. *NS*, III. 11.

39. *NS*, III. 15.

from the power of illumination with which it is falsely credited. But the position is quite different in the case of the Self. Consciousness is not an attribute of the Self; rather it constitutes the essence of the Self.[40] In the same way, existence and bliss are not the attributes of the Self; rather they constitute the essence of the Self. The Self by its very nature is existence, consciousness and bliss. It is, therefore, wrong to say that existence, consciousness, etc. are the attributes of the Self. In the words of Sureśvara: "The distinction between substance and attribute arises only for the intellect. But never does it arise for the Self. So the Self which is inward light is undifferentiated, as there is no reason for differentiation in it."[41]

According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman is *nirdharmaka*. The critics who are bent upon proving that Brahman-Ātman is not pure undifferentiated Being criticize the Advaita standpoint in a different way. Does *nirdharmakatva* exist in Brahman or not? If the former, how could it be said, so the critics argue, that Brahman is *nirdharmaka*? If the latter, Brahman cannot be *nirdharmaka*. This argument is fallacious. It is absurd to say that there is the attribute, *viz. nirdharmakatva*, in an object which is said to be devoid of attributes (*nirdharmaka*). This point may be made clear by citing an analogous case. It is absurd to say that there is the attribute, *viz. guṇatva* in a *guṇa* which is said to be *nirguṇa*. If it be said that in a *guṇa* there is another *guṇa*, then the latter, too, must be said to have another *guṇa* which, again, must be said to have another *guṇa*, and so there arises the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*). When Brahman-Ātman is said to be devoid of attributes (*nirdharmaka*), it is absurd to say that, if not anything else, at least *nirdharmakatva* must be the attribute of Brahman.

The objection was raised that neither perception nor inference nor verbal testimony lends support to the existence of an object which is devoid of attributes. This objection cannot stand examination. The Advaitin cites the case of deep sleep experience with a view to show that there is the evidence of perception for the experience of an object-devoid-of-attribute. When a person wakes up from deep sleep, he recollects his experience by saying: "I did not see anything." Recollection presupposes, and is based

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40. *NS*, III. 19. 41. *NS*, III. 13.

on, previous experience. In deep sleep there is the perceptual experience of the pure undifferentiated consciousness. Further, it may also be argued on the basis of inference that the Self is devoid of attributes. For example, the argument, "The self is devoid of attributes, for unlike objects like pot it is not perceived as endowed with attributes in deep sleep" is quite sound. The view that Brahman-Ātman is devoid of attributes is sought to be established not merely on the basis of inference, but also on the authority of scripture. Sureśvara observes: "How can *śruti*, which often speaks of the attributeless Brahman by saying that everything other than consciousness (*i.e.* the Self) is perishable and that (the Self) is 'not this,' 'not this,' be ignored?"[42]

Let us now consider the third aspect, *viz.* that the Self is immutable. In several places Sureśvara refers to the nature of the Self as immutable, as what is free from changes like origination, existence, growth, etc.[43] While the Self is immutable, everything other than the Self is subject to change. It is not difficult for us to understand how objects like a pot are subject to change. What applies to an external object also holds good in the case of the mind. If the Self which is really changeless appears to have changes, it is due to the lack of discrimination between the Self and the mind. It is the mind which is subject to constant changes. When we claim to know anything, whether it is an external object like a tree or a subjective state like pleasure, it is through the modifications of the mind. The manifold modifications of the mind are superimposed on the Self due to ignorance, though in truth "the Self is the unchanging witness to the thousand modifications of the intellect."[44] Sureśvara establishes this at great length by showing that the Self which is eternal awareness pervades as it were all the perishing functions of the mind,[45] that it is the witness of the mental states like pleasure and pain, that it is the constant factor in all mental modifications like memory, dream, and awakening,[46] and also in the different states of experience, *viz.* waking, dream, and deep sleep. The Self, says Sureśvara, is not affected by anything external to it, whatever may be the state of experience.

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42. *NS*, II. 42.
43. *NS*, II. 82-85.
44. *NS*, II. 77.
45. *NS*, II. 69.
46. *NS*, II. 83.

V

Our entire business of life involving differentiation like "I know this," "I do this action," "This is the fruit of my action," "I am old," "I am blind," etc., is based on the superimposition of one thing on another or the attributes of one thing on another due to ignorance (*avidyā*). We cannot carry on our business of life without relating the Self with the not-Self, though in truth the Self is unattached. If a person mistakes one thing for another or superimposes the attribute of one thing on another, it is because of ignorance. Such a superimposition does not take place of its own accord. Though *avidyā* is the root cause of superimposition and thereby of evil, it is the ego (*aham*) that plays the chief role in the mechanism of superimposition, and so the ego may be characterized as the villain of the piece.[47] Being the primary adjunct (*mukhyopādhi*) of the Self, it serves as the meeting place of the inner Self and the outer world; it is the knot (*granthi*) which unites as it were the Self and the not-Self.

It is necessary to explain the mechanism of superimposition at different levels in order to understand the part played by the ego (*ahaṅkāra*). The internal organ, the senses, and the body are the adjuncts of the Self. All of them are insentient (*jaḍa*). When we say that man is a sentient being, we superimpose sentience, which constitutes the nature of the Self, on the body. By superimposing the characteristic of the body on the Self, we say "I am a man." As pointed out earlier, our entire business of life is carried on by superimposing one thing on another. If we discriminate the Self from the not-Self, we will understand that the body is insentient like a stone, even though it is treated as sentient when compared with a stone. In the absence of the functioning of the senses, the body is insentient, and so it looks as if the senses are sentient, though in truth they are also insentient. In the same way, in the absence of the co-operation of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) the sense organ is not able to do its function and becomes inert like a stone. The manifold modifications of the internal organ may be brought under two categories, *viz.* the modification as "I" (*ahaṁvṛtti*) and the modification as "this" (*idaṁvṛtti*). When the internal organ undergoes the former modi-

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47. *NS*, II. 53, *sambandhokti.*

ation, it is known as mind (*manas*). The mind, when discriminated from the ego, will be seen to be insentient. Just as we say "my table," so also we say "my mind", and like any other insentient object, it is also dependent on what is sentient. The ego, too, must be discriminated from the Self. So long as it is not discriminated, it appears to be sentient. Though it is insentient, it appears to be sentient and assumes the status of a knower (*jñātā*) owing to the reflection of consciousness in it (*citpratibimbagrāhitayā*). In the same way, on account of the superimposition of the ego on the Self, the latter appears to be what is denoted by the ego (*ahaṁpratyayaviṣaya*). So the reciprocal superimposition of the one on the other — the nature of the sentient Self on the ego and the sense of the ego on the Self — is at the basis of our claim "I know". That is to say, when the Self is conditioned by the ego (*ahaṅkāra*), we say "I know." With the addition of mind (*manas*) as the adjunct to the Self-ego complex, we have the experience, "I am happy." By bringing in the body (*deha*) as the conditioning factor to the Self-ego complex we say, "I am a man." The ego is the first to be superimposed on the Self; and the other adjuncts starting from the mind are superimposed on the Self-ego complex. This accounts for the fact that while the mind, the senses, and the body are easily discriminated from the Self, there is much difficulty in discriminating the ego from the Self. Since the ego, by virtue of its being the primary adjunct of the Self, is at the basis of all that we claim to know and all that we do in our day-to-day experience, Sureśvara maintains that the ego is the root cause of all the evil in the world and that its elimination will amount to the realization of the non-dual Self.[48]

VI

If Brahman-Ātman which is the ultimate reality is one and non-dual, what is the status of the world? It is true that, according to Advaita, the world of plurality is superimposed on the non-dual Brahman, but this explanation does not seem to be quite satisfactory to the critics. Is the world, so the critics argue, different from Brahman or not? If it is different from Brahman, there arises dualism, for there are at least two entities, *viz.* Brahman and the world. The other alternative fares no better. If it is

48. *NS*, II. 53.

said that there is identity or non-difference between the two, how are we to understand this non-difference? Is the world non-different from Brahman, or is Brahman non-different from the world? If it is said that the world is non-different from Brahman, there is no need for Brahman-knowledge; and if Brahman is non-different from the world, then Brahman will cease to be Brahman, and it will be composite in nature. Sureśvara answers these questions by saying that the world has no being of its own (*anātmakam*), that it is wrongly imagined to exist (*mithyāsiddham*) due to delusion (*mohamūlam*), and that it defies rational inquiry (*sudurbodham*).[49] Since it does not have a status of its own independently of the Self,[50] and since it is not identical with the Self, it has to be said that the pluralistic universe is wrongly imagined to exist due to *avidyā*.

VII

Since the problem of the world is sought to be solved in terms of *avidyā*, it is necessary to shift our attention to the latter problem. There are two questions to be considered in this connection. One is regarding the locus (*āśraya*) of *avidyā*. The other question is about its content (*viṣaya*). According to Sureśvara, Brahman-Ātman is the locus of *avidyā*. It may appear that since the Self is of the nature of knowledge it cannot be the locus of *avidyā*. Knowledge and ignorance are opposed to each other like light and darkness. If so, how could *avidyā*, it may be thought, be located in the Self? Sureśvara argues that the Self alone is the locus of ignorance and not anything else which is not-Self. First, the not-Self by its very nature is ignorance; and it does not make sense to say that ignorance is located in what is of the nature of ignorance. Second, knowledge and ignorance must have the same locus (*ekādhikaraṇa*). Ignorance which is opposed to knowledge can be located only in that which has the possibility of knowledge. Since there is no possibility of the not-Self acquiring knowledge, ignorance can never have the not-Self for its

49. *NS*, II. 44.

50. According to Advaita the illusory snake which is superimposed on the rope does not have a nature or status of its own independently of the rope which is the substratum. The principle is: "*Kalpitasya adhiṣṭhānāmeva svarūpam.*"

locus. Third, the not-Self is itself a product of ignorance. It is wrong to say that ignorance which, being the cause, is earlier (*kāraṇatayā pūrvasiddham*) is dependent on its own effect which comes later. And last, the not-Self has no nature of its own independent of ignorance. Sureśvara, therefore, concludes that the Self alone is the locus of *avidyā*.[51]

The contention that the Self which is of the nature of knowledge (*jñāna-svarūpa*) cannot be the locus of ignorance is not tenable. For the purpose of answering this objection it is necessary to clarify the sense in which the Self is said to be of the nature of knowledge. It cannot be in the sense of *pramāṇa-jñānasvabhāva*, for the latter which involves the distinctions of the knower, the known, and the resulting knowledge is based upon *avidyā*; and so being illusory, it cannot constitute the nature of the Self which is real. If it is understood in the sense of witness-consciousness (*sākṣi-caitanya-svabhāva*), it is not opposed to *avidyā*, for the two are related as what reveals and what is revealed.[52] Even such a relation is meaningful only in the context of *avidyā*. From the standpoint of Brahman, says Sureśvara, there is no *avidyā* at all.[53]

It may be argued that ignorance cannot be located in the Self on the ground that the Self is one and non-dual, and so the relation of what contains and what is contained (*āśraya-āśrayi-bhāva*) which involves difference is not possible in the Self. This argument, too, is not tenable. The relation of the locus and the contained is itself based on *avidyā* which is superimposed on the Self, though in truth the Self is one and non-dual. From the standpoint of Brahman there is no *avidyā*; nor is Brahman the locus of *avidyā*.

Avidyā is not what is established through any *pramāṇa*, but it is nevertheless experienced being illumined by the Witness-self.

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51. *NS*, III. 1, *sambandhokti*.

52. See *The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi of Sureśvarācārya* with the *Candrikā* of Jñānottama, Ed. M. Hiriyanna (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1925), p. 107.

53. See *The Sambandha-vārtika of Sureśvarācārya*, Ed. T. M. P. Mahadevan (Madras: University of Madras, 1958), verse 177a, p. 90.

It is impossible for us to explain in any intelligible way the relation between Brahman-Ātman and *avidyā*. As remarked earlier, it is only at the empirical level, which is itself a state of *avidyā* that we speak about *avidyā* and its location in Brahman. When Brahman is known, there is no *avidyā*, and when Brahman which is said to be the locus is not known, how can one know *avidyā* which is said to be located in it? *Avidyā* which does not stand the scrutiny of the means of valid knowledge is, therefore, unintelligible, mysterious. Sureśvara remarks: "Oh, no one is beyond the impudence of *avidyā*. Disregarding *pramāṇa* and the reality, it exists as if it were the supreme Self."[54]

What, then, is the content of *avidyā*? It is Brahman-Ātman, says Sureśvara. "Being-the-object-of-valid-cognition" (*meyatva*) is for the one Self alone, for that alone is unknown. It is the Self whose real nature remains concealed that is to be known. We always experience the not-Self, and so it is not unknown. Further, since the not-Self is insentient (*jaḍa*) by nature, there is no need for *avidyā* to conceal its nature. So the not-Self does not fall within the scope of *avidyā*.

It may be argued that the non-dual Self cannot be both the locus and the content of ignorance. The case of knowledge, it may be argued, is worth considering here. The subject of knowledge is different from the object of knowledge; that is to say, knowledge is *in* some one, and it is about something else; and so the locus of knowledge is different from the content of knowledge. The same thing holds good in the case of ignorance. Ignorance is *in* some one; and it is *about* something else. If so, the locus of ignorance must be different from its content. Since the Self is one and non-dual, homogeneous and partless, it is not possible to suggest that ignorance is located in one part of the Self which is known, and that its content in the other part of the Self which is not known. So the Self which is admitted to be the locus of *avidyā* cannot, according to the critics, be the content of *avidyā* as well.[55]

The Advaitin answers this objection by taking his stand on the undeniable fact of experience. It is a matter of common ex-

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54. *NS*, III. 111.

55. *NS*, III. 1, *sambandhokti*.

perience for us to say: "I know myself," and also "I don't know myself." When a person says, "I know myself," it is a case where one and the same entity is both the locus and the content of knowledge. The person who knows, that is to say, the person who has the knowledge is myself; and the content of knowledge is also myself. In the same way, when a person says, "I don't know myself," it shows that one and the same entity is both the locus and the content of ignorance. The person who is ignorant is myself; and the object of ignorance is also myself. So it is quite possible for one and the same entity to be both the locus and the content of ignorance.[56]

Avidyā which is the cause of bondage can be destroyed by the knowledge of the non-dual Self which can be obtained only through the principal texts (*mahāvākyas*) of the *Upaniṣads* like "*tat tvam asi*." Sureśvara emphatically declares that the saving knowledge cannot be obtained through other means of knowledge.[57] Brahman-Ātman is trans-empirical. Perception and other means of knowledge can convey the knowledge of empirical objects, but not that of the trans-empirical Brahman. Through perception we gain knowledge of the objects of the external world. Since the Self is the inner reality and not an object of the external world, it cannot be known through perception. Nor can it be known through inference. The Self being imperceptible, it is not possible for us to have the knowledge of the invariable relation (*vyāpti-jñāna*) between the Self and anything else; and in the absence of such a knowledge inference has to be ruled out.[58] Knowledge, as it is ordinarily understood, involves three factors, *viz.* the knower, the means of knowing and the object of knowing (*pramātṛ-pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāraḥ*) which relate to the objects of the external world (*parācīnaviṣaya*); and so the inward Self does not fall within the scope of knowledge as it is ordinarily understood.[59]

VIII

It should not be thought that Sureśvara denies or underestimates the value of reason. In several places he points out that

56. See Jñānottama's commentary on *The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, Ed. M. Hiriyanna, p. 106.

57. *NS*, III. 67.

58. *NS*, III. 51.

59. *NS*, III. 52.

the process of reasoning must be made use of for discriminating the Self and the not-Self. There are different forms of reasoning like inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), argument based upon co-presence and co-absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*), etc. Sureśvara makes use of all these forms of reasoning in his writings.

But reason has its own limitations. For one thing, it can give us only mediate knowledge which lacks certitude and which has, therefore, to be validated through some other knowledge. If this other knowledge is also mediate, we will require some other knowledge for the purpose of validation, and so on, and this will lead to infinite regress. Second, there cannot be any finality in respect of the findings of reason. What is reasonable when viewed from one point of view may be shown to be untenable from another point of view through the help of reason. Third, reason gives us only relational knowledge, a knowledge which involves subject-object, substance-attribute, cause-effect, and other relations. What is inward and non-relational cannot be grasped through reason. Fourth, reason may help us to discriminate the Self from the not-Self, but it cannot tell us what the Self is. It is only through scripture that we can gain the knowledge of the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman.[60]

It is not enough to know what the not-Self is. The inquiry comes to an end only when the nature of the Self is known positively. The body, the senses, and the mind have all along been mistaken for the Self because of *avidyā*. As a result of discrimination, a person who undertakes the inquiry is able to realize that the Self he was seeing all along is really not the Self.[61] It is quite possible that he entertains the doubt that he himself has been eliminated, for he has not known the Self, and what was thought of as the Self has turned out to be the not-Self. Being accustomed to know things through perception and other means of knowledge, he may endeavour to know the Self in the same way. Such an attempt is bound to result in disappointment. The Self which is trans-empirical cannot be known through the physical eye which is competent only in respect of empirical things. That is why scripture declares that the Seer of the seeing cannot be

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60. *NS*, III. 53. 61. *NS*, IV. 9.

seen.[62] That Brahman is knowledge, existence, and bliss by nature, and that it is no other than the Self, can be known only through *śruti* and not through any other source.

IX

According to Sureśvara, the knowledge that we get from *śruti* texts like "*tat tvam asi*" is direct and immediate (*aparokṣa*) as well as non-relational (*asaṁsṛṣṭa*). In understanding the meaning of the text, "*tat tvam asi*," we have to consider (i) the grammatical co-ordination (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) between the two terms "*tat*" and "*tvam*", (ii) the substantive-attribute relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*) in which the two terms are placed, and (iii) the implied meaning conveyed by the terms (*lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-sambandha*). The two words "that" (*tat*) and "thou" (*tvam*) are in grammatical co-ordination. But at the same time the meanings conveyed by them are not synonymous. The word "*tat*" refers to Brahman which is infinite, non-dual, etc. The word "*tvam*" signifies the individual Self. When we consider the mutual qualification of the two terms, *i.e.* the qualification of the meaning of "*tat*" by "*tvam*," and the qualification of the meaning of "*tvam*" by "*tat*," we find that a simple and direct identification of the one with the other as outwardly conveyed by the sentence is not possible. "*Thou*" means the individual self as determined by finitude, limited knowledge, etc. "*That*" means Brahman as determined by infinitude, omniscience, etc. It is absurd to identify "*Thou*" with "*That*" in view of the fact that the determinants of the two terms are mutually incompatible. In order to overcome the absurdity, we must resort to the implied meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) of the sentence. By removing the determinants of each term, which are incompatible with those of the other term, and by retaining the common element, it is shown that the *śruti* text "*tat tvam asi*" conveys the sense of identity, a unitary unrelated content.[63] The point to be emphasized here is that, according to Sureśvara, (i) the direct and immediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman is obtained through *śruti*, and that (ii) such a knowledge is non-sentential and non-relational (*avākyārtha* and *akhaṇḍārtha*).

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62. *BU*, 3.4.2.

63. *NS*, III. 3.

The meaning intended to be conveyed (*tātparya-viṣaya*) by a sentence in the context in which it is spoken or occurs is its import. Though a sentence is a group of words which are related to each other according to certain conditions like *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā*, etc., it does not mean that the meaning of every sentence is relational (*saṁsarga-viṣaya*). There are sentences which signify a relational content. And there are sentences which convey a non-relational meaning. If the meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence is relational, the sentence can be said to have its import in a relational content; if, on the contrary, it intends to convey a non-relational content, we have to say that its import is in a non-relational meaning. For example, the sentence, "This is that Devadatta" conveys the sense of identity, for that is the meaning intended to be conveyed by the person who uttered it. Let us consider another example. A person, let us say, does not know the moon, though he has been told that it is a heavenly body to be seen at night. When he asks another: "Which is the moon?" he is told: "The most resplendent is the moon." It is obvious that this sentence does not intend to convey any relational content, but only to convey *which* the moon is by identifying it to the enquirer who put the question. Since only the meaning intended to be conveyed must be taken as the import of a sentence, the contention of the critics that a sentence, be it scriptural or otherwise, which is the construction (*anvaya*) of different meaning of words always conveys a relational sense is unfounded.

The non-dual Brahman is made known by scripture only through implication (*lakṣaṇā*). Words can signify a class characteristic, or a quality, or an action, or convention, or relation.[64] But Brahman is none of these; and so it cannot be made known through the express meanings (*vācyārtha*) of words. Since the ultimate reality cannot be stated to be such and such, the *Vedānta* texts like "*neti neti*" seek to teach Brahman negatively by stating what it is not, by negating what is gross as well as what is subtle from Brahman. Even the affirmative *Vedānta* texts like "*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*" do not, strictly speaking, bring out the nature of Brahman positively. The text which says that Brahman is "*satyam, jñānam, anantam*" has to be interpreted in a secondary sense as stating that Brahman is other than what is unreal, what

64. *NS*, III. 103.

is insentient, and what is finite.[65] So long as there is *vyavahāra*, Brahman is said to be of the nature of consciousness which illumines objects. It is from the lower and relative standpoint of *vyavahāra* that *śruti* refers to Brahman as of the nature of consciousness. Strictly speaking, the nature of Brahman cannot be brought out positively as "such and such" because of the limitations of language; it can be taught only negatively as what it is not.

X

Reference was made earlier to the limitations of reason and the need for scripture for getting the knowledge of Brahman. Reason which helps the aspirant to discriminate the Self from the not-Self must be followed by scripture, for the goal of Brahman-knowledge, which is liberation, cannot be secured by the mere discriminating cognition through reason. While reason prepares the way, scripture accomplishes the goal. It only means that scripture which is *the* source of the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman should not be disregarded. Citing the case of the Buddhists who, without accepting the authority of *śruti*, depend on mere reason, Sureśvara sounds a note of warning by saying that those who do not accept the authority of *śruti* in respect of the trans-empirical reality will not only fail to reach the goal, *viz.* liberation, but will run into the danger of accepting what is false.[66]

It is necessary at this stage to consider the validity of *śruti* as a source of knowledge. If there are reasons to show that *śruti* cannot be accepted as a source of valid knowledge, we have to reject it. That which makes known what is otherwise unknown is a *pramāṇa*. Perception, inference, etc. are admitted to be sources of knowledge in matters empirical. But in respect of Brahman which is trans-empirical, *śruti* is our only source of knowledge. Sureśvara argues that *śruti* can be rejected as a source of knowledge (1) if what it conveys is otherwise known and therefore is not new, or (2) if what it says is opposed to the evidence of another *pramāṇa*, or (3) if what it says is doubtful, or (4) if it does

65. See R. Balasubramanian, Ed. *The Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika* of *Sureśvara* (Madras: University of Madras, 1974), II. 44-89.

66. *NS*, III. 34.

not make known anything at all.[67] We have to examine *śruti* with a view to find out whether it can be rejected as a source of valid knowledge for any or all of the conditions stated above.

The first condition does not hold good. The knowledge of the non-dual Brahman conveyed by scripture is otherwise unknown. The trans-empirical reality does not fall within the scope of *pramāṇas* like perception [68]

Is it the case that the testimony of *śruti* goes against the evidence of perception and other *pramāṇas*? Critics of Advaita answer this question in the affirmative. They try to substantiate their claim in several ways. While non-duality is the ultimate truth according to scripture, perception and other sources of knowledge lend support to the existence of a plurality of things as different from one another. That we experience a world of diversity in our day-to-day experience is a matter which does not require philosophical defence through dialectics. How can *śruti* be considered to be a source of knowledge when what it affirms is patently opposed to the unquestionable evidence of perception and other sources of knowledge? Further, while scripture declares that the Self is free from misery, perception testifies to the fact that the Self is subject to misery. There is yet another point to be taken into consideration. Everyone from infancy on depends upon perception. We are led to think of *śruti* only subsequent to perception. It means that perception comes first, and scripture comes later. If so, when the evidence of scripture comes into conflict with that of perception, either scripture, the critics argue, must be declared invalid or its meaning must be construed in accordance with the evidence of perception. In other words, when the testimony of scripture comes into conflict with that of perception, it becomes weaker.

It is first of all necessary to show that the basic assumption involved in the several points raised above is wrong. The argument as a whole proceeds on the assumption that there is conflict between the testimony of scripture and the evidence of other means of knowledge. But there is absolutely no justification for

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67. *NS*, III. 35, *sambandhokti*.

68. *NS*, III. 35.

this assumption. The scope of *śruti* is entirely different from that of perception and other means of knowledge. It means that the nature of validity claimed for *śruti* is different from that claimed for perception. Perception is a source of knowledge in empirical matters. It gives us a knowledge which accords with our experience of things. If the knowledge it gives does not stand the test of practical efficiency, if its evidence runs counter to our experience, then it has no validity at all. Perception has, therefore, only empirical validity (*vyāvahārikaṁ prāmāṇyam*). *Śruti*, on the contrary, is the means of our knowledge of the ultimate reality. Its claim to validity centres round the transcendental. Just as perception does not claim any validity in respect of the transcendental or trans-empirical, so also *śruti* does not claim empirical validity. In other words, there is a clear demarcation of the spheres of application and authority in respect of scripture and perception. If so, there is no possibility at all for any conflict between *śruti* and perception.[69] Sureśvara drives home this point by an illustration. Through the visual sense, colour is perceived; and through the auditory sense, sound is heard. The scope of each is restricted to its own sphere; and so the validity of the one cannot be denied by means of the other. It is absurd to argue: "This is not sound, for with my eyes I see colour."[70] In the same way, what *śruti* says about the trans-empirical reality cannot be disregarded on the ground that perception proves something else.

It was argued that there is conflict between scripture and perception, because while the former affirms the truth of oneness, the latter that of plurality. Here again it is assumed by the critics that perception proves the existence of a plurality of things. Sureśvara argues that perception does not reveal difference. Only if it is proved that we get the knowledge of difference or plurality through perception, we can say that the evidence of percep ion goes against the teaching of *śruti*.[71]

Sureśvara observes that there is no conflict between the teaching of scripture and the evidence of perception. If it appears that there is conflict between the two in a particular instance, it

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69. *NS*, III. 83. 70. *NS*, III. 84.

71. See *The Sambandha-vārtika*, verses 920-923, pp. 492-493.

is necessary for us to show that the alleged conflict is not genuine. Consider, for example, the contention that, while *śruti* tells us that the Self is intrinsically free from misery, the evidence of perception is to the contrary. Sureśvara says that the conflict here is only apparent and not real. The Self by its very nature is immutable. Pleasure, pain, etc. belong to the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is subject to modifications. Due to non-discrimination between the Self and the internal organ, what is true of the latter is ascribed to the former. So, if one says that the *jīva* is subject to misery as evidenced by perceptual experience, it must not be taken in the primary sense, but only in the secondary sense.[72] In that case, there is no conflict at all between scripture and perception because of the difference in the standpoints.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that there is conflict between *śruti* and perception. The question, then, arises whether the testimony of *śruti* should be accepted as valid or that of perception. Sureśvara maintains that scripture alone should be accepted as final authority for two reasons. First, *śruti* is of superhuman origin (*apauruṣeya*), and this rules out the possibility of any defect in it. But the same thing cannot be said of perception. Cases of error in perception are not wanting. If it is found that the evidence of perception goes wrong in one particular case, one may be sceptical about the reliability of perceptual evidence as a whole. Second, the experience of deep sleep corroborates the testimony of *śruti* that the Self is of the nature of bliss. It follows that what is bliss by nature is wrongly imagined to be associated with misery; and so perception must yield to *śruti* in this regard.[73]

The argument which seeks to prove the supremacy of perception on the ground that everyone from the beginning depends upon perception and that the knowledge conveyed by *śruti* which comes later cannot, therefore, sublate the knowledge conveyed by perception is suicidal. Far from strengthening the case of perception, it really undermines its position in relation to scripture. The very admission that perceptual knowledge is prior, while the scriptural knowledge is subsequent, weakens the former and

72. *NS*, III. 96. See Jñānottama's commentary.

73. *NS*, III. 94, *sambandhokti*.

strengthens the latter. It is well-known that the subsequent knowledge of shell becomes powerful by sublating the earlier cognition of silver. The subsequent cognition does not take place without sublating the earlier. In the same manner, the scriptural knowledge which is subsequent cannot help sublating the earlier cognition obtained through perception. Since perception and scripture are independent of each other, and since the scriptural knowledge is subsequent to the perceptual knowledge, we must, by adopting the principle of the subsequent sublating the earlier (*apaccheda-nyāya*), declare the earlier cognition through perception invalid.

The authority of scripture cannot be set aside on the ground that what it conveys is open to doubt (*saṁśaya*). Sureśvara says that there is absolutely no room for doubt here. The problem has to be looked at from two points of view. The first is to consider the nature of the *pramāṇa* at issue. There is room for doubt only with regard to what is dependent on the human agency. But since *śruti* is *apauruṣeya*, one cannot raise doubts about it as a source of knowledge. Further, when the not-Self is negated through the process of reasoning, there cannot be room for doubt in respect of what *śruti* teaches about the Self.[74] The second is to consider the nature of the object to be known. Here it is the Self which is to be known through scripture. That about which doubts may arise, says Sureśvara, is not the Self, according to the wise.[75]

Is it possible to say that scripture does not convey any knowledge whatever and that it is not, therefore, a source of knowledge? Sureśvara says that one who is incapable of comprehending the instruction of *śruti* in respect of the inward Self which is self-luminous by nature deserves to be treated contemptuously as a figure of clay in the human form. *Śruti*, in fact, cannot teach him at all. If he thinks that *śruti* does not convey any knowledge, it is no fault of *śruti*.[76]

XI

Liberation, according to Advaita, is the realization of Brahman-Ātman which is ever-free, non-dual, and eternal bliss. Igno-

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74. *NS*, III. 36. 75. *NS*, III. 37.
76. *NS*, III. 38.

rance (*avidyā*) of the real nature of Brahman-Ātman is the cause of bondage, and so the attainment of knowledge (*vidyā*) which destroys the foundational ignorance is liberation.

It is a matter of common knowledge that when we are ignorant of something we endeavour to remove that ignorance by gaining the true knowledge of that object. Take the familiar case of mistaking a rope which is in front for a snake. Not knowing the real nature of the object in front, a person thinks that it is a snake and begins to run away in fear. His ignorance of the real nature of the object is the cause of his thinking of it as a snake and the subsequent reactions in him like sweating, running away in fear, etc. It is not enough if he is told that the object in front is not a snake. The statement that it is not a snake does not serve to remove his ignorance of the object in front. Perhaps, he has known to some extent what it is not. But this does not mean that his ignorance has been removed. The very fact that he still entertains doubts about it and is keenly desirous of knowing what it is shows that he is still ignorant of it; and his ignorance can be removed only by attaining the knowledge of the object in front, *viz.* the rope. In short, it is knowledge alone that removes ignorance in the same way as light removes darkness. The contention of the Advaitin that knowledge is the direct means to Brahman-realization which is release is thus based upon what we experience in our day-to-day life. That knowledge is the antidote to ignorance holds good not only with regard to removing our ordinary ignorance as exemplified in our mistaking a rope for a snake, but also in overcoming the metaphysical or foundational ignorance from which we suffer. Sureśvara, therefore, maintains that Brahman-knowledge alone is the means to the attainment of the supreme good, *viz.* liberation.

There are critics who think that the Advaita conception of liberation as the attainment of Brahman-Ātman realization is untenable. They allege that, though the Advaitin speaks about liberation as an attainment, it is not *attainment* in the literal sense of the word. It is only attainment *as it were*, for the Advaita view of liberation comes to no more than spiritual awakening. So, if liberation is the goal, it is not what is accomplished or attained in the real sense. Bondage also, the critics allege, is not real according to Advaita. What is real can never cease to be, and if bondage is real, it will never cease to exist, and any

effort to overcome it is futile; and so there is no real bondage according to Advaita, but only bondage *as it were*. The critics seem to think that bondage which is genuinely experienced cannot and should not be dismissed in a cavalier manner as not real.

It is first of all necessary to bear in mind in this connection that the Advaita view of liberation is integrally connected with the Advaita theory of reality. Further, the objections raised against both liberation and bondage are not objections against two different and independent problems. If it is admitted that the Advaita conception of reality is sound, one cannot but accept the Advaita view of liberation and bondage which are two sides of the same coin. Third, one should be clear about the standpoint that is assumed in any statement about bondage and the attainment of liberation.

Let us first consider the sense in which the word "attainment" is understood by the Advaitin. Sureśvara says that what is to be attained is of two kinds. A person, let us say, has to go to a certain village. The attainment of the village is what is yet to be accomplished. This "attainment" is different from the attainment of a necklace which a person wrongly thinks to have been lost, though in truth it is in his own body. In the one case there is the attainment of what is not attained, whereas in the other case there is the attainment of what is already attained. Since Brahman is ever-existent and since it is no other than the inward Self of the individual, it is always attained, though due to ignorance a person thinks that it is what is yet to be attained.

In the same way what is to be removed is of two kinds. It may be a *factual* source of pain like a thorn or a needle that has gone into the flesh. Or, it may be an *imaginary* source of pain like an illusory serpent.[77] Since Brahman is ever-free and since the inward Self of the individual is non-different from it, the bondage of the *jīva* which has to be removed is like removing the serpent in the rope. The serpent is not in the rope; it is only imagined to be there. Likewise, the condition of bondage can never be a characteristic of the ever-free Self; but it is imagined to be so, the real nature of the Self being concealed by *avidyā*. In both the cases, the knowledge of truth — the rope which is in front in

77. *NS*, I. 31-34.

the one case, and the Self in the other — is the means for removing what is not really there, what is already avoided.

Since Brahman, the ultimate reality, is infinite, the attainment of Brahman cannot be analogous to attaining or reaching a village by a person. In the latter case, the village which is located at a particular place is different from the person. The latter must move towards his destination from his place if he wants to reach it. But this does not hold good in the other case. There is no need for the *jīva* to go by a certain path to reach Brahman, for the latter is all-pervading; and if it is all-pervading, it is always attained. Only if it is away from the *jīva*, it is intelligible to say that the *jīva* has to reach it by going through a particular path. But since Brahman is all-pervading, and since the inward Self of the individual is no other than Brahman, it is always attained. If due to ignorance a person thinks that he has to attain Brahman-Ātman and *attains* it through removing the ignorance, it is a case of attaining what is always attained. The Advaita view that liberation consists in the attainment of Brahman-Ātman through knowledge is, therefore, based on, and integrally connected with, the theory of reality which it formulates.

Advaita does not deny the *fact* of bondage at the empirical level. Bondage is an evil that has to be overcome. It is as much a fact as a tree and a stone are admitted to be facts at the empirical level. It is a hard reality which man has to reckon with so long as he is what he is carrying on the business of life in the world. It is real empirically, though there is no such thing as bondage from the transcendental point of view, from the standpoint of Brahman which alone is. In the same way, at the empirical level our endeavour to attain Brahman-Ātman is real and genuine, though from the transcendental standpoint the problem does not arise. When Gauḍapāda says, "There is no dissolution, no origination, none in bondage, none striving or aspiring for salvation, and none liberated. This is the highest truth,"[78] he is speaking from the transcendental point of view, from the standpoint of the non-dual Brahman which alone is real. Without specifying the standpoint which is adopted, to criticise the Advaita view of bondage as an *as-it-were-bondage* and the Advaita concep-

78. *MK*, II. 32.

tion of the attainment of liberation as an *as-it-were-attainment* is a gross misrepresentation of Advaita.

XII

Following Śaṅkara, Sureśvara maintains that knowledge alone is the means to liberation. It should not be thought that Sureśvara either ignores or minimises the importance of action (*karma*). *Karma* purifies the mind, and the knowledge of the Self is manifested only in such a pure mind. For the origination of the knowledge through the purification of the mind *karma* is necessary; but once knowledge has sprung up, it requries no help from *karma* or from anything else for accomplishing the final goal. While *karma* as enjoined by scripture is the remote means, self-control (*śama*), etc. are the proximate means to the origination of knowledge. Sureśvara insists that *karma* which is necessary in the initial stages of the discipline must be dropped after it has discharged its function.[79] In support of this, he quotes the *Gītā* text: "For one who wants to ascend to *yoga*, action is said to be the means. To the same person, when he has ascended to *yoga*, *śama* is said to be the means."[80]

Sureśvara refutes at great length the Mīmāṁsā view that *karma* is the means to liberation. The substance of his argument may be stated as follows.

(1) What is required for release is the destruction of ignorance. *Karma* which is a product of ignorance is not opposed to it, and so it cannot destroy it.

(2) It is a matter of common knowledge that anything that is produced by action is impermanent (*anitya*). If liberation were the result of *karma*, then it would be impermanent; and such a state is not desirable.

(3) The futility of *karma* in respect of attaining release can be shown in another way. Whenever we do any action, it is for the sake of production (*utpatti*), or purification (*saṁskāra*), or transformation (*vikāra*), or attainment (*āpti*). That is to say, *karma* can produce, or purify, or transform, or bring within reach some-

79. *NS*, I. 49.

80. *BG*, 6.3.

thing. Apart from these four, a fifth use of *karma* cannot be thought of. Release (*mokṣa*) is not something to be produced for it is eternal (*nityatvāt*). It is not something to be purified, for it is bereft of all qualities and impurities (*nirguṇatvāt, nirdoṣatvāt*). Further, only a thing that serves as a means can be purified like the sacrificial vessel or clarified butter by the sprinkling of water and so on. Since release is not a means (*asādhana-dravyātmakatvāt*), it cannot be purified. It is not something to be transformed, for it is immutable (*kuṭasthatvāt*). It is not something to be attained, for it is already attained as the Self of every one (*ātmatvena nitya āptatvāt*).[81]

It may be argued that, though *karma* by itself cannot be the means to release, it can, in combination with knowledge (*jñāma*), achieve the end. Sureśvara rejects the combination theory (*samuccayavāda*) as equally untenable, in whatever way the combination of action and knowledge is thought of — whether both action and knowledge are given equal status as the means, or whether action is made the principal means with knowledge as subsidiary to it, or whether knowledge is made the principal means with action as subsidiary to it.[82]

The usefulness of *karma* to the origination of knowledge has already been indicated. It means that action and knowledge are related as means and end. What is admitted to be the means is chronologically earlier than the end which it brings about. If so, knowledge which is to be accomplished through action cannot be the subsidiary (*aṅga*) to it.

Nor can action be the subsidiary to knowledge. There is no need of the assistance of *karma* to knowledge in the matter of attaining liberation. It cannot be said that *karma* assists *jñāna* by removing the hindrances that stand in the way of attaining release. The only hindrance to the attainment of liberation is ignorance. Knowledge without requiring any assistance from any source can remove ignorance.

Knowledge and action cannot co-exist and function as partners of equal status, because they are mutually opposed to each

81. *NS*, I. 53.

82. *NS*, I. 54, *sambandhokti*.

other. Just as a lion and a sheep cannot work together in partnership, just as the sun and darkness cannot co-exist, so also knowlege and ignorance can neither co-work nor co-exist.[83] Sureśvara draws pointed attention to the fact that knowledge and action radically differ in respect of their (1) source, (2) nature, and (3) effect. *Pramāṇa* is the source of knowledge; but ignorance and desire are the source of action. While knowledge reveals the reality, action which involves duality in the form of means and end, doer and deed, conceals the real. The destruction of ignorance is the effect of knowledge; but production, or attainment, or transformation, or purification, is the effect of *karma*. Sureśvara, therefore, concludes that action and knowledge cannot be joined together, as light and darkness cannot be.[84]

XIII

Sureśvara criticises the *prasaṅkhyāna* theory according to which meditation on the content of the principal texts of the *Upaniṣads* is required for getting the direct and immediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. In order to appreciate Sureśvara's arguments against the *prasaṅkhyāna* theory, it is first of all necessary to understand why meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) on the content of the *Upaniṣads*) is insisted on by the advocate of the *prasaṅkhyāna* theory.

Brahman which is non-dual, which is non-relational, cannot be made known by the verbal cognition (*śābdajñāna*) which has a relational content (*saṁsṛṣṭa-viṣaya*) and in order to have the direct intuition of Brahman meditation on the content of the verbal cognition is necessary. The knowledge of the Self conveyed by *śruti* texts is mediate, and continuous meditation on it gives rise to a different cognition (*vijñānāntaram*) which is immediate and non-verbal (*avākyārthātmakam*) and which is capable of destroying the darkness of ignorance *in toto*.

Where is the need, asks Sureśvara, for the other cognition which is supposed to originate from meditation? It cannot be said that it is required for knowing Brahman-Ātman. We do get, contends Sureśvara, the knowledge of the non-dual, non-relational Brahman from *śruti* texts like "The Self is not this, not this," "That thou art," etc. A cognition is required for the purpose of

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83. *NS*, I. 55-56. 84. *NS*, I. 66.

knowing something. Since the non-dual Brahman-Ātman is made known by *śruti* itself, there is certainly no need for the alleged cognition to be obtained from meditation. It is no argument to say that the other cognition is needed in order to know the object, *viz*. Brahman-Ātman. What is known once through some *pramāṇa* does not require to be known again through some other source. What the other cognition is expected to do has already been done by *śruti* texts.[85]

Nor can it be said that the other cognition to be obtained from meditation is required for the sake of overcoming the mediateness of the Self. The Self is the most direct and immediate reality, and so the question of removing the mediateness of the Self does not arise.[86]

It is no argument to say that the other cognition is required for knowing the object in a clear and definite way, free from doubt. The knowledge which we get from *śruti* texts is clear, definite, and free from doubt, and so there is no need for the other cognition. If the knowledge conveyed by *śruti* texts is not clear, definite, and free from doubt, *śruti* will cease to be a *pramāṇa*, and when it has discharged its function as a *pramāṇa*, there is no need for the other cognition to be obtained from meditation. Further, if the right knowledge of the desired type is not obtained from *śruti* texts in the first instance itself, it can never be obtained by means of meditation practised for any length of time.[87]

It cannot be said that only the other cognition different from the one which arises from *śruti* texts is capable of destroying the foundational ignorance. Sureśvara maintains that to a person who is qualified the comprehension of the meaning of *śruti* texts *at once* (without repetition) destroys the ignorance which manifests through action and the factors involved in action.[88]

It should not be thought that Sureśvara does not provide any place for meditation in the scheme of spiritual discipline. He admits that there is scope for meditation with regard to the hear-

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85. See *The Sambandha-vārtika*, verse 793, p. 422.

86. *Ibid.*, verse 793, p. 422.

87. *NS*, III. 124. 88. *NS*, I. 67.

ing of the texts (*śravaṇa*). By meditation the hearing is perfected; and an eligible person obtains straightaway Brahman-knowledge, which is non-sentential, which is non-relational, and which is immediate, from *śruti* texts.[89]

There is a basic difference between Sureśvara and the advocate of the *prasaṅkhyāna* theory on the nature of the verbal cognition conveyed by *śruti* texts. While Sureśvara maintains that the verbal cognition (*śābda-jñāna*) which arises from *śruti* is non-sentential, non-relational, and immediate, the advocate of the *prasaṅkhyāna* theory holds that it is mediate and relational like any other verbal cognition. If this basic difference between the two is borne in mind, it will be easier to understand why Sureśvara has to be extremely critical of the *prasaṅkhyāna* theory.

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89. *NS*, III. 125.

नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिः

NAISKARMYASIDDHI

CHAPTER I

[1]

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तैः सर्वप्राणिभिः सर्वप्रकारस्यापि दुःखस्य स्वरसत एव जिहासितत्वात्, तन्निवृत्त्यर्था प्रवृत्तिरस्ति स्वरसत एव। दुःखस्य च देहोपादानैकहेतुत्वात्, देहस्य च पूर्वोपचितधर्माधर्ममूलत्वादनुच्छित्तिः। तयोश्च विहितप्रतिषिद्धकर्ममूलत्वादनिवृत्तिः। कर्मणश्च रागद्वेषास्पदत्वात्, रागद्वेषयोश्च शोभनाशोभनाध्यासनिबन्धनत्वात्, अध्यासस्य च अविचारितसिद्धद्वैतवस्तुनिमित्तत्वात्, द्वैतस्य च शुक्तिकारजतादिवत् सर्वस्यापि स्वतःसिद्धाद्वितीयात्मानवबोधमात्रोपादानत्वादव्यावृत्तिः। अतः सर्वानर्थहेतुरात्मानवबोध एव। सुखस्य चानागमापायिनोऽपरतन्त्रस्यात्मस्वभावत्वात् तस्य अनवबोधः पिधानम्। अतः तस्यात्यन्तोच्छित्तौ अशेषपुरुषार्थपरिसमाप्तिः। अज्ञाननिवृत्तेश्च सम्यग्ज्ञानस्वरूपलाभमात्रहेतुत्वात् तदुपादानम्। अशेषानर्थहेत्वात्मानवबोधविषयस्य च अनागमिकप्रत्यक्षादिलौकिकप्रमाणाविषयत्वात्, वेदान्तागमवाक्यादेव सम्यग्ज्ञानम्। अतोऽशेषवेदान्तसारसङ्ग्रहप्रकरणमिदमारभ्यते। तत्राभिलषितार्थप्रचयाय प्रकरणार्थसंसूत्रणाय चायमाद्यः श्लोकः।

खानिलाग्न्यब्धरित्र्यन्तं स्रक्फणीवोद्गतं यतः।
ध्वान्तच्छिदे नमस्तस्मै हरये बुद्धिसाक्षिणे ॥ १ ॥

Since all creatures from Brahmā down to the clump of grass desire instinctively to avoid every kind of suffering,

they endeavour of their own accord to remove it. But suffering is not removed because it is due to embodiment, which, again, is caused by merit and demerit accumulated in the past. The latter do not cease, because they are due to the performance of prescribed and prohibited deeds. Deeds are due to desire and aversion; and desire and aversion arise because of the superimposition of goodness and badness [on the things of the world]. Superimposition, again, arises from duality due to absence of inquiry. And duality, which is like the silver seen in a shell, does not cease, because it is caused only by ignorance of the self-established, non-dual Self. Therefore, the ignorance of the Self alone is the cause of all evil. Ignorance conceals happiness which, being of the nature of the Self, has no beginning and end, and is not dependent on anything else. So when that [ignorance] is totally destroyed, there is complete fulfilment of all human ends. Since the destruction of ignorance takes place only through the attainment of the right knowledge of the Self as it is, the latter must be acquired. As the Self about which there is ignorance which is the cause of all evil cannot be known through those scriptural texts which do not produce the immediate knowledge as well as through empirical sources of knowledge, the right knowledge can be obtained only through the *Vedānta* texts which constitute scripture. So this manual which is the summary of the essence of the entire *Vedānta* is being written. Here comes the first verse [which is a prayer] for the spread of what is taught in this book [through the teacher-disciple tradition] and also for indicating briefly the teaching of this manual.

I offer obeisance to Hari, the destroyer of darkness and the witness to the intellect, from whom the world consisting of ether, air, fire, water, and earth has arisen like a snake from a garland. (1)

In the prose introduction, called *sambandhokti*, to the verse, Sureśvara first of all explains the causal nexus in which ignorance

(*avidyā*) of the Self is at one end and suffering (*duḥkha*) at the other. Man in his empirical existence is subject to suffering, because not knowing his real nature he wrongly identifies himself with his body, senses, and mind. This wrong identification called *adhyāsa* which is due to *avidyā* manifests itself in all forms of the life of man — in his words and deeds. When a person says, "I am stout," he identifies himself with his body. When he says, "I am blind," he identifies himself with a sense organ, *viz.* the visual sense. His identification with the mind takes place when he says, "I am happy or miserable." The deeds, both scriptural and secular, that he performs and the social roles that he plays in his day-to-day life are based on *adhyāsa*. The truth is that man is not the body or the senses or the mind, but the Self (*ātman*) which is eternal and infinite, one and non-dual. And the Self is Brahman which the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (2.1.1) describes as "real, knowledge, and infinite." Sureśvara says that ignorance of one's own nature, that is to say, ignorance of the Self which constitutes one's nature, is the root cause of suffering. Man can never be free from suffering so long as the ignorance of the Self persists. The causal chain consists of the following links — ignorance of the Self, perception of the world of plurality, superimposition of goodness and badness on things, desire and aversion, performance of deeds, acquisition of merit and demerit, embodied existence, suffering — in which the preceding one is the cause of the succeeding one.

The suffering of man is threefold — that which arises from his intra-organic causes (*ādhyātmika*) such as bodily and mental illness, that which arises from extra-organic natural causes (*ādhibhautika*) such as men and beasts, and that which arises from extra-organic supernatural causes (*ādhidaivika*) such as rain, famine and earthquakes. Though there are remedial measures which help man to overcome suffering arising from any of those sources in a temporary way, freedom from suffering totally and for ever (*ātyantika-duḥkha-nivṛtti*) can be attained only through the knowledge of the Self which alone destroys ignorance, the root cause of suffering. Suffering is inescapable so long as there is embodied existence with the wrong notions of "I" and "mine". Though the present body of a man is perishable, there is rebirth for him as a result of the merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) which he has to his credit. It may be thought that, once the stock of *dharma* and *adharma* gets exhausted through enjoyment,

there will be no more rebirth. But rebirth cannot be avoided so long as the performance of deeds which are enjoined (*vihita*) and prohibited (*pratiṣiddha*) continues, for one has to reap the consequences thereof for which rebirth is necessary, as in the case of the performance of a sacrifice to attain heaven. Desire (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) are responsible for the performance of various kinds of deeds. So long as these motivatory forces continue to take possession of man, he cannot but be engaged in action. Desire and aversion do not cease so long as man thinks of the things of the world as good (*śobhana*) and bad (*aśobhana*). Things by themselves are neutral. They are value-free. It is man who superimposes values such as good and bad on the things of the world. This is what Sureśvara calls *śobhanāśobhanādhyāsa*. This fact of superimposition cannot disappear of its own accord so long as there is perception of the world of duality (*dvaita-prapañca*). We not only perceive the world of duality, but also think of it as real due to the absence of inquiry. That is why Sureśvara speaks of the world of plurality as *avicāritasiddha-dvaitavastu*. Once we inquire into the origin and nature of the world, we will know that it is no better than the shell-silver. Though in truth the object in front is only a shell, a person due to ignorance perceives it as silver. In the same way, though the Self which is self-existent (*svatassiddha*) and non-dual (*advitīya*) is the reality, a person not knowing it perceives a world of plurality. The experience of the pluralistic universe will not cease so long as there is ignorance of the Self (*ātmānavabodha*). Sureśvara, therefore, concludes that ignorance of the Self is the root cause of all suffering and that so long as it persists man cannot overcome suffering through any other means. The removal of suffering will be possible only through the knowledge of the Self.

Anavabodha or *ajñāna* (also called *avidyā*), which means ignorance, is not a negative entity, but something positive (*bhāvarūpa*). What is negative cannot be the cause of anything. Since *ajñāna* is the cause of all evil, it is something positive. According to Advaita, *ajñāna* has two powers — concealment (*āvaraṇa*) and projection (*vikṣepa*). It means that *ajñāna* plays the double role of suppressing the truth and suggesting the false. Normally, *āvaraṇa* is followed by *vikṣepa*, and *vikṣepa* presupposes *āvaraṇa*. Not only does *ajñāna* project the world of plurality which is false (*mithyā*) and thereby becomes the source of all evil, but also

conceals happiness or bliss which constitutes the nature of the Self. Happiness that is referred to here is not what is momentary, being dependent on the enjoyment of the things of the world. It is not sensuous. On the contrary, it is the Self itself. That is why Sureśvara speaks of it as *anāgamāpāyi*, *i.e.* what does not appear and disappear, and *aparatantra*, *i.e.* what is not dependent. Since the Self is eternal and independent, happiness or bliss which constitutes the very nature of the Self is eternal and independent. That the Self is bliss or happiness by its very nature is taught by scripture. The destruction of *ajñāna* results not only in the removal of suffering, but also in the attainment of the supreme happiness. The implication is that the *summum bonum* of man, according to Advaita, is not negative in the sense of the absence of suffering (*duḥkha-nivṛtti*), but something positive in the sense of the attainment of the unsurpassable bliss (*niratiśaya ānandāvāpti*) which is no other than the Self.

What is it that destroys *ajñāna*? "It is knowledge," answers Sureśvara. He conveys the nature of knowledge by adding several qualifications to the term "*jñāna*" in the expression "*samyagjñānasvarūpalābhamātra*". A cognition (*jñāna*) through which an object is known as it is, is called *samyagjñāna* or right cognition, and it is different from *upāsanā* or meditation. In the latter, a given object (*e.g.* *śālagrāma*) is thought of as something different (*Viṣṇu*). Strictly speaking, it is a case of *atasmin tad-buddhi*. By adding the qualification "*samyag*" to "*jñāna*", Sureśvara excludes *upāsanā*. Further, a right cognition is one in which a person gains an insight into the nature of the object as it is. It gives *svarūpalābha*. So it is different from erroneous cognition (*viparyaya-jñāna* or *jñānābhāsa*). By using the term "*svarūpalābha*", Sureśvara has excluded erroneous cognition. The suffix "*mātra*" is intended to exclude *karma*. The point which Sureśvara wants to drive home is that knowledge alone is the means which destroys ignorance and that neither *upāsanā* nor *karma* is competent to do that.

The right knowledge capable of destroying ignorance is the direct and immediate knowledge of the Self which arises only from the *Vedānta* texts such as "*tat tvam asi*" (*CU*, 6. 8. 7), "*aham-brahmāsmi*," (*BU*, 1. 4.10). It is *āgamika* in the sense of "*āgama-vākyajanyam sākṣātkāralakṣaṇam pratyakṣam.*" There are scriptural texts such as, "That which breathes through the *prāṇa* is your

Self that is within all," (*BU*, 3.4.1) which seek to convey the knowledge of the Self as an entity distinct from the body and the organs. But these texts which prove the existence of the Self cannot give us the direct and immediate knowledge of the Self. They produce only mediate knowledge of the Self, which Sureśvara calls *anāgamika* by contrast to that which is *āgamika*. Also, perception and other sources of knowledge whose scope is restricted to revealing things empirical cannot give us the immediate knowledge of the Self. Sureśvara says that the immediate knowledge of the Self arises from "*vedānta-āgama-vākya*". There are those who, considering the *Vedānta* texts which form part of the *Veda* as barren and dry (*vedoṣarā vedāntāḥ*), would not accord them validity. With a view to show the untenability of such a view Sureśvara says that the *Vedānta* texts constitute scripture or *āgama*. The term "*vākya*" which means a sentence is intended to show that the *Vedānta* texts are not subsidiary to injunctive texts whose purport is in action. It means that the *Vedānta* texts which are sentences by themselves are valid on their own. So according to Sureśvara, the *Vedānta* texts alone which constitute *āgama* and which are sentences by themselves having independent validity convey the right knowledge of the Self which destroys ignorance.

Sureśvara calls his work a *prakaraṇa* which means a short treatise or manual. The learned acquainted with the different kinds of treatises define *prakaraṇa* as a book which is connected with a part of scripture (*śāstra-ekadeśa-sambaddham*) and which takes its stand on a specific topic thereof (*śāstra-kāryāntare sthitam*). The definition of *prakaraṇa* is given as follows:

> "*śāstraikadeśasambaddhaṁ śāstrakāryāntare sthitam*
> *āhuḥ prakaraṇaṁ nāma granthabhedaṁ vipaścitaḥ*"

Sureśvara says that his book is a *prakaraṇa* because it is *aśeṣa-vedāntasāra-saṅgraha*. The term "*aśeṣavedānta*" (the entire *Vedānta*) refers to scripture. Scripture speaks of Brahman as what is related to the world (*saprapañca*) and also as what is devoid of the world (*niṣprapañca*). The term "*sāra*" (essence) used by Sureśvara shows that his work is connected with only a part of scripture dealing with Brahman as *niṣprapañca*. Further, he says that his book is a "*saṅgraha*" (summary) with a view to show that it will be restricted to a brief discussion of a specific problem, *i.e. niṣpra-*

pañcabrahma, which has been dealt with elaborately in scripture. So his book fulfils the definition of *prakaraṇa*.

Sureśvara commences his work by offering his salutation to Hari, the supreme Being, who is the cause of the world. Advaita explains the cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world through the theory of *vivarta* which is different from *ārambhavāda* (also called *asatkārya-vāda*) of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and *pariṇāma-vāda* of Sāṅkhya. According to *ārambha-vāda*, the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. On the contrary, it is something new which comes into existence. But according to the theory of *pariṇāma*, the effect which pre-exists in the cause is only a transformation of it. Advaita holds that the world, which is an effect, exists in Brahman which is its cause and that it does not come into being as a transformation of Brahman. Though Brahman which is partless (*niravayava*) is not subject to change, it serves as the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the appearance of the world in the same way as a garland which is mistaken for a snake serves as the substratum for the appearance of the snake. In addition to the substratum there is, in both the cases, the work of *avidyā* which is responsible for the perceptual error (*bhrama*) we commit. Owing to *avidyā* we see a snake in a garland. In the same way, without perceiving Brahman which is the sole reality, we perceive the world of plurality due to *avidyā*. Sureśvara gives the example of a garland appearing as a snake in order to convey the idea that Brahman, without undergoing any modification, serves as the cause of the appearance of the world therein. Brahman is, therefore, said to be the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādānakāraṇa*) of the world.

Contextually speaking, the inward Self is the *Sākṣin*, *i.e.* the witness to the intellect and its functioning. Normally, Brahman is not referred to as the *Sākṣin* even though it is no other than the inward Self. Sureśvara uses the two terms "*haraye*" and "*buddhisākṣiṇe*" in grammatical co-ordination (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) with a view to convey Brahman-Ātman equation, *i.e.* the identity of the supreme Self and the inward Self.

Ajñāna is referred to as darkness (*dhvānta*). When Brahman-Ātman is realised, *ajñāna* which is the root cause of bondage is destroyed.

[2]

स्वसंप्रदायस्य चोदितप्रमाणपूर्वकत्वज्ञापनाय विशिष्टगुणसम्बन्धसङ्कीर्तन-पूर्विका गुरोर्नमस्कारक्रिया।

अलब्धवातिशयं यस्माद् व्यावृत्तास्तमबादयः।
गरीयसे नमस्तस्मा अविद्याग्रन्थिभेदिने ॥ २ ॥

With a view to indicate that his tradition (or what he has known) proceeds from the requisite authority [*viz.* his Teacher], the author, praising the excellent qualities of his Teacher, offers obeisance to him.

I offer salutation to the supreme Teacher who cuts the knot of ignorance and to whom the superlatives have returned without finding anyone superior to him. (2)

One should study scripture and know the truth under the guidance of a teacher. Scripture itself says: "One who has a teacher knows" (*CU*, 6.14.2); "The knowledge which has been learnt from a teacher best helps one to attain the end" (*CU*, 4.9.3). Sureśvara declares that his own tradition (*svasampradāya*) of Advaita proceeds from Śaṅkara, his teacher. The word "*svasampradāya*" may also be interpreted to mean "the knowledge which one has attained" (*svena samprāptaḥ vidyopadeśaḥ*).

[3]

नमस्कारनिमित्तस्वाशयाविष्करणार्थः।

वेदान्तोदरसङ्गूढं संसारोत्सारि वस्तुगम्।
ज्ञानं व्याकृतमप्यन्यैर्वक्ष्ये गुर्वनुशिक्षया ॥ ३ ॥

The following verse is for expressing his aim [in writing this book] which has occasioned the offering of obeisance [to his teacher].

In obedience to the command of my Teacher, I expound the knowledge which remains concealed in the interior of the *Vedānta*, which destroys bondage, and

which reveals the Real (the Self), though it has also been explained by others. (3)

Here Sureśvara states one of the reasons for his writing this manual, *viz.* the command of his teacher.

What are the (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *prayojana* and (3) *viṣaya* of the knowledge which Sureśvara plans to expound? The first line of the verse contains the answer to this question. The *Vedānta* text is the *pramāṇa* (source of knowledge) from which the right knowledge arises. Its *prayojana* (fruit) is the destruction of bondage caused by *avidyā*. Its *viṣaya* (content) is the Self which is the substratum on which the illusory world of plurality is superimposed. The knowledge of the Self contained in the *Vedānta* cannot be comprehended by those whose intellect is impure, *i.e.* not fit enough to know the truth. It remains concealed, *i.e.* inaccessible, to those who do not possess the necessary mental set.

[4]

किंविषयं प्रकरणमिति चेत्, तदुपन्यासः ।

यत्सिद्धाविदमः सिद्धिर्यदसिद्धौ न किञ्चन ।
प्रत्यग्धर्मैकनिष्ठस्य याथात्म्यं वक्ष्यते स्फुटम् ॥ ४ ॥

If it be asked, "What is the subject-matter of this manual?" it is explained.

The real nature of the inward Self which is the support of all, in whose presence the "this" [comprising the world of objects] is manifest and in whose absence nothing is manifest, will be clearly expounded. (4)

An object which is known in a general way, but not known specifically as such-and-such can be the subject-matter for discussion. Such an object which possesses general and specific qualities is *saguṇa* or *saviśeṣa*. But Brahman-Ātman, according to Advaita, is non-dual (*advitīya*) not only in the sense that there is nothing similar or dissimilar to it, but also in the sense that it is devoid of both general and specific qualities (*nissāmānya-viśeṣa*). It means

that Brahman-Ātman is free not only from *sajātīya-* and *vijātīya-bheda,* but also from *svagata-bheda.* So the question about the subject-matter of the manual is raised by the opponent with the view to show that Brahman-Ātman cannot be its subject-matter.

Sureśvara's answer to the objection is that Brahman-Ātman can be the subject-matter for discussion because it is both known and unknown. The first line of the verse explains how the Self is known in a general way. The Self through its reflection (*ābhāsa*) in the internal organ reveals this (*idam*) world of insentient objects, and in the absence of its reflection in the internal organ, nothing is known. Since the Self and the world are related as the revealer and the revealed, given the Self, one can claim the cognition of the world and in the absence of the Self, such a claim will not be possible. We speak of our experience of the world (*lokaprasiddhi*). Though *lokaprasiddhi* cannot be treated as a *pramāṇa* for the existence of the Self — for the Self cannot be made known by any *pramāṇa* — it nevertheless serves as a pointer to its existence, for the very possibility of *lokaprasiddhi* depends on the existence of the Self; and so its evidence cannot be dismissed. That there is such a thing as the Self is, therefore, known through the experience of the world, which can neither be treated as a *pramāṇa* therefor, nor rejected as no evidence. Though it is known that the Self exists and that it is the revealer of everything, its specific nature is not known. Hence there is the need for inquiry into the nature of the Self. Sureśvara brings out its specific nature when he speaks of it as "*pratyag-dharma*" in the second line of the verse. Discriminating the Self from the body, the senses and the mind, which are not-Self, one knows the Self not only as what is inward (*pratyak*) to the mind-sense-body complex, but also as the eternal, ever-pure, ever-free, non-dual reality serving as the substratum for the appearance of the pluralistic universe. The Self which is inward is said to be *dharma* in the sense of supporting *avidyā* and its effects superimposed thereon (*avidyātatkāryayoḥ svātmani adhyastayoḥ adhiṣṭhānatvena dhāraṇāddharmaḥ*). It may be noted that, though the Self is *nirviśeṣa,* so long as there is inquiry into its nature at the empirical level (*yāvadvyavahāram*) it is viewed as if it is *saviśeṣa* possessing general and specific aspects. So the Self whose specific nature has to be set forth through inquiry is the subject-matter of this manual.

"*Vakṣyate sphuṭam*" which occurs in the second line of the verse conveys the idea that Sureśvara writes the book for the benefit of those who want to know the Self.

[5]

विवक्षितप्रकरणार्थप्ररोचनाय अनुक्तदुरुक्ताप्रामाण्यकारणशङ्काव्युदासेन स्वगुरोः प्रामाण्योपवर्णनम् ।

गुरूक्तो वेदराद्धान्तस्तत्र नो वच्म्यशक्तितः ।
सहस्रकिरणव्याप्ते खद्योतः किं प्रकाशयेत् ॥ ५ ॥

With a view to stimulate interest in the subject-matter of the manual, the authority of the Teacher is stated by denying the possibility of omission and commission [in his teaching] which are the causes of invalidity.

I do not say anything [more] on the final doctrine of the *Veda* expounded by the Teacher because of my incompetence. What can a fire-fly illumine where there is pervasion by the thousand-rayed sun? (5)

"*Anukta*" means what has not been stated. "*Durukta*" means what has been wrongly stated. While the former is the defect of omission, the latter is that of commission. Sureśvara says that there is no scope for any of these defects in the teaching of his *guru*. The two expressions "*gurūktaḥ*" and "*vedarāddhāntaḥ*" used by Sureśvara are significant. It is "the final doctrine of the *Veda*" that Śaṅkara has expounded, and so it cannot be erroneous. The assertion that it has been "stated by the *guru*" is to show that there is no defect of non-statement or omisson.

[6]

गुरुणैव वेदार्थस्य परिसमापितत्वात् प्रकरणोक्तौ ख्यात्याद्यप्रामाण्यकारणाशङ्केति चेत्, तद्व्युदासार्थमाह ।

न ख्यातिलाभपूजार्थं ग्रन्थोऽस्माभिरुदीर्यते ।
स्वबोधपरिशुद्ध्यर्थं ब्रह्मविन्निकषाश्मसु ॥ ६ ॥

If it be doubted that, since the sense of the *Veda* has been completely stated by the Teacher himself, the composition of this manual is due to motives like love of fame, etc., which will render it invalid, he says the following with a view to reject it.

Not for the sake of fame, profit, or honour has this work been composed by us, but for the purpose of purifying one's own understanding [by testing it] on the touch-stones of the knowers of Brahman. (6)

If a person writes a book with ulterior plans such as gaining name, fame, and profit or reverential treatment by others, it is due to defects such as non-apprehension (*agrahaṇa*) and mis-apprehension (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) in him; and a book written with these motives cannot be authoritative. Sureśvara says that he is not open to criticism on these grounds. Nor can it be said that his composition is useless on the ground that his teacher has expounded the Vedānta philosophy in his numerous works such as the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. He writes this manual, Sureśvara says, for his own clarity of understanding (*svabodhapariśuddhi*); and this is another reason for his writing this book. He can get his views evaluated by those who know the truth — by the knowers of Brahman — only if he writes. Just as a touch-stone (*nikaṣa*) is used to test the purity of gold, even so the wise who know Brahman will be the touch-stone to test the authenticity of his teaching.

[7]

अनर्थानर्थहेतुपुरुषार्थतद्धेतुप्रकरणार्थसङ्ग्रहज्ञापनायोपन्यासः ।

ऐकात्म्याप्रतिपत्तिर्या स्वात्मानुभवसंश्रया ।
साऽविद्या संसृतेर्बीजं तन्नाशो मुक्तिरात्मनः ॥ ७ ॥

Evil and the cause of evil, the good of man and the means thereto, which constitute the theme of the manual, will be stated briefly.

Avidyā, which is non-apprehension of the oneness of the Self and which is located in the Self which is of the

nature of knowledge, is the seed of bondage. Its destruction is the liberation of the Self. (7)

Of the two questions which may be raised with regard to *avidyā*, one is about its content (*viṣaya*) and the other about its locus (*āśraya*). The Self is one and non-dual. Since we are ignorant of it, the oneness of the Self is the *viṣaya* of *avidyā*. The expression "*aikātmyāpratipatti*" contained in the first line of the verse conveys this idea. The Advaitins answer the question about the locus of *avidyā* in two different ways. According to some, *e.g.* Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*. But Sureśvara holds the view that Brahman-Ātman is the locus of *avidyā*. At the commencement of Chapter III (*sambandhokti* to verse 1) where he discusses this problem, he gives reasons to show why the Self (*ātman*) alone is the locus of *avidyā* after rejecting the other view according to which the not-Self (*anātman*) is the locus of *avidyā*. The term "*svātmānubhava-saṁśrayā*" in the first line of the verse means that which is the Self and which is also of the nature of *anubhava* (*jñāna* or *caitanya*) is the locus.

Sureśvara points out that bondage is the evil (*anartha*), ignorance is the cause of the evil (*anarthahetu*), and the destruction of ignorance, which results in liberation (*mukti*) is the good of man (*puruṣārtha*). Liberation takes place with the removal or destruction of *avidyā* (*avidyānivṛtti* or *avidyānāśa*). Since the destruction of *avidyā* alone is needed for attaining liberation, one may, in a negative way, speak of *mukti* as *avidyānivṛtti* or *avidyānāśa*. It may be noted that according to Advaita there is nothing, positive or negative, which remains to be accomplished after the destruction of *avidyā* for the purpose of attaining liberation.

[8]

पुरुषार्थहेतोरवशिष्टत्वात् तदभिव्याहारः ।

वेदावसानवाक्योत्थसम्यग्ज्ञानाशुशुक्षणिः ।
दन्दहीत्यात्मनो मोहं न कर्माप्रतिकूलतः ॥ ८ ॥

Since the means to the good of man remains to be stated, it is explained.

The fire of right knowledge which arises from the sentences of the concluding portion of the *Veda* destroys completely the ignorance about the Self, but not ritualistic action because it is not opposed to ignorance. (8)

Right knowledge is the means to liberation because it alone, and not *upāsanā*, is capable of destroying ignorance. Knowledge arises from a *pramāṇa*. If so, what is the *pramāṇa* from which the right knowledge which is the means to liberation arises? It is from the *Upaniṣad*, otherwise called *Vedānta*, which forms the end portion of the *Veda* (*vedāvasāna*) that the knowledge of the Self can be obtained.

It is usual to compare knowledge to fire. Using the expression "*jñānāgni*", the *Gītā* text (4.37), for example, says: "The fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes." It is necessary to note the aptness of this comparison. Though fire has the capacity to burn, it burns only those objects which can be burnt. For instance, a piece of wood is burnt by it, but not a stone. In the same way, when it is said that knowledge destroys not only *avidyā* but also *karmas* which are its effects, what is meant is that along with *avidyā* only two of its effects, *viz. sañcita-karma* (karma-in-store) and *āgāmi-karma* (karma-yet-to-come) get destroyed, but not *prārabdha-karma* (karma-in-action), even though it is also an effect of *avidyā*. *Prārabdha-karma*, unlike the other two, has commenced its work. It will cease to exist only when it is fully worked out, *i.e.* when it gets exhausted through experience (*bhoga*). Like fire, knowledge destroys only that which can be destroyed, *prārabdha-karma* being a limit to it.

Let it be that *upāsanā* cannot destroy *avidyā*. Why should it not be said, it may be asked, that ritualistic action (*karma*) either by itself or with the help of knowledge is competent to destroy *avidyā*? Sureśvara discusses this problem in detail in the sequel. He says briefly, in anticipation of what is going to be stated, that *karma*, not being opposed to *avidyā*, cannot remove it. Both *karma* and *avidyā* by their very nature conceal the truth; and both of them produce what is impermanent. Since they are not opposed to each other either in respect of their nature or in respect of what they produce (*svarūpato viṣayadvārā vā*), *karma* cannot remove *avidyā*.

[9 - 13]

प्रतिज्ञातार्थसंशुद्ध्यर्थं पूर्वपक्षोक्तिः । तत्र ज्ञानमभ्युपगम्य तावदुपन्यासः ।

मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वाद् ज्ञानं तत्र करोति किम् ।
कथं चेच्छृणु तत्सर्वं प्रणिधाय मनो यथा ॥ ९ ॥

अकुर्वतः क्रियाः काम्या निषिद्धास्त्यजतस्तथा ।
नित्यनैमित्तिकं कर्म विधिवच्चानुतिष्ठतः ॥ १० ॥

किमतो भवति ?

काम्यकर्मफलं तस्माद्देवादीमं न ढौकते ।
निषिद्धस्य निरस्तत्वान्नारकीं नैत्यधोजनिम् ॥ ११ ॥

देहारम्भकयोश्च धर्माधर्मयोर्ज्ञानिना सह कर्मिणः समानौ चोद्यपरिहारौ ।

वर्तमानमिदं याभ्यां शरीरं सुखदुःखदम् ।
आरब्धं पुण्यपापाभ्यां भोगादेव तयोः क्षयः ॥ १२ ॥

काम्यप्रतिषिद्धकर्मफलत्वात् संसारस्य तन्निरासेनैवाशेषानर्थनिरासस्य सिद्धत्वात् किं नित्यानुष्ठानेनेति चेत्, तन्न, तदकरणादप्यनर्थप्रसक्तेः ।

नित्यानुष्ठानतश्चैनं प्रत्यवायो न संस्पृशेत् ।
अनादृत्यात्मविज्ञानमतः कर्माणि संश्रयेत् ॥ १३ ॥

For the purpose of establishing the position mentioned above, the *prima facie* views are stated. Of these, the view which admits of knowledge is stated first.

Since liberation is attained through ritualistic actions, what does knowledge accomplish therefor? If you ask "How?", listen to everything with an attentive mind. (9)

To one who does not perform desire-prompted actions, who abstains from prohibited deeds, and who

performs daily and occasional [obligatory] deeds according to scriptural injunction [liberation takes place]. (10)

What follows from this?

As a consequence, the status of a god, etc., which is the fruit of the desire-prompted action does not accrue to him. Since prohibited deeds have been abandoned, he does not attain inferior birth associated with hell. (11)

And, as for merit and demerit which have caused the present embodiment, the objection and the answer are the same for the advocates of action and of knowledge.

The destruction of those merit and demerit, which have produced this present body that gives pleasure and pain, takes place only through enjoyment. (12)

Since bondage is the result of the performance of desire-prompted and prohibited deeds, and since the removal of all evil takes place by the abandonment of these [deeds] alone, what is the benefit, it may be asked, of the performance of daily [and occasional] deeds? Not that [they are useless], because evil will arise as a result of their non-performance also.

Sin does not accrue to this person because of the performance of daily deeds. So, disregarding the knowledge of the Self, let one resort to actions. (13)

The Advaita view that knowledge alone is the means to *mukti* is not accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas. Sureśvara states and examines in detail the Mīmāṁsā position which is now presented as the *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) from verses (9) to (21). There are two *prima facie* views on the Mīmāṁsā side. While one of them associated with the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas admits knowledge of the Self, the other one represented by the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas does not accept any such knowledge at all. Both of them, however, maintain that *mukti* can be secured by *karma*.

Sureśvara first of all explains the Bhāṭṭa view in verses (9) to (13). The deeds of a person fall under three groups. The first group comprises desire-prompted actions called *kāmya-karmas*

such as *jyotiṣṭoma*. These are the actions which a person performs with a view to achieve specific ends such as *svarga*. *Pratiṣiddha-karmas* whose performance is forbidden constitute the second group. The third group called *nitya-naimittika-karmas* consists of obligatory deeds of which some have to be performed daily (*nitya*) and some others on specific occasions (*naimittika*). The scheme of discipline formulated by the Bhāṭṭas is simple: to attain liberation, one should give up both *kāmya-* and *pratiṣiddha-karmas*, but perform *nitya-naimittika-karmas*. What is the rationale of this scheme? *Śruti* says: "According as one acts, according as one behaves, so does one become. The doer of good becomes good, the doer of evil becomes evil." (*BU*, 4. 4. 5). Since one cannot avoid reaping the consequence of good and bad deeds such as life of a god or life in hell, one should give up both *kāmya-* and *pratiṣiddha-karmas*. The present bodily existence, which is due to *prārabdha-karma*, *i.e.* the *karma* which has already started functioning, does not pose any problem, for it comes to an end when it is exhausted through experience (*bhogādeva kṣaya*); and both the Advaitins and the Mīmāṁsakas agree on this. Since evil (*pratyavāya*) will accrue to one who does not perform *nitya-naimittika-karmas*, one should perform them. So the avoidance of *kāmya-* and *pratiṣiddha-karmas* and the performance of *nitya-naimittika-karmas* will secure liberation. What the Advaitins call the knowledge of the existent Self, which is not helpful to the attainment of liberation, can be, the Mīmāṁsakas contend, safely ignored.

There are two possible objections, one specific and another general, which the Advaitins may raise against the Mīmāṁsā formula stated above. Both of them, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, are untenable. What is positive (*bhāva*) alone can be the cause of something. How can the non-performance of obligatory duties, which is *abhāva*, be the cause of sin, which is something positive? The Mīmāṁsakas answer this objection by citing the case of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) which is admitted as a *pramāṇa* by the Advaitins. *Anupalabdhi* which means *jñānābhāva* is *abhāva*. The Advaitins hold that *anupalabdhi*, in spite of being an *abhāva*, produces the knowledge of the absence of an entity (*abhāvajñāna*). Applying the same reasoning, the Mīmāṁsakas argue that the non-performance of obligatory duties (*i.e. nitya-naimittika-akaraṇa*) produces *pratyavāya*. The second objection is about the cause-effect relation between *karma* and *mukti*. Whatever is achieved

through *karma* is perishable; but liberation is eternal. Moreover, liberation which is remaining in one's own nature (*svarūpāvasthāna*) is not something to be produced by *karma*, *i.e.* it is *asādhya*. If so, how can *karma* be the means to *mukti*? The Mīmāṁsaka's answer is that the scheme of discipline sketched out by them does not aim at producing *mokṣa*. Rather it is intended to remove the obstacles (*pratibandha*) that stand in the way of attaining liberation. The performance of *kāmya* - and *pratiṣiddha-karmas* and the non-performance of *nitya-naimittika-karmas* produce obstacles to liberation; and the scheme, they claim, has been so formulated as to remove them.

[14 - 21]

अभ्युपेत्यैवमुच्यते, न तु यथावस्थितात्मवस्तुविषयं ज्ञानमस्ति, तत्प्रदिपादकप्रमाणाभावात्।

यावन्त्यश्चेह विद्यन्ते श्रुतयस्स्मृतिभिः सह ।
विदधत्युरुयत्नेन कर्मातो भूरिसाधनम् ॥ १४ ॥

स्यात् प्रमाणासम्भवो भवदपराधादिति चेत्, तन्न। यतः।

यत्नतो वीक्षमाणोऽपि विधिं ज्ञानस्य न क्वचित् ।
श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा पश्यामि विश्वासो नान्यतोऽस्ति नः ॥ १५ ॥

स्यात् प्रवृत्तिरन्तरेणापि विधिं लोकवदिति चेत्, तन्न । यतः ।

अन्तरेण विधिं मोहाद्यः कुर्यात् साम्परायिकम् ।
न तत्स्यादुपकाराय भस्मनीव हुतं हविः ॥ १६ ॥

अभ्युपगतप्रामाण्यवेदार्थविज्जैमिन्यनुशासनाच्च।

"आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यम्" इतोऽन्यथा ।
इति साटोपमाहोच्चैर्वेदविज्जैमिनिः स्वयम् ॥ १७ ॥

मन्त्रवर्णाच्च।

"कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजोविषेच्छतं समाः"।
इति मन्त्रोऽपि निश्शेषं कर्मण्यायुरवासृजत् ॥ १८ ॥

ज्ञानिनश्च वस्तुनि वाक्यप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात्, वाक्यस्य च क्रियापदप्रधानत्वात् ततश्चाभिप्रेतज्ञानाभावः।

विरहय्य क्रियां नैव संहन्यन्ते पदान्यपि।
न समस्त्यपदं वाक्यं यत्स्याद् ज्ञानविधायकम् ॥ १९ ॥

ज्ञानाभ्युपगमेऽपि न दोषः। यतः।

कर्मणोऽङ्गाङ्गिभावेन स्वप्रधानतयाऽथवा।
सम्बन्धस्येह संसिद्धेर्ज्ञाने सत्यप्यदोषतः ॥ २० ॥

यस्माज्ज्ञानाभ्युपगमानभ्युपगमेऽपि न ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः।

अतः सर्वाश्रमाणां हि वाङ्मनःकायकर्मभिः।
स्वनुष्ठितैर्यथाशक्ति मुक्तिः स्यान्नान्यसाधनात् ॥ २१ ॥

Admitting [knowledge] it has been stated in this way, but there is no knowledge of the existent Self, because there is no *pramāṇa* which propounds it.

All the *śruti* texts that exist, along with *smṛti* texts, emphatically enjoin action. Action is, therefore, the adequate means. (14)

If it be said, "The absence of *pramāṇa* is due to your fault," it is not so for this reason.

Though I have looked carefully, I do not see anywhere, in *śruti* or *smṛti*, a text which enjoins knowledge [of the Self]. We have no faith in anything else. (15)

If it be said that pursuit [of knowledge] can take place even without an injunction, as in daily life, it is not so for the following reason.

What is done through delusion, without [scriptural] injunction, for achieving an other-worldly result will not be conducive thereto, like oblation poured into ashes. (16)

[This is supported] also by the statement of Jaimini who knows the meaning of the *Veda* and whose authority is accepted.

Jaimini himself who knows the *Veda* has in a flurry declared loudly that, since the *Veda* has its purport in action, what is different from it is purportless. (17)

Because of the statement of the Vedic hymn also [it holds good].

The Vedic hymn, "By doing rituals, indeed, should one wish to live here for a hundred years," enjoins life-long performance of rituals. (18)

Since the advocate of knowledge accepts the validity of the [scriptural] sentence in respect of the Self and since the verb is the principal part of a sentence, it follows that the desired knowledge cannot arise.

Words can never be combined with one another without a verb. Without words there is no sentence which conveys knowledge. (19)

Even if knowledge is accepted, there is no defect for this reason.

Since combination of ritualistic action [with knowledge] either as the subordinate or principal factor or as what is equally important takes place here [in respect of attaining liberation], there is no defect even if knowledge is accepted. (20)

Thus, irrespective of the acceptance or non-acceptance of knowledge, liberation cannot be attained through knowledge.

So, for persons of all stages of life liberation takes place through the actions of speech, mind, and body performed by them according to their ability, and not through any other means. (21)

Sureśvara states the Prābhākara view, which is the second *pūrvapakṣa*, in verses (14) to (21).

Unlike the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras do not accept Self-knowledge on the ground that both *śruti* and *smṛti* texts enjoin only action and not knowledge (*ubhayam karmavidhāyakameva, na jñāna-vidhāyakam*). The Advaitins may argue that *śruti* texts like "The Self is to be seen" (*BU*, 2.4.5) enjoin the acquisition of the knowledge of the Self. But this is wrong according to the Mīmāṁsakas. These texts, they hold, convey the knowledge of the agent-self involved in action (*karmapravṛttihetubhūta-kartrātmajñāna*). Since they do not purport to teach that the Self is a non-agent (*akartā*), a non-enjoyer (*abhoktā*), etc., the Advaita view that Self-knowledge is the means to liberation is without scriptural support. The Bauddhas and others who do not accept the authority of *śruti* and *smṛti* may resort to knowledge as the means to liberation completely rejecting scriptural authority. This, however, cannot be done by the Mīmāṁsakas (as well as by the Advaitins) who do not have faith in any other source than scripture in matters trans-empirical.

Though it is true that in our day-to-day life we do many things such as eating and drinking without any scriptural injunction, we have to rely on scriptural injunction in our quest after other-worldly results such as *svarga* and *mokṣa*, which are *adṛṣṭa-phala*. For example, we know that the performance of a particular sacrifice called *jyotiṣṭoma* is the means to *svarga* only through the scriptural injunction, "*jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*". *Svarga* is an *adṛṣṭa-phala* because it is not an immediately attainable result soon after the performance of the prescribed sacrifice. *Mokṣa*, too, the Mīmāṁsakas argue, is an *adṛṣṭa-phala*. Since liberation is freedom from the body, the Advaitins speak of it as a bodiless state (*aśarīratva*). Since liberation in the sense of disembodiment can take place only after the falling off of the body, the Mīmāṁsakas contend that it is an *adṛṣṭa-phala* (*dehapātottarakālīnatvena adṛṣṭaphala*).

The next step in the Mīmāṁsā argument is to show that there is no cause-effect relation between *jñāna* and *mokṣa* as held by the Advaitins. That *jñāna* is the cause of *ajñāna-nivṛtti* is known to us in our day-to-day experience without any scriptural injunction. The logic of *anvaya-vyatireka* will show that there is cause-effect relation between *jñāna* and *ajñāna-nivṛtti*, because they are

co-present and co-absent. When there is *jñāna*, there is *ajñāna-nivṛtti*; and when the former is absent, the latter too is absent. If *ajñāna-nivṛtti* itself is release, one can support the Advaita view that knowledge is the means thereto. But release, as stated, earlier, is disembodiment and not just *ajñāna-nivṛtti*. It follows, the Mīmāṁsakas argue, that there is no cause-effect relation between *jñāna* and *mokṣa*, because *jñāna* is not the cause of disembodiment. It is of no use to cite the case of *jīvanmukti* (liberation-in-life) in support of the Advaita position. Even after getting the knowledge of the Self, which brings about the cessation of ignorance, the so-called *jīvanmukta* is in the embodied state. Since the embodied state persists even after the rise of knowledge, one should conclude that knowledge and disembodiment (which is only another name for release) are not related as cause and effect. Strictly speaking, the much-talked-about *jīvanmukti* is not a fact. It is just a name (*paribhāṣā-mātram*) frequently uttered by the Advaitins. So the Prābhākaras conclude that to pursue *mokṣa*, which is an *adṛṣṭa-phala*, without scriptural injunction is as futile as to pour oblations into ashes.

The Prābhākaras justify their position by invoking the authority of Jaimini according to whom the purport of the entire *Veda* is in action (*kriyārthatva* = *kāryaparatva*). The sentences of the *Veda* can be, in a broad way, classified into two groups — those which are injunctive (*vidhi-vākyas*) and those which are informative about an existent object (*siddhārthabodhaka-vākyas*). While the sentences of the former group enjoin some action to be performed, those of the latter group convey the knowledge of objects which already exist. According to Jaimini, only injunctive sentences of the *Veda* have validity. Informative sentences which occur in the *Veda* such as "*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*" which describe the nature of Brahman or the Self are not valid on their own since they are not injunctive. These texts which form part of the *Veda* cannot be ignored either. They have to be accommodated by making them subsidiary to injunctive texts which are principal. So according Jaimini whose authority in the interpretation of the *Veda* is accepted by all, the *Veda* as a whole enjoins various kinds of actions to be performed by men.

The Prābhākaras claim that scripture also lends support to their view. They quote in this connection the well-known *Īśāvāsya* text, which occurs not in the ritual portion (*karma-kāṇḍa*), but in

the knowledge portion (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) of the *Veda*. The meaning of the text is that, if a person who seeks liberation would desire to live a hundred years, he should do so by performing *karmas* such as *agnihotra*.

So far the Prābhākaras have argued on the basis of (1) reasoning (*yukti*), (2) the statement of a trustworthy person (*āptavākya*), *i.e.* Jaimini's statement, and (3) the statement of the *Upaniṣads* (*vedavacana*) that since the *tātparya* or purport of the *Veda* is only in action it is wrong to say that the *Veda* conveys the knowledge of the existent Brahman-Ātman. It is necessary at this stage to raise the basic question whether a sentence is capable of conveying the knowledge of an existent object. The Prābhākaras answer this question in the negative. A sentence consists of a group of words. The meaning of a sentence becomes complete only because of the verb (*kriyāpada*). In the absence of a verb in a sentence the expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) created by other words remains unfulfilled. For example, when some one says, "the white cow by means of a stick" (*śuklāṁ gāṁ daṇḍena*), the words uttered do not convey a complete sense because there is expectancy of something else which is wanting. The hearer would like to know: "What should one do with the white cow by means of a stick?" The expectancy created by the words becomes fulfilled and the sentence becomes *nirākāṅkṣā* only when the verb, *e.g.* "bring" (*ānaya*), which is missing is supplied. A sentence is nothing but a combination of words. Words combine with one another and convey a complete sense only because of the verb. The meaning of a verb is in action. So the meaning of a sentence consisting of a group of words is in action which is to be performed. In other words, it is impossible for a sentence to convey the meaning of an existent object. This argument, according to the Prābhākaras, is relevant in this context. The Advaitins who advocate Self-knowledge as the means to release have to rely on scriptural sentences as the *pramāṇa* therefor. But no scriptural sentence can convey the sense of the existent Brahman-Ātman, because every sentence, both scriptural and secular, is capable of conveying the sense of an action to be performed. So the Prābhākaras conclude that (1) there is no such thing as the knowledge of the Self and that (2) release can be obtained by *karma* alone.

The Prābhākaras argue that, even if the knowledge of the Self is admitted, knowledge by itself cannot be the means to

release, but knowledge in combination with *karma* can be the means. The combination of *jñāna* and *karma* (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*) can be explained in three ways for all of which, according to them, there is the scriptural evidence. In the combined role which they play, *jñāna* may be subsidiary (*aṅga*) to *karma*, which is the principal (*aṅgi*). The *śruti* statement (*CU*, 1. 1. 10) "What, indeed, one performs with knowledge" (*yadeva vidyayā karoti*) shows that knowledge is subsidiary to *karmas* such as *nitya-naimittika*. Another *śruti* statement (*BU*. 4. 4. 22) which says "The Brāhmaṇas seek to know it by sacrifice" (*taṁ etam … brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena…*) makes *karma* subsidiary to *jñāna*, which is the principal. The third possibility is to treat both *jñāna* and *karma* as principals placing them on a footing of equality (*samapradhāna*) as shown in the *śruti* statement (*ĪU*, 11) "Knowledge and ignorance (*i.e. karma*), he who knows the two together" (*vidyāṁ ca avidyāṁ ca yastadvedobhayaṁ saha*). The point which the Prābhākaras want to drive home is that *karma*, in association with *jñāna*, is the means to release; and so the admission of knowledge will not jeopardize their basic standpoint. Since *jñāna* by itself, independently of *karma*, cannot be the means, it is necessary for all persons who are in the different *āśramas* to perform their scripture-ordained *karmas* for the purpose of attaining liberation.

[22]

असदर्थंप्रलापोऽयमिति दूषणसम्भावनायाह।

इति हृष्टधियां वाचः स्वप्रज्ञाध्मातचेतसाम् ।
घुष्यन्ते यज्ञशालासु धूमानद्धधियां किल ॥ २२ ॥

That all this is nonsensical talk is said for the purpose of commencing its refutation.

Such, indeed, are the words proclaimed in sacrificial places by men whose vision is obstructed by smoke, who are self-satisfied, and whose mind is inflated by their own conjectures. (22)

Sureśvara begins his point-by-point refutation of the Mīmāṁsā view with a jibe at the Mīmāṁsakas in this verse. That it is difficult to see things in sacrificial places which are full of

smoke, is well-known. Sureśvara ridicules the Mīmāṁsakas, whose forte is the ritual, as men with distorted vision, who do not have the correct insight into the problem. The sacrifices they rely on are perishable; and the results they produce are also impermanent, as declared by a text of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (1.2.7), "Perishable, indeed, are these boats of the eighteen sacrificial forms," The same *Upaniṣad* says in the sequel (1.2.9) that "men engaged in *karma* do not understand (the truth)." They are complacent thinking that *mokṣa* can be attained by means of *karma* alone without submitting themselves to the difficult discipline of renunciation which is preliminary to the acquisition of knowledge. Not having the support of reasoning, their understanding of the problem relies on conjectures (*utprekṣā*). Their thinking that since bondage is due to *karma* the remedy therefor lies in *karma* alone is nothing but conjecture.

[23]

दूषणोपक्रमावधिज्ञापनायाह ।

अत्राभिदध्महे दोषान् क्रमशो न्यायबृंहितैः ।
वचोभिः पूर्वपक्षोक्तिघातिभिर्नातिसम्भ्रमात् ॥ २३ ॥

With a view to convey the scope of the criticism which has been commenced, it is said.

Now [with regard to this view] we will state the defects, not in haste, but in a systematic way by means of words which are supported by logic and which will destroy the *prima facie* view. (23)

Sureśvara emphasizes two points about his criticism of the opponent's view. First of all, his criticism, which will be systematic, will be supported by sound arguments. Secondly, he will not indulge in fallacious arguments such as *chala*, *jāti*, *nigrahasthāna* for the purpose of scoring points over his opponents. The expression "*na atisambhramāt*" (not in haste or error) is intended to convey the latter point.

[24]

चतुर्विधस्यापि कर्मकार्यस्य मुक्तावसम्भवान्न मुक्तेः कर्मकार्यत्वम् ।

अज्ञानहानमात्रत्वान्मुक्तेः कर्म न साधनम् ।
कर्मापमार्ष्टि नाज्ञानं तमसीवोत्थितं तमः ॥ २४ ॥

Since none of the four effects of action can be associated with liberation, liberation is not the effect of action.

Since liberation is only the destruction of ignorance, action is not the means thereto. Action does not remove ignorance in the same way as error caused by darkness [does not remove darkness]. (24)

Origination (*utpatti*), attainment (*āpti*), modification (*vikṛti*), and purification (*saṁskṛti*) are the four effects of action. Through action a pot is originated or produced from clay. One attains a place through the act of walking. An object which is in one form can be modified into another form by means of action. Grains used in scriptural rites are purified through the act of sprinkling water on them. Let us first consider whether the state of liberation can be produced by means of action. What is not existent can be produced. Since *mokṣa* is ever-existent, it is not something to be produced by action. There is also a further difficulty. Whatever has a beginning due to origination will have an end. In other words, anything that is the result of *karma* is impermanent. But *mokṣa* is eternal. So it cannot be an effect of *karma*. Secondly, the problem of attainment does not arise with regard to *mokṣa*. What is not attained and what is different from us can be attained. It makes sense to talk about the attainment of a particular place which is different from us and which we have not attained. Liberation is remaining as the Self; it is remaining in one's own state (*svarūpāvasthāna*). Since the Self which is ever-existent is always attained, *mokṣa* in the sense of *svarūpāvasthāna* is not something to be attained by means of *karma*. The third alternative also has to be ruled out. Modification is possible only in respect of an object which is made up of parts (*sāvayava*). For instance, objects such as clay and pot are subject to modification, because they are *sāvayava*. Since the Self is not a composite entity, it cannot be changed; so there is no scope for *karma*

with regard to the Self. Fourthly, since the Self is ever-pure, there is no need for purification of it through an act. That is why Sureśvara says that *mokṣa* does not fall within the scope of *karma*. Owing to ignorance a person does not know that he is the Self which is ever-existent, never-bound, and ever-pure, wrongly identifies himself with the mind-sense-body complex, and thinks that he is the agent and enjoyer. For realizing the truth of what he is, all that is needed is the destruction of ignorance (*ajñāna-hāna* = *ajñānanivṛtti*) and nothing else. When *ajñāna* which prevents a person from realizing the truth is removed, a person is said to be free, because he remains in his own natural state as the Self.

Let it be, one may argue, that liberation which is remaining in one's state cannot be achieved through *karma*. But inasmuch as liberation in the sense of *svarūpāvasthāna* cannot take place without the removal of ignorance and since the removal of ignorance is what is yet to be accomplished, why should it not be said, it may be asked, that *karma* is the means through which ignorance is removed? Sureśvara answers this question in the negative. *Ajñāna* and *karma* are related as cause and effect. It is because of *ajñāna* that a person develops likes and dislikes and engages himself in various kinds of activities in fulfilment of his likes and dislikes. Since *karma* is dependent on *ajñāna*, Sureśvara says that the former cannot remove the latter. He drives home his point by means of an illustration. Consider the case of a person who mistakes a rope for a snake in darkness. He commits this error due to darkness. Sureśvara's point is that just as the error (*bhrama*) which is caused by darkness (and also other factors) cannot remove darkness, even so *karma* which is caused by *ajñāna* cannot remove *ajñāna*.

[25]

कर्मकार्यत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि दोष एव।

एकेन वा भवेन्मुक्तिर्यदि वा सर्वकर्मभिः ।
प्रत्येकं चेद्वृथान्यानि सर्वेभ्योऽप्येककर्मता ॥ २५ ॥

Even if it is accepted that liberation is the effect of action, it is defective.

Liberation must take place as a result of either one action, or all actions. If it be [the effect] of one action, other actions become useless. If it be [the effect] of all actions, then [all of them get] the status of being one action. (25)

Even if we accept for the sake of argument that *karma* is the means to *mokṣa*, the Mīmāṁsā position, argues Sureśvara, is not free from difficulties. Since *karmas* are many, it is necessary to know whether liberation can be achieved through the performance of any one action itself or all actions taken together, If one action alone independently of other actions is capable of securing liberation, then the remaining actions become useless. Why should, then, scripture propose a plurality of actions? The second alternative fares no better. If different kinds of *karmas*, such as *agnihotra, darśapūrṇamāsa, cāturmāsya*, etc., collectively bring about liberation, then all of them taken together must be treated as one *karma* — a position which is untenable for several reasons. For one thing, each *karma* is the means to a specific result. Since scripture speaks of different results (*phalabhedaśravaṇāt*) arising from the performance of different *karmas*, it is wrong to say that all *karmas* collectively produce one result, *viz.* liberation. Secondly, a person who belongs to a particular stage of life (*āśrama*) cannot perform all the actions prescribed for all stages of life. Also, there is the question of eligibility. One who is eligible to perform *agnihotra* is not eligible to perform *cāturmāsya*. Thirdly, even if it be said that the aggregate of all *karmas* of one *āśrama* is the means to liberation, there is difficulty. Since there are different *āśramas*, the aggregate of *karmas* will vary from *āśrama* to *āśrama*. Consequently, *mokṣa* which is the result produced by them will not be the same in all the cases. This is absurd. *Mukti* is one and the same in all cases whoever attains it. There is neither diversity nor qualitative difference in it, because the Self is one and non-dual, and liberation is remaining as the Self.

The Advaitin admits the usefulness of *karma* as a remote aid to liberation. The different *karmas*, when performed disinterestedly, purify the internal organ; and variations are possible in this regard. In some cases purification may be slow or quick; or it may be meagre or adequate. Such differences in the time factor as well as quality of purification may arise because of the diffe-

rences in *karma*. But they have no bearing on *mukti*, because *karma* is not its direct cause. So the Advaitin who accepts *karma* as a remote aid to liberation will not have the difficulty which the Mīmāṁsaka has to face.

[26]

सर्वप्रकारस्यापि कर्मण उत्पत्तित एव विशिष्टसाध्याभिसम्बन्धान्न पारिशेष्य-न्यायसिद्धिः ।

दुरितक्षपणार्थत्वान्न नित्यं स्याद्विमुक्तये ।
स्वर्गादिफलसम्बन्धात् काम्यं कर्म तथैव न ॥ २६ ॥

Since every kind of action is associated with its own specific result by originating [and other] injunctions, the principle of residues does not hold good.

Nitya-karma cannot be the means to liberation because it is intended for the destruction of sin; likewise, *kāmya-karma* too cannot be the means, because it is associated with the result such as *svarga*. (26)

The Mīmāṁsaka may argue in a different way to show that *karma* is the means to *mokṣa*. Since *mokṣa* is admitted to be an end, there must be a means thereto. Since no specific end such as *svarga* is mentioned with regard to *nitya-naimittika-karma*, a specific end has to be provided for the latter. It means that *nitya-naimittika-karma* is a *sādhana* which is left over without a *phala*, and *mokṣa* which is left over is a *phala* requiring a *sādhana*. Why should it not be said by applying the principle of residues (*pāriśeṣya-nyāya*) that *nitya-naimittika-karma* is the means to *mokṣa*? This argument, says Sureśvara, is untenable. There are four kinds of injunctions dealing respectively with origination (*utpatti*), application (*viniyoga*), performance (*prayoga*), and qualification (*adhikāra*). From these injunctions we know what rite is to be performed, the manner of its performance, the result it produces, etc. In short, a scriptural injunction gives us knowledge of the means-end relation (*iṣṭa-sādhanatā-jñāna*). If *karma* which is enjoined is the means (*sādhana*), what is produced (*sādhya*) through the performance of that *karma* is the end (*iṣṭa*). Liberation, however, is not something to be accomplished by means of *karma*. Further,

according to the principle enunciated in the *viśvajidadhikaraṇa*, where a specific end is not stated in relation to a particular *karma*, *svarga* has to be viewed as its end. If so, it is wrong to connect *nitya-naimittika-karma* and *mokṣa* as means and end by applying the principle of residues. It is not as if *nitya-naimittika-karma* has been left out without a *phala*. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that destruction of sin (*duritakṣapaṇa*) is the result of the performance of *nitya-naimittika-karma*. Therefore, without disowning their position the Mīmāṁsakas cannot think of connecting *nitya-naimittika-karma* and *mokṣa* as means and end. It may be mentioned in this connection that according to Advaita the attainment of *pitṛloka* is the result of the performance of *nitya-naimittika-karma* as stated in the *śruti* text "The world of the Manes (is to be won) through rites" (*BU*, 1.5.16).

Nor is it possible to connect *kāmya-karma* with *mokṣa*. Each *kāmya-karma* is associated with a specific result such as heaven, cattle, and so on, which cannot be replaced by *mokṣa*.

[27]

प्रमाणासम्भवाच्च ।

साध्यसाधनभावोऽयं वचनात् पारलौकिकः ।
नाश्रौषं मोक्षदं कर्म श्रुतेर्वक्त्रात्कथञ्चन ॥ २७ ॥

Also, there is no scriptural evidence [supporting it].

The means-end relation in respect of what is other-worldly is known through scriptural statement. Nowhere is it heard from the mouth of *śruti* that *karma* is the means to *mokṣa*. (27)

The Mīmāṁsā view that *karma* is the means to liberation has to be rejected, because there is no *śruti* or *smṛti* text which speaks of *karma* as the means thereto.

[28]

अभ्युपगताभ्युपगमाच्च श्वश्रूनिर्गच्छोक्तिवद्भवतो निष्प्रयोजनः प्रलापः ।

निषिद्धकाम्ययोस्त्यागस्त्वयापीष्टो यथा मया ।
नित्यस्याफलवत्त्वाच्च न मोक्षः कर्मसाधनः ॥ २८ ॥

Also, because of the acceptance of what has been accepted, your talk is useless like the statement of the mother-in-law, "Go out" [in the story].

The abandonment of *niṣiddha-* and *kāmya-karmas* is also desired by you in the same way as it is by me. Also, since *nitya-karma* is not productive of anything new, *karma* is not the means to liberation. (28)

When the Mīmāṁsaka says that both *kāmya-karma* and *pratiṣiddha-karma* have to be given up, he is only repeating what is upheld by the Advaitin. Sureśvara alludes to the story of a mother-in-law who, calling back a beggar who was refused food earlier by her daughter-in-law, told him, "Go out, there is no food." The mother-in-law has only repeated what was said earlier by her daughter-in-law. In the same way, the Mīmāṁsā position about *kāmya-karma* and *pratiṣiddha-karma* amounts to a repetition of the Advaita view.

The work of *nitya-naimittika-karmas* is only negative since their performance either prevents the occurrence of sin (*pratyavāya-parihāra*) or destroys the sin that has accumulated (*duritakṣapaṇa*). They do not produce anything new of a positive kind. It is in this sense that they are said to be *aphala*. The Mīmāṁsaka has, therefore, not shown how *karma* is the means to *mokṣa*.

[29]

एवं तावत् "मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वात्" इति निरस्तोऽयं पक्षः। अथाधुना सर्वकर्मप्रवृत्तिहेतुनिरूपणेन यथावस्थितात्मवस्तुविषयकेवलज्ञानमात्रादेव सकलसंसारानर्थनिवृत्तिरितीमं पक्षं द्रढयितुकाम आह।

इह चेदं परीक्ष्यते — किं यथा प्रतिषिद्धेषु यादृच्छिकेषु च कर्मसु स्वाभाविकस्वाशयोत्थनिमित्तवशादेव "इदं हितम्, इदमहितम्" इति परिकल्प्य मृगतृष्णिकोदकपिपासुरिव लौकिकप्रमाणसिद्धान्येव च साधनान्युपादायेष्टप्राप्तयेऽहितनिवृत्तये च स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते निवर्तते च, तथैवादृष्टार्थेषु काम्येषु नित्येषु च कर्मसु। किं वा अन्यदेव तत्र प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ?— इति।

किञ्चातः यद्येवं, शृणु। यदि तावद्यथावस्थितवस्तु सम्यग्ज्ञानं प्रमाणभूतमागमिकं लौकिकं वा प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति निश्चीयते, निवृत्तिशास्त्रं च नाभ्युप-

गम्यते, तथा हताः कर्मत्यागिनो, भ्रान्तिविज्ञानमात्रावष्टम्भात्, अलौकिकप्रमाणोपात्तकर्मानुष्ठानत्यागित्वाच्च। अथ मृगतृष्णिकोदकपिपासुप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तवदयथावस्तु भ्रान्तिविज्ञानमेव सर्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं, तदा वर्द्धामहे वयं, हताः स्थ यूयमिति।

हितं सम्प्रेप्सतां मोहादहितं च जिहासताम्।
उपायान् प्राप्तिहानार्थान् शास्त्रं भासयतेऽर्कवत्॥ २९॥

Thus the view that "liberation is attained through ritualistic actions" has been refuted. Now by determining the cause of the pursuit of all actions, he wants to strengthen the view that the removal of the evil of the entire bondage will be possible only through the knowledge of the Self as it is.

Here this is what is to be examined. Like one who is desirous of drinking the water of a mirage, a person, entertaining imaginary distinctions such as "This is good," and "This is bad," caused by natural inclinations, performs and abstains from actions which are forbidden and fortuitous for the purpose of attaining the good and avoiding the bad through means known only through secular sources of knowledge. Is it the case that in the same way a person performs *kāmya-* and *nitya-karmas* which lead to unseen future results? Or, is there any other cause for the performance of, and abstinence from, actions?

If you ask, "What is the use [of this examination]?" then listen. If it is established that the cause of the performance of action is the right knowledge of the reality as it is, which is valid and which is obtained from secular or scriptural source and if scripture which teaches renunciation of action is rejected, then those who renounce actions are wrong, for the reasons that they depend on wrong knowledge and that they renounce actions enjoined by the scriptural authority. Alternatively, if the cause of

the performance of all actions is the wrong knowledge alone, as in the case of the cause of action of a person who is desirous of drinking the water of a mirage which is false, then we win and you are defeated.

Like the sun, scripture reveals the means for acquiring and avoiding the ends for the benefit of those who, due to delusion, wish to attain the good and avoid the bad. (29)

The point at issue between Advaita and Mīmāṁsā can be settled by considering the cause of the performance of all actions. Sureśvara, therefore, raises this question about *sarva-karma-pravṛtti-hetu* in this context. It is erroneous cognition (*mithyā-jñāna*), says Sureśvara, that is responsible for man's involvement in various kinds of activities, secular as well as scriptural. Not realizing that he is the Self which is bliss by its very nature, a person thinks that happiness is something to be pursued and attained by him through the enjoyment of objects which are external to him, evaluates objects as good if they are conducive to his happiness, and bad if they are not, develops likes and dislikes (*rāga* and *dveṣa*) towards objects, and engages himself in various kinds of activities (*pravṛtti*) for attaining what he has evaluated to be the good. Some of his activities such as eating and sleeping are *yādṛcchika* in fulfilment of the instinctive needs. Sometimes he performs acts which are forbidden (*pratiṣiddha*). In all these cases he acts on his own, independently of scripture, impelled by impulses, desires and a wrong sense of values. The point which Sureśvara wants to drive home here is that *mithyā-jñāna* functioning through *rāga* and *dveṣa* is the cause of *pravṛtti* in our day-to-day life.

Sureśvara argues that what is true of our day-to-day secular activities is also true of our scriptural activities such as the performance of *kāmya-* and *nitya-karmas* for the purpose of realizing the unseen, other-worldly ends, which are called *adṛṣṭa-phala*. The Mīmāṁsā position will be tenable only if it could be shown that the performance of actions is valid and justified (*pramāṇabhūta*) on the ground that it is based on the right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) of reality as it is (*yathāvasthita-vastu*). To show that it is not tenable, Sureśvara explains the scope of the work of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*.

That the Self is of the nature of bliss is known through experience (*anubhava*), reasoning (*yukti*) and scripture (*śruti*). Let us first

consider the case of deep sleep (*suṣupti*) which is perceptual experience. All of us experience happiness in deep sleep. Since the mind and the senses do not function then, there is no experience of objects, external or internal, at that time; and so there is no possibility of a person getting happiness through the enjoyment of objects in that state. If, in the absence of the experience of objects, a person enjoys happiness in the state of deep sleep, it is only because of the Self which is present at the time. The Self is bliss; and this bliss which manifests itself in deep sleep is enjoyed by us. Also, we recollect our experience of happiness when we wake up from sleep.

It is a well-known fact, declares Śaṅkara, that the Self alone is dear, and nothing else (*lokaprasiddhametat ātmaiva priyo nānyat* — *BUB*, 2. 4. 5). Every object other than the Self is cared for and loved not for its own sake, but for the sake of the Self. This is the central idea which Yājñavalkya conveys in the course of his discussion with Maitreyī in *BU*, 2. 4. 5. The argument which is implicit in Yājñavalkya's elucidation of the problem may be stated as follows. We love other objects, since they contribute to the pleasure of the Self. So our love for other objects is secondary. But our love for the Self alone is primary. So the Self is bliss or happiness by its very nature.

There are also *śruti* texts which declare that the Self is of the nature of bliss. For instance, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (4. 3. 32) says: "This is its supreme bliss."

Though the Self which is bliss is non-dual, eternal, immutable and ever-free from evil, it is only because of the ignorance of the Self that a person thinks of other objects as good, endeavours to attain them as sources of happiness, and also tries to remove the sources of evil. The truth is that since the Self constitutes the essential nature of the individual, there is nothing else to be acquired or rejected by him. Scripture does not say that the *jīva* is an agent (*kartā*) and enjoyer (*bhoktā*). Nor does it produce the sense of agency and enjoyership, the distinctions of age, caste, and stages of life in the *jīva* which is devoid of them by its very nature. Superimposing on itself all these distinctions due to *avidyā*, the *jīva* desires to attain the good and avoid the evil and is in search of the means thereto.

Sureśvara observes that the role of scripture is similar to that of the sun. We know that the sun through its light reveals things which are existent. It is not the work of the sun to make a person seek one object or shun another. It is totally indifferent to what one does through one's likes and dislikes. In the same way, the work of *śruti* is no more than that of revealing the means-end relation (*sādhya-sādhana-sambandha*), which cannot be known through any other source. For example, *śruti* provides the information that the performance of *jyotiṣṭoma* is the means to the attainment of *svarga*. Apart from providing this information about means-end relation, it does not compel anyone to seek *svarga* or to perform *jyotiṣṭoma*. The scriptural injunction, "One should offer the *agnihotra* for life," is a hypothetical and not a categorical imperative. Whether one performs an action or abstains therefrom is dependent on one's likes and dislikes. *Śruti* is indifferent (*udāsīna*) to what one does or fails to do.

Thus the entire *karma-pravṛtti-śāstra*, *i.e.* the scriptural portion which enjoins the performance of all kinds of ritualistic actions, presupposes *adhyāsa* which again is based on *mithyā-jñāna*.

[30]

एवं तावत् प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमप्रमाणावष्टम्भादात्मनो निरतिशयसुखहिताव्यतिरेकसिद्धेः, अहितस्य च षष्ठगोचरवत् स्वत एवानभिसम्बन्धात्, एवंस्वाभाव्यात्मानवबोधमात्रादेव "हितं मे स्यादहितं मे मा भूत्" इति मिथ्याज्ञानं तूषरशुक्तिकानवबोधोत्थमिथ्याज्ञानवत् प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति निर्धारितम्। शास्त्रं च न पदार्थशक्त्याधानकृदिति। अथैतस्यैवोत्तरत्र प्रपञ्च आरभ्यते।

न परीप्सां जिहासां वा पुंसः शास्त्रं करोति हि।
निजे एव तु ते यस्मात् पश्चादावपि दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

Thus it is established on the basis of perception, inference, and scripture that the Self is unsurpassable bliss from which the good is not different, that the evil, like the non-existent, has of its own accord no relation with it, and that because of the ignorance of this nature of the Self there arises the erroneous cognition such as "Let me attain the good," "Let me not have the evil," which is the cause of

man's engagement in actions, in the same way as the erroneous cognition which arises because of the ignorance of the shell in the saline soil leads to the activity [of picking it up as silver]. It has also been shown that scripture does not produce any potency in an object. The elaboration of this is given in what follows.

Scripture, indeed, does not produce in men the desires to acquire or avoid [anything], for they are innate as seen in animals also. (30)

Śaṅkara in his *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* shows how men are in no way different from animals in respect of their desire-prompted behaviour. A cow moves away from a man who, holding a raised stick, wants to beat her, while she advances towards a man who holds some grass in his hand. Men too behave in the same way when they confront an object which is pleasing or painful to them. Śaṅkara points out that what is true of man in his day-to-day life is also true of him with regard to his desire-prompted scripture-based activities which presuppose *adhyāsa*.

Elucidating the comparison between the behaviour of men and animals instituted by Śaṅkara, Sureśvara emphasises once again the work of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*. *Śruti*, declares Sureśvara, is not capable of generating power or potency in anything (*padārtha-śakti*). It does not produce the capacity of agency and enjoyership in the Self which is neither an agent nor an enjoyer. It does not confer on *yāga* the capacity of being a means (*sādhanatva-śakti*) or on *svarga* the capacity of being an end (*sādhyatva-śakti*). As a *pramāṇa*, it is only informative and not productive.

[31-34]

उक्तं तावदनवबुद्धवस्तुयाथात्म्य एव विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रेष्वधिक्रियत इति । अथाधुना विषयस्वभावानुरोधेन प्रवृत्त्यसम्भवं वक्तुकाम आह ।

लिप्सतेऽज्ञानतोऽलब्धं कण्ठे चामीकरं यथा ।
वर्जितं च स्वतो भ्रान्त्या छायायामात्मनो यथा ॥ ३२ ॥

भयान्मोहावनद्धात्मा रक्षः परिजिहीर्षति ।
यच्चापरिहृतं वस्तु तथाऽलब्धं च लिप्सते ॥ ३२ ॥

तत्रैतेषु चतुर्षु विषयेषु प्राप्तये परिहाराय च विभज्य न्यायः प्रदर्श्यते।

प्राप्तव्यपरिहार्येषु ज्ञात्वोपायान् श्रुतेः पृथक्।
कृत्वाथ प्राप्नुयात् प्राप्तं तथानिष्टं जहात्यपि ॥ ३३ ॥

अथावशिष्टयोः स्वभावत एव।

परिहृतावाप्तयोर्बोधाद्धानप्राप्ती न कर्मणा।
मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात् क्रियया ते न सिद्ध्यतः ॥ ३४ ॥

It has been said that only a person who is ignorant of the real nature of the Self acts according to scriptural injunctions and prohibitions. Now, with a view to show that performance of action is impossible if one considers the nature of the Self, he says.

A person desires to attain what is unattained through ignorance, as in the case of the golden ornament on the neck. Also, one desires to remove what is absent of its own accord, like a person who, overcome by fear, tries to avoid a demon mistakenly seen in his own shadow. Again, one desires to remove an object which has to be [really] avoided and to attain something which is [really] unattained. (31-32)

For the purpose of [explaining] attainment and avoidance in respect of these four cases, the principle is shown through classifying [the cases].

Having known from *śruti* the different means in respect of things to be attained and avoided, and having pursued them thereafter, one attains what is to be attained and also removes what is undesirable. (33)

Now with regard to the [two] remaining cases, [both attainment and avoidance take place] of their own accord.

With regard to what is avoided and what is attained [of their own accord], removal and attainment take place through knowledge and not through action. Since ignorance alone is the obstacle, they are not achieved through action. (34)

Sureśvara now argues that the nature of the Self is such that it rules out resort to the performance of *karma* for the purpose of attaining it. He says that what is to be attained (*prāpya*) is of two kinds, and what is to be avoided also (*parihārya*) is of two kinds. First, consider the case of a person who wants to and does attain objects such as wealth which are not in his possession. This is a case of attainment of what is really unattained. Secondly, a person, let us say, is in search of an object, *e.g.* the golden necklace, which is already on his neck, though due to ignorance he does not realize that it is in his possession. Subsequently he realizes the mistake he has committed. This is a case of attainment of what is already attained. Thirdly, consider the case of a person who wants to avoid what is bad or dangerous, *e.g.* the threat to one's life through thieves and wild beasts. This is a case of avoidance of what is to be avoided. The last one is the case of a person who has mistaken his own shadow for a ghost, is frightened, and makes efforts to get rid of it, while actually there is no ghost. This is a case of avoidance of what is already absent or avoided. For attaining what is in fact unattained and for avoiding what has to be avoided, one must find out and pursue the appropriate means, which will demand engagement in action. We have to depend upon *śruti* when the object we wish to attain, *e.g. svarga*, or the one we wish to avoid, *e.g. naraka*, cannot be known through any other source and pursue the means suggested by it through engagement in action. But no action is needed for attaining what is already attained or for avoiding what is really non-existent excepting the right knowledge of the situation in which the person finds himself. If a person thinks that he has to attain the Self which is already in him, it is because of ignorance; and for removing this ignorance knowledge alone is needed and not *karma*.

[35]

कस्मात् पुनरात्मवस्तुयाथात्म्यावबोधमात्रादेवाभिलषितनिरतिशयसुखप्राप्ति-निश्शेषदुःखनिवृत्ती भवतो न तु कर्मणेति ? उच्यते ।

कर्माज्ञानसमुत्थत्वान्नालं मोहापनुत्तये ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानं विरोध्यस्य तामिस्रस्यांशुमानिव ॥ ३५ ॥

It may be asked: "Why is it that the attainment of the unsurpassable bliss and the removal of the entire suffering, which are desired, take place only through the knowledge of the real nature of the Self and not through action?" We reply:

Action is not competent to remove ignorance, because it arises from ignorance. Right knowledge is its enemy in the same way as the sun is the enemy of darkness. (35)

Let it be, the opponent argues, that the Self, though really attained, appears to be unattained due to ignorance. If so, what is needed for its attainment is knowledge alone and not *karma*. But it does not follow from this, the opponent contends, that *mokṣa* which is a state of happiness, free from all misery, can be attained through knowledge. The principle of the "attainment of what is already attained" (*svataḥ prāptasya prāpti*) does not hold good in the case of *mokṣa* which is non-existent in the state of bondage in which we find ourselves and which is consequently what is yet to be accomplished. So the opponent concludes that the view that *karma* is the means to *mokṣa* cannot be rejected.

According to the opponent, the need for *karma* for attaining *mokṣa* can be shown in a different way also. Consider the case of a person who mistakes a shell for silver when he sees it from a distance. When he moves closer to the object, he realizes the mistake. Here, it is the act of going near the object (*nikaṭa-upa-sarpaṇakriyā*) which helps him to remove his ignorance of object and thereby to correct the mistake. If so, why should it not be said, so the opponent argues, that *karma* will help one to remove the ignorance of the Self?

Both the arguments are untenable. According to Advaita, to remain as the Self is release; *mokṣa*, that is to say, is the Self. To attain the Self is to attain *mokṣa*. Since the existent Self which is free by its very nature remains concealed due to ignorance, we imagine that *mokṣa* is absent in the state of bondage.

It is a matter of common experience that knowledge removes ignorance. When the ignorance of the Self is removed through the right knowledge of the Self, we speak of the attainment of the Self or *mokṣa*.

It is the right knowledge of the given object, *e.g.* the shell, that removes our ignorance of it. The act of moving close to the object does not by itself remove ignorance. Remaining in the same place, if a person cognizes the object as it is, he is free from error. If, in spite of moving near the object, he does not perceive it as it is, he does not get rid of his error. It follows that the act of moving close to the object is not the cause of the removal of ignorance.

Engagement in action is due to *rāga-dveṣa* which, again, is due to *avidyā*. *Karma*, being thus dependent on *avidyā*, is not opposed to it, and so it cannot remove *avidyā*; but knowledge which is opposed to it can remove it.

[36]

नन्वात्मज्ञानमप्यविद्योपादानम्, न हि शास्त्रशिष्याचार्याद्यनुपादायात्मज्ञानमात्मानं लभत इति। नैष दोषः। यत आत्मज्ञानं हि स्वतःसिद्धपरमार्थात्मवस्तुस्वरूपमात्राश्रयादेव अविद्यातदुत्पन्नकारकग्रामप्रध्वंसि स्वात्मोत्पत्तावेव शास्त्राद्यपेक्षते, नोत्पन्नमविद्यानिवृत्तौ। कर्म पुनः स्वात्मोत्पत्तावुत्पन्नं च। न हि क्रिया कारकनिस्पृहा कल्पकोटिव्यवहितफलदानाय स्वात्मानं बिभर्ति, साध्यमानमात्ररूपत्वात् तस्याः। न च क्रिया आत्मज्ञानवत् स्वात्मप्रतिलम्भकाल एव स्वर्गादिफलेन कर्तारं सम्बध्नाति। आत्मज्ञानं पुनः पुरुषार्थसिद्धौ नोत्पद्यमानस्वरूपव्यतिरेकेणान्यद्रूपान्तरं साधनान्तरं वापेक्षते। कुत एतत्? यतः।

बलवद्धि प्रमाणोत्थं सम्यग्ज्ञानं न बाध्यते।
आकाङ्क्षते न चाप्यन्यद्बाधनं प्रति साधनम्॥ ३६॥

The knowledge of the Self too, it may be objected, is caused by *avidyā*; for the knowledge of the Self does not come into existence without presupposing [the distinctions of] scripture, disciple, teacher, etc. This objection is not

tenable, because the knowledge of the Self, which has for its content the self-established, absolutely real Self and which destroys ignorance and the aggregate of the instruments of action produced by it, requires scripture, etc., only for its origination, and not for the removal of *avidyā* after its origination. *Karma*, on the other hand, [is dependent on *avidyā*] for its origination (as well as for producing its result) after its origination. *Karma*, indeed, cannot maintain itself for producing its fruit, which will take place after an interval of crores of epochs, without depending on the instruments of action, for its nature is to produce only future results. Unlike the knowledge of the Self, *karma* does not connect the agent with fruits such as *svarga* at the time of its performance itself. But the knowledge of the Self, apart from the help it requires for its origination, does not seek the help of any other mental discipline (*upāsanā*) or means (*karma*) for accomplishing the end of man. If it be asked, "Why is it so?" it is for this reason.

Since knowledge which arises from *pramāṇa* is powerful, it cannot be sublated. Also, it does not seek the help of any other means for removing [the erroneous perception of duality]. (36)

Sureśvara refers to and answers a possible objection here. Scripture, teacher and disciple are required for the origination of the knowledge of the Self. Scripture is the *pramāṇa* from which knowledge arises. The teacher imparts the teaching of the scripture, and the disciple receives the instruction from him. Since the knowledge of the Self presupposes, and is dependent on, plurality in the form of scripture-teacher-disciple distinction which is due to *avidyā*, the opponent argues that if *karma*, because of its dependence on *avidyā*, cannot remove it, *jñāna* also for the same reason cannot remove it.

The above objection, says Sureśvara, is untenable as there is no parity at all between the two cases. First of all, there is difference between *ātma-jñāna* and *karma* in respect of their content. While the Self which is one and non-dual is the content of *jñāna*, plurality involving distinctions such as the agent, the means, the

result, etc., is the content of *karma*. In other words, while *jñāna* is concerned with *advaita-viṣaya*, *karma* deals with *dvaita-viṣaya*. If so, while knowledge of the Self can remove *avidyā*, *karma* cannot. Secondly, if the knowledge of the Self requires the help of diverse factors such as scripture, teacher, etc., which presuppose *avidyā*, it is only for its origination (*utpatti*); but after coming into existence, it does not seek the help of anything, *upāsanā* or *karma*, for accomplishing its result, *viz.* the destruction of *avidyā*. *Karma*, on the other hand, is dependent on *avidyā* not only for its genesis but also for the completion of its work. It means that while *jñāna* is independent (*svatantra*) in doing its work, *karma* is dependent (*paratantra*) on other factors such as the subject, the instrument, etc., without which no action is possible. Such a distinction arises because of the fact that while *jñāna* produces its result immediately, *karma* is productive of its result at a later period. In other words, while *jñāna* has *dṛṣṭa-phala*, *karma* has *adṛṣṭa-phala*. There is, therefore, no parity between *jñāna* and *karma*.

There is yet another argument which may be adduced to show that *jñāna*, after its genesis, has to seek the help of *upāsanā* or *karma*. The impressions left over by the experience of plurality caused by *avidyā* which is *anādi* will, it is argued, sublate the right knowledge that has arisen; and they could be countered by knowledge only with the help of *upāsanā* or *karma*. This argument, too, is untenable. Sureśvara says that right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) is powerful, because it has arisen from a *pramāṇa*. Once it has come into being, it can never be sublated by the perception of diversity (*dvaitadarśana*) or by the impressions (*saṁskāra*) left over by it. Also, the right knowledge does not require the help of anything — *upāsanā* or *karma* — for the purpose of removing the perception of diversity and the impressions thereof, as it can accomplish its result on its own.

[37]

स्वपक्षस्य हेत्ववष्टम्भेन समर्थितत्वान्निराशङ्कमुपसंह्रियते ।

तस्माद्दुःखोदधेर्हेतोरज्ञानस्यापनुत्तये ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानं सुपर्याप्तं क्रिया चेन्नोक्तहेतुतः ॥ ३७ ॥

Since his standpoint has been established by means of reasoning, he concludes without any uncertainty.

Therefore, the right knowledge is enough for destroying ignorance which is the cause of the ocean of sorrow. If it be said that action could do that, it is not so, for the reasons already stated. (37)

[38]

ननु बलवदपि सम्यग्ज्ञानं सद्प्रमाणोत्थेनासम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाध्यमानमुपलभामहे। यत उत्पन्नपरमार्थबोधस्यापि कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरागद्वेषाद्यनवबोधोत्थप्रत्यया आविर्भवन्ति। न ह्यबाधिते सम्यग्ज्ञाने तद्विरुद्धानां प्रत्ययानां सम्भवोऽस्ति। नैतदेवम्। कुतः?

बाधितत्वादविद्याया विद्यां सा नैव बाधते।
तद्वासना निमित्तत्वं यान्ति विद्यास्मृतेर्ध्रुवम्॥ ३८॥

It may be objected that, though the right knowledge is powerful, we find that it gets sublated by the erroneous cognition arising from invalid source. For, wrong ideas such as agency and enjoyership, feelings of desire and aversion, etc., which are caused by ignorance appear even in the case of a person who has the knowledge of the ultimate reality; and without sublating the right knowledge, the wrong notions which are opposed to it cannot take place. This objection is not tenable for this reason.

Since ignorance has been sublated, it can never sublate knowledge. The impressions left over by knowledge certainly lead to the recollection of knowledge. (38)

The opponent questions the alleged "strength" of the right knowledge which has arisen from the *Vedānta* text on the ground that it is subject to sublation (*bādha*) as seen in the case of the conduct of one who has the knowledge of the Self. The contention of the opponent is that even a man of knowledge is engaged in action and that engagement in action will be possible only if

he has likes and dislikes and notions of agency and enjoyership (*kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva-rāga-dveṣādi*) which are due to *avidyā*. Since these false notions cannot arise unless the right knowledge gets sublated, one has to conclude that even the right knowledge generated by a *pramāṇa* can be dislodged by *mithyā-jñāna*.

Sureśvara refutes this argument on the ground that *samyag-jñāna*, once it arises, can never be sublated in the present or in the future. Right knowledge produced by *śruti*, which is *pramāṇa*, destroys *ajñāna*, which is the root cause of bondage; and when *ajñāna* is removed, *mithyā-jñāna* which manifests itself in the form of desire, aversion, agency, etc., and which is due to *ajñāna* gets removed. It means that *samyag-jñāna* and *mithyā-jñāna* are related as sublator (*bādhaka*) and the sublated (*bādhita*). What is *bādhita* cannot sublate its own *bādhaka*. Sureśvara rules out the possibility of *samyag-jñāna* getting sublated in the future by the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of the false notions of duality (*dvaita-pratyaya* or *avidyā-vāsanā*). The impressions left over by the right knowledge are enough to counter the impressions of *avidyā*, should they arise.

The entire argument of the opponent proceeds on the wrong assumption that a person who has known the Self, who remains as the Self, will behave in the same way, afflicted by desire, aversion, agency, etc., which are the characteristics of an ignorant person, as he did before the rise of knowledge. As Śaṅkara puts it in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4, a person who has once known Brahman to be the Self does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before; and one who belongs to this transmigratory world as before has not known Brahman to be the Self.

[39]

"कर्माज्ञानसमुत्थत्वात्" इत्युक्तो हेतुस्तस्य च समर्थनं पूर्वमेवाभिहितं "हितं सम्प्रेप्सताम्" इत्यादिना। तदभ्युच्चयार्थमविद्यान्वयेन च संसारान्वयित्वं प्रदर्शयिष्यामीत्यत आह।

ब्राह्मण्याद्यात्मके देहे ज्ञात्वा नात्मेति भावनाम्।
श्रुतेः किङ्करतामेति वाङ्मनःकायकर्मसु॥ ३९॥

By the statement, "Since *karma* arises from ignorance" (verse 35) the reason has been given [to show why *karma* cannot remove ignorance]; and the justification therefor has already been provided through verses such as "One desires to attain the good" (verse 29). With a view to supplement it, he says the following by showing that continuance of bondage is because of the continuance of ignorance.

A person, holding the notion that the body associated with the status of a Brāhmaṇa, etc., is the Self, becomes a servant of *śruti* in his actions of speech, mind and body. (39)

Characteristics such as being a Brāhmaṇa, belonging to a particular stage of life, being a youth, etc., (*varṇāśrama-vayo'vasthāviśeṣa*) belong to the body. By superimposing the characteristics of the body on the Self, a person becomes eligible to perform actions enjoined by scripture. It follows that, since the performance of *karma* is due to *adhyāsa* which is caused by *avidyā*, *karma* cannot remove *avidyā*. In short, *avidyā* and *karma* are co-present.

[40]

यस्मात् कर्माज्ञानसमुत्थमेव तस्मात् तद्व्यावृत्तौ निवर्तत इत्युच्यते ।

दग्धाखिलाधिकारश्चेद्ब्रह्मज्ञानाग्निना मुनिः ।
वर्तमानः श्रुतेर्मूर्ध्नि नैव स्याद्वेदकिङ्करः ॥ ४० ॥

It will be stated that, since action arises from ignorance, it disappears when ignorance is removed.

If a sage can get the entire notion of eligibility burnt by the fire of the knowledge of Brahman, he remains seated on the head of *śruti*; and he is never a servant of the *Veda*. (40)

While in the previous verse Sureśvara brought out the principle of *anvaya*, *i.e.* co-presence between *avidyā* and *karma*, here he emphasises the principle of *vyatireka*, *i.e.* co-absence, that holds

good between them. When *avidyā* is present, *karma* is present; and when it is absent, *karma* also is absent.

[41]

अथेतरो घनतराविद्यापटलसंवीतान्तःकरणोऽङ्गीकृतकर्तृत्वाद्यशेषकर्माधिकारकारणो विधिप्रतिषेधचोदनासन्दंशोपदष्टः कर्मसु प्रवर्तमानः।

शुभैः प्राप्नोति देवत्वं निषिद्धैर्नारकीं गतिम् ।
उभाभ्यां पुण्यपापाभ्यां मानुष्यं लभतेऽवशः ॥ ४१ ॥

Then, the other person, whose mind is covered by the dense veil of ignorance and who accepts conditions such as agency which make him eligible for all actions, engages in actions, being pressed by the tongs of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions.

Such a person, who has no freedom, attains the status of a god by doing good deeds, goes down to hell by performing prohibited actions, and attains the status of a man by doing both good and bad deeds. (41)

Sureśvara gives an account of what awaits an ignorant person who submits himself to the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions with a view to help him develop dispassion (*vairāgya*).

An ignorant man is not free and has no control over his future, because he is dependent on his desires and deeds. Sureśvara calls him *avaśaḥ* in the sense of *kāma-karmādi-paratantraḥ*. His future is decided by his deeds, as shown by the *śruti* text, "He is taken to a virtuous world by virtuous deeds, to a sinful world by sinful acts and to the world of men by both." (*PU*, 3.7)

[42]

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्ते घोरे दुःखोदधौ घटीयन्त्रवदारोहावरोहन्यायेन अधममध्यमोत्तमसुखदुःखमोहविद्युच्चपलसम्पातदायिनीर्विचित्रयोनीश्चण्डोत्पिञ्जलकश्वसनवेगाभिहताम्भोधिमध्यवर्तिशुष्कालाबुवत् शुभाशुभव्यामिश्रकर्मवायुसमीरितः।

एवं चङ्क्रम्यमाणोऽयमविद्याकामकर्मभिः ।
पाशितो जायते कामी म्रियते चासुखावृतः ॥ ४२ ॥

Taking different births — high, low, and middle — which provide lightning-like momentary pleasure, pain and delusion, moving up and down like a water-wheel in the ocean of sorrow which comprises all beings from Brahmā down to the clump of grass, he is revolving being propelled by the wind of good, bad, and mixed deeds in the same way as a dry gourd which is placed in the mid-ocean is tossed about by the speed of the fierce stormy wind.

Perpetually revolving in this way, the man of desire takes birth, being bound by ignorance, desire and deeds, and dies full of misery. (42)

Sureśvara explains the state of bondage and the way thereto.

[43]

यथोक्तेऽर्थे आदरविधानाय प्रमाणोपन्यासः।

श्रुतिश्चेमं जगादार्थं कामस्य विनिवृत्तये ।
तन्मूला संसृतिर्यस्मात् तन्नाशोऽज्ञानहानतः ॥ ४३ ॥

With a view to show respect to what has been said above, the [scriptural] authority will be cited.

Since desire is the root of bondage, *śruti* also conveys this teaching for the purpose of the cessation of desire. Its destruction arises from the destruction of ignorance. (43)

[44]

का त्वसौ श्रुतिरिति चेत्।

"यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते" "इति नु" इति च वाजिनः ।
कामबन्धनमेवेदं व्यासोऽप्याह पदे पदे ॥ ४४ ॥

If it be asked, "What is that *śruti* text?" [we reply].

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says: "When all desires are destroyed" and "Thus the man who desires [transmigrates] ..." Vyāsa also says repeatedly that this [life] is a bondage due to desire alone. (44)

Sureśvara quotes the authority of *śruti* and *smṛti* in support of what he has said about bondage. In the first line of the verse he refers to two texts of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (*Vājasaneyī*). One of them says: "When all desires that dwell in his heart (mind) are destroyed, then he, having been mortal, becomes immortal, and attains Brahman in this very body." (*BU*, 4.4.7) The other passage contrasts a man of desires with one who is free from desires. It says: "Thus the man who has desires (transmigrates). But the man who does not desire (never transmigrates). Of him who is without desires, who is free from desires, the objects of whose desire have been attained, and to whom all objects of desire are but the Self— the organs do not depart. Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman." (*BU*, 4.4.6) In the second line Sureśvara cites the authority of Vyāsa who said: "This (life) is a bondage due to desire alone. Here there is no other bondage. One who is free from the bondage of desire, indeed, has no more birth."

[45]

एष संसारपन्था व्याख्यातः। अथेदानीं तद्व्यावृत्तये कर्माण्याराादुपकारकत्वेन यथा मोक्षहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते, तथाभिधीयते।

तस्यैवं दुःखतप्तस्य कथञ्चित्पुण्यशीलनात्।
नित्येहाक्षालितधियो वैराग्यं जायते हृदि ॥ ४५ ॥

Thus the way to bondage has been explained. Now for the purpose of destroying it, the manner in which actions, as remote aid, are the means to liberation will be explained.

In the heart of a person who, being thus tormented by sorrow, has his mind purified by the desire for [the performance of] obligatory deeds, dispassion arises due to merit acquired with great difficulty. (45)

Advaita does not say that *karma* is not at all useful to the attainment of *mokṣa*. On the contrary, it emphasises the importance of *karma* as a remote aid (*ārādupakāraka*) to *mokṣa*. Sureśvara explains in the sequel the way in which *karma* is helpful to the attainment of *mokṣa* by bringing about purification of the mind (*citta-śuddhi*) and dispassion (*vairāgya*).

The desire for the performance of obligatory duties leads to their performance (*nityehayā nityakarmānuṣṭhāna*); and their performance results in the purification of the mind. A person who has his mind purified develops dispassion towards fruits of *kāmya-karma*.

[46]

कीदृग्वैराग्यमुत्पद्यत इति ? उच्यते ।

नरकाद्भीर्यथास्याभूत् तथा काम्यफलादपि ।
यथार्थदर्शनात् तस्मान्नित्यं कर्म चिकीर्षति ॥ ४६ ॥

To the question, "What kind of dispassion does arise?" the answer is given.

Just as he was afraid of hell, even so he is afraid of fruits of desire-prompted actions, as a result of knowing their real nature. Therefore, he desires to perform obligatory deeds. (46)

When a person knows that the fruits such as heaven achieved through the performance of *kāmya-karmas* are impermanent, surpassable, and baneful, he no longer longs for them, gives up *kāmya-karmas* and desires to perform *nitya-karmas* in full swing.

[47]

एवं नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानेन ।

शुध्यमानं तु तच्चित्तमीश्वरार्पितकर्मभिः ।
वैराग्यं ब्रह्मलोकादौ व्यनक्त्यथ सुनिर्मलम् ॥ ४७ ॥

Thus, as a result of the performance of daily and occasional obligatory duties:

The mind, purified by the deeds dedicated to the Lord, develops faultless dispassion towards objects such as the world of Brahmā. (47)

[48]

यस्माद्रजस्तमोमलोपसंमृष्टमेव चित्तं कामबडिशेनाकृष्य विषयदुरन्तसूनास्थानेषु निक्षिप्यते, तस्मान्नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानपरिमार्जनेनापविद्धरजस्तमोमलं, प्रसन्नमनाकुलं, संमार्जितस्फटिकशिलाकल्पं, बाह्यविषयहेतुकेन च रागद्वेषात्मकेनातिग्रहबडिशेनानाकृष्यमाणं, विधूताशेषकल्मषं, प्रत्यङ्मात्रप्रवणं, चित्तदर्पणमवतिष्ठते। अत इदमभिधीयते।

व्युत्थिताशेषकामेभ्यो यदा धीरवतिष्ठते ।
तदैव प्रत्यगात्मानं स्वयमेवाविविक्षति ॥ ४८ ॥

Since the mind is tainted by the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas*, it is attracted by the bait of desire and is placed in the slaughter-house of countless sense-objects; but it becomes pure and tranquil, like a well-washed crystal stone, when it is cleansed by the performance of daily and obligatory deeds, and the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas* are removed from it. Then, being free from all impurities, it is not attracted by the powerful bait of desire and aversion which are caused by the external objects, and remains like a clean mirror, inclined only towards the inward Self. Hence the following is stated.

When the intellect remains bereft of all desires, then alone it is inclined, of its own accord, to enter the inward Self. (48)

Rāga is the obstacle that stands in the way of the pursuit of *mokṣa* (*mokṣopāya-pravṛtti-pratibandhaka*). Sureśvara explains how one can get rid of it through the performance of *nitya-naimittika-karmas*. He also explains the significance of dispassion in the scheme of discipline leading to liberation.

[49]

अतःपरम् अवसिताधिकाराणि कर्माणि प्रत्यक्प्रवणत्वसूनौ कृतसम्प्रत्तिकानि चरितार्थानि सन्ति।

प्रत्यक्प्रवणतां बुद्धेः कर्माण्युत्पाद्य शुद्धितः।
कृतार्थान्यस्तमायान्ति प्रावृडन्ते घना इव ॥ ४९ ॥

Thereafter, actions having done their work [of the removal of desire] and having achieved their goal by entrusting their work to the intellect in which inclination towards the Self has arisen [disappear].

Actions, after producing inclination towards the Self in the intellect by purifying it and after having achieved their goal, disappear like clouds at the end of the rainy season. (49)

The performance of *nitya-naimittika-karmas* in a spirit of dedication to the Lord is for purifying the mind and thereby for helping it develop dispassion. Once this is achieved, there is no more need of *karma*. It means that only a person whose mind is purified and who has developed dispassion is eligible to renounce all actions (*śuddha antaḥkaraṇasya utpanna-vairāgyasya sarvakarma-sannyāse adhikāraḥ*).

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (1.5.17) speaks of *sampratti-karma* (the act of entrusting) which is a spiritual rite in which a father, before his death, entrusts his religious duties to his son. Sureśvara makes use of the idea of "entrusting" in describing the relation between *karma* and *pratyakpravaṇatā*, which has been produced by *karma*. Just as a father, having done his work, entrusts to his son what remains to be achieved, even so *karma*, having done its work, entrusts to *pratyak-pravaṇatā* (inclination towards the Self) what remains to be achieved for attaining liberation.

[50]

यतो नित्यकर्मानुष्ठानस्यैष महिमा।

तस्मान्मुमुक्षुभिः कार्यमात्मज्ञानाभिलाषिभिः।
नित्यं नैमित्तिकं कर्म सदैवात्मविशुद्धये ॥ ५० ॥

The greatness of the performance of daily obligatory duties is for this reason.

Therefore, for the purpose of purification of the mind, daily and occasional obligatory deeds have always to be done by seekers of liberation who desire the knowledge of the Self. (50)

[51]

यथोक्तेऽर्थे सर्वज्ञवचनं प्रमाणम् ।

"आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते ।
योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शम" एवेति च स्मृतिः ॥ ५१ ॥

The utterance of the omniscient Lord is the authority in respect of what has been stated.

The *smṛti* text says: "For a devotee who wishes to attain to *yoga*, action is said to be the means. For the same [devotee], when he has attained to *yoga*, quiescence" alone [is the means]. (51)

Sureśvara cites the authority of the *Bhagavad-gītā* (6.3) to show how *karma* is useful to the attainment of *mokṣa* only as a remote aid. Śaṅkara explains the word "*yoga*" which occurs in the first line of the verse as *dhyāna-yoga*. *Dhyāna* is concentration of the mind, *i.e.* keeping the mind steady on one thing. A devotee or spiritual aspirant (*muni*) becomes fit for *dhyāna-yoga*, *i.e.* attains the capacity for concentration, as a result of the purification of mind he has attained through the performance of *karma*. So the word "*yoga*" in the context conveys, as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says, the sense of *antaḥkaraṇaśuddhirūpaṁ vairāgyam*. The word "*śama*" which occurs in the second line of the verse means "*sarvakarma-sannyāsa*", *i.e.* renunciation of all actions. A spiritual aspirant whose mind is purified and who has developed dispassion has to renounce all actions for attaining the goal of liberation. It means that *karma* which is necessary for becoming a *yogārūḍha* should be given up after becoming a *yogārūḍha*. The *Gītā* (6.4) defines a *yogārūḍha* as one who has renounced all

thoughts about the objects of desire and who is not attached to sense-objects and actions.

[52]

नित्यकर्मानुष्ठानाद्धर्मोत्पत्तिः, धर्मोत्पत्तेः पापहानिः, ततश्चित्तशुद्धिः, ततः संसारयाथात्म्यावबोधः, ततो वैराग्यं, ततो मुमुक्षुत्वं, ततस्तदुपायपर्येषणं, ततः सर्वकर्मतत्साधनसन्न्यासः, ततो योगाभ्यासः, ततश्चित्तस्य प्रत्यक्प्रवणता, ततस्तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यार्थपरिज्ञानं, ततोऽविद्योच्छेदः, ततश्च स्वात्मन्येवावस्थानं, "ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति" "विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते" इति ।

पारम्पर्येण कर्मैवं स्यादविद्यानिवृत्तये ।
ज्ञानवन्नाविरोधित्वात् कर्माविद्यां निरस्यति ॥ ५२ ॥

From the performance of daily obligatory duties merit arises. From the origination of merit comes destruction of sin; and from this arises purification of the mind, and from this comes the understanding of the real nature of bondage; and therefrom dispassion arises; and from this comes a longing for liberation; and this leads to a search for the means thereto; and from this comes the renunciation of all actions and their means; then there is the practice of *yoga*; and from this comes the inclination in the mind towards the inward Self, and then there arises the knowledge of the meaning of the texts such as "*tat tvam asi*," and from this results the destruction of ignorance; and thereafter comes the state of remaining as the Self alone, as shown by the texts, "Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman," "Being liberated, one becomes free."

Thus, action leads successively to the removal of ignorance. Action cannot [directly] remove ignorance like knowledge, because it is not opposed to it. (52)

Sureśvara explains how *karma*, through a series of stages (*pāramparyeṇa*), leads to *mokṣa*.

The word "*dharma*" in the text means the practice of *śravaṇa* (hearing of the text), *manana* (reflection), and *nididhyāsana* (repeat-

ed contemplation). The term "*vākyārtha-parijñāna*" is used in the sense of direct realization (*sākṣātkāra*) of the truth conveyed by the *mahāvākya*. The two *śruti* texts quoted in the text are from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (4.4.6) and the *Kaṭha* (2.2.1) respectively.

[53]

न च कर्मणः कार्यमण्वपि मुक्तौ सम्भाव्यते। नापि मुक्तौ यत्सम्भवति तत्कर्मापेक्षते। तदुच्यते।

उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं च क्रियाफलम्।
नैवं मुक्तिर्यतस्तस्मात् कर्म तस्या न साधनम्॥ ५३॥

The effect of action has no scope at all in respect of liberation; and what takes place in liberation does not require the help of action. This will be explained.

The result of action is origination, attainment, purification, or modification. Since liberation is not any of these, action is not the means thereto. (53)

In this verse Sureśvara states the reason for *karma* not being the direct means to *mokṣa*. See the explanation already given for verse (24).

[54]

एवं तावत् केवलं कर्म साक्षादविद्यापनुत्तये न पर्याप्तमिति प्रपञ्चितम्। मुक्तौ च मुमुक्षुज्ञानतद्विषयस्वाभाव्यानुरोधेन सर्वप्रकारस्यापि कर्मणोऽसम्भव उक्तो "हितं सम्प्रेप्सताम्" इत्यादिना। यादृशश्चारादुपकारकत्वेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ कर्मणां समुच्चयः सम्भवति, तथा प्रतिपादितम्। अविद्योच्छित्तौ तु लब्धात्मस्वभावस्यात्मज्ञानस्यैवासाधारणं साधकतमत्वं, नान्यस्य प्रधानभूतस्य गुणभूतस्य चेत्येतदधुनोच्यते। तत्र ज्ञानं गुणभूतं तावदहेतुरित्येतदाह।

सन्निपत्य न च ज्ञानं कर्माज्ञानं निरस्यति।
साध्यसाधनभावत्वादेककालानवस्थितेः॥ ५४॥

So far, it has been shown that action by itself cannot directly destroy ignorance. In verses (I. 29 ff.) beginning with "*hitaṁ samprepsatām*" (those who wish to attain the good) it has been stated that, considering the nature of the seeker of liberation, the nature of knowledge, and its object, there is no scope for action of every kind in respect of liberation. The way in which the association of action finds a place as a remote aid in respect of the origination of knowledge has also been explained. Now it will be stated that the knowledge of the ever-existent Self is the special and the best means for destroying ignorance and that nothing else, either as the principal or subsidiary, can be the means [in combination with knowledge]. On this issue, he first explains why knowledge as a subsidiary (to *karma*) cannot be the cause [of the destruction of ignorance].

Knowledge cannot remove ignorance by union with action [as its subsidiary]. Action and knowledge cannot exist at the same time as they are related as means and end. (54)

Sureśvara says that, if we consider the nature of *mumukṣu* (seeker of liberation), *jñāna* (knowledge) and *jñāna-viṣaya* (object of knowledge), it will be obvious that *karma* in any form cannot directly bring about *mokṣa*. A *mumukṣu* is one who is free from desires for impermanent fruits. However, the only desire that he has is for liberation, which is eternal. Since *karma* is capable of producing only impermanent results, it is of no use to a seeker of liberation. *Jñāna* arises from a *pramāṇa*. Further, not only does it require an object which is its content, but also corresponds to it; that is to say, as the object, so is the knowledge. Knowledge is, therefore, both *pramāṇa*-dependent and object-dependent. Its nature is such that it can remove ignorance, and thereby bring about *mokṣa*. But since *karma* cannot remove ignorance, it is of no use to achieving the goal of liberation. Since the Self which is to be known is ever-existent and immutable, it is not something to be accomplished by *karma*. For these reasons, Sureśvara concludes that *karma* by itself (*kevala-karma*) cannot be the means to *mokṣa*.

Is it possible for *karma* to produce *mokṣa* in combination with *jñāna*? Sureśvara answers this question in the negative. The

theory of the combination of *jñāna* and *karma* is called *jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda*. *Jñāna* which is to be combined with *karma* may be accorded the status of a subsidiary (*aṅga* or *guṇa*) to *karma*, or that of equality (*samapradhāna*) with *karma*. Neither position, argues Sureśvara, is tenable.

There are three important reasons to show why *jñāna* cannot be a subsidiary to *karma*. First of all, *karma* which produces purification of the mind is the means to the origination of knowledge, and *karma* and *jñāna* being thus related as means (*sādhana*) and end (*sādhya*) cannot co-exist at the same time. If so, *jñāna* cannot be a subsidiary to *karma*. Secondly, since *karma* is the means to *jñāna*, they cannot together be the means to *mokṣa*. Thirdly, *karma* performed in the earlier life can, through purification of the mind, be the means to the origination of knowledge in the present life; and this rules out the possibility of *jñāna* being a subsidiary to *karma*. Therefore, *aṅgāṅgi* relation between knowledge and action is not tenable.

[55]

समप्रधानयोरप्यसम्भव एव ।

बाध्यबाधकभावाच्च पञ्चास्योरणयोरिव ।
एकदेशानवस्थानान्न समुच्चयता तयोः ॥ ५५ ॥

Also, they cannot be combined as equal partners.

No combination of them is possible as they cannot co-exist being related as the sublator and the sublated, like the lion and the sheep. (55)

Sureśvara refutes here the combination theory which accords equal status to *jñāna* and *karma*. The nature of *jñāna* and *karma* is such that they are mutually exclusive. If so, how can they co-exist and function as equal partners for achieving the goal of *mokṣa*?

[56]

कुतो बाध्यबाधकभावः ? यस्मात् ।

अयथावस्त्वविद्या स्याद्विद्या तस्या विरोधिनी ।
समुच्चयस्तयोरेवं रविशार्वरयोरिव ॥ ५६ ॥

If it be asked, "Why are they related as the sublator and the sublated?" the following is the reason.

Ignorance [as well as *karma*] is concerned with the unreal. Knowledge is opposed to ignorance. Thus their combination will be like that of the sun and darkness. (56)

The content of knowledge is the Self which is real. *Karma* which is due to *avidyā* functions on the basis of the false or unreal notions of agency, enjoyership, etc., which are superimposed on the Self. Being thus opposed to each other, *karma* and *jñāna* do not admit of combination in any form.

[57]

तस्मादकारकब्रह्मात्मनि परिसमाप्तावबोधस्य अशेषकर्मचोदनानां अचोद्यस्वाभाव्यात् कुण्ठता । कथं तत् ? अभिधीयते ।

बृहस्पतिसवे यद्वत् क्षत्त्रियो न प्रवर्तते ।
ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यहंमानी विप्रो वा क्षत्त्रकर्मणि ॥ ५७ ॥

Hence, in the case of a person who has attained the knowledge of Brahman which is not involved in action, all injunctions which prescribe the performance of action lose their force, because his nature is such that he is no longer subject to injunctions. If you ask, "How is that possible?" it will be explained.

Just as a Kṣatriya does not perform *Bṛhaspati-sava*, even so a Brāhmaṇa who considers himself as possessing the nature of *brāhmaṇa*, etc. does not perform the duties of a Kṣatriya. (57)

Sureśvara says that one who has realized Brahman does not come under the sway of scriptural injunctions. Such a person who has no sense of agency, who is free from all kinds of false identification with *varṇa* and *āśrama*, will not be engaged in actions enjoined by scripture. Consider the case of a person who thinks of himself as a Kṣatriya. Since he identifies himself with a

particular caste, he will not perform *Bṛhaspati-sava* which is prescribed for Brāhmaṇas. In the same way, if a person thinks of himself as a Brāhmaṇa, he will not perform actions which are prescribed for Kṣatriyas. In short, a misconception (*abhimāna*) that one belongs to a particular caste, stage of life, etc., is the prerequisite for the performance of scripture-enjoined actions. And this misconception which is a case of *adhyāsa* is due to *avidyā*. It follows that scriptural injunctions become inoperative in the case of a *jñānin* who has the right knowledge of the Self and who is free from *adhyāsa*.

[58]

यथायं दृष्टान्त एवं दार्ष्टान्तिकोऽपीत्येतदाह ।

विदेहो वीतसन्देहो नेति नेत्यवशेषितः ।
देहाद्यनात्मदृक्तद्वत् तत्क्रियां वीक्षतेऽपि न ॥ ५८ ॥

To show that what is true of the example also holds good with regard to what is to be illustrated, he says the following.

[A person who has the right knowledge] is one who is free from the body, who is free from doubt, who remains [as the Self] through the practice of the technique of "not this, not this" and who sees the body, etc. as not-Self. In the same way [as shown in the example] he does not even look at their action. (58)

Here is a beautiful description of the state of a man of wisdom (*jñānin*) which can be contrasted with that of an ignorant man who is bound by the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*), the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) and the causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*). A person who has attained the right knowledge of the Self is, indeed, a *jīvanmukta*, the liberated-in-life, because such a person is free from the limitations of all the three bodies even while he is alive. If association with the body (*saśarīratva*) is bondage, dissociation from the body (*aśarīratva*) is freedom or liberation. A man of wisdom, though tenanting a body, is really free from its limitations. He is *videha*, *i.e.* free from the gross body. Because he has

known the Self, he no more identifies himself with the gross body. *Sandeha* or doubt is a state of the mind which is an important constituent of the subtle body. By the expression "*vītasandeha*", Sureśvara suggests that a *jñānin* is also free from the subtle body. The rise of knowledge causes the disappearance of *avidyā*, which is the causal body. By adopting the Upaniṣadic technique of "*neti neti*" which helps to negate all the objects of the world with form (*mūrta*) and without form (*amūrta*) as not-Self, the man of wisdom, after discarding the not-Self, remains as the Self. And he is really disembodied, though he appears to be associated with the body. It was pointed out earlier that a Brāhmaṇa will not care for the duties of a Kṣatriya and *vice versa*, because each is conditioned in a particular way. Since a man of wisdom, being free from all false notions, is not conditioned in any way by anything, he is indifferent to the activities of his body, senses, and mind. He is free here itself, while being alive.

[59]

तस्यार्थस्याविष्करणार्थमुदाहरणम् ।

मृत्स्नेभके यथेभत्वं शिशुरध्यस्य वल्गति ।
अध्यस्यात्मनि देहादीन् मूढस्तद्वद्विचेष्टते ॥ ५९ ॥

With a view to clarify this idea, an illustration is given.

Just as a child, superimposing the notion of a [real] elephant on the clay-elephant, runs away from it, even so an ignorant man, superimposing the notions of the body, etc. on the Self, is engaged in action. (59)

Here Sureśvara elucidates the idea that engagement in activities, both secular and scriptural, is due to *adhyāsa* or *mithyābhimāna* by citing the example of a child which runs away from a clay-elephant imagining it to be a real one. The behaviour of an ignorant man is comparable to that of a child. In the case of both, *mithyābhimāna* is the cause of action.

[60]

न च वयं ज्ञानकर्मणोः सर्वत्रैव समुच्चयं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे । यत्र प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावो ज्ञानकर्मणोः, तत्र नास्मत्पित्रापि शक्यते निवारयितुम् । तत्र विभागप्रदर्शनायोदाहरणं प्रदर्श्यते ।

स्थाणुं चोरधियालाय भीतो यद्वत् पलायते ।
बुद्ध्यादिभिस्तथात्मानं भ्रान्तोऽध्यारोप्य चेष्टते ॥ ६० ॥

We do not deny the combination of knowledge and action in all cases. Wherever action and knowledge are related as cause and effect, even our father in such a case cannot repudiate [their combination]. With a view to show the distinction in this connection an example is given.

Just as a person cognizing a post as a thief runs away in fear, even so a deluded person, superimposing intellect, etc. on the Self, is engaged in action. (60)

It may appear that the combination of *jñāna* and *karma* is favoured by *śruti* texts such as (*CU*, 1.1.10) "*yadeva vidyayā karoti*" (what, indeed, one performs with knowledge...). Sureśvara says that Advaita does not totally reject the combination of *jñāna* and *karma*. There are places where a combination between them is possible. Also, there are places where no combination between them in any form is possible. It all depends on the nature of *jñāna* which is sought to be combined with *karma*. Sureśvara says that there is combination between *jñāna* and *karma* whenever they are related as means and end (*prayojya-prayojaka-bhāva* = *nimitta-naimittika-bhāva*). What kind of *jñāna* is it that serves as the means to *karma*? The answer is *mithyā-jñāna*. It is because of the erroneous cognition of the post in front as a thief that a person runs away from it in fear. What holds good in this example also holds good with regard to our mis-apprehension of the Self as the agent, enjoyer, etc. In short, *mithyā-jñāna* which leads to action is a subsidiary to it (*karmapravṛtti-nimittatvāt mithyā-jñānaṁ karmāṅgam*).

[61]

एवं यत्र यत्र ज्ञानकर्मणोः प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावः, तत्र सर्वत्रायं न्यायः । यत्र तु न समकालं नापि क्रमेणोपपद्यते समुच्चयः, स विषय उच्यते ।

स्थाणोः सतत्त्वविज्ञानं यथा नाङ्गं पलायने ।
आत्मनस्तत्त्वविज्ञानं तद्वन्नाङ्गं क्रियाविधौ ॥ ६१ ॥

Thus, wherever there is means-end relation between knowledge and action, this principle holds good in all those cases. But cases where neither simultaneous nor successive combination is tenable, will be stated [in the sequel].

Just as the right knowledge of the post is not subsidiary to the act of running, even so the right knowledge of the Self is not subsidiary to the injunction of action. (61)

Sureśvara says that there is neither *sama-samuccaya* (simultaneous combination) nor *krama-samuccaya* (successive combination) between *tattva-jñāna* and *karma*. When a person knows that the object in front is only a post, he does not run away from it in fear. In the same way, when a person realises the Self as a non-agent (*akartā*), as a non-enjoyer (*abhoktā*), he cannot be engaged in action. In short, since *samyag-jñāna* is not the means to action, it cannot be combined with it, either successively or simultaneously. *Śruti* texts such as "*yadeva vidyayā karoti*" (*CU*, 1. 1. 10) speak about the combination of *mithyā-jñāna* and *karma*, and not *samyag-jñāna* and *karma*.

[62]

यस्माद्गुणस्यैतत्स्वाभाव्यम् ।

यद्धि यस्यानुरोधेन स्वभावमनुवर्तते ।
तत्तस्य गुणभूतं स्यान्न प्रधानाद्गुणो यतः ॥ ६२ ॥

For, that is the nature of a subsidiary.

That, indeed, which follows the nature of another in conformity to it can be subsidiary to it. But that which destroys the principal cannot be a subsidiary to it. (62)

What is helpful alone to the principal can be its subsidiary. If we apply this criterion to *samyag-jñāna* to find out whether it can be a subsidiary to *karma*, it will be obvious that it cannot be. The right knowledge of the Self, says Sureśvara, eats up *karma* which is said to be the principal (*pradhānam atti*). So it cannot be *aṅga* to *karma*.

[63 - 64]

यस्मात् ।

कर्मप्रकरणाकाङ्क्षि ज्ञानं कर्मगुणो भवेत् ।
यद्धि प्रकरणे यस्य तत्तादङ्गं प्रचक्षते ॥ ६३ ॥

स्वरूपलाभमात्रेण यत्त्वविद्यां निहन्ति नः ।
न तदङ्गं प्रधानं वा ज्ञानं स्यात् कर्मणः क्वचित् ॥ ६४ ॥

For this reason [also].

The knowledge which expects the context of action will be a subsidiary to action; for, that which belongs to the context of something is said to be a subsidiary to it. (63)

Knowledge which, by its mere origination, destroys our ignorance cannot anywhere be a subsidiary or the principal to action. (64)

According to the Mīmāṁsā, the proofs indicative of the subsidiary relation (*aṅgatva-bodhaka-pramāṇa*) are six, *viz.* direct assertion (*śruti*), indication (*liṅga*), syntactical connection (*vākya*), context (*prakaraṇa*), position (*sthāna*), and designation (*samākhyā*). Of these six proofs, the only proof to be considered for deciding whether *jñāna* is a subsidiary to *karma* is *prakaraṇa*, for all the other proofs enumerated above do not hold good here. So Sureśvara takes up *prakaraṇa* alone for consideration, and vindicates by applying the test of *prakaraṇa* that the knowledge of the Self is not a subsidiary to *karma*.

Prakaraṇa is mutual expectancy (*prakaraṇaṁ nāma paraspara ākāṅkṣā*). For example, on the basis of *prakaraṇa* it is decided that *Prayāja* and other sacrifices are subsidiary to *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, because there is mutual expectancy between them. But there is no mutual expectancy between *ātmajñāna* and *karma*. No sooner does the knowledge of the Self arise than it destroys ignorance. When ignorance is destroyed, *karma* also, which is dependent on ignorance, gets removed. Since *ātmajñāna* and *karma* are

mutually exclusive, there cannot be mutual expectancy between them. If so, Sureśvara asks, how can *ātmajñāna* be related to *karma* either as its subsidiary or principal ?

[65]

समुच्चयपक्षवादिनापि अवश्यमेतदभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । यस्मात् ।

अज्ञानमनिराकुर्वञ्ज्ञानमेव न सिद्ध्यति ।
विपन्नकारकग्रामं ज्ञानं कर्म न ढौकते ॥ ६५ ॥

This has to be necessarily admitted even by the advocates of the theory of combination [of knowledge and action]. For:

Knowledge which does not destroy ignorance does not come into existence at all. Action does not touch knowledge which has destroyed the aggregate of the factors of action. (65)

It is well-known that one's ignorance of a particular object, *e.g.* a tree, is removed when one gets the knowledge of that object. Since knowledge of an object arises from a *pramāṇa*, it is its very nature to bring about the destruction of ignorance about that object (*svaviṣaya avidyā-nivṛtti*); and without doing this, a *pramāṇa-jñāna* does not establish itself. We have already pointed out how *karma* with all that it implies in the form of the several factors of action such as the subject, the object, the instrument, etc., is dependent on *avidyā*. So the rise of *pramāṇa-jñāna* means the disappearance not only of *avidyā*, but also of *karma*. If so, how can *karma* be combined with *jñāna*?

In short, since *ātmajñāna* which the *Upaniṣads* convey does not occur in the *karma-prakaraṇa*, it is not an *aṅga* to *karma*.

[66]

इदं चापरं कारणं ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयनिबर्हि ।

हेतुस्वरूपकार्याणि प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।
विरोधीनि ततो नास्ति साङ्गत्यं ज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥ ६६ ॥

This is also another reason for rejecting the combination of knowledge and action.

Since the sources, nature, and effects of [both] knowledge and action are opposed like light and darkness, there is no combination of them. (66)

Sureśvara brings out the antithesis between knowledge and ritualistic action in three respects with a view to stress the impossibility of their combination. First of all, they differ with regard to their source (*hetu*). While *pramāṇa* is the source of knowledge, *avidyā* followed by *rāga* and *dveṣa* is the source of *karma*. The second point of difference is in respect of their nature (*svarūpa*). While knowledge by its very nature is revelatory of the real, action cannot do this. Thirdly, they differ in respect of the results (*kārya*) which they produce. While *avidyā-nivṛtti* is the effect of *jñāna*, origination, attainment, etc. (*utpattyāptyādi*) are the effects of *karma*. Being thus opposed to each other, like light and darkness, in respect of their *hetu*, *svarūpa*, and *kārya*, they cannot stand any kind of combination with each other.

[67]

एवमुपसंहृते केचित् स्वसम्प्रदायबलावष्टम्भादाहुः, यदेतद्वेदान्तवाक्यात् "अहं ब्रह्म" इति विज्ञानं समुत्पद्यते, तन्नैव स्वोत्पत्तिमात्रेणाज्ञानं निरस्यति। किं तर्हि? अहन्यहनि द्राघीयसा कालेनोपासीनस्य सतो भावनोपचयात् निश्शेषमज्ञानमपगच्छति, "देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति" इति श्रुतेः। अपरे तु ब्रुवते, वेदान्तवाक्यजनितम् "अहं ब्रह्म" इति विज्ञानं संसर्गात्मकत्वात्, आत्मवस्तुयाथात्म्यावगाह्येव न भवति। किं तर्हि? एतदेव गङ्गास्रोतोवत् सततमभ्यस्यतोऽन्यदेव अवाक्यार्थात्मकं विज्ञानान्तरमुत्पद्यते। तदेवाशेषाज्ञानतिमिरोत्सारीति, "विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः" इति श्रुतेरिति। अस्य पक्षद्वयस्य निवृत्तय इदमभिधीयते।

सकृत्प्रवृत्त्या मृद्नाति क्रियाकारकरूपभृत् ।
अज्ञानमागमज्ञानं साङ्गत्यं नास्त्यतोऽनयोः ॥ ६७ ॥

When we thus conclude, there are those who, on the strength of their own tradition, say that the knowledge,

"I am Brahman," which arises from the *Vedānta* text does not remove ignorance by its mere origination. What then? One who practises meditation every day for a long time can get rid of the entire ignorance by the accumulated strength of meditation, as shown by the *śruti* text, "Becoming (knowing) god, he attains the gods." Some others maintain that since the knowledge, "I am Brahman," which has risen from the *Vedānta* text is relational, it does not at all apprehend the real nature of the Self. What then? This [knowledge] itself, when it is continuously meditated upon [without any break] like the stream of the Gaṅgā, produces in a person another knowledge which is different [from it] and which is non-sentential. That alone destroys the entire darkness of ignorance, as shown by the *śruti* text, "The Brāhmaṇa, after knowing it, should attain the direct knowledge." For the refutation of these two views, this is stated.

The knowledge which arises from scripture on its first appearance destroys ignorance which manifests in the form of the instruments of action. Hence there is no combination of these two. (67)

The two views which Sureśvara takes up for examination are associated with Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana, who are also Vedāntins. When Sureśvara remarks that the advocates of these views take their stand on the strength of their own tradition (*svasampradāyabala avaṣṭambhāt*), the implication is that their views are not supported by *pramāṇa* and *yukti* and their standpoint cannot, therefore, be characterized as *satsampradāya*.

Brahmadatta's view can be summarised in a series of propositions as follows.

(1) The *Upaniṣads* purport to teach meditation (*bhāvanā* or *upāsanā*) and there are Upaniṣadic texts which are injunctive.

(2) These injunctive texts enjoin meditation on Brahman-Ātman. For example, there is the text, "The Self alone is to be meditated upon" (*BU*, 1.4.7). Assertive statements such as "*tat tvam asi*" must be construed along with the injunctive texts to which they are subsidiary.

(3) The Upaniṣadic texts like "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*," "*tat tvam asi*," convey only mediate knowledge (*parokṣa-jñāna*) of Brahman.

(4) Constant meditation on the content of these Upaniṣadic texts gives rise to direct and immediate knowledge, called *aparokṣa-jñāna* or *sākṣātkāra* of Brahman.

(5) The *aparokṣa-jñāna* which arises as a result of *bhāvanā* destroys *avidyā*.

(6) *Karma* has to be performed at the time of the practice of meditation.

(7) When the body falls off, the meditator (*upāsaka*) attains union with God on which he has been meditating. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (4.1.2), "*devo bhūtvā devānapyeti*," lends support to this view. "*Devo bhūtvā*" means "*devabhāvaṁ sākṣātkṛtya*", *i.e.* attaining the direct, immediate knowledge of God. How is this possible? The answer is: "because of the strength of the continued meditation" (*bhāvanopacayāt*). "*Devānapyeti*" means "*devatābhāvam prāpnoti*", *i.e.* becomes one with God who has been meditated upon, when his body falls off.

The second view which is ascribed to Maṇḍana may be summarised as follows.

(1) The knowledge which arises from the *Upaniṣads* is relational (*saṁsṛṣṭa*) and mediate (*parokṣa*) like any other knowledge which arises from a sentence. A sentence is a group of words. Since each word which conveys its own meaning comes into relation with other words in a sentence, the meaning conveyed by a sentence is relational. Further, a sentence which gives information about an object can generate only mediate knowledge. In this respect, what is true of a secular sentence is also true of a scriptural sentence.

(2) Such a knowledge cannot apprehend Brahman-Ātman which is non-relational (*asaṁsṛṣṭa*) and immediate (*aparokṣa*).

(3) In order to overcome the difficulty, one should meditate on the knowledge obtained from the *Upaniṣads*.

(4) As a result of meditation (*bhāvanā* or *upāsanā*), another knowledge which is non-relational and immediate arises. It is called *avākyārtha-jñāna* (non-sentential knowledge).

(5) It is this *avākyārtha-jñāna* that destroys *avidyā*.

(6) One should perform obligatory duties during the time of the practice of meditation.

(7) The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (4.4.21) "*vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta*"

supports this view. "*Vijñāya*" means "knowing Brahman in a relational way" (*saṁsṛṣṭarūpam brahma avagamya*). "*Prajñāṁ kurvīta*" means "should attain the direct knowledge which is non-relational (*sākṣātkāra-lakṣaṇām asaṁsargātmikāṁ sādhayet*).

Sureśvara refutes both the views together in the verse. The real issue to be considered is not about the utility of *bhāvanā*, but is about the stage when it is needed and has to be practised. So the question to be asked is: Is it needed before or after the origination of knowledge? There is no difficulty in accepting the utility of *bhāvanā* before the rise of knowledge. Distractions in the form of doubt (*asambhāvanā*) and erroneous cognition (*viparīta-bhāvanā*) which are obstacles to the origination of knowledge have to be removed by achieving concentration of the mind; and *bhāvanā* brings about concentration of the mind. When the right knowledge from the Upaniṣadic text arises, *bhāvanā*, having done its work, goes away. And the knowledge which has been produced by *śruti* at once destroys *avidyā* and the instruments of action. There is, thus, no scope either for *bhāvanā* or for *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* after the rise of knowledge.

Let us now bring out the meaning of the text, "*vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta.*" "*Vijñāya = vedāntavākya-pratipādyaṁ brahmeti vijñāya*, *i.e.* knowing that Brahman is the purport of the *Vedānta* text, "*prajñāṁ kurvīta*" = *aparokṣabrahma-vijñānaṁ vākyādeva kuryāt*, *i.e.* one should attain the immediate knowledge of Brahman from the text itself. A spiritual aspirant who is desirous of getting the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman from the *śruti* texts must go through two kinds of discipline — preliminary and final. The preliminary discipline, frequently referred to as *sādhana-catuṣṭaya*, insists on discrimination (*viveka*), dispassion (*vairāgya*), control of the mind and the senses (*śama*, *dama*, etc.), and longing for liberation (*mumukṣutva*) as the prerequisities for the study of the *Vedānta* texts. *Śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (reflection), and *nididhyāsana* (repeated contemplation) constitute the final discipline for getting the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman from the text. The condition of the mind which, on hearing the texts, enables one to know Brahman-Ātman as the purport of the *Vedānta* texts by the application of the six purport-indicating marks such as harmony between *upakrama* and *upasaṁhāra*, *abhyāsa*, etc. is called *śravaṇa* (*śravaṇaṁ nāma yuktyā ṣaḍvidha-tātparya-liṅgaiḥ vedāntavākyānāṁ*

advitīye pratyagabhinna-brahmaṇi tātparya-nirṇayānukūla-cetovṛttiviśeṣaḥ). *Manana* is constant thinking on the non-dual Brahman-Ātman by making use of different kinds of reasoning which will not only prove the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, but also disprove their difference (*mananaṁ nāma pratyag-brahmaikya-sādhaka-tadbheda-bhādhaka-yuktibhiḥ sadā advitīya-brahmātmaikya anusandhānam*). Maintaining the continuous thought-stream of Brahman without allowing it to be disturbed by the ideas of difference (or not-Self) is *nididhyāsana* (*bhedapratyayānantarita-brahmākāra-pratyaya-pravāha eva nididhyāsanamucyate*). Since knowledge does not fall within the scope of injunction, the injunctive force of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (4.4.21) mentioned above has reference only to the discipline of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* which can and has to be practised for the purpose of removing the obstacles of *asambhāvanā* and *viparītabhāvanā* which stand in the way of the origination of knowledge.

[68]

एवं तावदनानात्वे ब्रह्मणि, ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयो निराकृतः। अथाधुना पक्षान्तराभ्युपगमेनापि प्रत्यवस्थाने पूर्ववदनाश्वासो यथा, तथाभिधीयते।

अनुत्सारितनानात्वं ब्रह्म यस्यापि वादिनः।
तन्मतेनापि दुस्साध्यो ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयः॥ ६८॥

So far the combination of knowledge and ritualistic action was refuted on the ground that Brahman is non-dual. Now, even if another view [according to which Brahman is one as well as dual] is accepted, we will show that we cannot, as earlier, have any faith in the rejected [combination theory].

The combination of knowledge and ritualistic action cannot be established even according to the view of the disputants who hold that Brahman is not free from plurality. (68)

Sureśvara introduces here the view of Bhartṛprapañca, which is different from that of Advaita. While Advaita holds

that Brahman is one and non-dual (*anānātvam = advayam*) in the sense that it is free from *sajātīya-*, *vijātīya-* and *svagata-bheda*, Bhartṛprapañca is of the view that Brahman is one as well as dual (*dvaitādvaita* or *bhedābheda*). So far as its specific nature is concerned, Brahman is different from the *jīva*. It is also one with the *jīva* in respect of what it has in common with the *jīva*. Brahman which has the general (*sāmānya*) as well as the specific (*viśeṣa*) nature is, according to Bhartṛprapañca, *bhinnābhinna*. It is of variegated nature (*anekarasa = nānārasa*).

Sureśvara argues that the theory of *samuccaya* which has been rejected does not hold good, even if one were to accept Bhartṛprapañca's conception of Brahman.

[69]

तस्य विभागोक्तिर्दूषणविभागप्रज्ञप्तये ।

ब्रह्मात्मा वा भवेत्तस्य यदि वानात्मरूपकम् ।
आत्मानाप्तिर्भवेन्मोहादितरस्याप्यनात्मनः ॥ ६९ ॥

The alternatives in the [above] theory are stated for the purpose of their refutation separately.

For the disputant, either Brahman is the Self or it is different from the Self. [If the former], the non-attainment of the Self is due to illusion. In the case of the other alternative, since it is different from the Self [there is no attainment of it]. (69)

Sureśvara examines the theory of Bhedābheda (also known as Anaikāntika) advocated by Bhartṛprapañca and his followers by focussing attention on the way in which the relation between Brahman and *jīva* is sought to be explained by them in three different ways. Some of the advocates of Bhedābheda hold the view that Brahman and *jīva* are non-different *even* in the state of bondage, while some others of the same school maintain that they are different in the state of bondage, even though they become non-different in the state of release. Some others, again, of this school hold the view that Brahman and *jīva* are both different

and not-different even in the state of bondage. Altogether there are three alternatives. The first two alternatives are examined in verses (69) to (71), while the third one is examined in verse (72). Sureśvara argues that whatever be the alternative through which the relation between Brahman and *jīva* is sought to be explained according to the theory of Bhedābheda, there is no scope for *jñāna-karma-samuccaya.* The first line of verse (69) refers to the first two alternatives of the theory, and the second line contains their refutation.

Consider the first alternative. If Brahman is non-different from the individual Self even in the state of bondage, it only means that Brahman by its very nature is the inward Self of the *jīva.* If so, the non-attainment of Brahman by the *jīva* must be due to *avidyā.* We have already stated that *avidyā* can be removed by knowledge alone. It follows that, since *karma* is not at all required for attaining Brahman, the question of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* does not arise.

The second alternative fares no better. If Brahman by its very nature is different from *jīva*, the latter can never become identical with the former by any means at any time. It means that neither *jñāna* nor *karma* can help the *jīva* to become one with Brahman. If so, what is *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* for?

[70]

तत्र यदि तावद्ब्रह्मास्त्वेनैव वृत्तेन ब्रह्म प्राप्तमात्मस्वाभाव्यात्, केवलमासुर-मोहापिधानमात्रमेवानाप्तिनिमित्तं, तस्मिन् पक्षे।

मोहापिधानभङ्गाय नैव कर्माणि कारणम्।
ज्ञानेनैव फलावाप्तेस्तत्र कर्म निरर्थकम् ॥ ७० ॥

Now, if Brahman is really attained in view of its being of the nature of the Self, it is only the veil of the demoniac delusion that is the cause of its non-attainment. With regard to this view [this has to be said].

Ritualistic actions can never be the means to the removal of the veil of delusion. Since the result can be

attained by the knowledge alone, ritualistic action is futile thereto. (70)

Sureśvara elucidates further the first of the two alternatives.

[71]

अनात्मरूपके तु ब्रह्मणि न कर्म साधनभावं प्रतिपद्यते, नापि ज्ञानं कर्मसमुच्चितमसमुच्चितं वा, यस्मादन्यस्य स्वत एव साधकस्य ब्रह्मणोऽप्यन्यत्वं स्वत एव सिद्धम्। तत्रैवम्।

अन्यस्यान्यात्मताप्राप्तौ न क्वचिद्धेतुसम्भवः।
तस्मिन् सत्यपि नो नष्टे* परात्मानं प्रपद्यते ॥ ७१ ॥

If, on the other hand, Brahman is not of the nature of the Self, ritualistic action cannot be the means [to the attainment of Brahman]. Nor can knowledge, either combined or not combined with ritualistic action, be the means [thereto]. The reason is that to the aspirant, who is by his very nature other than [Brahman], Brahman also of its own accord is different from him. Here it is thus.

Nowhere is there a cause by which an object can become another. When an object remains what it is, it cannot be [another]. Also, when it ceases to be, it cannot become another. (71)

Sureśvara elucidates further the untenability of the second alternative. If the *jīva* who is a *sādhaka* is essentially different from Brahman, he can never achieve *brahmaprāpti*, *i.e.* he can never become one with Brahman, by *jñāna*, or by a combination of *jñāna* and *karma*. Is it possible to say that, even though the *jīva* is different from Brahman, Brahman is non-different from the *jīva*? "No," answers Sureśvara. If A is different from B, then B is also different from A. If the difference between *jīva* and Brahman is accepted, it is impossible for the *jīva* to become

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* नष्टः (H)

Brahman. Every object is what it is. It cannot be another. Nor can it become another without jeopardizing its own existence. That is why Sureśvara says that there is no means by which one object can become another. Either an object is, or it is not. So long as an object is what it is, it cannot really be another, because its essential nature is different from that of the other object. When it ceases to be, *i.e.* when it is lost, it cannot become another, because it is no more.

[72]

अपरस्मिंस्तु पक्षे विधिः।

परमात्मानुकूलेन ज्ञानाभ्यासेन दुःखिनः ।
द्वैतिनोऽपि प्रमुच्येरन् न परात्मविरोधिना ॥ ७२ ॥

But, in the case of yet another view, there is scope for injunction [about meditation].

Even the dualists who experience suffering will be liberated through the practice of meditation [on the *jiva*] as the supreme Self, but not through that [knowledge of difference] which is contrary to the nature of the supreme Self. (72)

Sureśvara introduces in verse (72) the third alternative through which the relation between Brahman and *jīva* is explained from the standpoint of Bhedābheda. According to this alternative, *jīva* is identical with, and also different from, Brahman in the state of bondage. Sureśvara argues that this alternative may account for "*brahmaprāpti*", *i.e.* the union of *jīva* with Brahman, through the practice of *upāsanā*. It has to be borne in mind that *upāsanā* is conducive to the attainment of Saguṇa-Brahman alone and not Nirguṇa-Brahman. So in the context of *upāsanā*, the term, "*brahma-prāpti*" means "*saguṇa-brahma-prāpti*". Earlier reference was made to the *śruti* text (*BU*, 4.1.2), "*devo bhūtvā devānapyeti*," which says that one who meditates on God attains union with that God as a result of *upāsanā*. Sureśvara's point is that, by considering the *jīva* as Brahman for the purpose of meditation (*jīve brahmadṛṣṭi-prakṣepeṇa yadupāsanam*), it is intelligible to say that

a meditator attains union with Saguṇa-Brahman through the practice of meditation. Since the *upāsanā* is conducive to the attainment of *saguṇa-brahma-prāpti*, Sureśvara speaks of it as *paramātmānukūla-jñāna*" in the first line of the verse. Of course, what is achieved through *bhāvanā* or *upāsanā* is not permanent just as what is attained through *karma* is not permanent. Sureśvara will emphasize this point in the sequel (III, 93). In short, the efficacy of *upāsanā* is restricted to the attainment of what is called "*apara-mukti*" which is not eternal. It is in this way that Sureśvara is willing to accommodate *upāsanā* (and the injunction which enjoins *upāsanā*) as the means to *saguṇa-brahma-prāpti*. But there is no scope for *karma* (or *karma-vidhi*) in respect of *brahma-prāpti*, because *karma* presupposes and operates on the basis of difference, which is opposed to the nature of Brahman. The notion of difference which is necessary for the practice of *karma* is, Sureśvara says, *paramātma-virodhi*. So it is impossible for one to achieve *brahma-prāpti* through the practice of *karma*.

[73]

इतरस्मिंस्तु पक्षे विधेरेवानवकाशत्वम्। कथम्?

समस्तव्यस्तभूतस्य ब्रह्मण्येवावतिष्ठतः।
ब्रूत कर्मणि को हेतुः सर्वानन्यत्वदर्शिनः॥ ७३॥

In the case of the other view (which holds that the *jīva* is identical with Brahman), there is no scope at all for injunction. Why?

Tell me. Where is the need for action on the part of a person who sees everything as non-different from himself, who remains only as Brahman, and who is all, collectively as well as individually? (73)

If it be said, with a view to avoid the difficulties stated above, that the *jīva* is identical with Brahman which is of variegated nature (*anekarasa*), then there is no scope for any injunction — *upāsanā-vidhi* or *karma-vidhi* — in the matter of achieving *brahma-prāpti*. Sureśvara gives the reason for this in the verse. A person who has known the truth of the non-difference between Brahman

and *jīva* remains as Brahman which is one. As Brahman, he is everything, individually and collectively. There is nothing which is different from him. To such a person, there cannot be anything which remains to be accomplished. If so, Sureśvara says, there is no need either of *upāsanā* which is a mental activity or of ritualistic action which is external and bodily activity. This shows, once again, the untenability of the combination theory.

[74]

सर्वकर्मनिमित्तसम्भवासम्भवाभ्यां सर्वकर्मसङ्करश्च प्राप्नोति । यस्मात् ।

सर्वजात्यादिमत्त्वेऽस्य नितरां हेत्वसम्भवः ।
विशेषं ह्यनुपादाय कर्म नैव प्रवर्तते ॥ ७४ ॥

Since it becomes possible as well as impossible for one to perform all actions [on the view of non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman], there arises also [the defect] of mixing up of all actions.

For this person who identifies himself with all castes etc., there is no reason at all [for the performance of any ritualistic action]. Indeed, ritualistic action cannot take place at all in the absence of specification [such as caste, etc.] (74)

There is yet another objection against the view which holds that the *jīva* is identical with Brahman which is of variegated nature (*kevalābheda eva anekarasa brahmaṇā*). If the difference between Brahman and the *jīvas* is admitted, one can explain and justify how the duties of one person are different from those of another. Each individual is eligible to perform ritualistic actions in accordance with the caste and the stage of life he identifies himself with. It is on the basis of this identification that scripture says that a Brāhmaṇa is eligible to perform *Bṛhaspatisava*, that a king is eligible to perform *Rājasūya*, and so on. There is, thus, *karma-vyavasthā*, *i.e.* restriction with regard to what ritualistic actions one should and should not do based on *adhikāri-vyavasthā*. But this restriction, says Sureśvara, will not be possible on the view that

all the *jīvas* are identical with Brahman which is not one and homogeneous, but which is of a variegated nature (*anekarasa*). Since Brahman comprises everything, a Brāhmaṇa who claims identity with Brahman is not only a Brāhmaṇa, but also a Kṣatriya. In the same way, a Kṣatriya who claims identity with Brahman is not only a Kṣatriya, but also a Brāhmaṇa. In short, on the basis of identity with Brahman which, being variegated, comprises within its bosom everything, every individual becomes identical with all other individuals belonging to other castes and stages of life. If an individual is what he is and also others, there will be no restriction for him to do only one set of actions and not others. He may not even do the deeds he is called upon to perform on the ground that he is somebody else. Since *karma-vyavasthā, i.e.* restriction with regard to the eligibility for the performance of *karma*, goes away, it will lead to the undesirable result of "*sarva-karma-saṅkara*", *i.e.* the mixing up of all *karmas*. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that the *jīva* is identical with Brahman which is *anekarasa* (= *nānārasa*).

[75]

स्याद्विधिरध्यात्माभिमानादिति चेत्, नैवम्। यस्मात्।

न चाध्यात्माभिमानोऽपि विदुषोऽस्त्यासुरत्वतः।
विदुषोऽप्यासुरश्चेत् स्यान्निष्फलं ब्रह्मदर्शनम्॥ ७५॥

If it be said that there is room for injunction [which enjoins the performance of *karmas* on the basis of eligibility], since there is identification with the body, it is not so for the following reason.

Also, identification with the body which is due to the demoniac delusion is not possible for an enlightened person. If even an enlightened person be subject to demoniac delusion, Brahman-realization would be useless. (75)

The opponent who holds that the *jīva* is identical with Brahman which is of variegated nature may argue in a different way to justify both *adhikāri-vyavasthā* (eligibility-restriction) and

karma-vyavasthā (duty-restriction) without giving up his basic position. Even though one individual becomes identical with other individuals on account of his identity with Brahman which is all, there is also, so the opponent argues, difference between one individual and others in so far as an individual identifies himself with his own gross body which is endowed with the characteristics of caste and stages of life (*jātyādi-samavāyi-sthūla-dehābhimāna*). Consequently, it is reasonable, according to the opponent, to think in terms of *adhikāri-vyavasthā* and *karma-vyavasthā*.

Sureśvara rejects this argument on the ground that it proceeds on an untenable assumption. The opponent seeks to justify *karma-vyavasthā* on the basis of *adhikāri-vyavasthā*, *ādhikāri-vyavasthā* on the basis of *bheda*, and *bheda* on the basis of *sthūla-dehābhimāna*. The question is whether a man of knowledge will have the alleged identification with the gross body, *i.e. adhyātma abhimāna*. "No such identification is possible for a man of knowledge," answers Sureśvara. One who has the right knowledge is free from *avidyā*, and in the absence of *avidyā*, identification with the body, senses, and mind cannot take place. Therefore, the assumption that a man of knowledge will have *adhyātma abhimāna* is untenable. If we assume for the sake of argument that, after attaining Brahman-knowledge, one has this identification, it will prove, Sureśvara says, the futility of Brahman-realization (*brahma-darśana*). But this is absurd, because knowledge cannot establish itself without removing *avidyā* and its work. In short, one who is a knower of Brahman cannot have the false identification with the mind-sense-body complex; and one who has this identification cannot be a knower of Brahman.

[76]

अज्ञानकार्यत्वान्न समकालं नापि क्रमेण ज्ञानकर्मणोर्वस्त्ववस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् सङ्गतिरस्तीत्येवं निराकृतोऽपि, काशं कुशं वा अवलम्ब्याह ।

अथाध्यात्मं पुनर्यायादाश्रितो मूढतां भवेत् ।
स करोत्येव कर्माणि को ह्यज्ञं विनिवारयेत् ॥ ७६ ॥

Even though the theory of simultaneous as well as successive combination between knowledge which is dependent on

the real and ritualistic action which is dependent on the unreal has been refuted on the ground that ritualistic action is the result of ignorance, (the opponent again) argues catching hold of straws.

If it be the case that there is identification with the body (for the enlightened man), then he is an ignorant man. He certainly performs actions. Indeed, who can prevent an ignorant one? (76)

The opponent once again tries to defend the combination theory on flimsy grounds in the same way as a drowning man would endeavour to save himself by catching hold of flimsy things such as straws. It is seen, the opponent argues, that a man of knowledge has identification with the body; and what is observed as a matter of fact cannot be refuted by reasoning or *yukti*. This argument, says Sureśvara, is not convincing. The Advaitin does not deny that an ignorant man has *adhyātma abhimāna* and that as a consequence of this he performs ritualistic actions. That is why Sureśvara asks: Who can restrain an ignorant man from the deeds he performs? On the contrary, the Advaitin maintains that an enlightened man, *i.e.* a knower of Brahman, cannot have *adhyātma abhimāna* and that he cannot, therefore, be engaged in actions. Right knowledge and false identification with the mind-sense-body complex cannot co-exist in the same person.

[77]

सिद्धत्वाच्च न साध्यम् । यतः ।

सामान्येतररूपाभ्यां कर्मात्मैवास्य योगिनः ।
निश्श्वासोच्छ्वासवत् तस्मान्न नियोगमपेक्षते ॥ ७७ ॥

Since (what has to be done) has already deen achieved (by the man of knowledge), it is not something yet to be accomplished. It is for this reason.

Action, either as the universal or as the particular, becomes the very nature of the man of knowledge. Therefore, it requires no injunction like breathing in and breathing out. (77)

Sureśvara argues in a different way to show that the combination theory cannot be justified from the standpoint of Anaikāntika of Bhartṛprapañca. His argument can be summarised in a series of propositions as follows.

(1) Everything must be either universal (*sāmānya*) or particular (*viśeṣa*).

(2) Ritualistic action must be one of these two.

(3) Brahman is all. So it must be of the nature of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

(4) The enlightened man is identical with Brahman.

(5) It follows from propositions (1) to (4) that *karma* constitutes the very nature of the enlightened man.

(6) *Karma*, by virtue of its being the very nature of the enlightened man, is something existent (*siddha*). It is not what is yet to be accomplished (*sādhya*). It *is* already there in the enlightened man without any effort on his part, just like respiration in him (*niśśvāsaucchvāsavat*).

(7) If so, *karma* which is *siddha* does not fall within the scope of injunction, *i.e.* it is not *niyoga-viṣaya*.

(8) What does not fall within the scope of injunction cannot be performed.

(9) When *karma* does not admit of practice, the question of combining *jñāna* and *karma* for achieving the goal does not arise.

[78]

अस्तु तर्हि भिन्नाभिन्नात्मकं ब्रह्म। तथा च सति ज्ञानकर्मणी सम्भवतो भेदाभेदविषयत्वात् तयोः। तत्र तावदयं पक्ष एव न सम्भवति। किं कारणम्? न हि भिन्नोऽयमित्यभेदबुद्धिमनिराकृत्य भेदबुद्धिः पदार्थमालिङ्गते। एवं ह्यनभ्युपगमे भिन्नाभिन्नपदार्थयोरलौकिकत्वं प्रसज्येत। अथ निष्प्रमाणकमप्याश्रीयते, तदप्युभयपक्षाभ्युपगमात् अभेदपक्षे दुःखि ब्रह्म स्यादत आह।

भिन्नाभिन्नं विशेषैश्चेद्दुःखि स्याद्ब्रह्म ते ध्रुवम्।
अशेषदुःखिता च स्यादहो प्रज्ञात्मवादिनाम्॥ ७८॥

"Then," so the opponent argues, "let Brahman be different as well as non-different. In that case, both knowledge and action become possible, because they are concerned

with oneness and difference." But this theory itself is untenable. Why is it so? The notion of difference such as "This is different" cannot arise with regard to any object without removing the notion of non-difference. If this is not accepted, the terms "difference" and "non-difference" will lose their ordinary significance. If this theory is entertained [by the opponent] even though there is no evidence for it, then since both positions (*i.e.* difference and non-difference between Brahman and *jīva*) are accepted [by him], Brahman would be subject to misery from the standpoint of non-difference. Therefore it is said.

If Brahman is different as well as non-different on account of [the common and] specific qualities, then in your theory Brahman is surely subject to misery. Also, it has to bear the entire misery [of all the *jīvas*]. Wonderful is the wisdom of those who talk about the Self! (78)

In verses (73) to (77) Sureśvara criticized the standpoint of non-difference between Brahman and *jīva* upheld by the advocates of Bhedābheda or Anaikāntika, who consider Brahman as of variegated nature (*anekarasa*). He now argues that the concept of "*bhedābheda*" itself is logically untenable.

Let us first consider how the advocate of Bhedābheda tries to justify his conception of Brahman as *bhedābheda*. The *Veda* consists of two parts — the ritual section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) and the knowledge section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*). While the former deals with *karma*, the latter has its purport in *jñāna*. It is well-known that *karma* presupposes and operates on the basis of difference (*bheda*). The Upaniṣadic texts such as "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*" which teach the identity of Brahman and *jīva* presuppose non-difference (*abheda*). It means that *karma-kāṇḍa* whose purport is in *karma* accepts the validity of *bheda* and that *jñāna-kāṇḍa* which conveys the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman identity accepts the validity of *abheda*. Both *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna-kāṇḍa*, argues the Bhedābhedavādin, will cease to be *pramāṇa* if the truth of *bheda* and *abheda* conveyed by them is not accepted. But since the validity of these two sections which constitute the *Veda* is accepted, and since the *Veda*

as a whole purports to teach Brahman, it follows that Brahman is *bhedābheda*.

At the outset Sureśvara summarily dismisses the theory on the ground that our experience does not testify to its validity. We do say on the basis of experience that two things are identical or that they are different; but we do not say that they are both identical and different at the same time, for our experience of things is not in this way.

The advocate of Bhedābheda may argue that our day-to-day experience does warrant the concept of *bhedābheda*. Consider the following case. On seeing a white cloth, we say, "*śuklaḥ paṭah.*" The two words "*śuklaḥ*" and "*paṭaḥ*" in our expression, which denote a quality (*guṇa*) and a substance (*dravya*) respectively, are in grammatical coordination (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). Though each word in this expression conveys its own meaning, we have to say on the basis of grammatical coordination that obtains between these two words that both of them refer to one thing as possessing two different aspects (*bhinnapravṛtti-nimittānāṁ śabdānāṁ ekasminnarthe vṛttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam*). So the expression "white cloth" conveys the idea that "the object which is a cloth is white", or "that which is white is a cloth." Here the relation between *dravya* (*i.e.* cloth) and *guṇa* (*i.e.* whiteness) is such that they are not completely identical or totally different. This is also true in the case of the universal and the particular, *i.e.* *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, as seen in our usage "*sanghaṭaḥ*". As a general principle it may be stated that the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* usage will not be possible if the objects denoted by words are completely identical or totally different. But inasmuch as our experience warrants such usage, the advocate of Bhedābheda claims that things in the world are both identical and different and that the concept of *bhedābheda* is tenable.

Sureśvara exposes the untenability of the above argument on the ground that *bheda* and *abheda* which are mutually exclusive cannot hold good in the same context at the same time. In order to appreciate the force and the full significance of Sureśvara's argument, it is necessary to explicate the meaning of the term "*abheda*". Does the term "*abheda*" mean absence of *bheda* (*bhedābhāva*), or what is opposed to *bheda* (*bhedavirodhī*), or what is different from *bheda* (*bhedāt anyaḥ*)? If the meaning of the term "*abheda*" is understood in the first two senses, it is obvious that

bheda and *abheda* cannot co-exist at the same time. Absence of *bheda* is not possible where there is *bheda*. Nor can that which is opposed to *bheda* co-exist with it. Then, is it possible to explain the term "*abheda*" in the sense of "what is different from *bheda*" for the purpose of accommodating *bheda* and *abheda* together? This way of explaining the term also is not helpful. If *bheda* is accepted as a category, colour and taste which are also categories are "different from *bheda*". If "what is different from *bheda*" is *abheda*, then inasmuch as colour and taste are different from *bheda*, they may as well be called "*abheda*", which is absurd. In short, *bheda* and *abheda* being mutually exclusive cannot co-exist. That is why Sureśvara says that the notion of difference cannot arise with regard to any two objects without dislodging the notion of non-difference. If two objects are non-different from each other, they cannot also be different.

If, in spite of this difficulty, the advocate of *Bhedābheda* insists on calling objects as both different and non-different at the same time, he will be using the terms " *bheda*" and "*abheda*" not in the usual way in which they are used and understood; that is to say, his usage of the terms will be *alaukika* or *aprasiddha*.

Reference was made to the usage of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* for justifying the acceptance of both *bheda* and *abheda* as equally real. The Advaitin does accept the usage of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. But there is no binding on that account that both *abheda* and *bheda* must be accepted as real. This usage, according to Advaita, can be accounted for by accepting *bheda* as illusory (*kalpita*), while *abheda* is real as in the case of the sentence, "*so'yaṁ devadattaḥ*" (This is that Devadatta). The person, *viz.* Devadatta, seen in two different places at different times, is the same, even though we speak of "This Devadatta" and "That Devadatta" as if there are two persons. Here, while *abheda* is real, *bheda* is illusory.

Apart from the objection against the concept of *bhedābheda* from the standpoint of our experience, Sureśvara criticizes the theory by exposing its absurdity when applied to Brahman. Since Brahman is said to be non-different from the *jīvas*, it has to experience the sufferings of all the *jīvas*. While each *jīva* experiences its own misery, Brahman has to experience the sufferings of all the *jīvas*; and so its bondage is more terrible than that of an individual *jīva*. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the

Anaikāntika theory of Bhartṛprapañca, which is not dissimilar to the Jaina standpoint in this regard.

[79]

तस्मात् सम्यगेवाभिहितं न ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इत्युपसंह्रियते ।

तमोऽङ्गत्वं यथा भानोरग्नेश्शीताङ्गता यथा ।
वारिणश्चोष्णता यद्वत् ज्ञानस्यैवं क्रियाङ्गता ॥ ७९ ॥

Therefore, we conclude that it has been well stated that there is no combination of knowledge and ritualistic action.

Just as the sun cannot be a part of darkness, just as cold cannot be a part of fire, just as water cannot go with heat, even so knowledge cannot be a part of ritualistic action (or, cannot have ritualistic action as its part). (79)

The members of each pair given as example — sun and darkness, cold and fire, and water and heat — are mutually exclusive; and so they cannot be related with each other. The same is the case with *karma* and *jñāna*. The three examples given by Sureśvara exemplify (1) that *jñāna* is not subsidiary to *karma*, (2) that *karma* is not subsidiary to *jñāna*, and (3) that there is no simultaneous combination of *karma* and *jñāna*.

The term "*kriyāṅgatā*" which occurs in the second line of the verse may be understood as "*kriyām prati aṅgatā*" (being subsidiary to *karma*) and also as "*kriyāṅgaṁ asya*" (that of which *karma* is subsidiary). The idea is that there cannot be *aṅgāṅgi* relation between *jñāna* and *karma*.

[80]

यथोक्तोपपत्तिबलेनैव पूर्वपक्षस्योत्सारितत्वात्, वक्तव्यं नावशेषितमित्यतः प्रतिपत्तिकर्मवत् पूर्वपक्षपरिहाराय यत्किञ्चिद्वक्तव्यमित्यत इदमभिधीयते ।

"मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वाद्" इत्याद्यनुचितं बहु ।
यदभाणि तदन्याय्यं यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥ ८० ॥

Since the *prima facie* view has been refuted by the arguments stated above, nothing remains to be stated. Nevertheless, with a view to say something more for the disposal of the *prima facie* view, the following is stated like the *pratipatti-karma* (the rite of disposal).

Commencing with the statement, "Since liberation is attained through ritualistic actions," many improper assertions have been made. How they are untenable will be stated now. (80)

Sureśvara has refuted the *prima facie* view according to which liberation can be attained through *karma* alone, or through *karma* in combination with *jñāna*. It is quite possible that a dull-witted person may think that the specific arguments adduced by the opponent have not been answered by him. Sureśvara says that what follows is for the purpose of refuting these arguments of the opponent which have been stated from verse (9). What he proposes to do for the disposal of the *prima facie* view is like *pratipatti-karma*. The scriptural rite for the disposal of the used material by throwing it in the appropriate place, *e.g.* throwing the black antelope's horn in a hole, is called *pratipatti-karma* (*upayuktasya dravyasya vihitadeśe prakṣepaḥ pratipattiḥ, yathā "cātvāle kṛṣṇaviṣāṇam utsṛjet" iti niyamavat*).

[81]

योऽयं काम्यानां प्रतिषिद्धानां च त्यागः प्रतिज्ञायते, सा प्रतिज्ञा तावन्न शक्यतेऽनुष्ठातुम्। किं कारणम्? कर्मणो हि निर्वृत्तात्मनो द्वाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यां निवृत्तिः सम्भवति, आरब्धफलस्योपभोगेन, अनारब्धफलस्याशुभस्य प्रायश्चित्तैरिति। तृतीयोऽपि त्यागप्रकारोऽकर्त्रात्मावबोधात्, स त्वात्मज्ञानानभ्युपगमाद्भवता नाभ्युपगम्यते। तत्र यान्यनुपभुक्तफलान्यनारब्धफलानि, तानीश्वरेणापि केनचिदपि न शक्यन्ते परित्यक्तुम्। अथारब्धफलानि त्यज्यन्ते, तान्यपि न शक्यन्ते त्यक्तुम्। किं कारणम्? अनिवृत्तेः। अनिर्वृत्तं हि चिकीर्षितं कर्म शक्यते त्यक्तुम्, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती प्रति कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यात्। निर्वृत्ते तु कर्मणि तदसम्भवाद्दुरनुष्ठेयः प्रतिज्ञातार्थः। अशक्यप्रतिज्ञानाच्च। न च शक्यते प्रतिज्ञातुं "यावज्जीवं काम्यानि प्रतिषिद्धानि च कर्माणि न करिष्यामि" इति सुनिपुणानामपि सूक्ष्मापराधदर्शनात्। प्रमाणाभावाच्च।

न च प्रमाणमस्ति, मोक्षकामो नित्यनैमित्तिके कर्मणी कुर्यात्, काम्यप्रतिषिद्धे च वर्जयेत्, आरब्धफले चोपभोगेन क्षपयेदिति। आनन्त्याच्च। न चोपचितानां कर्मणामियत्तास्ति, संसारस्यानादित्वात्। न च काम्यैः प्रतिषिद्धैर्वा तेषां निवृत्तिरस्ति, शुद्ध्यशुद्धिसाम्ये सत्यविरोधादित्याह।

न कृत्स्नकाम्यसन्त्यागोऽनन्तत्वात् कर्तुमिष्यते ।
निषिद्धकर्मणश्चेह* व्यतीतानन्तजन्मसु ॥ ८१ ॥

The abandonment of desire-prompted and prohibited deeds which was proposed [by the opponent] cannot be put into practice. What is the reason for that? The removal of action that has already been performed takes place in two ways — through enjoyment in the case of action that has started to produce its fruit and through expiatory rites in the case of an evil action which has not started bearing its fruit. And a third way of removing it is through the knowledge of the Self, which is not the agent of action. But it has not been accepted by you, since you do not admit the knowledge of the Self. Of these, those [good] actions which have not yet started to produce their fruits and whose fruits have not been experienced cannot be given up not even by *Īśvara*, or by any one else. If it be said that actions which have started bearing fruit can be renounced, they too cannot be given up. Why is it so? Because they cannot be removed. Indeed, an action which has not been performed but which one desires to perform, can be given up because the agent is free to do or not to do it. But, since this is not possible in the case of action that has already been performed, the proposed abandonment cannot be put into practice. Further, what cannot be practised has been proposed. It is impossible to make the resolve, "So long as I live, I will not perform the desire-prompted and forbidden deeds," because subtle mistakes are seen even in the wisest of men. Also, there is no *pramāṇa* [in support

* निषिद्धकर्मणश्चेत्तु (H)

of the opponent's view]. There is no scriptural statement which says, "One who is desirous of liberation should perform daily and occasional obligatory deeds, should give up desire-prompted and prohibited deeds, and should exhaust through enjoyment the action which has begun to fructify." Further, [the past actions] are innumerable. There is no limit to the accumulated deeds, since transmigratory existence has been without a beginning. Their removal cannot take place through desire-prompted or prohibited deeds, for there is no opposition between them in so far as there is parity [between them] as regards purity and impurity. Hence it is stated.

Here it is not possible to abandon the entire desire-prompted and prohibited deeds performed in the innumerable lives of the past, because they are infinite. (81)

Sureśvara argues that the Mīmāṁsā formula that one who is desirous of liberation should give up *kāmya-* and *pratiṣiddha-karmas* stated earlier in verse (10) is impracticable, untenable, and without scriptural support.

[82]

स्यान्मतं, व्यतीतानन्तजन्मोपात्तानां कर्मणाम् ।

क्षयो नित्येन तेषां चेत् प्रायश्चित्तैर्यथैनसः ।
निष्फलत्वान्न नित्येन काम्यादेर्विनिवारणम् ॥ ८२ ॥

It may be said that [the destruction of] the actions acquired in the innumerable lives of the past [is possible through *nitya-karmas*].

If it be said that their destruction is through [the observance of] daily obligatory deeds in the same way as sin is destroyed through expiatory rites, the removal of desire-prompted deeds, etc. cannot take place through daily obligatory deeds, because they are not productive of any result. (82)

Sureśvara says that one cannot get rid of *kāmya-* and *pratiṣiddha-karmas* performed in one's past lives by performing *nitya-karmas* in this life, because *nitya-karmas* are *niṣphala*, *i.e.* they do not produce any positive result as held by the Prābhākaras. According to the Prābhākaras, while the non-performance of *nitya-naimittika-karmas* leads to sin (*pratyavāya*), their performance produces no result (*nitya-naimittikayoḥ akaraṇe pratyavāya eva, kṛte phalaṁ nāsti*).

[83]

प्रमाणाभावाच्च। कथम् ?

पापापनुत्तये वाक्यात् प्रायश्चित्तं यथा तथा।
गम्यते काम्यहानार्थं नित्यं कर्म न वाक्यतः ॥ ८३ ॥

Also, there is no *pramāṇa* [in support of it]. Why?

Just as it is known from the scriptural text that expiatory rite is for removing sin, it is not known that way from the scriptural text that daily obligatory deeds are for the purpose of the destruction of desire-prompted actions. (83)

It may be argued that, since the Bhāṭṭas hold the view that the performance of *nitya-naimittika-karmas* brings about the destruction of sin, it is wrong to say that *nitya-naimittika-karmas* are *niṣphala*. Sureśvara says that even if it is conceded that they produce a result, there is no scriptural text which says that *nitya-naimittika-karmas* remove the *kāmya-karmas* performed in the past lives.

[84]

अथापि स्यात् काम्यैरेव काम्यानां पूर्वजन्मोपचितानां क्षयो भविष्यतीति, तन्न। यतः।

पाप्मनां पाप्मभिर्नास्ति यथैवेह निराक्रिया।
काम्यैरपि तथैवास्तु काम्यानामविरोधतः ॥ ८४ ॥

If it be said that the destruction of the desire-prompted actions acquired in the previous lives takes place through [the performance of] desire-prompted actions themselves, it is not so, for this reason.

Just as the removal of sins does not take place here through sins, even so [the removal] of desire-prompted actions [does not take place] through desire-prompted actions, since there is no opposition between them. (84)

Just as the *kāmya-karmas* done in the previous lives cannot be removed by *nitya-naimittika-karmas* which we do now, even so they cannot be removed by *kāmya-karmas* which we perform in this life.

[85]

एवं तावत् "मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वात्" इति निराकृतम्। अथात्मज्ञानस्य सद्भावे प्रमाणासम्भव उक्तः, तत्परिहारायाह।

श्रुतयस्स्मृतिभिस्साकमानन्त्यात् कामिनामिह।
विदधत्युरुयत्नेन कर्मातो बहुकामदम् ॥ ८५ ॥

So far, we have refuted the contention [of the opponent] that "since liberation is attained through ritualistic actions..." (verse 9). Then with a view to answer the contention that there is no *pramāṇa* which proves the existence of the knowledge of the Self, the following is stated.

Since there are innumerable men of desire in this world, *śruti* texts, along with *smṛti* texts, enjoin, with significance, actions. So actions are conducive to the manifold satisfaction of desires. (85)

Sureśvara refutes here the contention of the opponent stated in verse (14). If many *śruti* and *smṛti* texts enjoin action for the fulfilment of desires of many kinds, it is because of the fact that there are innumerable men who have all sorts of desires. The point to be noted here is that these texts only show how *karmas* are useful to the attainment of the objects of desire. They do

not deny the knowledge of the Self. Nor do they deny that the knowledge of the Self is the means to *mokṣa*. If so, it is wrong to conclude from this that there are no *śruti* texts which convey the knowledge of the existent Self.

[86]

न च बाहुल्यं प्रामाण्ये कारणभावं प्रतिपद्यते । अत आह ।

प्रामाण्याय न बाहुल्यं न ह्येकत्र प्रमाणताम् ।
वस्तुन्यटन्ति मानानि त्वेकत्रैकस्य मानता ॥ ८६ ॥

Abundance [of texts] is not the cause of validity. So it is said.

Abundance is not required for the sake of validity. Many texts [proofs] do not get the status of *pramāṇa* in respect of one object. Each is a *pramāṇa* in respect of one thing. (86)

It may be argued that the purport of *śruti* is only in *karma* because *śruti* texts which enjoin *karma* are many, whereas *śruti* texts which convey the knowledge of the Self are only a few. Sureśvara rejects this argument which proceeds on the fallacious assumption that the truth or validity of an issue is decided by numerical strength (*bāhulya*). It is wrong to apply the principle of majority for deciding the soundness of a philosophical position.

First of all, every *pramāṇa* is valid on its own. The implication of this is that one *pramāṇa* is not dependent on another *pramāṇa* for doing its work. If it cannot discharge its function on its own, it will cease to be a *pramāṇa*. Secondly, coherence (*saṁvāda*) is not the test of truth. The truth of a proposition is not dependent on its agreement or coherence with another proposition. Thirdly, we have to say that every scriptural text is valid with regard to what it conveys. Let us consider this with regard to *karma-kāṇḍa*. Though there are many *karmas* which are enjoined, it is accepted that a particular text which enjoins a particular *karma* is the *pramāṇa* therefor. We do not say that many texts enjoin one *karma*. Nor do we say that a *karma* which is enjoined is valid only if there are many texts in support of it

by applying the principle of *bāhulya*. Fourthly, since *karmas* to be performed are many, *śruti* texts which enjoin *karmas* are many. But the position is different in the case of the Self. Since the Self is one and non-dual, there is no need for many texts for conveying its nature. However, if one is insistent on having many texts for setting forth the nature of the Self, we may say that on account of the different recensions (*śākhās*) we do have many texts which bring out the nature of the Self.

[87]

यत्तूक्तं "यत्नतो वीक्षमाणोऽपि" इति, तत्रापि भवत एवापराधः। कस्मात्? यतः।

"परीक्ष्य लोकान्" इत्याद्या आत्मज्ञानविधायिनीः।
नैष्कर्म्यप्रवणास्साध्वीः श्रुतीः किं न शृणोषि ताः॥ ८७॥

It was said that "Though I have looked carefully..." (verse 15). Here also the fault is yours. Why? It is for this reason.

Have you not heard the *śruti* texts such as, "After examining the worlds..." which are purportful, which enjoin the knowledge of the Self, and which develop an inclination [in men] towards the state of freedom from action? (87)

Here Sureśvara replies to the opponent's contention that there is no scriptural text which enjoins the knowledge of the Self (see verse 15). There are *śruti* texts which enjoin the knowledge of the Self. If the opponent thinks otherwise, it is his fault. Sureśvara invites the attention of the opponent to the *Muṇḍaka text* (1.2.12) which says: "A Brāhmaṇa should resort to renunciation after examining the worlds, acquired through *karma*, with the help of this idea, 'There is nothing (here) which is not the result of *karma*. So what is the need of performing *karma*?' For knowing that (Brahman), he should go, with sacrificial faggots in hand, to a teacher, versed in the *Vedas* and absorbed in Brahman." This text enjoins that one should go to a teacher (*gurum abhigacchet*) for attaining the knowledge of Brahman-

Ātman. The idea is that after developing dispassion (*nirveda*) towards the things of the world which, being the product of *karma*, are impermanent, one should approach a teacher alone — and this implies that he should not seek for the knowledge of Brahman independently (*svātantryeṇa brahmajñānānveṣaṇaṁ na kuryāt*) — for getting the knowledge of Brahman.

Sureśvara says that these *Vedānta* texts are "*sādhvīḥ*", *i.e.* proper, meaning thereby that they are purportful. By saying that they are "*naiṣkarmyapravaṇāḥ*" he suggests that they are fruitful, because they help the spiritual aspirant to overcome the bondage of *karma* caused by *avidyā*.

[88]

ननु "आत्मेत्येवोपासीत", "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः" इत्यपूर्वविधिश्रुतेः पुरुषस्यात्मदर्शनक्रियायां नियोगोऽवसीयत इति । नैवम् । अपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानस्य सकलानर्थबीजात्मानवबोधोत्सारिणो मुक्तिहेतोरिति । विध्यभ्युपगमेऽपि नापूर्वविधिरयम् । अत आह ।

नियमः परिसङ्ख्या वा विध्यर्थोऽपि भवेद्यतः ।
अनात्मादर्शनेनैव परात्मानमुपास्महे ॥ ८८ ॥

If it be said that from the original injunctive texts such as, "The Self alone is to be meditated upon," "The Self, indeed, should be seen," it is known that the action of getting the knowledge of the Self is enjoined on the person, it is not so; because the knowledge of the Self as it is. which destroys the ignorance of the Self, which is the cause of all evil, and which is the means to liberation, is not dependent on the person. Even if it be admitted as an injunction, it is not an original injunction. Hence it is said.

The injunctive sense [here] must be that of restrictive or exclusive injunction, for we (know, or) contemplate on the supreme Self by excluding the perception of the not-Self. (88)

In the previous verse, Sureśvara said that there are *śruti* texts which enjoin the knowledge of the Self (*ātmajñānavidhāyinīḥ śrutīḥ*). What he meant was that there are *Vedānta* texts which enjoin the act of going to a teacher (*ācārya upagamana*), the practice of discipline such as *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc., for the purpose of attaining the knowledge of Brahman. Without correctly understanding Sureśvara's idea the opponent who is a Mīmāṁsaka takes the expression "*ātmajñānavidhāyinīḥ*" as it is and argues that the *Vedānta* texts such as "The Self, indeed, should be seen" (*BU*, 2.4.5) enjoin the knowledge of the Self and that the force of injunction in these texts should be understood in the sense of original injunction (*apūrva-vidhi*).

This argument, says Sureśvara, is untenable as there is no scope for any injunction either with regard to knowledge (*jñāna*) or the fruit of knowledge (*jñāna-phala*). Let us first consider the case of knowledge. Knowledge arises from a *pramāṇa*. Also, it requires an object which is its cognitum. In short, knowledge by its very nature is *pramāṇa-tantra* and *vastu-tantra*, *i.e.* *pramāṇa*-dependent and object-dependent. That is why Sureśvara says that knowledge is *apuruṣatantra*. But *karma* is *puruṣa-tantra* (person-dependent), because it is something which one may perform, or may not perform, or may perform in a different way, according to one's desire (*icchayā kartuṁ akartuṁ anyathākartuṁ śakyatvāt*). *Karma*, therefore, can be enjoined. Since *jñāna* is not *puruṣa-tantra*, it falls outside the scope of injunction.

Nor does *ajñāna-nivṛtti*, *i.e.* the removal of ignorance, which is the fruit of *jñāna*, fall within the scope of injunction. By the application of the logic of *anvaya-vyatireka*, we find that when there is *jñāna*, there is *ajñāna-nivṛtti*, and that in the absence of *jñāna* there is no *ajñāna-nivṛtti*. In other words, knowledge does not require the help of an injunction for producing its result. So it is wrong to say that the *Vedānta* texts enjoin knowledge or the fruit of knowledge. As stated earlier, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc., which constitute the final discipline to be practised, as also the act of going to a teacher for studying the text, can be enjoined by *śruti*.

Sureśvara argues that even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the *śruti* text (*BU*, 2.4.5) mentioned above enjoins knowledge, it can be treated either as a restrictive injunction

(*niyama-vidhi*) or as an exclusive injunction (*parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*), but not as an original injunction (*apūrva-vidhi*). A brief explanation of these injunctions is necessary to follow Sureśvara's argument.

There are three kinds of injunction — *apūrva-vidhi*, *niyama-vidhi*, and *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*. That which inculcates about something utterly unknown is *apūrva-vidhi* (*atyantamaprāptau apūrva-vidhiḥ*). For example, the injunction "One should sprinkle the rice grains" (*vrīhīn prokṣati*) is *apūrva-vidhi*, because the sprinkling of the rice grains to be used in the sacrifice would never be known without this injunction. *Niyama-vidhi* is that which restricts something that is known only as a possible alternative (*pākṣikatayā prāptau niyamaḥ*). We know already that the removal of the husk of the grains to be used in the sacrifice can be done by threshing them or by splitting them with finger-nails. When threshing, thus, becomes a possible alternative (*pakṣe prāptam*), the injunction restricts that husking shall be done by threshing only. So the sentence, "*vrīhīn avahanti*" (one should thresh the rice grains) is a restrictive injunction. When something may be taken to refer to both of two alternatives simultaneously, the injunction that precludes one of them is called *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi* (*dvayoḥ samuccitya prāptau itaranivṛtti-phalako vidhiḥ parisaṅkyā-vidhiḥ*). When in a particular context two alternatives, *viz.* the seizing of the rein of the horse as well as the seizing of the rein of the donkey may be thought of, the text says, "One should catch hold of the rein of the horse saying ..." Since this text excludes the other alternative, *viz.* seizing the rein of the donkey, it is a case of exclusive injunction.

Which of the three kinds of injunction is possible in the case of the knowledge of the Self (*ātma-darśana*)? Sureśvara says that *apūrva-vidhi* is ruled out here as it holds good only in the case of something totally unknown (*atyantaṁ aprāptau*). Since the Self is known, there is no scope for *apūrva-vidhi*. However, if one is keen on accommodating an injunction here, one may, says Sureśvara, treat this text (*BU*, 2.4.5) as either *niyama-vidhi* or *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*.

Of the two alternatives — knowledge of the Self (*ātma-darśana*) and knowledge of the not-Self (*anātma-darśana*) — which are already known, the latter which is stronger is likely to be dominant. Since the *śruti* text here restricts that one should know

the Self, it is a case of *niyama-vidhi*. Since the not-Self is known along with the "I" or the Self, two alternatives simultaneously present themselves (*dvayoḥ samuccitya prāptiḥ*); the *śruti* text which says that one should know the Self eliminates the other alternative. So it is a case of *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*. Since through *anātmādarśana*, *i.e.* through the non-perception of the not-Self, *ātma-darśana*, *i.e.* perception of the Self, takes place, Sureśvara considers the *śruti* text stated above as *niyama-vidhi* or *parisaṅkhyāvidhi*.

The second line of the verse may be interpreted in another way also. Even in the case of contemplation on the Self there is, according to Sureśvara, no scope for *apūrva-vidhi*. *Upāsanā* or contemplation on the Self takes place of its own accord when there is *anātmādarśana*, *i.e.* when there is no perception of the not-Self. And the work of elimination of the perception of the not-Self is done by *niyama-vidhi* and *parisaṅkhya-vidhi*. There is, therefore, no need to bring in *apūrva-vidhi* even in respect of *upāsanā*.

[89]

यच्चोक्तम् "विश्वासो नान्यतोऽस्ति नः" इति, तदपि निद्रातुरचेतसा त्वया स्वप्नायमानेन प्रलपितम्। किं कारणम्? न हि वयं प्रमाणबलेनैकात्म्यं प्रतिपद्यामहे, ऐकात्म्यस्य स्वत एवानुभवमात्रात्मकत्वात्। अत एव सर्वप्रमाणावतारासम्भवं वक्ष्यति। प्रमाणव्यवस्थायाश्च अनुभवमात्राश्रयत्वात्। अत आह।

वाक्यैकगम्यं यद्वस्तु नान्यस्मात् तत्र विश्वसेत्।
नाप्रमेये स्वतस्सिद्धेऽविश्वासः कथमात्मनि ॥ ८९ ॥

It was said (in verse 15), "We have no faith in anything else." It is also non-sensical talk by you in dream with the mind under the influence of sleep. What is the reason? We do not set forth the oneness of the Self on the strength of *pramāṇa*, because the Self which is one is knowledge by its very nature. Hence, the impossibility of the work of all *pramāṇas* [with regard to the Self] will be stated [in the sequel], for the basis of *pramāṇa* itself is dependent on knowledge. The following is, therefore, said.

With regard to that which can be known only through the [scriptural] text, one need not have faith in anything else [than the text]. How can a person be without faith in the Self, which is not an object of knowledge and which is self-established? (89)

Sureśvara challenges the contention of the opponent who thinks that the very existence of the Self has become doubtful, since scripture, the only *pramāṇa* in which he has faith as the authority in matters trans-empirical, does not speak about it. The difficulty with the opponent is that he assumes that the existence of the Self can be proved by a *pramāṇa*. But the assumption is wrong. We do not, declares Sureśvara, prove the existence of the Self through a *pramāṇa*. First of all, the Self which is of the nature of knowledge and which is, therefore, self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) does not require any proof at all. The Self is self-luminous in the sense that, while it reveals everything else, it itself is not revealed by anything (*ananyāvabhāsyatve sati svetara-sarvāvabhāsakatvaṁ svayamprakāśatvam*).

Secondly, *pramāṇas* themselves depend on the Self, and not *vice versa*. A *pramāṇa* is able to reveal a thing only with the help of the Self which is knowledge or consciousness (*caitanya* = *jñāna*). That which is the basis and presupposition of all *pramāṇas* cannot be proved by them. In fact, it is as good as proved.

Thirdly, one has to make a distinction between the Self on the one hand, and *dharma* and *adharma* on the other. The latter can be known only through the scriptural text (*vākyaikagamyam*). "What is *dharma*?" "What is *adharma*?" — these can be known only through scripture and not through any other *pramāṇa*. The opponent will be right if he holds that he cannot have faith in any other *pramāṇa* excepting scripture in respect of *dharma* and *adharma*. This, however, does not hold good in the case of the Self.

Fourthly, the Self is *aprameya*, *i.e.* it is not an object of knowledge. Keeping the dichotomy between the Self and the not-Self, the Advaitin says that while entities such as the table and the tree are objects of knowledge, the Self is *aprameya*, *i.e.* not an object of knowledge for the simple reason that there is nothing else to which it can be an object of knowledge. It cannot

be said that the Self is known by the not-Self which is insentient. Nor can it be said that it is known by another Self, because there is no second Self. Also, it is absurd to say that the Self knows itself, because one and the same Self cannot be both the knower and the known at the same time. It is for these reasons that Sureśvara says that the Self is *aprameya.* At the same time, the Self is *svatassiddha*, *i.e.* self-established, because it is self-luminous. There cannot, therefore, be doubt with regard to the existence of the Self.

At the commencement of Chapter II, Sureśvara will show how the Self cannot be known through *pramāṇas* such as perception, inference, etc.

[90]

यदप्युक्तम्, "अन्तरेण विधिम्" इति, तदप्यबुद्धिपूर्वकमिव नः प्रतिभाति। यस्मात् कालान्तरफलदायिषु कर्मस्वेतद्घटते। आत्मलाभकाल एव फलदायिनि त्वात्मज्ञाने नैतत् समञ्जसमित्याह।

ज्ञानात्फले ह्यवाप्तेऽस्मिन्प्रत्यक्षे भवघातिनि।
उपकाराय तन्नेति न न्याय्यं भाति नो वचः ॥ ९० ॥

Also, it was said (in verse 16) that "Without injunction..." This, too, appears to us to be due to wrong understanding, because it holds good in respect of actions which yield their fruits at a later time. But it is not true with regard to the knowledge of the Self, which yields its fruit at the time of its origination. So the following is said.

When the destruction of bondage which is the fruit of knowledge is directly perceived, the statement that it is not helpful does not seem to us to be reasonable. (90)

The opponent argued in verse (16) that anything that is done for achieving an other-worldly result without scriptural injunction will not be fruitful and that the pursuit of knowledge in the absence of injunction will be useless. This argument, says Sureśvara, is wrong. There is the need for *vidhi* only in respect of a fruit, *e.g. svarga*, which will accrue at a later time through

the performance of *karma*. But no injunction is required in the case of knowledge which yields its result immediately as soon as it arises. In short, the opponent has ignored the important distinction between *karma* which produces *adṛṣṭa-phala* and *jñāna* which yields *dṛṣṭa-phala*. Consider the case of eating which immediately produces satisfaction (*tṛpti*). There is no time-lag between eating and getting satisfaction. As one eats, one gets satisfaction. In the same way, the moment the right knowledge of the Self arises, there is liberation, a result which is directly and immediately seen. So the contention that knowledge in the absence of injunction is not productive of its fruit is disproved by experience.

[91]

यदपि जैमिनीयं वचनमुद्घाटयसि, तदपि तद्विवक्षाऽपरिज्ञानादेवोद्भाव्यते। किं कारणम्? यतो न जैमिनेरयमभिप्रायः, आम्नायः सर्वं एव क्रियार्थ इति। यदि ह्ययमभिप्रायोऽभविष्यत्, "अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। जन्माद्यस्य यतः।" इत्येवमादिब्रह्मवस्तुस्वरूपमात्रयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपरं गम्भीरन्यायसन्दब्धं सर्ववेदान्तार्थमीमांसनं श्रीमच्छारीरकं नासूत्रयिष्यत्। असूत्रयच्च। तस्माज्जैमिनेरेवायमभिप्रायः, यथैव विधिवाक्यानां स्वार्थमात्रे प्रामाण्यम्, एवमैकात्म्यवाक्यानामपि, अनधिगतवस्तुपरिच्छेदसाम्यादिति। अत इदमभिधीयते।

अधिचोदनं य आम्नायस्तस्यैव स्यात् क्रियार्थता।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां ब्रूत कर्मार्थता कथम्॥ ९१॥

As for the statement of Jaimini which you have referred to, that, too, has been quoted without knowing his intention. If you ask, "What is the reason for that?" the answer is that it is not the view of Jaimini that the entire *Veda* has its purport in action. If it were his view, [Bādarāyaṇa] would not have composed the sacred *Śārīrakasūtra*, beginning with "Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman. That [Brahman] from which the origination, etc., [take place]," which has its purport in bringing out the real nature of Brahman, which abounds in profound reasoning, and which is an inquiry into the meaning of the entire *Vedānta*. But [Bādarāyaṇa] has written [that work]. So the view of

Jaimini is this: just as the injunctive texts are authoritative in respect of what they convey, even so the texts which teach the oneness of the Self [are authoritative in their sphere], since there is parity between them in respect of revealing what is otherwise unknown. Hence the following is stated.

That scriptural text alone which is subsidiary to an injunction has its purport in action. Tell me: how can statements such as "That thou art" have their purport in action? (91)

Sureśvara refutes here the argument of the opponent stated in verse (17). The opponent quoted Jaimini's statement that since the *Veda* has its purport in action whatever does not refer to action is purportless. Sureśvara argues that the opponent has not correctly understood the intention of Jaimini. If it were Jaimini's intention that the entire *Veda* comprising *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna-kāṇḍa* has action for its purport, then the *Brahma-sūtra*, otherwise called *Śārīrakasūtra*, composed by Bādarāyaṇa, which seeks to expound the existent Brahman as taught in the *Upaniṣads* should be set aside as meaningless. The *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa is authoritative as the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* of Jaimini. While the latter deals with the *karma-kāṇḍa* of the *Veda*, the former is concerned with the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* of the *Veda*. There is a division of labour between them, and each is valid in its own sphere, because each gives us knowledge of *dharma* or Brahman as the case may be, which cannot be known through any other *pramāṇa*. Since the works of both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa discuss the subject matter taught in the *Veda* and since both of them are authoritative, there cannot be any incompatibility between them. Following the way in which Śaṅkara has reconciled in the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 1.1.4, the scope of the works of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, Sureśvara applies the principle of demarcation for restricting the scope of each and says that the statement of Jaimini quoted by the opponent is applicable only to that part of scripture consisting of injunctions and prohibitions.

Jaimini was concerned with the problem of justifying the usefulness of corroborative statements (*arthavādas*) which are not injunctive, but are merely informative such as "The Wind is,

indeed, a very swift deity" (*vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā*). Raising the issue that, since action is the purport of the *Veda*, the corroborative statements which occur in the context of injunctions (*vidhi-prakaraṇa*) will be of no use since they do not impel one either to perform or abstain from an action, Jaimini said in the *sūtra*, 1.2.7, that these *arthavādas* are authoritative only as forming a unitary passage with injunctive texts (*vidhinā ekavākyatvāt*) by demonstrating the praiseworthiness of what is enjoined. It means that, according to Jaimini, these *arthavādas*, in order to be valid, must be construed as subsidiary to injunctive texts (*vidhi-śeṣa*). It does not follow from this that statements such as "*tat tvam asi*" which are not *arthavādas* and which convey the knowledge of Brahman which is *siddha-vastu* are not valid on their own and that they have to be construed with injunctive texts in order to make them valid.

[92]

अपि च, ऐकात्म्यपक्ष इवादृष्टार्थकर्मसु भवत्पक्षेऽपि प्रवृत्तिर्दुर्लक्ष्या । यतः ।

स्वर्गं यियासुर्जुहुयादग्निहोत्रं यथाविधि ।
देहाद्व्युत्थापितस्यैवं कर्तृत्वं जैमिनेः कथम् ॥ ९२ ॥

Moreover, as in the case of the doctrine of the oneness of the Self, even on your theory pursuit of actions which produce unseen results is impossible for the following reason.

Since it is said on Jaimini's theory that one who is desirous of heaven should perform *agnihotra* according to the rules, how is agency possible [for the Self] which transcends body, etc.? (92)

Sureśvara wants to show that what has been stated in the *Īśāvāsya* text, 2, quoted by the opponent in verse (18) is applicable to one who is ignorant of the nature of the Self. The Advaitin says that the Self which is different from the body and other adjuncts is not an agent of any action. One who has realized the truth about the Self cannot, therefore, be engaged in action. The Mīmāṁsā system of Jaimini also has to admit that the Self is different from the body and other adjuncts in order to make injunctions such as "One who is desirous of heaven

should perform *agnihotra*" meaningful. Heaven is a fruit which will accrue to one in some other life as a result of the performance of *agnihotra* in this life. It means that one will enjoy heaven after the present body falls off.

The question to be considered is whether the Self which survives the body and which is, therefore, different from it is the agent of action. Whatever is an agent of action will be subject to modification; and that which undergoes modification must be an entity containing parts (*sāvayava*). Since the Self is partless (*niravayava*), it cannot be subject to modification; consequently, it cannot be an agent of action. Nor is it possible to say that the Self, though immutable, is the agent on the ground that it has the quality of effort (*prayatna*). Like desire (*kāma*), resolve (*saṅkalpa*), doubt (*vicikitsā*), faith (*śraddhā*), etc., effort is a quality of the internal organ; and so it is impermanent. What is impermanent cannot be a quality of the Self which is permanent. Also, the Self which is *nirguṇa* cannot be a substratum of qualities. So agency can never be associated with the Self. Sureśvara, therefore, concludes that one who knows the real position, *viz.* that the Self which survives the body is not the agent and that adjuncts such as the body which are agents are perishable here itself, will not be engaged in any action such as *agnihotra*.

[93]

न च प्रत्याख्याताशेषशरीरादिकर्मसाधनस्वभावस्यात्ममात्रस्य कर्मस्वधिकारः। यस्मात्।

सर्वप्रमाणासम्भाव्यो ह्यहंवृत्त्येकसाधनः* ।
युष्मदर्थमनादित्सुर्जैमिनिः प्रेर्यते कथम् ॥ ९३ ॥

Also, one who remains merely as the Self free from all instruments of action such as the body is not eligible to perform actions. For:

How can the Self of Jaimini which cannot be known through any *pramāṇa*, but which is known only through the ego, and which has no relation with the not-Self, be impelled [to action by any injunction]? (93)

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* अहंवृत्त्यैकसाधनः (H)

In the previous verse Sureśvara pointed out how the Self *per se* cannot be the agent of any action. Now he shows that it has no eligibility (*adhikāra*) for the performance of any action. It is only when a person identifies himself with the body and considers himself a Brāhmaṇa or a Kṣatriya, a celebate student or a householder, that he becomes eligible to perform actions prescribed by scripture; and such an identification with one's body is due to *mithyā-jñāna*. On account of *mithyā-jñāna* there arises *dehābhimāna*; and from this takes place *adhikāri-vyavasthā* which again leads to *karma-vyavasthā*. Neither for the Self *as such* nor for the body *as such* can there be eligibility as well as agency for action. But the notions of eligibility, agency, and so on, become possible only when there is the wrong identification of the Self with the body.

When Sureśvara asks, "*jaiminiḥ katham preryate*," he means: "How can the inward Self implied by the body of Jaimini be impelled to action?" (*jaimini-śabdavācya-śarīropalakṣitaḥ pratyagātmā kathaṁ preryate*). What, then, is the nature of the Self? Sureśvara brings out the nature of the Self in three different ways. First of all, since the Self is of the nature of knowledge, it cannot be known through any *pramāṇa*. But at the same time — and this is the second point — it does not remain unknown because it is indicated through the "I"-sense or ego-sense (*ahaṁ-vṛtti*). When there is the reflection of the Self or consciousness in the internal organ, a person knows himself as "I" (*aham*). The "I"-notion which arises when the internal organ is in the appropriate state indicates the Self in the absence of which the "I"-notion cannot take place at all. Thirdly, the Self has no relation whatsoever with the internal organ and other adjuncts which are not-Self, what Sureśvara calls *yuṣmadartha*, even though it may appear that it has relation with them. There cannot be any real relation between the Self which is *paramārtha* and the not-Self which is *mithyā*.

[94]

प्रवृत्तिकारणाभावाच्च। यस्मात्।

सुखदुःखादिभिर्योग आत्मनो नाहमेष्यते* ।
पराक्त्वात् प्रत्यगात्मत्वाज्जैमिनिः प्रेर्यते कथम् ॥ ९४ ॥

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* **नाहमेक्ष्यते** (H)

Also there is no cause for action for the following reason.

The Self has no relation with pleasure, pain etc. (But such a relation is desired only with the internal organ), because (pleasure, pain, etc., which are known) are external, whereas the Self is inward. How, then, can the Self of Jaimini be impelled to action? (94)

In this verse as well as in the following one, Sureśvara shows that the Self is not an enjoyer of the fruits of action. The end or result which one wants to achieve is the motivatory force which impels one to action (*prayojanaṁ pravṛtti-kāraṇam*). Whatever be the action which one does, it is for getting happiness; and so in the ultimate analysis it is happiness that serves as the motivatory force. The question which Sureśvara raises here is whether pleasure which is sought after is appropriated by the Self as its quality. Sureśvara answers this question in the negative. It may appear that the Self is related to pleasure and pain because we say, "I am happy," "I am miserable." Strictly speaking, pleasure and pain are states or conditions of the mind or the internal organ, and so they belong to it. The *śruti* text says (*BU*, 1.5.3) in a suggestive way: "Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence, fear — all these are but the mind." Owing to a false identification of the Self with the mind, the characteristics of the latter are illicitly transferred to the Self.

Pleasure and pain belong to the category of objects which are known. Just as I am aware of my body and other external objects, even so I am aware of pleasure and pain which are the forms or states of the mind. It means that they are witnessed by the Self. Consequently, they are external (*parāk*) to the Self in the same way as the things of the world as well as the body and the senses are external to the Self. Because of their externality to the Self (*parāktvāt*), and also because of the inward Self being a witness to them (*sākṣitvena pratyagātmatvāt*), Sureśvara says that they do not belong to the Self. So the Self which is no more than a witness can never be subject to the experience of pleasure and pain. In short, the Self is not a *bhoktā*.

[95]

किञ्च ।

न तावद्योग एवास्ति शरीरेणात्मनः सदा ।
विषयैर्दूरतो नास्ति स्वर्गादौ स्यात् कथं सुखम् ॥ ९५ ॥

Moreover:

All the time the Self has no relation with the body itself. Much less can it be related with objects. How, then, can it be related with pleasure in places like heaven? (95)

The Self can be an enjoyer (*bhoktā*) only if it is connected with the instruments of enjoyment (*bhoga-sādhana*) such as the body. First of all, the Self has no relation with the body itself with which it is very often wrongly identified. When a person says, "I am stout, fair, a Brāhmaṇa, etc.," he identifies himself with the body. Since the notion of "I" takes place in the body, the body is referred to as the support of "I", *i.e. ahampratyayālambana*. This kind of identification is not possible with external objects, for even a stupid person does not say, "I am the house." Rather he says, "This house is mine." So when the Self has no relation with the body itself, which is *ahampratyayālambana*, it is untenable to think of its relation with objects which, when compared with the body, are farther removed from it. One may, therefore, conclude *a fortiori* that the Self cannot have any relation with pleasure to be enjoyed in heaven in some other life.

[96]

यस्मादन्यथा नोपपद्यते ।

नराभिमानिनं तस्मात् कारकाद्यात्मदर्शिनम् ।
मन्त्र आहोररीकृत्य "कुर्वन्" इति न निर्द्वयम् ॥ ९६ ॥

Since it cannot be explained otherwise, [we have to say this].

So the hymn says, "By doing rituals alone...", with reference to a person who considers himself a human being

connected with the instruments [of action], etc., and not with regard to a [person who knows himself to be] the non-dual Self. (96)

Since the Self is neither the agent nor the enjoyer of actions and also has no eligibility to perform action, the *Īśāvāsya* text, 2, which says that "By doing *karma*, indeed, should one wish to live here for a hundred years" is applicable to one who, because of ignorance, has *mithyābhimāna* in the form of "I" and "mine." The Upaniṣadic text goes on to say that there is no other alternative than this (*na anyathā ito'sti*) for an ignorant man. For him, to be engaged in actions prescribed by scripture is the only way by which he may be free from bad *karma* (*aśubhaṁ karmaṇā na lipyate*). So this Upaniṣadic text does not apply to a man of knowledge who has realized the non-dual Self.

[97]

यच्चोक्तं "विरहय्य" इति तदपि न सम्यगेव। तथापि तु न या काचित् क्रिया यत्र क्व चाध्याहरणीया, किन्तु या यत्राभिप्रेतसम्बन्धं घटयितुं शक्नोत्याकाङ्क्षां च वाक्यस्य पूरयति, सैवाध्याहरणीया। एवंविशिष्टा च क्रिया अस्माभिरभ्युपगतैव। सा तूपादित्सितवाक्यार्थाविरोधिन्येव, नाभूतार्थप्रादुर्भावफलेति। षड्भावविकाररहितात्मवस्तुनो निर्धूताशेषद्वैतानर्थस्य, अपराधीनप्रकाशस्य विजिज्ञापयिषितत्वात् "असि" "अस्मि" इत्यादिक्रियापदं स्वमहिमसिद्धार्थप्रतिपादनसमर्थमभ्युपगन्तव्यं, न विपरीतार्थप्रतिपादनपरमिति।

धावेदिति न दानार्थे पदं यद्वत् प्रयुज्यते।
एधीत्यादि तथा नेच्छेत् स्वतःसिद्धार्थवाचिनि ॥ ९७ ॥

And it was stated that "Without a verb..." (verse 19). That contention also is not correct. Even then, any verb whatsoever cannot be supplied in any place. On the contrary, only that [verb] which in a particular place is capable of conveying the intended relation and which can also fulfil the expectancy of the sentence has to be supplied. And such a verb related to other words is, indeed, accepted by us. It is not at all opposed to the intended meaning of the sentence; nor does it convey the sense of giving rise to a result which is non-existent.

Since the Self which is desired to be known is free from six kinds of modifications characteristic of positive entities, which is free from the entire evil of duality, and which is self-luminous, verbs such as "are", "am" which are capable of conveying that which is existent of its own accord have to be accepted, but not those which have their import in something opposed to it.

Just as the word "run" is not used to convey the sense of "give", even so one should not desire to use verbs such as "grow", in a sentence which conveys the self-existent entity. (97)

The opponent argued in verse (19) that words can never be combined with one another without a verb, that the sentence-sense is impossible without the relation among words, and that, since the meaning of a verb is in action, it is impossible for a sentence to convey an existent object. This argument also, Sureśvara says, is wrong. It is quite possible to convey as well as understand the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārtha*) even without a verb. For example, when some one says in a particular context, "Thief," "Devadatta," one can construe the meaning intended to be conveyed by the speaker even in the absence of a verb. It is no argument to say that a verb such as "catch", "see", which is missing here has to be supplied and that the hearer in fact construes the meaning in the context by supplying the verb which is elliptical. The point at issue is not whether a verb which is elliptical in a particular context has to be supplied or not. The real issue is what sort of verb has to be supplied as required by the context, if there is an ellipsis. As against the Mīmāṁsaka, the Advaitin maintains that there is no requirement that only a verb which conveys the sense of an action to be performed (*pravartaka-kriyāpada*) has to be supplied for construing the meaning of the sentence in the context. It all depends on the context.

So far as the *Vedānta* texts are concerned, they are not without verbs. In sentences such as "*tat tvam asi*", "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*", "*asi*" and "*asmi*" are the verbs. Where verbs are elliptical as in "*satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*" we have to supply a verb which is warranted by the context so that it will bring out the meaning intended to be conveyed. The Self which is immutable is free

from *ṣaḍbhāvavikāras*, *i.e.* the six kinds of changes, *viz.* origination, existence, growth, maturity, decay, and death, which are applicable to all positive entities we are familiar with; and so we cannot use verbs which convey the sense of origination (*utpatti*), modification (*vikṛti*), etc. with reference to it. Since by its very nature it is devoid of all evil arising from duality, we cannot also use a verb which conveys the sense of the removal of evil therefrom. Nor can we use a verb which conveys the sense of seeing or knowing with reference to it, because the Self which is self-luminous does not depend on anything else for its illumination. It means that not any verb, but only that verb whose sense is in consonance with the nature of the Self which is sought to be conveyed by the sentence can be used. Sureśvara gives an illustration to drive home his point. In the context of helping the needy with money, we use the verb "give" and say "Give money." We do not in that context use the verb "run" which is not appropriate. In the same way we cannot use verbs such as "grow", "become", etc. with reference to the Self which is free from changes such as growth, modification, etc. On the contrary, only verbs which bring out its existential nature have to be used; and this is what is being done by the *Vedānta* texts.

[98]

न च यथोक्तवस्तुवृत्तप्रतिपादनव्यतिरेकेण तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं वाक्यार्थान्तरं वक्तीति शक्यमध्यवसातुमित्याह ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां स्वतस्सिद्धार्थबोधनात् ।
अर्थान्तरं न सन्द्रष्टुं शक्यते त्रिदशैरपि ॥ ९८ ॥

It cannot be said that sentences such as "*tat tvam asi*", without setting forth the nature of the Self as described above, convey the sense of some other sentence. And for this reason it is said.

Since sentences such as "*tat tvam asi*" convey the sense of the self-existent entity, a different meaning [for them] cannot be construed even by gods. (98)

The purport of the *Vedānta* texts is ascertained by the application of six principles known as *ṣaḍliṅgas* — harmony between the beginning and the end of the passage (*upakrama-upasaṁhāra*),

repetition (*abhyāsa*), novelty (*apūrvatā*), fruitfulness (*phala*) corroboration (*arthavāda*), and intelligibility in the light of reasoning (*upapatti*). When it is decided on the basis of the *ṣaḍliṅgas* that the *Vedānta* texts have the purport in the existent Brahman-Ātman, it is wrong to say that they are not valid on their own or that they have their purport in meditation.

[99]

यस्मादेवम् ।

अतः सर्वाश्रमाणां तु वाङ्मनःकायकर्मभिः ।
स्वनुष्ठितैर्न मुक्तिः स्याज्ज्ञानादेव हि सा यतः ॥ ९९ ॥

Such being the case, it follows.

Hence for persons of all *āśramas*, release will not take place through the deeds of speech, mind, and body performed by them, because it is attained only through knowledge. (99)

Sureśvara here sums up the position by rejecting the claim of theopponent contained in verse (21).

[100]

तस्माच्च कारणादेतदप्युपपन्नम् ।

स्वमनोरथसङ्क्लृप्तप्रज्ञाध्मातधियामतः ।
श्रोत्रियेष्वेव वाचस्ताः शोभन्ते नात्मवेदिषु ॥ १०० ॥

Because of this reason, this also is tenable.

So these words, uttered by men whose mind is inflated by their own conjectures, are attractive only to those learned in the *Vedas*, but not to those who have the knowledge of the Self. (100)

Sureśvara maintains that what he said about the Mīmāṁsakas in verse (22) at the commencement of his criticism of the Mīmāṁsā position is quite reasonable. The arguments of the Mīmāṁsakas will be acceptable only to those who, being ignorant of Brahman-Ātman, are interested in the ritual section of the *Veda*, entertaining all the distinctions of caste and stages of life under the spell of *adhyāsa* and *mithyābhimāna*, but not to those who know the truth of Brahman-Ātman.

CHAPTER II

[1]

प्रत्यक्षादीनाम् अनेवंविषयत्वात्, तेषां स्वारम्भकविषयोपनिपातित्वात्, आत्मनश्चाशेषप्रमेयवैलक्षण्यात्, सर्वानर्थैकहेत्वज्ञानापनोदिज्ञानदिवाकरोदय-हेतुत्वं वस्तुमात्रयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपटीयसस्तत्त्वमस्यादेर्वचस एवेति बह्वीभि-रुपपत्तिभिः प्रदर्शितम्। अतस्तदर्थाप्रतिपत्तौ यत् कारणं तदपनयनाय द्वितीयोऽध्याय आरभ्यते।

श्रावितो वेत्ति वाक्यार्थं न चेत् तत्वमसीत्यतः।
त्वम्पदार्थानभिज्ञत्वादतस्तत्प्रक्रियोच्यते ॥ १ ॥

Since the senses which give perceptual knowledge do not deal with this subject-matter, since their scope is restricted to the elements which have produced them, and since the Self is different from all objects of knowledge, it has been shown through many arguments that only sentences such as *tat tvam asi* which are capable of revealing the real nature of the Self cause the rise of the sun of knowledge destructive of ignorance, the sole cause of all evil. Hence the Second Chapter is begun for removing the cause of non-apprehension of the meaning of these texts.

If a person who hears the text "*tat tvam asi*" does not understand its sense, it is because of not knowing the meaning of the word "*tvam*" (you). So, the way to understand it will be explained. (1)

Of the different *pramāṇas* which have been admitted as sources of knowledge, it is only through *śabda*, *i.e.* the *śruti* texts such as "*tat tvam asi*," "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*," that we can know that the Self of

the *jīva* is no other than Brahman, and not through *pramāṇas* such as perception. Sureśvara adduces three reasons to show why the Self cannot be known through perception and other *pramāṇas*.

First of all, all the *pramāṇas* excepting *śabda* — perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) — are not concerned with the non-dual Self.

Secondly, the sense organs such as the auditory sense, visual sense, etc. give us perceptual knowledge of the external, material objects such as sound, colour, etc. Each sense organ is derived from the *sattva* aspect of a material element (*bhūta*) — the auditory sense from ether (*ākāśa*), the tactile sense from air (*vāyu*), the visual sense from fire (*tejas*), the gustatory sense from water (*jala*), and the olfactory sense from earth (*pṛthivī*); and each is capable of perceiving the special quality of that element alone from which it is derived. That each sense organ which is material is capable of perceiving the quality of the material object can be stated in the form of an inferential argument. For example: the auditory sense is produced by the substance of the same class, whose special quality it perceives, because it is an external sense, like the visual sense, etc. (*śrotraṁ svagrāhyajātīya-viśeṣaguṇavad-dravyārabdhaṁ, bāhyendriyatvāt, cakṣurādivat*). The same argument can be applied to other sense organs. *Śruti* also lends support to this view. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (2.4.11) says: "As the ocean is the one goal of all sorts of water, as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch, as the nostrils are the one goal of all odours, as the tongue is the one goal of all savours, as the eye is the one goal of all colours, as the ear is the one goal of all sounds..." In the course of the commentary on this text, Śaṅkara says: "The *śruti* considers the organs to be of the same category as the objects, not of a different category. The organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them as light, which is but a mode of colour, is an instrument for revealing all colours."

Thirdly, the Self is altogether different from objects of knowledge such as sound, colour, etc., which are perceived by the senses; and so it cannot be known by the senses. Since the senses themselves are known through the Self, the latter can never be known by them.

What holds good for perception also holds good for other *pramāṇas* whose work is restricted to revealing empirical things. The Self which is devoid of qualities and which has no second to it neither possesses nor is related to any quality or mark through which it can be inferred in the same way as fire is inferred from smoke, which serves as the *liṅga* with which it is related, on the basis of *vyāptijñāna* and *pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna*. So inference is of no avail for getting the knowledge of the Self. Neither *upamāna* nor *arthāpatti* will be of use for getting the knowledge of the non-dual Self, for each of them functions on the basis of duality. *Upamāna* gives us knowledge of similarity as in the case of our comparing a cow with a *gavaya* before arriving at the judgement, "The cow at home is like the *gavaya* which I see now." Since there is no second to Brahman for the purpose of comparison, *upamāna* is of no use in this case. In *arthāpatti* we proceed from the knowledge of what is to be made intelligible (*upapādya*) to that which makes it intelligible (*upapādaka*); *e.g.* in order to account for the fatness of a person who does not eat by day we postulate his eating at night. Since *arthāpatti* functions presupposing difference, it cannot be relied on for getting the knowledge of the non-dual Self. Also, we have to rule out *anupalabdhi* which is the *pramāṇa* for getting the knowledge of the non-existence (*abhāva*) of something. The Self is not a negative entity; and so it cannot be known through *anupalabdhi*. The only *pramāṇa* through which it can be known is *śabda*, *i.e.* the *śruti* texts such as "*tat tvam asi*."

One can know the Self only if one understands the meaning of the sentence, "*tat tvam asi*," and to get at the non-relational, non-sentential sense of this text, one must understand the meaning of the words "*tvam*" (you) and "*tat*" (that). Sureśvara declares that one who is ignorant of the meaning of *tvam* cannot construe the meaning which this sentence intends to convey. Though he refers to *tvampadārtha* alone in the verse, it is only in a suggestive way as *tatpadārtha* is also implied by it (*tvampadeti tatpadasyāpi upalakṣaṇam*). It means that one should know the meanings of both the words, "*tvam*" and "*tat*", in order to comprehend the sense of the sentence.

The reason for mentioning only *tvampadārtha* can be explained in a different way also. It is desirable to proceed from words we are familiar with (*prasiddha*) to unfamiliar words (*aprasiddha*). First, we have to understand the meanings of words such as

"*tvam*" (you) and "*ahām*" (I) known to us in our every-day usage; and thereafter we have to ascertain the meanings of words like "*tat*", "*brahma*", "*sat*", etc. This procedure will help us to construe the meaning of *śruti* texts, "*tat tvam asi*," "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi.*" That is why Śaṅkara says (*US*, 18.177): "The understanding of the meaning of the sentence becomes possible after it has been ascertained by the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* which word should be construed first and which word next."

"*idaṁ pūrvamidaṁ paścāt padaṁ vākyaṁ bhavediti*
anvayavyatirekābhyāṁ tato vākyārthabodhanam"

So one should first of all understand the meaning of *tvam* for construing the meaning of the sentence sense.

Though in a sense we know the meaning of the words, "*tvam*" and "*aham*", there is difficulty in comprehending the meaning intended to be conveyed by them. When someone says using the first person singular, "I am stout," "I am blind," "I am happy," does the word "I" refer to the body or the sense-organ or the mind? Or does it refer to the Self? When we are told that the implied meaning of this word is the Self which is of the nature of knowledge, which is not the agent or the enjoyer, we find it difficult to accept this meaning as it goes contrary to the evidence of perception and other *pramāṇas*. In construing the meaning of this word and thereafter the meaning of the sentence as a whole, one should know by distinguishing the Self from the not-Self that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman (*jīva-brahma-aikya*) which is the purport of the sentence cannot be disproved by *pramāṇas* such as perception, since these *pramīṇas* have nothing to do with the Self. So long as the meaning of the word "*tvam*" (as well as that of *tat*) is not known, one cannot understand the purport of the sentence, "*tat tvam asi.*"

[2 - 3]

योऽयमहं ब्रह्मेति वाक्यार्थः, तत्प्रतिपत्तिर्वाक्यादेवेति, प्रत्यक्षादीनाम् अनेवंविषयत्वात् इत्यवादिषम्। तस्य विशुद्ध्यर्थमनैकान्तिकत्वं पूर्वपक्षत्वेनोपस्थाप्यते।

कृत्स्नानात्मनिवृत्तौ च कश्चिदाप्नोति निर्वृतिम् ।
श्रुतवाक्यस्मृतेश्चान्यः स्मार्यते च वचोऽपरः ॥ २ ॥

एतत्प्रसङ्गेन श्रोत्रन्तरोपन्यासमुभयत्रापि सम्भावनायाह ।

वाक्यश्रवणमात्राच्च पिशाचकवदाप्नुयात् ।
त्रिषु यादृच्छिकी सिद्धिः स्मार्यमाणे तु निश्चिता ॥ ३ ॥

It was stated that the sense conveyed by the sentence, "I am Brahman," can be known only from that sentence, since perception, etc. are not concerned with this subject-matter. That this is not necessarily the case is sought to be shown by stating the view of the opponent for the purpose of clarifying (establishing) the position.

One attains liberation when the entire not-Self gets removed, another person by remembering the sentence heard by him, and someone else by being made to remember the sentence. (2)

In this context, the case of another hearer is mentioned with a view to show that in both ways [the rise of knowledge] takes place.

Also, by the mere hearing of the text, as in the case of Piśācaka, one attains it. The attainment [of liberation] is accidental in three cases; but in the case of one who is made to remember, there is certainty of attainment. (3)

The point to be considered is whether Brahman-Ātman identity can be known only through the scriptural sentence (*vākya*) or whether it can be known through other means as well independently of scripture. The *pūrvapakṣa* which Sureśvara introduces in these two verses holds the latter view. The opponent tries to justify his standpoint by means of examples.

The first one that is mentioned is the case of Virāj of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (1.4.1-2). Virāj, the first embodied being, reflected on what he was, and found nothing else but himself. He was afraid. Then he reflected on the situation and realized that there was nothing else in addition to himself to be his rival who could kill him. Once he realized this truth, he was free from fear. The *Upaniṣad* says (*BU*, 1.4.2.): "From that alone his fear was gone,

for what was there to fear. It is from a second entity that fear comes." So here is a person who has known the truth of oneness through reasoning alone, without the help of the scriptural sentence, by eliminating the entire world of the not-Self which is the cause of difference.

The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* provides the case of Bhṛgu who serves as the second example of a person who got the saving knowledge by inquiry into the definition of Brahman given by his father, Varuṇa. When Bhṛgu requested his father to teach him Brahman, he was given the formula: "Crave to know that from which all these beings are born, that by which they live after being born, that towards which they move and into which they merge." (*TU*, 3.1.1) This formula does not state the essential nature of Brahman. It was, therefore, necessary for Bhṛgu to resort to *tapas*, *i.e.* inquiry, for the purpose of knowing the real nature of Brahman. Remembering the formula given by his father, he thought first of all that matter (*annam*) was Brahman, and then he thought, one after another, of vital force (*prāṇa*), mind (*manas*), and intellect (*vijñāna*) as Brahman, before finally arriving at the truth that bliss is Brahman as stated in the text, "*ānando brahmeti vyajānāt*" (3.6.1). The case of Bhṛgu proves, according to the opponent, that the knowledge of Brahman can be obtained even by inquiry (*vicāra*) and not necessarily by *vākya*.

Śvetaketu who is introduced in the Sixth Chapter of the *Chāndogya* is the third example mentioned by the *pūrvapakṣin* to strengthen his case. Uddālaka asked his son Śvetaketu, who was arrogant when he returned home after completing his formal study, whether he had known that by knowing which "what is not known becomes known" (*avijñātaṁ vijñātaṁ bhavati* — *CU*, 6.1.3). When Śvetaketu confessed that he did not know it, Uddālaka taught him the truth by making him remember the statement "*tat tvam asi*" which was repeated nine times and by providing illustrations for the elucidation of the truth. The contention of the opponent is that Śvetaketu knew the truth, not through *vākya*, but through *vākya-smaraṇa*, *i.e.* remembrance of the sentence, which was in the form of an inquiry into the truth through the removal of doubt and error.

Unlike Virāj, Bhṛgu, and Śvetaketu, who obtained the saving knowledge independently of the scriptural sentence, Piśācaka

who is mentioned as the fourth example realized the truth by hearing the sentence alone. A certain person by name Piśācaka who had a pure mind as a result of the practice of austerities in the previous life happened to go to the forest and heard by chance the sentence "*tat tvam asi*" as it was recited by some. No sooner did he hear the text than he realized the truth of Brahman-Ātman identity.

Of the four examples mentioned above, the attainment of the saving knowledge by Virāj, Bhṛgu, and Piśācaka is, according to the *pūrvapakṣin*, purely accidental, whereas it is certain in the case of Śvetaketu who has been guided towards the truth in a systematic way by being made to remember the sentence. Since the knowledge of the Self can be obtained even without the scriptural text, the opponent concludes that the *vākya* which is given as the *hetu* for obtaining the aforesaid knowledge is *anaikāntika*, i.e. is not the invariable reason.

[4]

नायमनैकान्तिको हेतुः। यतः।

सर्वोऽयं महिमा ज्ञेयो वाक्यस्यैव यथोदितः।
वाक्यार्थं न ह्यृते वाक्यात् कश्चिज्जानाति तत्त्वतः ॥ ४ ॥

This [sentence] is not the variable cause. For:

It should be known that the entire power [of producing this knowledge] belongs to the sentence itself, as stated. Indeed, no one can really know the meaning of the sentence in the absence of the sentence. (4)

Sureśvara refutes the contention of the opponent in this verse. While the first line of the verse refutes what was urged in the case of Bhṛgu and Śvetaketu, the second line answers the point with regard to Virāj.

It is not correct to say that *vākya-smaraṇa*, i.e. remembrance of the sentence, and not *vākya*, was productive of the saving knowledge obtained by Bhṛgu and Śvetaketu. Let us consider

the case of inference to drive home the point. Though it is admitted that remembrance of the *liṅga* (=*hetu*) which is invariably related to the *sādhya* is the cause of inferential knowledge, it does not follow that the *liṅga* is not the cause thereof. In fact, remembrance of the *liṅga* (*liṅga-smaraṇa*) is unthinkable in the absence of the *liṅga*. In the same way, *vākya-smaraṇa* will not be possible without the *vākya*. Indeed, *vākya-smaraṇa* is no other than *smaryamāṇa-vākya*, *i.e* the sentence which is remembered; and so it does not matter whether one speaks of *smaryamāṇa-vākya* or *vākya-smaraṇa*. What is essential is the *vākya*. Consequently, it is the sentence that is the invariable cause of the knowledge with which we are concerned here.

The *pūrvapakṣin* has not proved his point in the case of Virāj. Though Virāj was able to remove the entire world as not-Self through reasoning, he should have obtained the knowledge of the Self as unsurpassable bliss and as identical with Brahman — which is different from the absence of the world (*prapañcābhāva-vyatirikta-niratiśayānanda-rūpa-brahmāvagatiḥ*) — only through the scriptural text, for the Self, as stated earlier, is not the subject-matter of any other *pramāṇa*.

[5]

वाक्यश्च प्रतिपादनाय प्रवृत्तं सत् प्रतिपादयत्येव, सर्वप्रमाणानामप्येवंवृत्तत्वात्।

नाहंग्राह्ये न तद्धीने न प्रत्यङ्नापि दुःखिनि ।
विरोधः सदसीत्यस्माद्वाक्याभिज्ञस्य जायते ॥ ५ ॥

The sentence which proceeds for the purpose of explaining [the Self] does accomplish its work, because this is the nature of all *pramāṇas*.

One who understands the meaning of the sentence "You are that" does not face contradiction in respect of that [body] which is known as "I", or that [sense-organ] which is not known in that way, or the inward Self, or that [mind] which is subject to suffering. (5)

Sureśvara considers two possible objections here. One may raise an objection that the knowledge conveyed by the *Vedānta* text cannot be accepted as valid, since it cannot be confirmed or supported by another *pramāṇa* such as perception for the simple reason that the Self, according to the Advaitin, is not the subject-matter of any of these *pramāṇas*. Sureśvara refutes this objection in the *sambandhokti* by taking his stand on the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*). Every *pramāṇa* functions and does its work on its own. This is as much true with regard to *śabda* as it is with regard to *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. A *pramāṇa* not only produces knowledge, but also guarantees its validity; and the validity of knowledge is known as soon as it arises inasmuch as it is revelatory of objects. It means that knowledge which arises from a *pramāṇa* is intrinsically valid both in respect of its origin (*utpatti*) and ascertainment (*jñapti*). Also, the principle of coherence (*saṁvāda*) should not be followed for the purpose of deciding the validity of knowledge. If we accept one knowledge as valid on the ground that it coheres with another knowledge, the latter too, if it is to be accepted as valid, must cohere with some other knowledge which again should cohere with something else; and this will lead to infinite regress (*anavasthā*). It means that the validity of knowledge conveyed by any *pramāṇa* cannot and should not be decided in terms of its coherence with the evidence of another *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇāntara-saṁvāda*). If so, the question of confirmation or support of the knowledge produced by the *vedānta-vākya* (= *śābda*) by another *pramāṇa* does not arise.

The second objection which Sureśvara refutes in verse (5) is formulated on the basis of *pramāṇa-virodha*. According to this objection, what the *śruti* text conveys cannot be accepted as valid not because of want of coherence, but because of conflict, with the evidence of another *pramāṇa*. Since I know myself to be a limited, mortal being, so the argument goes, I cannot be identical with the infinite, eternal, Brahman. So the opponent's contention is that since Brahman-Ātman identity taught by *śruti* is opposed to the evidence of perception, it cannot be accepted as valid. This objection, says Sureśvara, is wrong, for what is taught by *śruti* is not in conflict with perception. Sureśvara clarifies the position by elucidating the meaning of "I" in the sentence, "I am Brahman." Since the sentence identifies "I" with Brahman, we have

to find out whether the term "I" refers to the body, or the sense-organ, or the mind, or the Self. Sureśvara examines one by one all the four possibilities in the first line of the verse to remove the objection of *pramāṇa-virodha*.

Sometimes we identify ourselves with the body and speak of it as "I", as when we say "I am a man" (*ahaṁ manuṣyaḥ*). So the body is *ahaṁgrāhya*. The *śruti* text identifies "I" with Brahman. But since the material body cannot be identified with Brahman, the word "*aham*" in the scriptural text cannot *prima facie* refer to the body. If this identification were conveyed, one would be justified in saying that it is disproved by perception. The text, however, does not convey the identification of the material body with Brahman. Again, no one identifies the "I" with any of the sense-organs which are instruments. For example, no one says, "I am the visual sense." But everyone says, "I see with my eye, I hear with my ears..." (*cakṣuṣā paśyāmi, śrotreṇa śṛṇomi*...). Since there is no *ahaṁpratyaya* in the sense-organ, the question of identification of the sense-organ with Brahman is ruled out. Moreover, pleasure and pain are but states of the mind which is the internal organ. When someone says, "I am happy," "I am miserable," the "I" which experiences happiness or sorrow is the mind which carries the reflection of the Self. Since the text does not identify the mind, which is referred to by the word "I" in all these cases of the experience of pleasure and pain, with Brahman, there is no conflict with perception. And lastly, the implied meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) of "I" is the inward Self which is consciousness; and it is this Self which is said to be identical with Brahman by the text. What is true of the word "I" is also true of the word "you" (*tvam*). So the words "I" (*aham*) and "you" (*tvam*) in the *śruti* texts imply the Self which is no other than Brahman. When the meaning intended to be conveyed by the text is construed in the sense of identity of the Self and Brahman, there cannot be any conflict with the evidence of perception.

To sum up: the words "*aham*" and "*tvam*" may be understood in the primary sense (*vācyārtha*) or in the secondary sense (*lakṣyārtha*). Since the *śruti* text does not purport to convey that the body, or the sense-organ, or the mind, which is the *vācyārtha* of "*aham*" or "*tvam*", is identical with Brahman, there is no conflict with perceptual evidence. Since the inward Self is the *lakṣyārtha* of these words, the notion of identity of the Self and Brahman,

which is intended to be conveyed by these texts through the secondary sense, does not come into conflict with the evidence of perception and other *pramāṇas* which have a totally different subject-matter.

[6 - 10]

नाविरक्तस्य संसारान्निविवृत्सा ततो भवेत् ।
न चानिवृत्ततृष्णस्य पुरुषस्य मुमुक्षुता ॥ ६ ॥

न चामुमुक्षोरस्तीह गुरुपादोपसर्पणम् ।
न विना गुरुसम्बन्धं वाक्यस्य श्रवणं भवेत् ॥ ७ ॥

तथा पदपदार्थौ च न स्तो वाक्यमृते क्वचित् ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ च तावृते स्तां किमाश्रयौ ॥ ८ ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विना वाक्यार्थबोधनम् ।
न स्यात् तेन विनाऽज्ञानप्रहाणं नोपपद्यते ॥ ९ ॥

विनाऽज्ञानप्रहाणेन पुरुषार्थः सुदुर्लभः ।
तस्माद्यथोक्तसिद्ध्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥ १० ॥

A person who has no dispassion towards transmigratory existence does not desire the cessation of it. One who is not free from [worldly] desire has no longing for liberation. (6)

One who is not a seeker after liberation will not, here, resort to the feet of a preceptor. Without association with a preceptor, the hearing of the [scriptural] sentence is not possible. (7)

In the same way, without a sentence, the words and the meanings which they convey are not possible. And in their absence, what will one inquire into by the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* method? (8)

In the absence of [inquiry through] *anvaya-vyatireka* method, there is no comprehension of the meaning of the sentence. And without it, the destruction of ignorance is impossible. (9)

Without the destruction of ignorance, the good of man cannot be attained. So, for ascertaining [the meaning of "*tvam*"] as stated earlier, the subsequent portion of the work is begun. (10)

Sureśvara maintained earlier that the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman identity can be obtained only from the *Vedānta* text and that this knowledge which is valid on its own neither requires confirmation from another *pramāṇa* nor encounters the danger of conflict with another *pramāṇa*. But still Sureśvara's standpoint, one may argue, is not free from difficulty, for it is well-known that not all who hear the *śruti* text obtain the saving knowledge therefrom; and this, so one may argue, disproves Sureśvara's claim.

This objection is wrong. There is a saying that the *Veda* is productive of knowledge only to a person who has made himself eligible for it (*adhikāriṇaḥ pramiti-janako vedaḥ*). If anyone does not get the saving knowledge from the *śruti* text, it is no fault of of the text. On the contrary, it is the defect of the person who has not properly equipped himself to comprehend its meaning. It is not *pramāṇa-doṣa*, but *puruṣa-doṣa*. Hence there is the ruling that one who does not fulfil the four requirements of the preliminary discipline (*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*) is not eligible for the study of the *Vedānta* text, which is included in the final discipline.

Sureśvara mentions here the possession of dispassion (*vairāgya*) and a deep-rooted longing for liberation (*mumukṣutva*) as the qualifications of a person for the study of the *Vedānta*. A person who is thus eligible has to seek the help of a competent teacher for the study of the *Vedānta* text and guidance, since the meaning of the text cannot be comprehended without the help of a teacher. The teacher will instruct him by clarifying the meanings of the words of the text (*padārtha-śodhana*) for which he will adopt the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*. Śaṅkara observes that, as the first step towards understanding the meaning of the text "*tat tvam*

asi", one should know the distinction between the Self and the not-Self (*US*, 18.90) through the application of *anvaya-vyatireka* method (*US*, 18.96). What is invariably present in all our experience and what is not subject to change is *anvaya*; and what is sometimes present and sometimes absent and what is, therefore, subject to change is *vyatireka*. These criteria of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* help us to decide that the Self which, being the witness-consciousness to everything, is uniformly present in all our experience — waking, dream, and deep sleep — and which is not subject to modification is real, whereas the not-Self — comprising everything that is material starting from the mind — which is not uniformly present in all our experience and which is subject to change is not real. When a person gets the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman identity from the text after making use of the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* method, he is liberated from the bondage caused by *avidyā*.

[11]

वर्चस्कं त्वन्नकार्यत्वाद्यथा नात्मेति गम्यते ।
तद्भागः सेन्द्रियो देहस्तद्वत् किमिति नेक्ष्यते ॥ ११ ॥

Just as the excretion is not regarded as the Self since it is the product of food, why is it that the body along with the senses, also a product of food, is not viewed in the same way ? (11)

In verses (11) to (21) Sureśvara adduces a number of reasons to show how the Self is different from the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*).

Sureśvara argues that the body and the senses are on a par with the excretion (*varcaska*=*purīṣa*). If the latter is treated as not-Self, the former too must be treated as not-Self, because all of them are products of food (*anna-kāryatvāt*). The reasoning can be formulated in the form of an inference as follows:

The body and the senses are not-Self.
Because they are products of food (*annakāryatvāt*).
Whatever is a product of food is not-Self,
e.g. excretion.

[12]

आद्यन्तयोरनात्मत्वे प्रसिद्धे मध्येऽपि कः प्रतिबन्धः ?

प्रागनात्मैव जग्धं सदात्मतामेत्यविद्यया ।
स्रगालेपनवद्देहं तस्मात् पश्येद्विविक्तधीः ॥ १२ ॥

If what is in the beginning as well as what is at the end is obviously not-Self, what is the difficulty in admitting it to be such in the middle?

What is not-Self before gets the status of the Self after consumption, due to *avidyā*. So a man of discrimination should see the body like a garland and ointment. (12)

What exists as food in the beginning becomes, after consumption, excretion at the end. Both food and excretion are not-Self. When the same food assumes the form of the body and the senses during the interval, people, due to ignorance, consider it as the Self, though in truth it is not-Self. The idea which Sureśvara wants to drive home is that what is not-Self in the beginning and in the end cannot be the Self in the middle. Sureśvara's point can be stated in the form of an *anumāna* as follows:

> The body and the senses are not-Self.
> Because they are of the nature of food (*annātmatvāt*).
> Whatever is of the nature of food is not-Self, *e.g.* excretion.

In the second line of the verse Sureśvara gives another reason to show that the body and the senses are not-Self. A garland which a person puts on or an ointment which he applies to the body is incidental or adventitious (*āgantuka*); likewise, the appearance of the body and the senses are incidental. If so, they must be treated as not-Self like a garland or ointment. The argument is as follows:

> The body and the senses are not-Self.
> Because they are adventitious (*āgantukatvāt*).
> Whatever is adventitious is not-Self, *e.g.* a garland.

[13]

अथैवमपि मद्वचनं नाद्रियसे, स्वयमेवैतस्माच्छरीरादशुचिराशेर्निराशो भविष्यसि ।

मन्यसे तावदस्मीति यावदस्मान्न नीयसे ।
श्वभिः क्रोडीकृते देहे नैवं त्वमभिमंस्यसे ॥ १३ ॥

Even though my word is not accepted, you will have, on your own, revulsion from this body, a heap of impurities.

As long as you are not taken out of this [body], you think "I am this [body]." You do not have this identification when this body is embraced by dogs. (13)

A person identifies himself with his body so long as he is tenanting it. But he has to leave the body which is perishable. Since it has a beginning, it has an end, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. When a person leaves the body at the time of death, it is taken care of by dogs and other animals. Sureśvara's argument to show that the body is not-Self can be formulated as follows:

This body is not-Self.
Because it goes away (*apāyitvāt*).
Whatever goes away is not-Self, *e.g.* a pot.

[14]

शिर आक्रम्य पादेन भर्त्सयत्यपरान् शुनः ।
दृष्ट्वा साधारणं देहं कस्मात् सक्तोऽसि तत्र भोः ॥ १४ ॥

Standing on the head [of the body], one dog fights with other dogs. Having seen that the body becomes the common possession, oh, how is it you are attached to it ? (14)

A person claims that the body he is tenanting is "his". But the same body is claimed by dogs and other animals as "theirs". It is nothing but ignorance to be attached to the body which becomes the common property of both man and animals.

[15]

श्रुतिपरिप्रापितोऽयमर्थोऽनात्मा बुद्ध्यादिदेहान्त इतीदमाह ।

बुसव्रीहिपलालांशैर्बीजमेकं त्रिधा यथा ।
बुद्धिमांसपुरीषांशैरन्नं तद्वदवस्थितम् ॥ १५ ॥

The following is stated to show that it is the view of *śruti* that everything from the intellect down to the body is not-Self.

Just as a seed changes into the three forms of chaff, grain, and bran, even so the food assumes the forms of intellect, flesh and excretion. (15)

So far Sureśvara established on the basis of reasoning that the body and the senses are not-Self. He now shows that there is also the support of *śruti* for his view. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6.5.1) says: "Food, when eaten, becomes, threefold: its coarsest portion becomes the faeces; its middle portion (becomes) flesh; and its subtlest portion (becomes) the mind."

[16 - 17]

यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां, न रागद्वेषाभ्यां विक्रियते विपश्चिदित्यस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये दृष्टान्तः ।

वर्चस्के सम्परित्यक्ते दोषतश्चावधारिते ।
यदि दोषं वदेत् तस्मै किं तत्रोच्चरितुर्भवेत् ॥ १६ ॥

तद्वत् सूक्ष्मे तथा स्थूले देहे त्यक्ते विवेकतः ।
यदि दोषं वदेत् ताभ्यां किं तत्र विदुषो भवेत् ॥ ॥ १७ ॥

The [following] example is given in order to convey the idea that a man of knowledge, if what has been stated is understood [by him], will not be subject to desire and aversion.

When the faeces is excreted and when its impurity is known, how does it affect him when someone speaks about its impurity? (16)

In the same way, when the gross and subtle bodies are discarded through discrimination, how does it affect the man of knowledge when someone speaks about their defect? (17)

A person does not feel sorry when he knows, and also when others talk about, the impurity of the faeces excreted by him. In the same way, a man of knowledge is not affected in any way when he knows that the gross and subtle bodies with which he identified himself earlier are not-Self. The expression "*dehe tyakte*" means *dehābhimānatyāge*, *i.e.* when the identification with the body, gross and subtle, is given up. The idea is that a man of knowledge is free from *dehābhimāna*.

When a person realizes that the Self is different from the gross and subtle bodies, he is not afflicted by *rāga* and *dveṣa* (desire and aversion) which are the sources of evil. Freedom from *rāga-dveṣa* is the *dṛṣṭa-phala* of the attainment of the right knowledge.

[18]

एतावदेव हि "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इति वाक्यार्थाप्रतिपत्तौ कारणं यदुत बुद्ध्यादौ देहान्ते ह्यहंममेति निस्सन्धिबन्धनो ग्रहः। तद्व्यतिरेके हि न कुतश्चिद्विभज्यते, एकल एव प्रत्यगात्मन्यवतिष्ठत इत्याह।

रिपौ बन्धौ स्वदेहे च समैकात्म्यं प्रपश्यतः।
विवेकिनः कुतः कोपः स्वदेहावयवेष्विव ॥ १८ ॥

The [false] notion of "I" and "mine" with regard to objects beginning with the intellect down to the body, which continuously clings to a person — it is this notion, indeed, that is the cause of the non-comprehension of the meaning of the sentence, "I am Brahman." If, on the contrary, [there is the right knowledge], a person is not separated from anyone else when he remains as the one inward Self [of all]. So the following is stated.

How can a wise man who sees the same Self in an enemy, in a kinsman, and in his own body be angry [with anyone], just as [one cannot be angry] with the organs of one's own body? (18)

Sureśvara emphasizes the idea that one cannot understand the import of the *śruti* text, "*tat tvam asi*", so long as one does not give up the false identification with the mind-sense-body complex. What separates a person from another is the mind-sense-body complex which serves as the adjunct (*upādhi*) of the Self. When a person realizes that the Self which is in all being — a friend and a foe, a beast and a man — is one and the same (*ekala*), he cannot have hatred towards anyone.

[19]

इतश्चानात्मा देहादिः ।

घटादिवच्च दृश्यत्वात् तैरेव करणैर्दृशेः ।
स्वप्ने चानन्वयाज्ज्ञेयो देहोऽनात्मेति सूरिभिः ॥ १९ ॥

For this reason also, body and other objects are not-Self.

Since the body, like pot, etc., is seen by the same sense-organs, and since it does not continue in dream, it should be known as not-Self by the wise. (19)

Sureśvara argues in a different way to show that the body is not Self. Here he makes use of *dṛśyatva* as the *hetu* which has been used by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara for proving the illusoriness (*mithyātva*) of the world which is not-Self. While the Self is knowledge (*jñāna*) by its very nature, pot, pan, and other things which are perceived by us are objects of knowledge (*jñeya*). The latter are different from the Self, because they are perceived (*dṛśyatvāt*) by one or more of our sense-organs; but the Self can never be perceived. Since I see my body in the same way as I see an external object such as a pot, the body, like a pot, must be not-Self. It may be mentioned here that the Self which is knowledge is never an object of knowledge. If it were an object of knowledge in the sense in which a tree or a table is an object

of knowledge, it would cease to be the Self. So the body which is seen and which is, therefore, an object of knowledge is not-Self. We may summarize this discussion in the following propositions.

(1) The body which is seen is *jñeya*.

(2) The Self which is *svaprakāśa* is *jñāna* (=*caitanya*).

(3) What is *jñeya* is different from *jñāna*, and *vice versa*. It means that *jñeya* can never be *jñāna*, and *jñāna* can never be *jñeya*.

(4) Since the body is *jñeya*, it is different from the Self which is *jñāna*. So the body is not-Self.

The same idea can be conveyed in the form of an *anumāna*:

The body is not-Self.
Because it is seen (*dṛśyatvāt*).
Whatever is seen is not-Self, *e.g.* a pot.

In the second line of the verse Sureśvara adduces another reason to establish the same point. We have not only waking experience, but also dream experience. The body with which we identify ourselves at the waking level (*jāgrat*) and transact business through it does not continue during our dream experience (*svapna*). It is through some other body, *e.g.* the body of an angel or that of a beast, that business is transacted at that time. When a person moves from dream to the waking level, he has once again association with the same body of the waking experience which disappeared at the time of dream. In short, the body we are familiar with appears and disappears. The Self, on the contrary, is uniformly present in all the three levels of experience — waking, dream, and sleep; it persists all the time as the witness (*sākṣin*) to the presence as well as the absence of things. Since the body comes and goes away, it is not-Self. The argument can be formulated as follows:

The body is not-Self.
Because it appears and disappears (*āgamāpāyitvāt*).
Whatever appears and disappears is not-Self, *e.g.* a pot.

[20]

देहादिकार्यंकरणसङ्घातव्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकदर्शिनः प्रत्यक्षत एव विरुद्धं कार्यं उपलभ्यते।

चतुर्भिरुह्यते यत्तात् सर्वशक्त्या शरीरकम् ।
तूलायते तदेवाहंधियाघ्रातमचेतसाम् ॥ २० ॥

One who knows the Self as different or as non-different from the body, etc., which are the aggregate of factors which are effects as well as instruments, directly sees the contradictory results [which arise therefrom].

That body which is removed by four persons with all their strength is light like cotton to an ignorant person who is overcome by the sense of identification with it. (20)

The body is composed of several factors which are the effects of other things and which serve as instruments. It is, therefore, referred to as *kārya-karaṇa-saṅghāta*. One and the same body, says Sureśvara, is viewed differently by different people. Consider the case of an ignorant man who identifies himself with his body. He does not feel the heaviness of his body, and is able to move about comfortably with his body as though it is flimsy like cotton. He has *mithyā-jñāna*, because he does not know that he is different from his body. But the pall-bearers who carry his body do not identify themselves with it, because they know that they are different from it. Consequently, these people who have the discriminating knowledge (*viveka-jñāna*) know how heavy the body is. The body which is light to one who has *mithyā-jñāna* is heavy to another person who has *viveka-jñāna*. The very fact that the body evokes responses which are mutually opposed (*viruddha-kārya*) depending on the situation — whether it serves as the *upādhi* to the Self which is related to it or not — shows, declares Sureśvara, that it is not the Self.

[21]

प्रसिद्धत्वात् प्रकरणार्थोपसंहारायाह ।

स्थूलं युक्त्या निरस्यैवं नभसो नीलतामिव ।
देहं सूक्ष्मं निराकुर्यादतो युक्तिभिरात्मनः ॥ २१ ॥

Since this idea is well-known, by way of concluding the topic under discussion the following is said.

After differentiating the gross body [from the Self] through reasoning in this way, just as blueness is differentiated from the sky, the subtle body also should be differentiated from the Self through reasonings. (21)

The distinction between the Self and the gross body is accepted by all schools excepting the Cārvāka. Sureśvara suggests that there is no need to labour on this point which will be obvious with a little reflection on the issue.

[22]

कथं देहं सूक्ष्मं निराकुर्यादिति ? उच्यते ।

अहंममत्वयत्नेच्छा नात्मधर्माः कृशत्ववत् ।
कर्मत्वेनोपलभ्यत्वादपायित्वाच्च वस्त्रवत् ॥ २२ ॥

How should one differentiate the subtle body [from the Self]? The answer is given [in the sequel].

The notions of "I" and "mine", effort and desire, are not the attributes of the Self, because they are perceived as objects like leanness and also because they disappear like a garment. (22)

Since it is difficult to distinguish the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*), particularly the internal organ which is the subtlest component of it, from the Self, Sureśvara devotes considerable attention to this problem in this chapter. The subtle body, also known as the *liṅga-śarīra*, consists of seventeen factors — five organs of action, five vital airs, five organs of knowledge, *buddhi* and *manas*. The last two factors constitute the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*). *Buddhi* is that mode of the internal organ which stands for certitude, while *manas*, as a mode of the internal organ, stands for desire and doubt. According to some, *citta* and *ahaṅkāra* may be included in these two. But if they are reckoned separately, we have to speak of nineteen constituents of the subtle body. Though the internal organ is one, it is referred to as existing and functioning in four forms as *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, and *citta* (*ekamapi antaḥkaraṇaṁ vṛttibhedena mana iti, buddhiriti, ahaṅkāra iti, cittamiti ca ākhyāyate*). A verse quoted in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* in the section on Perception says:

"*mano buddhirahaṅkāraścittaṁ karaṇamāntaram*
saṁśayo niścayo garvaḥ smaraṇaṁ viṣayā ime"

It means: "The internal organ comprises *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, and *citta*. The contents of these are doubt, certitude, pride and recollection."

A text of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (1.5.3) says: "Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence, fear — all these are but the mind." Keeping this text in the mind Sureśvara says that the notions or cognitions such as "I" and "mine", desire and effort — and this list is only suggestive — are not the attributes of the Self. Rather, they belong to the internal organ. The Advaitin maintains the dichotomy between the Self and the not-Self throughout the epistemological discussion at the empirical level. If the attributes mentioned above are not those of the Self, but of some other entity, *viz*. the internal organ, then the latter is not-Self.

It is necessary to note the significance of the expression "*karmatvena upalabhyatvāt*" used by Sureśvara in the second line of the verse. Just as desire, pleasure, pot, pan, etc. are known, the Self too is known. And from this one may draw the conclusion that there is no difference between the Self on the one hand and other entities, whether they are subjective states such as pleasure and pain or external things such as pot and pan in so far as all of them are known. With a view to emphasize the distinction between the Self and other entities, Sureśvara says that the latter are known as "objects of knowledge". The Self is known, but it is not known as an object of knowledge, because it is *svaprakāśa* unlike other objects. While other objects are revealed by it and thereby become objects of knowledge, it is not revealed by anything, and so it does not become an object of knowledge. In another way also we may bring out the distinction. Two conditions have to be fulfilled if anything is to be an object of knowledge. For example, a pot is an object of knowledge only when there is *vṛtti-vyāpyatva* as well as *phala-vyāpyatva*; that is to say, it becomes an object of knowledge through the modification of the internal organ which assumes its form and through its revelation by consciousness. In other words, (1) the appropriate *vṛtti* of the internal organ and (2) consciousness are needed if anything is to be an object of knowledge. However, in the case of knowing

the Self, only one of the two conditions stated above is required. Since the Self which is consciousness is already there, what is needed is the appropriate mental mode or state, usually referred to as the *akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti* (the unitary, unfragmented mental state). Since both the conditions are not fulfilled in the case of knowing the Self, the Advaitin maintains that the Self is not an object of knowledge in the sense in which stocks and stones are said to be objects of knowledge.

As in the earlier cases, here also Sureśvara's argument can be stated in the form of an *anumāna* as follows:

The notions of "I", "mine", etc. are the attributes of the not-Self.

Because they are known as objects of knowledge (*karmatvena dṛśyatvāt*), *e.g.* leanness.

Sureśvara adduces another reason also in this verse to show that the notions of "I" and "mine", desire and aversion, etc., are not the qualities of the Self. Since these qualities go away (*apāyitvāt*) like a garment which a person puts on, they are not the qualities of the eternal Self. What is impermanent (*anitya*) cannot be the quality of an eternal object (*nityavastu*).

[23]

वैधर्म्ये दृष्टान्तः ।

नोष्णिमानं दहत्यग्निः स्वरूपत्वाद्यथा ज्वलन् ।
तथैवात्मात्मनो विद्यादहं नैवाविशेषतः ॥ २३ ॥

To bring out the difference, an example is given.

Just as the blazing fire does not burn its heat, since the latter is its very nature, even so the Self cannot comprehend the "I", should that ["I"] be its own, as there is no distinction [between the two cases]. (23)

In the previous verse Sureśvara gave the example of leanness, similar to the point he was trying to establish, for leanness, the notion of "I", desire, aversion, etc. are qualities of objects different from the Self. In this verse he justifies his standpoint by

citing a dissimilar case, that of fire, well-known in our day-to-day life. Whatever may be the way in which one considers the relation between heat and fire, whether as an attribute (*dharma*) of fire, or as its nature (*svarūpa*), the fact remains that it cannot be consumed by fire, for it is not external to fire. While fire burns a piece of wood or some other object which is outside it, it never burns its own heat. In the same way, the "I", otherwise called the ego (*ahaṅkāra*), can be comprehended by the Self only if it is external to the Self, and not if it is part or constitutive of the Self. In other words, the Self cannot be both the knower and the known at the same time.

[24]

एकस्यात्मनः कर्मकर्तृभावः सर्वथा नोपपद्यत इति श्रुत्वा, मीमांसकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते, अहंप्रत्ययग्राह्यत्वाद्ग्राहक आत्मेति। तन्निवृत्त्यर्थमाह।

यत्कर्मको हि यो भावो नासौ तत्कर्तृको यतः।
घटप्रत्ययवत् तस्मान्नाहं स्याद्द्रष्टृकर्मकः ॥ २४ ॥

Hearing the view that it is utterly impossible for one and the same Self to be both the subject and the object, the Mīmāṁsaka raises the objection on the ground that the Self which is the subject (knower) is known through the "I"-cognition. With a view to refute this, the following is stated.

A cognition which has something as its object cannot, indeed, have it as its subject, as in the case of pot-cognition. So the "I"-cognition cannot have the seer as its object. (24)

Sureśvara introduces here the objection of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka who holds the view that one and the same Self is both the subject and the object, *i.e.* the knower and the known, at the same time in the same act of cognition. He justifies his view on the strength of the evidence of *ahaṁ-pratyaya* ("I"-cognition which all of us have). When I say, "I know myself" (*māmahaṁ jānāmi*), the knower is the Self, and the object known is also the Self. In other words, at the time of self-consciousness, the Self splits itself

into two as the knower and the known. If so, what has been said by Sureśvara by citing the example of fire, so the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka argues, is wrong.

Sureśvara rejects the Bhāṭṭa view by means of reasoning. It is common knowledge that anything which is known as an object of a cognition cannot also be the subject of that cognition. For example, in pot-cognition (*ghaṭa-pratyaya*) pot is the cognitum, and the subject which knows it is different from it. In the same way, if the Self is the object of *ahaṁ-pratyaya*, it cannot at the same time be its subject. This point can be conveyed through the following *anumāna:*

> The "I"-cognition does not have the Self as its object.
> Because the Self is the subject of that cognition (*ātma-kartṛkatvāt*), *e.g.* pot-cognition.

[25]

अत्राह — प्रत्यक्षेणात्मनः कर्मकर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमे तत्पादोपजीविनानुमानेन प्रत्यक्षोत्सारणमयुक्तमिति चोद्यम्। तन्निराकरणाय प्रत्यक्षोपन्यासः।

यत्र यो दृश्यते द्रष्ट्रा तस्यैवासौ गुणो न तु।
द्रष्टृस्थं दृश्यतां यस्मान्नैवेयाद्द्रष्टृबोधवत् ॥ २५ ॥

Here the opponent objects that, since it has to be accepted on the basis of perception that the Self is both the subject and the object, it cannot be denied by inference which is dependent on perception. With a view to refute this, [the position of] perception is set forth.

That which is perceived in a locus by the seer must be the quality of that [locus], and not that of the seer, because [if it be otherwise] it can never be seen, like the consciousness of the seer. (25)

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka claims that his position is quite sound since it has the support of perception. If the Self is the knower of "I" because there is *ahaṁ-pratyaya*, it is also the known, because we have the experience of self-consciousness such as "I know myself." It is well-known, observes the opponent, that

inference is dependent on perception; and the latter, therefore, is stronger than inference. It means that what is proved by perception can never be set aside by inference. So the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka concludes that the Self is both the knower and the known at the same time.

Here Sureśvara meets the objection of the opponent by relying on the evidence of perception. While the internal organ is present at waking and dream experience, it is absent in deep sleep experience. Advaita holds that the internal organ, when it is present, is directly seen or witnessed by the Self; *i.e.* it is *kevala-sākṣi-bhāsya*. Since the cognition in the form "*aham*" (*ahaṁ-pratyaya*) arises only when the internal organ is present and seen by the Self, it must be the attribute of the internal organ, and not that of the Self. If it were the attribute of the Self, it can never be seen by the Self. Moreover, though the Self which is revelatory by its nature is present in the state of deep sleep, there is no *ahaṁ-pratyaya* at that time. If it were the attribute of the Self, it should have been revealed by the Self at that time, and we should have had *ahaṁ-pratyaya*, as we do have it in the other two states. But we never get it at that time. So Sureśvara concludes that perceptual experience does not prove what has been claimed by the opponent

What is called "self-consciousness" does not mean consciousness *of* the Self in the sense that the Self, like other objects, becomes an object of our consciousness. We have already said that the Self *per se* is knowledge or consciousness; and what is *jñāna* by its very nature can never be *jñeya*. Further, if "self-consciousness" is understood as consciousness of the Self, it will only mean consciousness of consciousness; and this will lead to infinite regress as we will require at every stage one consciousness to know another consciousness such that we will be forced to speak of consciousness of consciousness of consciousness...If so, what does the statement, "I know myself" (*ahaṁ māṁ jānāmi*) mean? It is necessary to bear in mind that we make such a claim not in the state of deep sleep, but only in the other two states in which the Self exists as conditioned or qualified by the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa*). So when someone says, "I know myself," what is known is not the Self *per se*, but the empirical or conditioned self. When the internal organ in which there is the reflection of consciousness (Self) is left

alone without beingrelated to any object, there is *aham-pratyaya*, which enables one to put forth the claim " I know myself."

[26]

प्रत्यक्षेणैव भवदभिमतस्य प्रत्यक्षस्याभासीकृतत्वात् सुस्थमेवानुमानम्। अतस्तदेव प्रक्रियते। तत्र च विकल्पदूषणाभिधानम्।

नात्मना न तदंशेन गुणः स्वस्थोऽवगम्यते।
अभिन्नत्वात् समत्वाच्च निरंशत्वादकर्मतः॥ २६॥

Since the perceptual experience accepted by you is disproved by perception itself, the inference [given earlier] is valid. So the same view will be vindicated [in another way]. For this purpose, the alternatives [of the opponent's view] will be stated and criticized [in the sequel].

A quality inherent in one's own being (*i.e.* in the Self) cannot be known by the Self or by its part, because of non-difference [in the Self], because of identity [in nature between the Self and its part], because the Self is partless and also because it is not an object of knowledge. (26)

The perceptual evidence cited by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka in support of his position is erroneous. What is actually perceived is different from what he thinks he has perceived. It is just like the case of one who, having seen a pillar, claims that he has seen a man. Since the analysis of experience of waking, dream, and deep sleep states shows that the conditioned or empirical self alone is perceived and not the Self *per se*, Sureśvara says that the alleged perceptual evidence relied on by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka is fallacious. With a view to strengthen his own position Sureśvara undertakes further analysis of the problem posed by the *pūrvapakṣin*.

If it is claimed that the "I"-notion is a quality of the Self and not that of the internal organ, then what is it, asks Sureśvara, that knows it? Is it known by the whole Self or by a part of it? One cannot think of a third alternative because there is no seer other then the Self. The first alternative, says Sureśvara, is un-

tenable. To know a quality is to know it as a quality of an object. It is impossible to know a quality without knowing the locus in which it inheres. If the "I"-notion which is known by the Self is a quality thereof, it will mean that the Self divides itself into the knower and the known, which is not only absurd but also impossible, because the Self which is one and homogeneous does not admit of any such division (*abhinnatvāt*). Nor does the second alternative fare better. There cannot be any qualitative difference between the whole and its part. If we assume for the sake of argument that the Self is divisible such that we can speak of a part (*aṁśa*) of the Self, even then the Self and its part must have identical nature. If the Self is knowledge, its *aṁśa* cannot be qualitatively different from it. It means that, since both have identical nature (*samatvāt*), a part of the Self cannot become the knower by reducing the remaining part to the status of an object. In fact, the very assumption is wrong, because the Self is partless (*niraṁśatvāt*). Moreover, both the alternatives proceed on the assumption that the Self is an object of knowledge, which is not true. So the view that the *ahaṁ-pratyaya* is a quality of the Self is wrong. If it were the case, it can never be known.

[27]

न युगपन्नापि क्रमेणोभयथा चैकस्य धर्मिणो ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वमुपपद्यत इति प्रतिपादनायाह ।

द्रष्टृत्वेनोपयुक्तत्वात् तदैव स्यान्न दृश्यता ।
कालान्तरे चेद्दृश्यत्वं न ह्यद्रष्टृकमिष्यते ॥ २७ ॥

With a view to substantiate that one and the same object cannot be the knower and the known simultaneously, or successively, or both [simultaneously and successively], it is said.

Since the Self is admitted to be the knower, it itself cannot be the known. If it be said that it becomes the known at some other time, something being the known without a knower cannot be accepted. (27)

Sureśvara brings out the absurdity of the view that the Self is both the knower and the known in a different way. Is it the case, Sureśvara asks, that the Self is both the knower and the known simultaneously (*yugapat*) or successively (*krameṇa*)? Neither alternative, he says, is tenable.

It is admitted that the Self is the knower through which objects which are different from it are known. Since it is the knower, it cannot at the same time be the known. Further, being homogeneous and partless by nature, the Self cannot, as stated earlier, divide itself into the knower and the known for the purpose of playing two mutually opposed roles at the same time. Nor can it be said with a view to overcome the above difficulties that the Self which is the knower at one time becomes the known at a different time. The Self which alone is the seer is one. If it is reduced to the status of the known, there will not be any seer to which it can be related as the seen. It is absurd to speak of a cognitum without a cognizer. Therefore, it is impossible for the Self to be the knower and the known successively.

Owing to the reasons stated above, the Self cannot be the knower and the known both successively and simultaneously.

[28]

सन्तु काममनात्मधर्मा ममत्वादयो यथोक्तन्यायबलादनात्मतयैव च तेषु व्यवहारात् अहंरूपस्य तु प्रत्यगात्मसम्बन्धितयैव प्रसिद्धेः, "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इति श्रुतेश्चानात्मधर्मत्वमयुक्तमिति चेत्, तन्न।

अहंधर्मस्त्वभिन्नश्चेदहंब्रह्मेति वाक्यतः।
गौरोऽहमित्यनैकान्तो वाक्यं तद्व्यपनेतृ तत् ॥ २८ ॥

Let it be, the opponent argues, that the notions of mine, etc., are the attributes of the not-Self because of the strength of the argument stated above, and also because they are treated in our day-to-day life as not-Self. But since the notion of "I" is known only in relation to the inward Self and since there is the *śruti* text, "I am Brahman," it is not proper to say that it is an attribute of the not-Self. If this be the contention, it is not so.

If the notion of "I" should be identified [with Brahman-Ātman] because of the sentence, "I am Brahman," the

reasoning does not hold in the case of "I am fair." The [*śruti*] sentence in question removes that [identification]. (28)

Here there is a climb-down by the opponent from his original position. Drawing a distinction between the "I"-notion on the one hand and other features such as the notion of mine, effort, desire, etc., on the other hand, the opponent argues that while the latter are the attributes of the not-Self, the former, *i.e. ahaṁ-pratyaya*, belongs to Brahman-Ātman. He adduces two reasons in support of his contention. There is, first of all, the empirical usage (*laukika-vyavahāra*) such as "I am the Self" which shows the identification of "I" and the Self on the basis of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Secondly, the scriptural text, "I am Brahman," also confirms this idea. What the opponent emphasizes here is that the identification of "I" and the Self cannot be dismissed as a case of wrong identification due to ignorance inasmuch as this identification continues even after the attainment of the right knowledge as shown by the *śruti* text, "I am Brahman."

Both the arguments are wrong. Sureśvara rejects the first argument on the ground that the *hetu* or reason given by the opponent is deviant (*anaikāntika*). If the empirical usage such as "I am the Self" is the reason for identifying the "I" and the Self, then on the basis of the usage "I am fair" (*gauro'ham*), one would be justified in saying that fairness is an attribute of "I" or the Self, which is absurd. The second argument betrays lack of understanding of the purport of the *śruti* text. Far from supporting the claim of the opponent, the text disproves it. It is wrong to conclude on the basis of grammatical coordination (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) between the two words "*aham*" and "*brahma*" that the "I" and Brahman are idential. The purport of the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* here is not to convey the identity of "I" and Brahman, but to deny it. In short, it is a case of *bādhāyaṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya*. This point will be elucidated in the subsequent verse. So, what holds good for the notion of mine, effort, desire, etc., also holds good for the "I"-notion. All of them are attributes of the not-Self.

[29]

कथं वाक्यं तद्व्यपनेतृ तदिति ? उच्यते ।

योऽयं स्थाणुः पुमानेष पुंधिया स्थाणुधीरिव ।
ब्रह्मास्मीति धियाशेषा ह्यहंबुद्धिर्निवर्त्यते ॥ २९ ॥

If it be asked: "How does the sentence remove that [identification]?" we reply.

Just as in the sentence, "This post is a man," the cognition of post is removed by the cognition of man, even so by the cognition that "I am Brahman" the entire cognition of "I" is removed. (29)

Sureśvara explains how the sentence, "I am Brahman," when, properly understood, will remove all wrong notions starting with the *ahaṁ-pratyaya* which a person entertains as a result of which he identifies himself with the mind-sense-body complex, by making him realize that he is different from it. Sureśvara interprets the text, "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi,*" through what is called *bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya*, which also holds good in the case of the sentence, "*ayaṁ sthāṇuḥ pumān*" (This post is a man) which is given as an example for the elucidation of the interpretation.

In a sentence words which, having the same case-endings, denote one and the same thing are said to be in *samānādhikaraṇa*; and the relation that obtains between (or among) the words is called *sāmānādhikaraṇya-sambandha*. This relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is of two kinds — *mukhya-sāmānādhikaraṇya* and *bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya*. In the former, the objects denoted by the words of the sentence will have equal ontological status (*samāna-sattā*), will be identical in nature (*samāna-svarūpa*), and will not be really different from each other (*vāstavabhedaśūnya*). For example, when we say, "*ghaṭākāśa mahākāśa eva,*" (The pot-ether is but the great-ether), the words "*ghaṭākāśa*" and "*mahākāśa*" are in *mukhya-sāmānādhikaraṇya*. The pot-enclosed ether and the ether outside it have the same ontological status, *i.e.* both are empirically real. Also, both of them have the same nature. Though they appear to be different, they are not really so. The pot which is the *upādhi* (adjunct) separates the ether in the pot from the ether outside it, and so the difference between the two is only *aupādhika*. When the *upādhi* is removed, they become one which they really are all the time. So *mukhya-sāmānādhikaraṇya* is defined as follows: *samāna-sattākatvena samāna-svarūpakatvena ca vāstavabheda-śūnyayoḥ dvayoḥ padārthayorbodhaka-vākyagata-padadvayasya mukhya-sāmānādhikāraṇyaṁ ucyate.*

But if the words of a sentence, which have the same case-endings denote objects which have different ontological status and

if they purport to convey only one idea, then they are in *bādhāyaṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya*. For example, when we say, "*ayaṁ sthāṇuḥ puruṣaḥ*" (This post is a man), the objects denoted by the words "*sthāṇu*" and "*puruṣa*" have different ontological status. Since what exists really is a man and not a post, "man" is empirically real (*vyāvahārika*), whereas "post" is apparently real (*prātibhāsika*). So the definition of *bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya* can be stated as follows: *bhinna-sattākayorubhayoḥ padārthayoḥ samāna-vibhaktikatva-balena aikya-pratipādakavākyastha-padadvayasya bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ ucyate.*

Let us now elucidate the example given by Sureśvara to see the force of his interpretation of the *śruti* text. A person, due to distance and other factors, first of all perceives a man as a post, but subsequently corrects the mistake when he knows that the object seen by him is not a post, but a man, and says: "The post is a man" (*ayaṁ sthāṇuḥ puruṣaḥ*). It is absurd to say on the basis of a superficial reading of the sentence structure that he identifies the post and the man. What he intends to convey by this sentence is that the object which he cognized as a post is, indeed, a man. Here, the subsequent cognition of the object as a man sublates the earlier cognition of it as a post; and it does not take place without cancelling the earlier cognition which is erroneous. The object referred to by the sentence is only one; and the sentence achieves its objective through the sublation of one cognition by another cognition. In the same way, when a person realizes that he is Brahman as a result of the hearing of the *śruti* text under the guidance of a competent teacher, the right cognition which he has attained sublates the wrong cognitions he had earlier — cognitions such as "I am a man," "I am blind," "I am miserable," etc. — which are connected with the "I".

[30]

अहम्परिच्छेदव्यावृत्तौ न किञ्चिदव्यावृत्तं द्वैतजातमवशिष्यते, द्वितीयसम्बन्धस्य तन्मूलत्वात्। अत आह।

निवृत्तायामहंबुद्धौ ममधीः प्रविलीयते।
अहंबीजा हि सा सिद्ध्येत् तमोऽभावे कुतः फणी ॥ ३० ॥

When the notion of "I" is eliminated, there is nothing in the world of duality which remains unsublated, since relation with a second entity is dependent on it. So the following is stated.

When the notion of "I" is removed, the notion of "mine" disappears, for it arises, indeed, because of the notion of "I". In the absence of darkness, how can there be the [illusory] snake? (30)

Sureśvara explains the benefit that accrues as a result of the elimination of the notion of "I". Since the "I"-notion is the support of the entire world of duality, its elimination is *ipso facto* the elimination of all other factors such as the notion of "mine", desire, effort, etc., which constitute the world of duality. In other words, no special effort is needed for removing them. Sureśvara illustrates this point by means of the rope-snake example. As long as a person is ignorant of the rope which is in front, there is the appearance of the snake for him. The illusory snake goes away the moment his ignorance of the object gets removed through the right knowledge of the object. *Ajñāna* is the cause of *mithyā-jñāna*. In the absence of darkness, *i.e.* ignorance (*tamo'bhāve = ajñānābhāve*), one cannot perceive the rope-snake.

[31]

विवक्षितदृष्टान्तांशज्ञापनाय दृष्टान्तव्याख्या ।

तमोऽभिभूतचित्तो हि रज्ज्वां पश्यति रोषणम् ।
भ्रान्त्या, भ्रान्त्या विना तस्मान्नोरगं स्रजि वीक्षते ॥ ३१ ॥

The example is elucidated with a view to remind the point of similarity which is intended to be conveyed.

Indeed, one whose mind is overwhelmed by the darkness of ignorance sees the rope as a snake due to error. So without error [caused by ignorance], one does not see a snake in a garland. (31)

[32]

अनन्वयाच्च नात्मधर्मोऽहङ्कारः ।

आत्मनश्चेदहंधर्मो यायान्मुक्तिसुषुप्तयोः ।
यतो नान्वेति तेनायमन्यदीयो भवेदहम् ॥ ३२ ॥

Further, the "I" is not a quality of the Self, since it is not invariably related [to the Self].

If the attribute of "I" belongs to the Self, it should continue [along with the Self] in the states of liberation and sleep. Since the "I" does not continue with the Self, it must belong to something else. (32)

Sureśvara cites the evidence that we find in the states of deep sleep and liberation to disprove the claim that the "I"-notion (*ahaṅkāra*) is an attribute of the Self. If the "I" is an essential or inseparable quality of the Self, it must uniformly continue with the Self, in the same way as heat which is the essential quality of fire characterizes it all the time. This, however, is not the case. The "I" which is present along with the Self in waking and dream states is absent in sleep, even though the Self is present at that time. The "I" is absent in *suṣupti*, because the internal organ is absent in that condition. Since the Self exists without the "I" in *suṣupti*, the latter cannot be its quality. What holds good in sleep also holds good in the state of liberation. One who has the notion of "I" and thereby the notion of "mine" is in bondage; and to be free from the notion of "I" is to be liberated from bondage. It means that the state of liberation is a condition in which the Self exists without the "I".

There are also *śruti* texts in support of the above analysis. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.11.2), Indra, while receiving instruction from Prajāpati, speaks of sleep as a state of "annihilation", since there is no "I", nor any object, at that time. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, Yājñavalkya tells Maitreyī (2.4.12) that when the *jīva* attains the infinite Reality "it has no more (particular) consciousness" (*na pretya saṁjñāsti*). Commenting on this text, Śaṅkara observes: "After attaining (this oneness) the *jīva*, freed from the

body and the organs, has no more particular consciousness…as 'I, so and so, am the son of so and so; this is my land and wealth; I am happy or miserable'…"

So Sureśvara concludes relying on the evidence provided by the states of *suṣupti* and *mukti* that *ahaṅkāra* is not a quality of the Self.

[33]

आत्मधर्मत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपरिहार्यदोषप्रसक्तिश्च ।

यद्यात्मधर्मोऽहङ्कारो नित्यत्वं तस्य बोधवत् ।
नित्यत्वे मोक्षशास्त्राणां वैयर्थ्यं प्राप्नुयाद्ध्रुवम् ॥ ३३ ॥

Also, if the "I" is admitted as a quality of the Self, unavoidable defects will arise.

If the "I" is a quality of the Self, then it will be eternal like consciousness. And if it is eternal, scriptural texts which speak of liberation will certainly become futile. (33)

Sureśvara points out the undesirable consequence that will follow if the "I" is admitted to be a quality of the Self. The notion of "I" is the basis of the bondage of man. If it were to persist along with the Self which is eternal, liberation will be impossible, and also scripture which speaks about liberation must be treated as useless.

[34]

स्यात्परिहारः स्वाभाविकधर्मत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि आम्रादिफलवदिति चेत् , तन्न ।

आम्रादेः परिणामित्वाद्गुणहानिर्गुणान्तरैः ।
अविकारि तु तद्ब्रह्म न हि द्रष्टुरिति श्रुतेः ॥ ३४ ॥

If it be said that there is a solution to the difficulty even if it is admitted to be a natural quality [of the Self], as in the case of fruits such as mango, it is not so.

Since objects such as mango are subject to modification, one quality is replaced by other qualities. But Brahman is immutable, for the *śruti* says, "The vision of the seer is never lost." (34)

Sureśvara considers a possible solution that might be offered by the opponent in justification of his standpoint. He may argue that the difficulty stated above arises only if the "I" is treated as a permanent quality of the Self. But there is no need to treat it in that way. Though the Self is eternal, the "I" may be a temporary quality of it. He may cite the case of a mango fruit in justification of his contention. The mango is green at one time, but becomes yellow subsequently. Though it is sour when it is unripe, it becomes sweet when it is ripe. It means that qualities such as greenness, sourness, etc., which characterize it at one time are replaced by other qualities which arise subsequently. In the same way, though the "I" is a quality of the Self, it need not be its permanent quality. If so, neither liberation is to be ruled out; nor does scripture become futile.

Sureśvara rejects this argument on the ground that the analogy between the Self on the one hand and objects such as mango on the other does not hold good. The latter which are composite are subject to change such that origination of new qualities in them is possible. If so, the new quality which arises is a replacement of the old one. Unlike objects such as mango, the Self which is partless is immutable; and so there cannot be any loss of its quality, whatever it may be. That is why *śruti* (*BU*, 4.3.23) says, "The vision of the seer is never lost." If so, there is no possibility of replacement of any of its quality. In other words, if the "I" is a quality of the Self, it has to be its permanent quality; consequently, the difficulty stated earlier cannot be got over. Since the "I" is impermanent, it cannot be a quality of the Self which is eternal (*ahaṅkārasya anityatvāt nityātmadharmatvaṁ anupapannam*).

[35]

अहङ्कारस्य चागमापायित्वात्, तद्धर्मिणश्चानित्यत्वं प्राप्नोति ।

आगमापायिनिष्ठत्वादनित्यत्वमियाद्दृशिः ।
उपयन्नपयन् धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणम् ॥ ३५ ॥

Since the "I" comes and goes away, the substance in which it inheres will also be impermanent.

Consciousness will become impermanent if it is the locus of that ["I"] which comes and goes away. A quality which appears and disappears changes, indeed, its substratum. (35)

Sureśvara now argues that, since the Self is eternal, it cannot be the substratum (*dharmī*) of impermanent qualities such as *ahaṅkāra* (*ātmano nityatvāt anitya-ahaṅkāradharmitvam ayuktam*). A quality which comes and goes away will change its substratum. That which is subject to change cannot be eternal. Consequently, the Self, if it were to have *ahaṅkāra* which is impermanent as its quality, will cease to be eternal.

[36]

अस्त्वनित्यत्वम्, कमुपालभेमहि प्रमाणोपपन्नत्वादिति चेत्, तन्न।

सदाविलुप्तसाक्षित्वं स्वतस्सिद्धं न पार्यते ।
अपह्नोतुं घटस्येव कुशाग्रीयधियात्मनः ॥ ३६ ॥

If it be said, "Let the Self be impermanent. Whom shall we blame for this, since it is supported by *pramāṇa*?" it is not so.

The self-established nature of the Self as the eternal witness cannot be denied even by the sharpest intellect [as it can be done] in the case of objects such as pot. (36)

Sureśvara considers here the standpoint of the Vijñānavādin who denies the existence of the permanent Self on the ground that everything is momentary. According to the Vijñānavādin, reality consists of a series of *vijñānas* or cognitions which follow one another, each cognition in this series being momentary. Just as the flame which is continuous appears to be one and identical, just as the continuously flowing stream appears to be one and identical, even so the series of momentary cognitions, so the Vijñānavādin argues, appears to be one and identical in such a

way that we speak of one permanent cognition or knowledge. The Vijñānavādin maintains that knowledge which is said to be the Self by the Advaitin is not one and permanent, because whatever is existent is momentary like objects such as flame (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, jvālādivat*) and since knowledge is also existent, it must be momentary.

The standpoint of the Vijñānavādin cannot be accepted for several reasons. First of all, the sense of identity which everyone experiences cannot be accounted for unless the existence of a permanent Self is admitted. Even though I am subject to change from time to time passing through the stages of childhood, youth and old age, I recognize myself to be the same person who went through the stages of childhood and youth. And this proves that there is an unchanging factor which is uniformly present through all the bodily changes and which is a witness to them without being affected by them; and that abiding factor is the Self. The same is the case with regard to the three states of experience (*avasthātraya*) we pass through. When I wake up from sleep, I recognize myself to be the same person who went through the states of dream and sleep; and I say that the person who was asleep or who dreamt is identical with the one who is now awake. And this recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is made possible not by the mind, or the body, or the sense which is variable, but by the Self which persists through all the three states as the unchanging witness to them. It is, therefore, necessary to admit the existence of a permanent Self to account for the recognition of identity that we have. Secondly, it is impossible to account for memory (*smṛti*) in the absence of a permanent entity connected with the past and the present. If a person recollects his past either of this life or of the previous life, it is because of the existence of the Self which continues to exist all the time from the past to the present. Thirdly, a series can never be aware of itself as a series. To know the series as a series, there must be an entity which is outside the series and which is permanent unlike the impermanent factors in the series. In other words, the Vijñānavādin can speak of a series of cognitions only if he admits a permanent Self other than the series. Fourthly, if there is no permanent Self, there will be no entity to reap the consequences of actions, good or bad, which is absurd; in that case we will not be in a position to justify the happiness or misery of a *jīva* in terms of its past deeds. Fifthly, there are *śruti* texts which speak of the Self as one and eternal in

the primary sense of the term, and what is conveyed by *śruti* cannot be contradicted by other *pramāṇas* such as perception and inference. We have already pointed out how the Self which is the subject matter of *śruti* does not fall within the scope of perception and other *pramāṇas*. Lastly, the explanation which the Buddhist gives for the recognition of oneness is untenable. According to the Buddhist, objects which are different are said to be "one" or "same" because of similarity (*sādṛśyāt*), as when we speak of "the same flame", "the same river", etc. This explanation will hold good only in those cases where there is reason to believe that objects are really different and that we refer to them as the "same" due to similarity. But it breaks down in those cases where we are concerned with only one object. Consider the case where we identify an individual, *e.g.* Devadatta, who has been seen in two different places and times. When I recognize the person and say, "This is that Devadatta," I affirm that the person seen by me is one and the same, even though the places, times, and contexts in which he was seen are different. It is absurd to say that "this Devadatta" whom I see now in this place is similar to "that Devadatta" who was seen earlier in a different place by me and that, because of the similarity between the two, I speak of the "oneness" of the person. This is a case of the recognition of "sameness" not because of similarity, but because of oneness (*ekatvāt pratyabhijñā* and not *sādṛśyāt pratyabhijñā*).

Unlike objects such as pot which are impermanent, the Self is eternal. It is self-established (*svatassiddha*), *i.e.* its existence is not proved by any *pramāṇa*, because it is *svaprakāśa*. It is the ever-existent witness to everything — the presence as well as the absence of objects. Sureśvara says that its existence cannot be denied even by one endowed with the subtlest intellect (*kuśāgrīya-dhiyā = atisūkṣmabuddhinā*).

[37]

एतस्माच्च हेतोरहङ्कारस्यानात्मधर्मत्वमवसीयताम् ।

प्रमाणैश्चावगम्यत्वाद्घटादिवदहंदृशेः ।
यतो राद्धिः प्रमाणानां स कथं तैः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥ ३७ ॥

From this reason also, it should be known that the "I" is a quality of the not-Self.

Since the "I" is known through *pramāṇas*, its relation to the Self is like that of objects such as pot. How can that from which *pramāṇas* are established be proved by them? (37)

Pot and other objects which are known are not qualities of the Self. Since the "I" is also an object of knowledge like a pot, it cannot be a quality of the Self. So the "I"-notion must belong to an entity other than the Self.

It is no argument to say that the Self which is known through a *pramāṇa* is an object of knowledge and that the "I" can, therefore, be a quality of it, for it proceeds on the assumption that the Self is known through a *pramāṇa*. The Self can never be known through the mind or the sense-organ, which is insentient. Nor can it be known through inference and other *pramāṇas*. So the Self is not an object of knowledge at all. In fact, it is the Self that reveals both the mind and the senses. But for the Self, no *pramāṇa* is possible. *Śruti* texts also support this position. The *Kena Upaniṣad* (1.2) speaks of the Self as "the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind..." Commenting on this text Śaṅkara points out that the ability of the ear to reveal its object is possible only because of the Self. Similarly, the internal organ, remarks Śaṅkara, cannot do its function of thinking, determination, etc. without the help of the Self. The same *Upaniṣad* in the sequel (1.6) says: "That which man does not comprehend with the mind, that by which, they say, the mind is encompassed, know that to be Brahman..." In the course of his commentary on this text Śaṅkara says: "Since the Self, indeed, constitutes the essence of everything, therefore the mind cannot act with regard to its own Self. The mind can think only when it is illumined by the light of consciousness within." The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (4.4.20) declares that the Self is "unknowable and eternal" (*aprameyaṁ dhruvam*). It is for these reasons that Sureśvara asks: "How can the Self which reveals everything be revealed or proved by any *pramāṇa* ?"

The point which Sureśvara wants to drive home here is that, since the "I" is the known and the Self is the knower, there cannot be *dharma-dharmī* relation between them.

[38]

धर्मधर्मिणोश्चेतरेतरविरुद्धात्मकत्वादसङ्गतिः ।

धर्मिणश्च विरुद्धत्वान्न दृश्यगुणसङ्गतिः ।
मारुतान्दोलितज्वालं शैत्यं नाग्निं सिसृप्सति ॥ ३८ ॥

Since they (*i.e.* the Self and the "I") are mutually opposed in nature, they cannot be related as substance and attribute.

An attribute of an object which is seen can never be related to the seer as its substance, because they are opposed to each other. Cold cannot go near the blazing fire which is helped by the wind. (38)

The Self is knowledge by nature, whereas the "I" which is a quality of the internal organ belongs to the realm of things which are known. Since the Self and "I" are mutually opposed in nature in the same way as fire and cold are, they cannot be related as substance and attribute.

[39]

तस्माद्विस्रब्धमुपगम्यताम् ।

द्रष्टृत्वं दृश्यता चैव नैकस्मिन्नेकदा क्वचित् ।
दृश्यदृश्यो न च द्रष्टा द्रष्टुर्दर्शी दृशिर्न च ॥ ३९ ॥

So, this may be accepted without any doubt.

One and the same thing cannot anywhere be both the seer and the seen at the same time. The seer cannot be seen by that which is seen [by it]. Knowledge also cannot see the seer. (39)

Sureśvara reiterates by way of conclusion that (1) the seer and the seen are totally different, (2) that one and the same entity cannot be both the seer and the seen, and (3) that the Self which is the seer can never be an object of knowledge. See explanatory notes given earlier for verses II. 22 and II. 25-27.

[40]

सर्वसंव्यवहारलोपश्च प्राप्नोति । यस्मात् ।

द्रष्टापि यदि दृश्याया आत्मेयात् कर्मतां धियः ।
यौगपद्यमदृश्यत्वं वैयर्थ्यं चाप्नुयाच्छ्रुतिः ॥ ४० ॥

Also, the entire business of life will come to a standstill [on the opponent's view]. For this reason [it is said].

If the Self which is the seer also becomes an object [of knowledge] to the intellect which is the seen, then [the Self and the intellect must be both the seer and the seen] simultaneously. [And since both of them are seers], they cannot be objects which are seen. Also, *śruti* will become futile. (40)

Sureśvara exposes the absurdity of the opponent's view by showing how it will result in utter confusion in the transaction of our day-to-day life. The Self is the seer, and the intellect is what is seen by the Self. If the Self, in spite of being the seer, were to be seen by the intellect, it will be an object of knowledge in the same way as the intellect is an object of knowledge. The absurdity that arises here is that the Self as well as the intellect must be viewed as both the seer and the seen at the same time. It amounts to abolishing the distinction between the seer and the seen on the basis of which we transact our business of life. Secondly, since the intellect also becomes a seer along with the Self, they cannot be objects which are seen. This, however, is not true; and we carry on our daily life on the belief that there are objects which are seen by us. Moreover, the scriptural texts such as "You cannot see that which is the witness of the vision" (*na dṛṣṭeḥ draṣṭāraṁ paśyeḥ* — *BU*, 3.4.2), which declare that the Self is the immutable, eternal witness will become futile, if the Self were to be an object of knowledge.

[41]

कुतः ? यस्मात् ।

नालुप्तदृष्टेर्दृश्यत्वं दृश्यत्वे द्रष्टृता कुतः ।
स्याच्चेद्दृगेकं निर्दृश्यं जगद्वा स्यादसाक्षिकम् ॥ ४१ ॥

If it be asked, "Why?" it is for this reason.

The uninterrupted vision [of the Self] can never become an object which is seen. If it be an object which is seen, how can it be the seer? If it were possible [for the seer to be the seen and for the seen to be the seer], there could be the seer alone without anything to be seen; or there could be the world without a witness. (41)

If the opponent would ask how the scriptural teaching about the Self would become futile, the answer is that the Self, according to *śruti*, is uninterrupted, inextinguishable vision (*aluptadṛṣṭi*) and that it can never become an object of knowledge without a loss or break in this vision. This, however, is not possible. Just as the heat of fire lasts as long as there is fire, even so the vision of the Self lasts as long as the Self lasts; and the Self is eternal. That is why the *śruti* text (*BU*, 4.3.23) says: "There is no cessation of the vision (seeing) of the seer, because it is immortal" (*na hi draṣṭuḥ dṛṣṭeḥ viparilopo vidyate, avināśitvāt*). That it is impossible for the Self to be both the seer and the seen has already been pointed out. If, in spite of the absurdity and the logical impossibility, the opponent would persist in holding the view that the seer (*i.e.* the Self) is also the seen on the basis of a faulty analysis of our claim "I know myself," it would only mean that the seer could as well be the seen, and the seen, in the same way, could as well be the seer as there is no exclusive disjunction between the seer and the seen. The consequence of such a view, says Sureśvara in the second line of the verse, is disastrous. Either it will be a case of only the seer without the seen, or it will be a case of the seen without the seer. Neither alternative is tenable.

[42-43]

उक्तयुक्तिं दृढीकर्तुमागमोदाहरणोपन्यासः ।

आर्तमन्यद्दृशेः सर्वं "नेति नेती"ति चासकृत् ।
वदन्ती निर्गुणं ब्रह्म कथं श्रुतिरुपेक्ष्यते ॥ ४२ ॥

"महाभूतान्यहङ्कार" इत्येतत् क्षेत्रमुच्यते ।
न दृशेर्द्वैतयोगोऽस्ति विश्वेश्वरमतादपि ॥ ४३ ॥

With a view to strengthen the reasoning [stated above], illustrative texts from scripture are cited.

How can *śruti*, which often speaks of the attributeless Brahman by saying that everything other than consciousness (*i.e.* the Self) is perishable and that [the Self] is "not this," "not this," be ignored? (42)

"The great elements, the ego," [and so on] are said to be the *kṣetra*. Even according to the view of the Lord of the universe, consciouness has no relation with [the world of] duality. (43)

Sureśvara cites texts from *śruti* and *smṛti* in support of his reasoning. He first of all refers to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (3.7.23) which begins by saying, "There is no other seer but the Self," and concludes that "Everything else (but the Self) is perishable." The idea that is sought to be conveyed by this passage is that the Self alone is the seer or the witness, that everything other than the Self, which is *dṛśya* is perishable, and that there cannot be any real relation between the eternal and the ephemeral. If so, the Self which is free not only from *sajātīya-bheda* and *vijātīya-bheda*, but also from *svagata-bheda* is *nirguṇa*.

Then Sureśvara refers to the famous description of Brahman as "not this," "not this," (*neti neti*) which occurs in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (2.8.6). The *Upaniṣad*, to start with, says (2.3.2) that Brahman has but two forms, the gross (*mūrta*) and the subtle (*amūtra*). These are the two forms which we superimpose on the formless Brahman. After explaining the gross and the subtle, the *Upaniṣad* declares that no better description of Brahman will be possible than the negative one — "not this," "not this," which consists in eliminating the limiting adjuncts, *viz. mūrta* and *amūrta*, which are falsely superimposed on Brahman. The *Upaniṣad* again says in the sequel (3.9.26) that "the Self is that which has been described as 'not this,' 'not this,'" because it is imperceptible (*agṛhyaḥ*) and unattached (*asaṅgaḥ*). So, Brahman-Ātman which is free from the gross and the subtle is *nirguṇa*.

Sureśvara, again, quotes from the *Bhagavad-gītā* to show that the Self, the *kṣetrajña*, is devoid of all the limiting adjuncts which constitute the body or the field (*kṣetra*). The Lord lists (*BG*,

13.5-6) the constituents and the characteristics of the *kṣetra* — great elements, egoism, intellect, the unmanifested, the ten senses and the one (mind), the five objects of the senses, desire, hatred, pleasure, pain, the aggregate, intelligence, and courage. Sureśvara mentions in the verse only the first two of them in a suggestive way.

[44]

अधुना प्रकृतार्थोपसंहारः ।

एवमेतद्विरुग्ज्ञेयं मिथ्यासिद्धमनात्मकम् ।
मोहमूलं सुदुर्बोधं द्वैतं युक्तिभिरात्मनः ॥ ४४ ॥

Now, the subject matter under discussion is concluded.

Thus, it should be known through reasonings that [the world of] duality which is a false appearance, which has no reality [of its own], which is caused by *avidyā*, and which defies understanding, is different from the Self. (44)

Sureśvara concludes on the basis of *śruti*, *smṛti*, and *yukti* that the whole world of duality starting from the mind is different from the Self. What, then, is the ontological status of the world of duality? Is it real (*paramārtha*) in spite of being different from the Self? According to the dualistic standpoint of Sāṅkhya, though *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are different from each other, the latter which is the source of the material world is as real as the former. Since *prakṛti* is real, the world which has come into existence through a process of evolution from it is also real according to Sāṅkhya. With a view to differentiate Advaita from Sāṅkhya, Sureśvara says that, since the sole reality that exists is the Self, the perception of the world is *mithyā*, in the same way as the perception of silver in shell is *mithyā*. So the world which is *mithyāsiddha* is not *paramārtha*.

Nor can it be accorded reality in the way the Naiyāyikas, who advocate *anyathā-khyāti*, consider the "silver" to be real in the case of shell-silver illusion. According to the Naiyāyikas, when a person sees shell as silver, both shell and silver are real. Nevertheless, it is a case of perceptual error, since the real "silver"

which is elsewhere is perceived as existing in front at that time. Both the subject and the predicate of the judgment, "This is silver," are real; but the relation between the two, which is claimed by the percipient, is erroneous, because the object in front is not silver, or the silver which is elsewhere is not related to the object in front. This explanation of the Naiyāyikas is not satisfactory. First of all, this is a case of perceptual error. What is elsewhere can never be an object of perception. Secondly, on the strength of the sublating cognition "This is not silver" which follows the erroneous cognition, we have to say that what is denied is the presence of the silver in front and not the relation between the "this" and the elsewhere existent silver. According to Advaita, the shell-silver is not *sat*, because it suffers sublation (*bādhyamānatvāt na sat*), and whatever is subject to sublation is not *sat*. The "silver" which is the object of erroneous perception is *kalpita*. It has no reality of its own, no existence of its own, apart from that of the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), *i.e.* shell, on which it is superimposed. The principle is: *kalpitasya adhiṣṭhānameva svarūpam*. What is true of the shell-silver is also true of the world of plurality. Just as the shell is the reality on which silver is superimposed, even so the Self is the reality on which the world is superimposed. Consequently, like the shell-silver, the world too has no reality of its own. That is why Sureśvara says that the world is *anātmaka*, which means *satsvabhāvarahita*.

It does not follow from what we said above that the world is *asat*, something totally non-existent, like the sky-flower. The world cannot be dismissed as *asat* because it is perceived, and whatever is perceived is not *asat* (*pratīyamānatvāt na asat*). The world which is neither *sat* nor *asat* is, therefore, accorded a unique ontological status by the Advaitin. It is said to be *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, *anirvacanīya*, *mithyā*. Since its nature cannot be determined as *sat* or *asat*, Sureśvara speaks of it as *durbodha*.

Just as the perception of the shell-silver is due to *avidyā*, even so the perception of the pluralistic universe is due to *avidyā*. It is, in the words of Sureśvara, *mohamūla*. The world as well as its appearance is not caused by Brahman-Ātman, but by *avidyā*. It is not *ātma-kārya*, but *avidyā-kārya*. As the Advaitin would put it, while Brahman-Ātman is the *vivartopādāna-kāraṇa* (transfigurative material cause), *māyā* or *avidyā* is the *pariṇāmyupādāna-kāraṇa* (transformative material cause) of the world. Since the material cause

and its product must have identical nature, as clay and pot for example, *māyā* or *avidyā* which is the material cause of the world must also be *anirvacanīya*.

[45]

कुतो मिथ्यासिद्धत्वं द्वैतस्येति चेत्।

न पृथङ्नात्मना सिद्धिरात्मनोऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः।
आत्मवत् कल्पितस्तस्मादहङ्कारादिरात्मनि ॥ ४५ ॥

If it be asked, "How is duality a false appearance?" [we reply].

Anything other than the Self does not exist apart [from the Self] or as identical with it, in the same way as the Self [exists on its own]. Therefore, the ego and other objects are superimposed on the Self. (45)

In the previous verse, Sureśvara characterized the material objects which constitute the world of duality (*dvaita-prapañca*) as *mithyā*. He now explains why they are considered to be *mithyā*. Consider the case of two objects such as a horse and a buffalo. The latter exists on its own without depending on the existence of the former. Also, the cognition of the one is not dependent on the cognition of the other. In short, the *sattā* as well as the *pratīti* of the one is independent of the *sattā* and *pratīti* of the other. But the position is different when we consider the relation between the Self and the not-Self. The Self which is real (*sat*) exists on its own. Since it is of the nature of knowledge, it is self-luminous, *i.e.* its cognition is not dependent on anything else. But the not-Self which is material has no reality or existence (*sattā*) of its own apart from that of the Self in the same way as the illusory snake has no existence or reality of its own apart from that of the rope which is its substratum. Nor can it be cognized independently of the Self in the same way as the illusory snake cannot be cognized independently of the substratum on which it is superimposed. In short, the not-Self, because it is non-different (*ananyatvāt*) from the Self, does not exist apart from it. It is necessary to note the significance of the term "*ananya*." The effect, whatever it may be,

is non-different from its cause. A pot, for example, which is a product of clay, is non-different from it. The well-known *vācārambhaṇa-śruti* (*CU*, 6.1.4), making use of the clay-pot example, says that the clay alone which is the cause is real and that the effect or the modification (*vikāra*) of it exists only in name. Since the pot which is made of clay is nothing but clay, it is non-different from clay, *i.e.* it has no existence apart from its cause. The same thing holds good between the not-Self and the Self. This idea is brought out by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, 2.1.14: "The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, *i.e.* has no existence apart from the cause."

Because the not-Self does not exist apart from the Self one should not draw the conclusion that it exists as identical with the Self. There cannot be any identity between the Self which is *caitanya* and not-Self which is *jaḍa* (*jaḍājaḍayoḥ abhedāyogāt*). Since the nature of the world consisting of mind, senses, body and other objects is such that it is neither different from the Self nor identical with it, it is treated as *mithyā* or *kalpita*.

[46]

तस्मादज्ञानविजृम्भितमेतत्।

दृश्याः शब्दादयः क्लृप्ता द्रष्टृ च ब्रह्म निर्गुणम् ।
अहं तदुभयं बिभ्रद्भ्रान्तिमात्मनि यच्छति ॥ ४६ ॥

Therefore, this [world of duality] is the projection of ignorance.

Sound and other objects which are seen are illusory and Brahman who is the seer is devoid of attributes. The ego which contains both [the Self and the not-Self] gives rise to the illusion [of agency, etc.] in the Self. (46)

If Brahman-Ātman is devoid of attributes, how is it that agency and other characteristics which belong to the not-Self are associated with it? It is due to the work of the internal organ, a

product of *avidyā*, which serves as the adjunct to the Self. Consider the case of a mirror in which there is the reflection of a face as well as that of the red colour. If someone who looks at the mirror says that the face reflected therein is red by wrongly associating redness with the face, it is a case of error. What does not belong to the face is attributed to it because of the medium, *viz.* the mirror, which is the connecting link. In the same way, characteristics such as agency, enjoyership, etc., which do not belong to the Self are wrongly ascribed to it because of the internal organ which serves as the meeting place of the Self and the not-Self. Even though there is no relation between them for the reason that they are mutually exclusive, it appears as if that they are related.

[47]

तत एवेयमभिन्नस्यात्मनो भेदबुद्धिः ।

दृगेका सर्वभूतेषु भाति दृश्यैरनेकवत् ।
जलभाजनभेदेन मयूखस्रग्विभेदवत् ॥ ४७ ॥

It is because of this [ego] that the one Self is thought of as different [in each body].

The seer [Self] which is one appears as many in all bodies because of the objects [such as the internal organ] which are seen, in the same way as the sun appears to be many due to the difference in the water-vessels. (47)

Sureśvara says that the internal organ is also responsible for differentiating the one Self into many. He illustrates this point by giving the example of the one sun appearing to be many when it is reflected in different vessels of water, which serve as the media.

[48]

यथोक्तार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये दृष्टान्तः ।

मित्रोदासीनशत्रुत्वं यथैकस्यान्यकल्पनात् ।
अभिन्नस्य चितेस्तद्वद्भेदोऽन्तःकरणाश्रयः ॥ ४८ ॥

With a view to make clear the idea which has been stated, [another] illustration [is given].

Just as one and the same person becomes a friend, a stranger, and an enemy, due to the imagination of other people, even so the one consciousness gets differentiated due to the internal organ. (48)

The Self which is one and non-dual remains the same all the time. It cannot become many either by itself (*svataḥ*) or through something else (*parataḥ*). However, it *appears* to be many due to the internal organ which varies from person to person.

[49]

अपहारो यथा भानोः सर्वतो जलपात्रकैः ।
तत्क्रियाकृतिदेशाप्तिस्तथा बुद्धिभिरात्मनः ॥ ४९ ॥

Just as the sun is captured completely by the water-vessels and assumes their action, form, and place, even so the Self is captured by the intellects [and assumes their action, form, and place]. (49)

Sureśvara shows how the infinite Self which exists on its own gets reflected in the internal organ and how, as a result of this reflection, qualities and actions of the internal organ are superimposed on it. What is true of the sun which is reflected in the several water-vessels is also true of the Self which is reflected in the several internal organs.

The Self which is infinite and has, therefore, no location appears to be located in the mind which is limited. Also, the mental functions such as meditation are also ascribed to it, even though it is actionless. Further, the qualities of the mind such as purity are also superimposed on it, even though it is devoid of qualities. What Sureśvara says here has the support of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (2.2.11): "Just as the sun, which is the eye of the whole world, is not tainted by the colour and external defects, even so the Self which is one in all beings is not tainted by the sorrows of the world, being external (to them)."

[50]

न च विरुद्धधर्माणामेकत्रानुपपत्तिः। किं कारणम् ?

कल्पितानामवस्तुत्वात् स्यादेकत्रापि सम्भवः।
कमनीयाशुचिः स्वाद्वीत्येकस्यामिव योषिति ॥ ५० ॥

Also, the the presence of contradictory qualities in the same place is not untenable. How is it so?

Since the illusory qualities do not really exist, they can inhere even in the same place, just as one and the same maiden is thought of as beautiful, impure and tasty. (50)

Qualities which are *kalpita*, even though they are contradictory, can co-exist in the same locus at the same time without violating the law of contradiction. And the locus is not at all affected by them, because all of them, being products of *avidyā*, are *kalpita*. Sureśvara illustrates this point by the example of a body of a woman which is viewed in three different ways — as beautiful by a womanizer, as impure by a monk, and as delicious by a dog though the body *per se* has none of these features. In the same way one and the same Self which exists in all beings is thought of as being happy and miserable, as having likes and dislikes, etc. at the same time. Really, these qualities which belong to the not-Self do not affect the Self.

[51]

न चायं क्रियाकारकफलात्मक आभास ईषदपि परमार्थवस्तु स्पृशति, तस्य मोहमात्रोपादानत्वात्।

अभूताभिनिवेशेन स्वात्मानं वञ्चयत्ययम्।
असत्यपि द्वितीयेऽर्थे सोमशर्मपिता यथा ॥ ५१ ॥

This false appearance of [the world of] action, factors involved in action, and their result does not touch the real Self in any way, since it is caused by delusion (*avidyā*).

Even though there is no second entity, this (*jīva*) deceives itself by imagining what does not exist, like the father of Somaśarman. (51)

Sureśvara characterizes the world as *kriyā-kāraka-phalātmaka*. Such a world which is a product of *avidyā* will not in any way affect the non-relational Self. The Self does not become relational just because it is said to be the substratum for the world of plurality which is false any more than the sky which is falsely seen as blue becomes blue. In an oft-quoted passage which occurs in the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara observes that the Self which is the substratum is not at all affected by any blemish or good quality of the object which is superimposed thereon (*tatraivaṁ sati yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tatkṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate*).

The *jīva* is Brahman itself, which is one and non-dual. Owing to ignorance, it imagines that there is the world of duality which is really non-existent in addition to it and suffers as a result of its own self-deception in the same way as a poor *brahmacārin* deceived himself by imagining that he was the father of a non-existent son by name Somaśarman. The story goes that a poor *brahmacārin* sat down under a tree with his begging bowl and began to day-dream about his becoming wealthy, getting married, begetting a son who would be named Somaśarman, etc. The day-dream went to such an extent that, imagining that he was hitting his wife with his bowl when he was angry with her, he actually hit it against the ground, broke it into pieces and lost whatever alms he had collected in the bowl.

[52]

वस्तुयाथात्म्यानवबोधपटलावनद्धाक्षः सन् ।

सुभ्रूः सुनासा सुमुखी सुनेत्रा चारुहासिनी ।
कल्पनामात्रसम्मोहाद्रामेत्यालिङ्गतेऽशुचिम् ॥ ५२ ॥

With the visual sense concealed by the veil of ignorance of the real nature of the object —

A person embraces, due to delusion caused by ignorance, an impure woman imagining that she has beautiful eyebrows and nose, beautiful face and eyes, and lovely smiles. (52)

Sureśvara gives one more example to show how a thing which is not real is thought of to be such due to ignorance.

[53]

सर्वस्यानर्थजातस्य जिहासितस्य मूलमहङ्कार एव, तस्यात्मानात्मोपरागात्। न तु परमार्थत आत्मनोऽविद्यया तत्कार्येण वा सम्बन्धोऽभूत्, अस्ति, भविष्यति वा, तस्यापरिलुप्तदृष्टिस्वाभाव्यात्।

दृश्यानुरक्तं तद्द्रष्टृ दृश्यं द्रष्ट्रनुरञ्जितम्।
अहंवृत्त्योभयं रक्तं तन्नाशेऽद्वैततात्मनः ॥ ५३ ॥

The ego alone is the root-cause of the entire evil which men desire to remove, because it connects in its own being the Self and the not-Self. But, in reality, the Self has no relation with *avidyā* or with its effect at any time — past, present, or future — since it is of the nature of eternal knowledge.

[The ego] which is connected with the objects which are seen becomes the seer. Being related to the Self, it becomes the seen. By the ego, both of them (the Self and the objects which are seen) are connected. When it is destroyed, the Self remains non-dual. (53)

Earlier Sureśvara has pointed out (1) that the internal organ is the connecting link between the Self and the not-Self (v. 46), (2) that it makes the Self which is one appear as many (v. 47), (3) that it is because of it that the Self, though free from action and attributes, appears to have all of them (v. 49), and (4) that it makes the non-relational Self relational as it were (v. 51). He further elucidates now what he stated in verse (46).

The internal organ assumes the form of the external object, whatever it may be, when it is presented to it; and when this

modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*) is illumined by the Self which is reflected therein, the internal organ assumes the role of the knower or the seer (*draṣṭṛ*), though by itself it cannot be the knower since it is material. Though it pretends to be a seer by putting forth a false claim, it is really what is seen (*dṛśya*) by the Self which alone is the seer. Thus, the internal organ which is a pseudo-seer is related to the Self on the one hand inasmuch as it carries the reflection of the Self (*svātmani pratibimbita-caitanyābhāsāt*) and to the external objects which are not-Self, on the other hand, by assuming their forms, when they are presented to it. Every kind of knowledge-claim that we make such as "I know this" (*jānāmi*), "I experience this" (*anubhavāmi*) proves the connecting role that the internal organ, what is called the "I" or the ego, plays. In the absence of the internal organ, the Self has no relation with anything, does not experience anything, subjective or objective, as seen in *suṣupti*.

Advaita holds that Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality. *Avidyā* which is admitted as the cause of the world does not in reality exist. So long as there is the perception of the pluralistic universe, it is spoken of as something existent, for in the absence of it the perception of the world cannot be accounted for. But it ceases to be when the truth of Brahman-Ātman is known. What is real can never cease to be. Inasmuch as *avidyā* ceases to be at the onset of Brahman-realization, Advaita maintains that it does not *really* exist. It may be noted here that when Advaita speaks of *avidyā* as something existent, as the cause of the world, it is from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint; and when it says that Brahman is the sole reality and that *avidyā* or anything else caused by it does not exist, it is from the *pāramārthika* point of view. It is against this background that one must understand Sureśvara's remark that "in reality the Self has no relation with *avidyā* or its effect," for the latter does not exist at all at any time. Gauḍapāda says (*MK*, 4.59), "*sā ca māyā na vidyate*," (That *māyā* is non-existent). In the course of his commentary on this *kārikā*, Śaṅkara observes: "That *māyā* does not exist, the idea being that it is the name we give to something which does not really exist."

[54]

इह केचिच्चोदयन्ति — योऽयमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामनात्मतयोत्सारितोऽहङ्कारो वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तये, सोऽयं विपरीतार्थः संवृत्तः, यस्मात् "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इति

ब्रह्माहंपदार्थयोः सामानाधिकरण्यश्रवणात् अनात्मार्थेन सामानाधिकरण्यं प्राप्नोति। वक्तव्या च प्रत्यगात्मनि तस्य वृत्तिरिति। सोच्यते प्रसिद्धलक्षणा-गुणवृत्तिभिः।

नाज्ञासिषमिति प्राह सुषुप्तादुत्थितोऽपि हि।
अयोदाहादिवत् तेन लक्षणं परमात्मनः॥ ५४॥

Here some raise an objection: 'Through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* the ego has been discarded as the not-Self for the purpose of comprehending the meaning of the [scriptural] sentence. But this leads to [construing the meaning of the sentence in] a contradictory sense, the reason being that since the two words "Brahman" and "I" are in grammatical co-ordination in the sentence, "I am Brahman," Brahman must be identified with [the "I" which is said to be] the not-Self. But it must be said that the "I" signifies the inward Self [in order to justify the grammatical co-ordination].' The reply is that it signifies [the Self] through primary sense, secondary sense, and similarity.

Indeed, one who wakes up from sleep says, "I did not know anything [then]." The supreme Self is implied [by the I], as in the case of the burning iron [where fire is implied by the iron]. (54)

Sureśvara considers here a possible objection that might be raised against the Advaita view that the "I" or ego (*aham*) is not-Self. The critic may argue that, if the "I" is not-Self, it cannot be identified with Brahman. But the *śruti* text, "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*," identifies the "I" and Brahman by using the two words "*aham*" and "*brahma*" in grammatical co-ordination. If the grammatical co-ordination of these two words is to be justified, it has to be said, so the critic argues, that the "I" signifies the Self.

Sureśvara rejects this objection. He argues that, though the "I" or ego is not-Self, it does signify the inward Self in three ways through (1) the primary sense (*prasiddha-vṛtti*, otherwise called *mukhya-vṛtti*), (2) the secondary or implied sense (*lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*), and (3) similarity (*guṇa-vṛtti*). He has already shown how the

sentence, "*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*," can be interpreted through *bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya*. He now explains the kind of *vṛtti* or signification through which "*aham*" indicates the inward Self. Of the three kinds of *vṛtti* mentioned above, he considers *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti* in verse (54).

First of all, it is necessary to show that the "I" can signify the inward Self. Consider the case of deep sleep where the Self alone exists without the "I"-notion connected with the internal organ. The state of sleep is a condition where nothing is known. When a person wakes up from sleep and recollects his experience, he says, "I did not know anything at that time." What he intends to convey is that the Self which was present at that time did not know anything. But he conveys this by using the "I" in the place of the Self, even though the "I" was absent at that time. What holds good here also holds good in the case of the sentence, "I am Brahman," where the "I" which is present signifies the inward Self such that we get the identity of Brahman-Ātman as the import of the proposition.

What kind of *vṛtti* is it when the "I" signifies the Self? This is the question which Sureśvara takes up for consideration in the second line of the verse. He says that the "I" signifies the Self through exclusive implication (*jahallakṣaṇā*) where the secondary sense is adopted by completely giving up the primary sense of the word.

When the primary meaning (*mukhyārtha*) of a word does not hold in a particular context, its secondary or implied meaning is adopted. For instance, when a soldier is referred to as a "lion", it does not mean that he is literally a lion. We cannot construe the word "lion" in its primary sense in this context since it goes contrary to the evidence of perception. So we understand the word in the secondary sense and say that it signifies the leonine qualities such as courage possessed by the soldier. Also, the secondary sense should be related to what is primarily denoted by the word. It means that we are not at liberty to construe as the secondary meaning of a word any sense which is not connected with its primary meaning. While the word "lion" in its primary sense denotes a powerful, carnivorous, wild animal with tufted tail and other features, it signifies in its secondary sense a courageous person, courage being a quality connected with this

animal. Śaṅkara in his *Vākyavṛtti* (v. 47) explains the principle to be followed for accepting the secondary sense of a word in the place of its primary sense:

> "*mānāntara-virodhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe*
> *mukhyārthenāvinābhūte pratītirlakṣaṇocyate.*"

It means: "When there is conflict with other evidences in adopting the primary meaning (of a word), the meaning which is connected with the primary sense (of the word) is called the implied or secondary sense."

There are three kinds of secondary sense: (1) *jahallakṣaṇā*, (2) *ajahallakṣaṇā*, and (3) *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. In the first one, the secondary sense is accepted by completely giving up the primary sense of the given word (*vācyārthaṁ samagraṁ parityajya tatsambandhi-mātram yatra pratīyate tatra jahallakṣaṇā*). When someone says that "there is a village on the Ganges" (*gaṅgāyāṁ grāmaḥ*), what he means is that there is a village on the bank of the river Ganges. Though the primary meaning of the word "Ganges" is the river, in this context we accept the secondary sense, *viz.* the bank, by completely giving up its primary sense. In *ajahallakṣaṇā*, without giving up the primary meaning of a word, what is implied by it is also adopted as the meaning conveyed by it (*vācyārthena sahaiva vācyasambandhijñānaṁ yena padena jāyate tasminnarthe ajahallakṣaṇā*). For instance, seeing a red horse which is running, a person says, "The red is running" (*śoṇo dhāvati*). Here, the primary meaning of the word "red" is a particular colour; but in the context the implied sense, *viz.* the horse, is also meant. So we retain the primary meaning and add to it the implied sense so that the sentence becomes intelligible. In the third variety of *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti* mentioned above, while a part of the primary meaning of a word is discarded, a part of it is retained (*padasya vācyārthe aṁśamekaṁ vihāya aṁśāntaragrahaṇaṁ jahadajahallakṣaṇā*). The sentence, "This is that Devadatta," is interpreted through this kind of *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*. What is meant by this statement is that Devadatta who is seen now in this place is the same as the one who was seen earlier in some other place. The primary meaning of the word "this" is Devadatta associated with the present time and place, whereas the primary meaning of the word "that" is Devadatta associated with the past time and some other place. Since this sentence purports to convey the identity of the person seen in different places

and times, we get at this import by discarding reference to place and time which is part of the primary meaning of the two words, "this" and "that" while retaining reference to Devadatta which is the remaining part of the primary meaning of the words. This kind of secondary meaning is also called *bhāgatyāga-lakṣaṇā*.

Though Sureśvara makes use of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* in the sequel (Chapter III) for interpreting the *mahāvākya*, he argues in the present context that *jahallakṣaṇā* is equally tenable. The primary meaning of "*aham*" is the internal organ. Since the internal organ which is an object of knowledge is material, it cannot be identified with Brahman which is non-material. So in the place of the primary meaning which does not hold good, the secondary meaning which is connected with it must be accepted in order to make the sentence intelligible in the context. Inasmuch as the Self is related to the internal organ, which is primarily denoted by "*aham*", through *adhiṣṭhāna-adhyasta-sambandha* or *tādātmya-sambandha*, the word "*aham*" signifies the Self through *jahallakṣaṇā*. We are thus able to get at the Brahman-Ātman identity which is the import of the proposition by resorting to this kind of secondary sense. Sureśvara clarifies the point by means of an example. With reference to the red-hot iron, we say, "The iron burns" (*ayo dahati*). Since the primary meaning of the word "iron" does not hold good here, it is discarded, and "fire" with which the metal is connected through *saṁyoga-sambandha* is accepted as its implied sense in the context. The meaning of the sentence construed in this way is intelligible.

[55]

प्रत्यक्त्वादतिसूक्ष्मत्वादात्मदृष्ट्यनुशीलनात् ।
अतो वृत्तीर्विहायान्या ह्यहंवृत्त्योपलक्ष्यते ॥ ५५ ॥

Since the "I" is inward, extremely subtle, and helpful to Self-realization, the Self is, therefore, implied by the "I"-notion, by discarding other notions. (55)

Guṇa-vṛtti which is signification of a thing on the basis of similarity is different from the primary sense (*mukhya-vṛtti*) of a word. There is similarity between the Self and the internal organ. The latter is inward (*pratyak*) when compared with all other objects

starting from the senses which are not-Self. Though the internal organ is a material substance, it is very subtle (*atisūkṣma*) in that it is devoid of qualities such as touch. Further, starting from the *annamaya-kośa* which is the outermost sheath, all the sheaths including the *vijñāna-maya-kośa* are viewed as the Self for the purpose of meditation as taught in the second chapter of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.* More particularly, the internal organ, because of its purity (*svacchatvāt*), is capable of reflecting the Self; and the *cidābhāsa* which it carries and with which it is fused so closely that it becomes difficult to distinguish the one from the other is indispensable for knowing everything including the Self. Unlike objects such as pot, the internal organ resembles the Self which is inward, subtle, etc. So because of the similarity it signifies the Self secondarily.

[56]

आत्मना चाविनाभावमथवा विलयं व्रजेत् ।
न तु पक्षान्तरं यायादतश्चाहंधियोच्यते ॥ ५६ ॥

The "I" does not exist without the Self; otherwise it will cease to be. And there is no other alternative. Therefore, the Self is denoted by the "I"-notion. (56)

In the two previous verses Sureśvara showed how the Self is the *lakṣyārtha* (secondary sense) of the word "*aham*". He now explains how the Self as qualified by the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭacaitanya*) is the *vācyārtha* (primary sense) of "*aham*". Whenever there is the "I"-notion, there is the Self; and it cannot exist on its own without the Self. If this be not the case, *i.e.* in the absence of the Self, the "*aham*" which is *kalpita* will cease to be, for what is *kalpita* cannot exist on its own without its *adhiṣṭhāna*. Apart from these two alternatives there is no third alternative for the "I". So long as we speak of the Self in our day-to-day life, we refer to it as "*aham*"; and "*aham*" does not exist without the Self. It means that the Self and "*aham*" are not ordinarily differentiated. It is for this reason that Sureśvara says that the Self as qualified by the internal organ is the primary sense of "*aham*".

[57]

कीदृक्पुनर्वस्तु लक्ष्यम् ।

नामादिभ्यः परो भूमा निष्कलोऽकारकोऽक्रियः ।
स एवात्मवतामात्मा स्वतस्सिद्धः स एव नः ॥ ५७ ॥

What, then, is the nature of the object which is indirectly indicated?

It is beyond name and other objects. It is infinite and partless. It is not a factor involved in action. It is actionless. It alone is the Self for all beings. For us, it alone is self-established. (57)

Sureśvara explains here the nature of the Self which is the implied sense of "*aham*". Alluding to Sanatkumāra's instruction to Nārada which occurs in the seventh chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Sureśvara says that the Self is beyond name and other objects. Sanatkumāra tells Nārada that Brahman-Ātman is beyond name (*nāma*), speech (*vāk*), mind (*manas*), will (*saṅkalpa*), thought (*cittam*), contemplation (*dhyānam*), understanding (*vijñānam*), strength (*balam*), food (*annam*), water (*āpaḥ*), heat (*tejas*), ether (*ākāśa*), memory (*smara*), hope (*āśā*), and vital air (*prāṇa*). After informing him that "the infinite is happiness" (7.23.1) Sanatkumāra says (7.24.1): "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the infinite." The idea that is sought to be conveyed here is that the Self which is infinite is free from the world of duality which is in the form of *kriyā-kāraka-phala*.

It may be argued that Brahman-Ātman which falls outside the scope of *pramāṇas* such as perception cannot be the *lakṣyārtha* of "*aham*". What is signified by a word as its secondary sense should have already been known through some other *pramāṇa*. When we say that the bank is the secondary sense of the word "Ganges", it is already known to us through perception. If it is not already known, we cannot say that it is the secondary sense of that word. Since Brahman cannot be known through perception and other *pramāṇas*, how can it be, the critic argues, the secondary sense of a word? This objection is not valid. All that

is required is that what a word signifies secondarily should have been known independently of the word — but not necessarily through a *pramāṇa* (*lakṣyatve śabda vyatirekeṇaiva siddhatvaṁ prayojakam, na tu pramāṇāntara siddhatvam*). Since the Self is *svaprakāśa* (= *svatassiddha*), it is known. What is self-revealing cannot remain unknown. There is, therefore, no difficulty in the Self being the *lakṣyārtha* of "*aham*".

[58]

अज्ञानोत्थबुद्ध्यादिकर्तृत्वोपाधिमात्मानं परिगृह्यैवान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् "अहं सुखी दुःखी च" इत्यहङ्कारादेरनात्मधर्मत्वमुक्तम्। केवलात्माभ्युपगमेऽशक्यत्वात्, फलाभावाच्च। अथेदानीमविद्यापरिकल्पितं साक्षित्वमाश्रित्य कर्तृत्वाद्यशेषपरिणामप्रतिषेधायाह।

एष सर्वधियां नृत्तमविलुप्तैकदर्शनः।
वीक्षतेऽवीक्षमाणोऽपि निमिषत्ताद् ध्रुवोऽध्रुवम् ॥ ५८ ॥

Viewing the Self as conditioned by the agency of the adjuncts such as the intellect which are caused by *ajñāna*, it was said on the basis of the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* that the notions of "I am happy," "I am miserable," etc. of the ego, are the qualities of the not-Self. If it is accepted that the Self is unconditioned, [it cannot be involved in any experience] for it is not fit enough for that; nor can any fruit accrue to it [in the absence of its involvement]. Now, by presupposing the witness-nature of the Self which is a projection of *avidyā*, the following is said with a view to deny [of the Self] all kinds of transformation such as agency.

This [Self] which is of the nature of continuous consciousness witnesses [as it were], even though [in reality] it does not see, the dance of all intellects which are insentient. Being eternal, [it reveals] what is impermanent. (58)

There are three ways in which the Self can be viewed for the purpose of bringing out its nature. First, it may be viewed as qualified or determined by the internal organ. Here, the Self is

referred to as *antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa-caitanya* or *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya*. In this conception of the Self, the internal organ is the *viśeṣaṇa*, and the Self, *viśeṣya*. That which distinguishes a given object from others by coexisting with it is the *viśeṣaṇa* (*kāryānvayitve sati, vidyamānatve sati, vyāvartakaṁ viśeṣaṇam*). For example the red colour of the rose which differentiates it from other flowers and which co-exists with it is its *viśeṣaṇa*. When the internal organ is viewed as the *viṣeṣaṇa* of the Self, it appears that they are inseparable; and the characteristics of the internal organ such as agency (*kartṛtva*), enjoyership (*bhoktṛtva*), etc. come to be associated with the Self, though in truth it does not possess any of these features. In Advaita, the Self as qualified by the internal organ is called *jīva* (*antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa-caitanyaṁ jīvaḥ*). By the application of the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* to the three states of experience (*avasthā-traya*) we are able to show that the Self and the internal organ are not inseparably related and that the Self is, indeed, devoid of agency and other qualities. In other words, it is the *jīva* that experiences happiness and misery in its empirical existence; but the Self *per se* which is *nirviśeṣa* has no such experience.

Secondly, the Self may be viewed as related to the internal organ which serves as its adjunct. Here the Self is referred to as *antaḥkaraṇa upahita-caitanya*. In this conception, the internal organ is the *upādhi* of the Self. *Upādhi* is an accidental, external property of a thing which, without co-existing with the given object, differentiates it from others (*kārya ananvayitve sati, vidyamānatve sati, vyāvartakaḥ upādhiḥ*). For example, a crow which is perched on the top of a house serves as a mark or indicator to identify the house and thereby differentiate it from other houses without becoming a part of the house. Since the internal organ is the external adjunct to the Self, agency of action, enjoyment of the consequences of action and other innumerable changes that take place in the internal organ do not affect the Self, which is just a witness (*sākṣī*) to them. In Advaita the conception of *sākṣī* is different from that of *jīva*. When the Self is viewed with the internal organ as its *upādhi*, it is called *sākṣī* (*antaḥkaraṇa upahita-caitanyaṁ sākṣī*). If we speak of the Self as *jīva*, it is because of *avidyā*. Sureśvara says that even the characterization of the Self as *sākṣī* is due to *avidyā*. "Witness" is a relative term. The Self can be a witness only if there are things to be witnessed to. Since the

Self is one and non-dual, to think of the internal organ and its functions as being witnessed to by the Self without in any way being affected by them is *avidyā*. That is why Sureśvara speaks of "*avidyāparikalpitaṁ sākṣitvam*". So long as there is *vyavahāra* (*yāvadvyavahāram*) which compels us to speak of the Self, we refer to it as the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and the witness (*sākṣī*). It becomes a seer only when it is qualified by the internal organ, though by itself it is not a seer. It becomes a witness only in the presence of the intellect or the mind to be witnessed to. By itself it is not a witness. That is why Sureśvara says that, though the Self does not see or witness, it is spoken of as seeing or witnessing (*vīkṣate avīkṣamāṇo'pi*).

In the light of the foregoing account, we can formulate the third view of the Self. We arrive at this view by denying what is wrongly superimposed on the Self due to *avidyā*. The method followed here is traditionally called *adhyāropa-apavāda* method. The Self *per se* is neither the *jīva* nor the *sākṣī*. There is no second to the Self to play the role of its *viśeṣaṇa* or *upādhi*. The Self is *kevala* or *nirdharmaka*.

[59]

ननु सर्वसिद्धान्तानामपि स्वस्वदृष्ट्यपेक्षयोपपन्नत्वात्, इतरेतरदृष्ट्यपेक्षया दुस्स्थितसिद्धिकत्वात्, नैकत्रापि विश्वासं पश्यामः। न च सर्वतार्किकैरदूषितं समर्थितम्, सर्वतार्किकोपद्रवापसर्पणाय वर्त्म सम्भावयामः। उच्यते। विस्रब्धैः सम्भाव्यतामनुभवमात्रशरणत्वात् सर्वतार्किकप्रस्थानानाम्। तदभिधीयते।

इमं प्राश्निकमुद्दिश्य तर्कज्वरभृशातुराः।
त्वाच्छिरस्कवचोजालैर्मोहयन्तीतरेतरम् ॥ ५९ ॥

There is an objection: "Though every doctrine is sound from its own point of view, it becomes untenable from the standpoint of other doctrines; consequently we do not come across any one doctrine acceptable to all. There is no doctrine which is not criticized or accepted by all logicians; and we do not see any way of escape from the criticism of all logicians." The reply is: let [experience] be accepted

with confidence, for the doctrines of all logicians are dependent on experience alone. This is explained.

It is by appealing to this umpire (*i.e.* experience) that all those who are afflicted by the fever of logic delude one another through deceptive words containing the termination "*tvāt*". (59)

The objection stated in the *sambandhokti* highlights the unsatisfactoriness of every philosophical doctrine. There is no doctrine, the critic argues, which is accepted by all philosophers whose forte is their own logic. What a philosopher establishes through his logic is demolished by another who is more ingenious; and the reasoning of the latter is refuted by a third whose logic is much more rigorous, and so on. As Śaṅkara remarks in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 2.1.11, it will not be possible to collect all the logicians of the past, present and future time in one place for formulating a doctrine which is acceptable to all. And there is no theory which is not vulnerable to the attack of logic. The contention of the critic is that what is true of any philosophical doctrine is also true of Advaita. It means that the standpoint of Advaita is also open to criticism as any other philosophical position.

It is true that logicians disagree with one another. Usually one argues that a particular view is true or not true because of such-and-such a *hetu*. It is the convention to state the *hetu* in an inferential argument with the termination "*tvāt*" (*tvācchiraska*), *e.g.* *dhūmavatvāt* is the *hetu* in the oft-repeated argument through which the existence of fire in the yonder hill is proved. Whatever may be the disagreement among all the logicians, all of them have to accept *anubhava* or experience about which there cannot be any dispute and which is the ultimate court of appeal. Sureśvara refers to *anubhava* as an impartial umpire (*prāśnika* = *madhyastha*). And this *anubhava* is the Self of the Advaitin.

The Self is immutable, *i.e.* it remains the same all the time; and so it is the true or the real. Knowledge of the real is perfect knowledge about which there cannot be any dispute or controversy. On the contrary, that which is subject to change is not real or true, and the knowledge of such an entity cannot be perfect knowledge. Śaṅkara's elucidation of this point which occurs

in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 2.1.11, is worth quoting: "Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge of such an entity is called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge conveyed by the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict, is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How, therefore, can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?" It is for this reason that Gauḍapāda says (*MK*, 4.2) that the Self is free from dispute (*avivāda*) and non-contradictory (*aviruddha*).

[60 - 61]

अत्रापि चोदयन्ति। अनुभवात्मनोऽपि विक्रियाभ्युपगमेऽनभ्युपगमेऽपि दोष एव। यस्मादाह।

"वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्येव तयोः फलम्।
चर्मोपमश्चेत् सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्समः" ॥ ६० ॥

बुद्धिजन्मनि पुंसश्च विकृतिर्यद्यनित्यता।
अथाविकृतिरेवायं प्रमातेति न युज्यते ॥ ६१ ॥

Critics raise objection against this also. Even though the Self is of the nature of experience, the position is, indeed, defective whether change in the Self is accepted or not accepted; and so they argue [as follows].

Because of rain and sunshine, how is the sky affected? Their effect is on the skin alone. If [the Self] is similar to the skin, it is not eternal; and if it is like the sky, it is as good as non-existent. (60)

If there is change in the Self when there is origination of cognition, then it is impermanent. If, on the other hand, there is no change at all [in it], it cannot be the knower. (61)

The *sambandhokti* and the two verses (60) and (61) state the *pūrvapakṣa.* The opponent argues that the Advaita standpoint according to which the Self is of the nature of *anubhava* is not free from controversy. There are two alternatives open to the Advaitin. He must say that the Self either undergoes modification or remains changeless, when there are causes to bring about modification in it. The opponent illustrates by citing two examples. While the skin is affected by rain and sunshine, the sky remains unaffected by them. Whatever be the alternative, the Advaita position, the opponent holds, is defective. If the Self undergoes modification as a result of the origination of knowledge of objects, then it is not eternal, because whatever is subject to change is not eternal. If it remains unchanging, it cannot be the knower (*pramātā*). And if it is not the knower, it does not serve any purpose or possess causal efficiency (*arthakriyā-kāritva*); and so it must be treated as non-existent (*asatsamaḥ*).

[62]

अस्य परिहारः ।

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति धूमे खं भिद्यते स्विन्न भिद्यते ।
न भिद्यते चेत् स्थास्नुत्वं भिद्यते चेद्भिदास्य का ॥ ६२ ॥

The refutation of this [objection follows].

When the smoke goes up, does the ether get divided or not? If it is not divided, then [the smoke] remains stationary. If it be divided, how does this division take place? (62)

Sureśvara replies to the objection of the opponent by means of a counter-example (*pratibandi-nyāyena*). *Ākāśa* or ether is that which provides space. Sureśvara asks: "What happens to *ākāśa* when a column of smoke goes up? Does it get divided into two in order to provide space for the rising smoke? If it does not, the

smoke cannot go up at all. But being partless it cannot be divided. Nevertheless, it is supposed to undergo division for the purpose of providing space to the rising column of smoke." The point which Sureśvara drives home is that just as *ākāśa*, though indivisible and not subject to change, is viewed as if it is subject to modification through providing space for various objects, the Self likewise, though immutable, appears to undergo modification as it were as a result of the changes in the intellect. The truth is that the Self is ever unchanging.

[63]

इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमाह।

अविक्रियस्य भोक्तृत्वं स्यादहंबुद्धिविभ्रमात्।
नौयानविभ्रमाद्यद्वन्नगेषु गतिकल्पनम् ॥ ६३ ॥

With a view to clarify this, the following is said.

The agency of the unchanging [Self] is an illusion due to the "I"-notion in the same way as the ascription of motion to the trees is an illusion due to the movement of the boat. (63)

Pleasure and pain are the states of the internal organ which is subject to modification. When the Self is wrongly identified with the internal organ, what belongs to the latter is falsely superimposed on the Self. Consequently, it is thought of as an enjoyer (*bhoktā*), *i.e.* as one who experiences pleasure and pain. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.3.6) says: "This infinite entity that is identified with the intellect ... (and) assuming the likeness (of the intellect), moves...it thinks as it were, shakes as it were." In the course of his commentary on this text, Śaṅkara observes: "By illumining the intellect, which does the thinking, through its own self-effulgent light that pervades the intellect, the Self assumes the likeness of the latter and seems to think, just as light (looks coloured). Hence people mistake that the Self thinks; but really it does not. Likewise, it shakes as it were. When the intellect and the other organs as well as the *prāṇas* move, the Self, which illumines them, becomes like them and therefore seems to move rapidly; but really the light of the Self has no motion."

Sureśvara gives the example of the moving boat to show how the changes of the internal organ are illicitly transferred to the Self in the same way as the motion of the boat is falsely ascribed to the stationary trees. See Śaṅkara's *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* (5.3) for the boat example and its bearing on the Self.

[64]

यथोक्तार्थाविष्करणाय दृष्टान्तान्तरोपादानम् ।

यथा जात्यमणेः शुभ्रा ज्वलन्ती निश्चला शिखा ।
सन्निध्यसन्निधानेषु घटादीनामविक्रिया ॥ ६४ ॥

Another example is given for the elucidation of what has been stated.

Just as the light of a superior jewel, which is radiant, shining and steady, remains changeless whether objects such as pot are in its proximity or not, [even so the Self remains unchanging in the presence and absence of the intellect]. (64)

[65]

अयमत्रांशो विवक्षित इति ज्ञापनायाह ।

यदवस्था व्यनक्तीति तदवस्थैव सा पुनः ।
भण्यते न व्यनक्तीति घटादीनामसन्निधौ ॥ ६५ ॥

With a view to bring out the point of comparison, the following is said.

The light [of the jewel] which is said to illumine [pot, etc., when they are near it] is also spoken of as not illumining pot, etc., when they are not near it. (65)

Sureśvara reminds us of the need to confine ourselves to the point of comparison between the jewel and the Self without stretching the analogy too far. The light of the jewel remains constant without undergoing any change, though it is spoken of as

illuminating objects while they are present and as not illuminating while they are absent. The same is the case with the revealing nature of the Self.

[66 - 67]

तत्र च ।

सर्वधीव्यञ्जकस्तद्वत् परमात्मा प्रदीपकः ।
सन्निध्यसन्निधानेषु धीवृत्तीनामविक्रियः ॥ ६६ ॥

न प्रकाशक्रिया काचिदस्य स्वात्मनि विद्यते ।
उपचारात् क्रिया सास्य यः प्रकाश्यस्य सन्निधिः ॥ ६७ ॥

Also in the other case [it holds good].

In the same way, the supreme Self, which is of the nature of illumination, remaining immutable in the presence as well as in the absence of the modifications of the intellect, reveals [the modifications of] all intellects. (66)

There is no activity of illumination whatsoever in the Self. This activity is figuratively attributed to it in the presence of an object which is illumined. (67)

The Self is *prakāśa-svarūpa*; that is to say, it is light or consciousness which reveals the presence as well as the absence of objects. We know that the sun is all the time nothing but light or illumination. Still, we speak of it as illuminating objects as if the act of illumination takes place in it at a particular time. This manner of speaking is intelligible only with reference to an object which is illumined by it. As in the case of the sun, the Self too is figuratively spoken of as the agent of illumination (*prakāśayati iti kartṛtva-vyapadeśaḥ*), while the truth is that it is not an agent at all.

[68]

मैवं शङ्किष्ठाः साङ्ख्यराद्धान्तोऽयमिति । यतः ।

यथा विशुद्ध आकाशे सहसैवाभ्रमण्डलम् ।
भूत्वा विलीयते तद्वदात्मनीहाखिलं जगत् ॥ ६८ ॥

It should not be doubted that this is the Sāṅkhya doctrine, for:

Just as in the clear sky the grouping of clouds disappears after its sudden appearance, even so in the Self the entire world [appears and disappears]. (68)

Since the Sāṅkhya system holds that the Self or *puruṣa* which is free from activity is a witness to all the modifications of the intellect (*sakalabuddhi-vṛtti-sākṣī*), it may be thought that the Advaita doctrine is not different from that of the Sāṅkhya. Sureśvara says that there is no scope for confusion between these two doctrines as there are many basic differences between them. First of all, while Advaita holds that the Self or the *puruṣa* is the only reality and that the perception of the pluralistic universe is due to ignorance of the Self, the Sāṅkhya maintains that the world which is a product of *pradhāna* is entirely different from the *puruṣa*. Secondly, according to Advaita neither Brahman by itself nor *māyā* by itself is the cause of the world. On the contrary, Brahman associated with *māyā* is the cause of the world. In other words, it is *Īśvara* who is the efficient-cum-material cause of the world (*abhinna-nimitta-upādāna-kāraṇa*). But according to Sāṅkhya *pradhāna* is the cause of the world. Thirdly, while *māyā* of Advaita is not an independent entity and cannot exist on its own, *pradhāna* of Sāṅkhya is an independent entity coeval with *puruṣa*. Fourthly, while Advaita holds that *māyā* is not real (*paramārtha*), Sāṅkhya maintains that *pradhāna* is real. Fifthly, the world, like *māyā* which is its material cause, is *anirvacanīya* according to Advaita; it is, that is to say, neither real nor unreal (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*). Since *pradhāna* is real, the world which is an evolute from it is also real, according to Sāṅkhya. Sixthly, while Advaita holds that the Self is one, Sāṅkhya admits of a plurality of *puruṣas*. Finally, both the systems differ even with regard to the nature of the Self. While the Self, according to Advaita, is neither the agent nor the enjoyer, *puruṣa* is viewed as an enjoyer (*bhoktā*) without being an agent (*kartā*). In view of these differences one should not, Sureśvara warns us, confuse the Advaita doctrine with that of Sāṅkhya.

[69]

तस्मादेष कूटस्थो न द्वैतं मनागपि स्पृशति । यतः ।

शब्दाद्याकारनिर्भासाः क्षणप्रध्वंसिनीर्दृशः ।
नित्योऽक्रमदृगात्मैको व्याप्नोतीव धियोऽनिशम् ॥ ६९ ॥

So, the immutable Self has no contact whatever with duality, for:

The Self which is one and eternal, which is the seer [of all] at the same time, constantly pervades as it were, through its consciousness, the perishing momentary modifications of the intellect which illumine objects such as sound. (69)

It may be argued that, since the world exists before its disappearance, it must have relation with the Self at least at the time of its existence with the result that the Self is neither non-dual nor can it remain unaffected by the world of plurality. This objection is untenable. The oneness or non-duality of the Self will be in jeopardy only if the world is real enough to be reckoned as reality in addition to the Self. Since the world is not *paramārtha*, the Self is the sole reality. That is why Sureśvara says that the Self is *ekaḥ*.

There cannot be any real relation or contact between the Self and the world, because while the former is *pāramārthika*, the latter is *vyāvahārika*. The Self is consciousness by nature and is partless, while the world which is material is made up of parts; and so they can never be related either through *samavāya* or *saṁyoga*. When the Advaitin says that the Self and the world are related through *adhiṣṭhāna-adhyasta* relation, it is with a view to deny any kind of real relation between them. He resorts to this manner of speaking only with a view to bring out the non-relational and thereby the non-dual nature of the Self.

Is it not the case, it may be asked, that the Self is in contact with the internal organ in the same way as the internal organ is in contact with the objects of the external world? If there is no such contact or relation with the internal organ, how can the Self reveal the modes (*vṛttis*) of the internal organ?

Sureśvara's answer is that the Self, though revelatory of the modes of the intellect, is nevertheless untouched by them. Let us first consider what happens to the internal organ when it comes into contact with the objects of the external world. The internal organ assumes the form of the object which is presented to it. Without undergoing modification it cannot, even with the help

of the reflection of the Self therein, give us knowledge of objects. Further, the *vṛttis* of the internal organ are momentary (*kṣaṇa-pradhvaṁsinyaḥ*). When the internal organ assumes the form of a pot, it cannot at the same time assume the form of a pan. It means that the *vṛttis* of the internal organ which are not permanent succeed one another. Since the *vṛtti* of the internal organ is determined by the object which is presented to it, the internal organ can cognize objects one after another (*kramadṛk*). But the Self is unlike the internal organ in all these respects. It does not undergo any modification when it illumines the *vṛttis* of the internal organ. It is not, therefore, touched by the internal organ and the objects of the world. Since it is not subject to any kind of change, it is eternal (*nitya*). Remaining what it is, the Self which is consciousness by its very nature is revelatory of everything at the same time (*akramadṛk*). Its range of cognition appears to be restricted because of the internal organ which is its *upādhi*. It is necessary to note the distinction between *sākṣi-caitanya*, *i.e.* the Self as the witness to everything (*i.e.* to all intellects and their modifications) and *vṛtti-jñāna* (= *buddhyārūḍha-jñāna*), *i.e.* the knowledge obtained through the intellect. Since the existence of more than one witness cannot be proved (*sākṣibhede pramāṇābhāvāt*), there is only one Witness-Self, according to Advaita. But there are many intellects; and the intellect is necessary for knowing the specific nature of objects as such-and-such (*viṣaya-viśeṣākāratva-āpādanāya*).

Śaṅkara brings out the distinction between the Witness-Self and the intellect in the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* (7.3): "As the Self is the witness of all intellects (and their modifications), it is not of limited knowledge like the intellect, and has no change, impurity, or material nature in it."

[70]

एवं च सति बुद्धेः परिणामित्वं युक्तम् ।

अतीतानागतेहत्यान् युगपत् सर्वगोचरान् ।
वेत्त्यात्मवन्न धीर्यस्मात् तेनेयं परिणामिनी ॥ ७० ॥

Thus, it stands to reason to say that the intellect is subject to modification.

Since the intellect does not cognize at the same time all objects, past, present, and future, in the same way as the Self does, it is subject to modification. (70)

The intellect is capable of knowing only a few things and also one after another (*katipaya-* and *krama-dṛṣṭi*) at a time. It is, therefore, subject to modification. See verse II. 81 in the sequel.

[71 - 75]

ततश्चैतत्सिद्धम् ।

अपश्यन् पश्यतीं बुद्धिमशृण्वन् शृण्वतीं तथा ।
निर्यत्नोऽविक्रियोऽनिच्छन्निच्छन्तीं चाप्यलुप्तदृक् ॥ ७१ ॥

द्विषन्तीमद्विषन्नात्मा कुप्यन्तीं चाप्यकोपनः ।
निर्दुःखो दुःखिनीं चैव निस्सुखः सुखिनीमपि ॥ ७२ ॥

अमुह्यमानो मुह्यन्तीं कल्पयन्तीमकल्पयन् ।
स्मरन्तीमस्मरंश्चैव शयानामस्वपन्मुहुः ॥ ७३ ॥

सर्वाकारां निराकारः स्वार्थोऽस्वार्थां निरिङ्गनः ।
निस्त्रिकालस्त्रिकालस्थां कूटस्थः क्षणभङ्गुराम् ॥ ७४ ॥

निरपेक्षश्च सापेक्षां पराचीं प्रत्यगद्वयः ।
सावधिं निर्गतेयत्तः सर्वदेहेषु पश्यति ॥ ७५ ॥

Therefore, this is established.

Without seeing, hearing, and desiring, the Self which is effortless, actionless and also the eternal seer, perceives the intellect which sees, hears, and desires. (71)

Though without hatred, anger, misery, and happiness, [the Self perceives the intellect] which hates, gets angry, suffers, and is happy. (72)

Being free from delusion, imagination, memory, and sleep all the time, [the Self perceives the intellect] which has delusion, imagination, memory, and sleep. (73)

Formless, existing for itself without any change, transcending the threefold time, and immutable, [the Self perceives the intellect] which assumes all forms, which exists for others, which is limited by the three dimensions of time, and which perishes in a moment. (74)

Though it is independent, inward, non-dual, and infinite, [the Self] perceives in all bodies [the intellect] which is dependent, which goes outward, and which is finite. (75)

[76]

एतस्माच्च कारणादयमर्थो व्यवसीयताम् ।

दुःखी यदि भवेदात्मा कस्साक्षी दुःखिनो भवेत् ।
दुःखिनः साक्षिताऽयुक्ता साक्षिणो दुःखिता तथा ॥ ७६ ॥

Because of this reason also, this idea has to be accepted.

If the Self were to be a sufferer, who could be the witness of the sufferer? A sufferer cannot himself be a witness [of his suffering]; in the same way, the witness cannot be subject to suffering. (76)

[77]

पूर्वस्यैव व्याख्यानार्थमाह ।

नर्ते स्याद्विक्रियां दुःखी साक्षिता का विकारिणः ।
धीविक्रियासहस्राणां साक्ष्यतोऽहमविक्रियः ॥ ७७ ॥

By way of elucidation of what was stated earlier, the following is said.

Without change, there can be no sufferer. How can that which changes be the witness? Therefore, the Self

[which is indicated by "*aham*"] is the unchanging witness to the thousand modifications of the intellect. (77)

The following points emerge from verses (76) and (77): (1) the Self cannot be both the witness and the sufferer; and (2) the Self is only the witness and not the sufferer. Suffering is change of state of the intellect (*duḥkhitvam nāma vikāritvam*). That which changes cannot notice its own change. There must be an entity different from it to witness the change that has taken place in it. And, such an entity must be free from change. The Self which is free from change is, therefore, the witness to the changes such as pain, pleasure, etc., which take place in the intellect.

[78]

एवं सर्वस्मिन् व्यभिचारिण्यात्मवस्त्वेवाव्यभिचारीत्यनुभवतो व्यवस्थापनायाह ।

प्रमाणतन्निभेष्वस्या नोच्छित्तिर्मम संविदः ।
मत्तोऽन्यद्रूपमाभाति यत् तत् स्यात् क्षणभङ्गि हि ॥ ७८ ॥

Thus, with a view to establish on the basis of experience that, while the Self is invariable, all other objects are variable, the following is said.

There is no destruction of my consciousness in the midst of valid cognitions and their semblance thereof. Whatever appears as something different from me is momentary. (78)

Here Sureśvara cites the experience of the wise (*vidvadanubhava*) in support of the view that the Self alone is the invariable factor in every cognition — valid as well as erroneous. According to Advaita, the mode of the internal organ as illumined by the Self is called *pramāṇa* (*vṛttijñānarūpo yo'ntaḥkaraṇa-pariṇāmaḥ sa pramāṇam*). It is the Self that is invariably present revealing the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* and its absence, and also *avidyā* and its modes. To know the presence as well as the absence of anything the Self is required. So, there is no cessation of consciousness in any situation.

[79]

उत्पत्तिस्थितिभङ्गेषु कुम्भस्य वियतो यथा ।
नोत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशाः स्युर्बुद्धेरेवं ममापि च ॥ ७९ ॥

Just as ether has no origination, existence, and destruction when origination, existence, and destruction take place for a pot, even so when all these take place for the intellect, [they do not take place] for me. (79)

[80]

सुखदुःखतत्सम्बन्धानां च प्रत्यक्षत्वान्न श्रद्धामात्रग्राह्यमेतत् ।

सुखदुःखादिसम्बद्धां यथा दण्डेन दण्डिनम् ।
राधको वीक्षते बुद्धिं साक्षी तद्वदसंहतः ॥ ८० ॥

Since the relation of pleasure and pain [with the internal organ] is directly seen, it need not be accepted as a matter of faith.

Just as a person who is not connected with the staff sees another person who holds it, even so the witness sees the intellect which is connected with pleasure, pain, etc., without being connected with them. (80)

That pleasure and pain are the characteristics of the internal organ need not be accepted merely on the basis of authority and reasoning. There is also the evidence of experience such as "I am happy," "I am miserable," in support of this position. The "I" in all these cases which is seen is the not-Self.

[81]

एतस्माच्च हेतोर्धियः परिणामित्वं युक्तम् ।

येनैवास्या भवेद्योगः सुखकुम्भादिना धियः ।
तं विदन्ती तदैवान्यं वेत्ति नातो विकारिणी ॥ ८१ ॥

Because of this reason also, it is proper to say that the intellect is subject to modification.

The intellect, when it is in contact with pleasure or a pot, knows it; but at the same time it does not know anything else. Therefore, it is subject to modification. (81)

Here Sureśvara emphasizes the inherent limitation of the intellect. When the intellect cognizes a pot, it cannot at the same time cognize a pan. When it is in the state of pleasure, it cannot at that time be in the condition of pain. In other words, the change or mode of the internal organ is restricted to one thing at a time. So it is capable of only *katipaya-* and *krama-dṛṣṭi.*

[82]

अस्याश्च क्षणभङ्गुरत्वे स्वयमेवात्मा साक्षी। न हि कूटस्थावबोधमन्तरेण बुद्धेरेवाविर्भावतिरोभावादिसिद्धिरस्ति।

परिणामिधियां वृत्तं नित्याक्रमदृगात्मना।
षड्भावविक्रियामेति व्याप्तं खेनाङ्कुरो यथा॥ ८२॥

The Self itself is the witness to the momentary changes of this [intellect]. Indeed, in the absence of the immutable consciousness, the appearance and disappearance of the intellect cannot be established.

Just as [origination and other changes of] a sprout take place as pervaded by *ākāśa*, even so the mode of the changing intellect goes through the sixfold change by being pervaded by the Self which is eternal and which is the seer [of everything] simultaneously. (82)

It is impossible for the internal organ to notice its own changes, to be a witness to its presence as well as absence, for the simple reason that one and the same entity cannot at the same time be the seer and the seen, the subject and the object of knowledge (*karma-kartṛ-virodha*). There is yet another difficulty. The state of sleep is a condition where the internal organ is absent. If the internal organ itself can notice its absence, it must

be present at that time to do this work. If so, there will not be a state called *suṣupti*, for *suṣupti* by definition is a state in which the internal organ is absent. So it is necessary to admit that the presence as well as the absence of the internal organ is revealed by the Self which is ever-present to play the role of a witness. Sureśvara gives the example of the role of *ākāśa* to illustrate his point. Without the help of *ākāśa* which, indeed, provides space for everything, a sprout cannot come into existence and undergo several changes; even so without the help of the ever-present Self, changes of the mind cannot be experienced.

Origination, existence, growth, maturity, decay, and death which are the changes of any positive entity (*bhāva-padārtha*) are referred to as *ṣaḍbhāvavikāra*.

[83]

सत आत्मनश्चाविकारित्वे युक्तिः।

स्मृतिस्वप्नप्रबोधेषु न कश्चित् प्रत्ययो धियः।
दृशाव्याप्तोऽस्त्यतो नित्यमविकारी स्वयंदृशिः ॥ ८३ ॥

Also, in support of the unchanging nature of the Self which is real, the following reasoning is given.

Of the different cognitions such as memory, dream, and waking, there is no cognition whatsoever which remains unpervaded by consciousness. So, the self-luminous consciousness is eternal and unchanging. (83)

The Self, unlike the internal organ, is unchanging. Whatever is subject to modification is not real. The Self by virtue of being a witness to the modifications of the internal organ is unchanging; and it is, therefore, real (*sat*). That is why Sureśvara refers to the Self as *sat* in the *sambandhokti*.

There are three kinds of cognition — memory, erroneous, and valid. Sureśvara refers to them as *smṛti*, *svapna* and *prabodha*. *Smṛti* is recollection of the past. *Svapna* or dream is erroneous cognition. A cognition which is subject to sublation is erroneous. The word "*svapna*" is suggestive of every case of erroneous cogni-

tion (*anyathāgrahaṇa* = *mithyā-pratyaya*). The word "*prabodha*" which means awakening, knowledge of the truth, suggests a valid cognition (*samyakpratyaya* = *pramāṇa-pratyaya*). Every cognition takes place when the appropriate modification of the internal organ is illumined by the Self. The Self which reveals the modifications of all internal organs has to be unchanging.

[84 - 85]

एवं तावत् पराभ्युपगतप्रक्रियाप्रस्थानेन निरस्ताशेषविकारैकात्म्यं प्रतिपादितं उपपत्तिभिः। अथाधुना श्रौतीं प्रक्रियामवलम्ब्योच्यते।

अस्तु वा परिणामोऽस्य दृशेः कूटस्थरूपतः।
कल्पितोऽपि मृषैवासौ दण्डस्येवाप्सु वक्रता ॥ ८४ ॥

षट्सु भावविकारेषु निषिद्धेष्वेवमात्मनि।
दोषः कश्चिदिहासक्तुं न शक्यस्तार्किकश्वभिः ॥ ८५ ॥

So far, the oneness of the Self which is devoid of all change has been set forth through reasonings by following the method of explanation accepted by others. Now, the following is said by adopting the method of explanation contained in *śruti*.

Let it be said that there is illusory change in consciousness. Since it is by nature immutable, the change [ascribed to it] is false, like the crookedness of the stick in the water. (84)

Since the six kinds of changes have been negated of the Self, no defect whatsoever can be associated with it by the dogs of logicians. (85)

The arguments given so far beginning from verse (58) with a view to show that, while the intellect is subject to change, the Self has no change whatsoever, have been set forth on the Sāṅkhya model which holds that the *puruṣa* which remains inactive witnesses the manifold modifications of *buddhi*. Strictly speaking,

the Sāṅkhya method of explanation cannot be followed by the Advaitin in all respects, however useful it may be initially to understand the nature of the Self and the intellect. The Sāṅkhya which is dualistic admits *buddhi* which is an evolute of *prakṛti* as an independent reality in addition to *puruṣa*. But Advaita which is non-dualistic does not admit the existence of any second reality besides the Self with the result that it is impossible to speak of changes in *buddhi* outside the Self. Since the whole world is a superimposition on the Self, all the changes which we think of must be in the Self, but not of the Self. *Māyā* or *avidyā* which is located in the Self is not real; and since the changes associated with *māyā* and its products such as the internal organ are illusory, they do not affect the Self. Because of this basic difference between Sāṅkhya and Advaita, Sureśvara says that we must switch over to the Upaniṣadic way of explanation of the present problem.

Though a straight stick kept in a glass of water appears to be bent when it is seen through the medium of the glass, even so the Self which is really immutable appears to be changing due to *māyā*. It means that the change in the Self is only apparent and not real. There are several *śruti* texts in support of this position. A text of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (3.13.3) says: "Though unborn, it appears to be born in many ways." Another *śruti* text (*BU*, 2.5.19), emphasizing the work of *māyā* as a distorting agency, declares: "The Lord (*i.e.* the Self) on account of *māyā*, is perceived as manifold." Another text (*KU*, 2.1.2) says: "There is no multiplicity here (in the Self)."

[86]

प्रकृतमेवोपादाय बुद्धेः परिणामित्वमात्मनश्च कूटस्थत्वं युक्तिभिरुच्यते ।

प्रत्यर्थं तु विभिद्यन्ते बुद्धयो विषयोन्मुखाः ।
न भिदावगतेस्तद्वत् सर्वास्ताश्चिन्निभा यतः ।। ८६ ।।

Going back to the subject-matter, the changing nature of the intellect and the immutability of the Self are stated through reasonings.

The modifications of the intellect which are object-oriented change from object to object. In the same way, there is no change in consciousness, for all of them are revealed by consciousness. (86)

The internal organ undergoes modification according to the object with which it comes into contact. The principle is: "As the object, so the mind." The modification of the mind by itself does not become a cognition. It becomes a cognition only when it is illumined by the consciousness which is reflected therein. Consider the different cognitions of objects such as pot-cognition (*ghaṭa-jñāna*), cloth-cognition (*paṭa-jñāna*), etc. In all these cases, there is no variation in the aspect of *jñāna* or cognition, though there are variations with regard to objects such as pot, cloth, etc. and the mental modes. However, it appears as if there are many cognitions because of the mental modes and their objects which are different.

[87]

स्वसम्बद्धार्थं एव ।

सावशेषपरिच्छेदिन्यत एव न कृत्स्नवित् ।
नो चेत् परिणमेद्बुद्धिः सर्वज्ञा सात्मवद्भवेत्* ॥ ८७ ॥

[The intellect cognizes] only that with which it is related.

The intellect cognizes [a few], leaving out many things, and so it does not cognize all. If it does not change, it will be omniscient like the Self. (87)

[88]

अतोऽवगतेरेकत्वात् ।

चण्डालबुद्धेर्यद्द्रष्टृ तदेव ब्रह्मबुद्धिदृक् ।
एकं तदुभयोर्ज्योतिर्भास्यभेदादनेकवत् ॥ ८८ ॥

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* **स्वात्मवद्भवेत्** (H)

Therefore, since consciousness is one, [it follows].

That which is the seer of the intellect of a Caṇḍāla is also the seer of the intellect of Brahmā. What illumines both of them is the one [consciousness]; but it appears to be many because of the difference in the illumined. (88)

[89]

कस्मात् ?

अवस्थादेशकालादिभेदो नास्त्यनयोर्यतः ।
तस्माज्जगद्धियां वृत्तं ज्योतिरेकं सदेक्षते ॥ ८९ ॥

Why is it so?

It is for the reason that there is no difference between them due to state, place, time, etc. Therefore, one consciousness always illumines the modes of the intellects of the world. (89)

In the context of the distinction between the immutable Self and the changing intellect Sureśvara considers the question whether the existence of more than one Self can be justified. Advaita holds that the Self which is the witness or seer of everything is one. Why should it not be said, it may be asked, that the Self or consciousness which witnesses the mind of a Caṇḍāla is different from that which witnesses the mind of the Creator? Sureśvara's answer is that the Self or consciousness is only one, whatever be the things which are witnessed to by it. It is impossible to prove the existence of a plurality of consciousness. Let us consider Sureśvara's argument in this regard.

The factors which help to distinguish one object from another are *avasthā*, *deśa*, *kāla*, *guṇa*, etc. The term "*avasthā*" here refers to size, shape, and other features of an object. Two objects, we say, are different from each other because of their difference in size, because of their location in different places, because of their existence at different periods of time, and so on. The question is whether differentiating features such as shape and

size, place and time, can be associated with consciousness for the purpose of proving the existence of a plurality of consciousness. Every differentiating feature such as *avasthā*, *deśa*, *kāla*, etc. has to be noticed by the Self. In that case it becomes what is seen or witnessed to (*sākṣya*) by the Self, and so it cannot belong to the latter. On the contrary, it must be different from the Self which is its witness (*sākṣī*). Since there is no evidence to prove the plurality of consciousness, Sureśvara concludes that consciousness is only one. A passage from the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (6.11) is relevant in this context. It says: "The one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the inner Self of all beings, the witness, the knower, the only one, devoid of all qualities."

[90]

सर्वदेहेष्वात्मैकत्वे प्रतिबुद्धपरमार्थतत्त्वस्याप्यप्रतिबुद्धदेहसम्बन्धादशेषदुःख-सम्बन्ध इति चेत्, तन्न ।

बोधात् प्रागपि दुःखित्वं नान्यदेहोत्थमस्ति नः ।
बोधादूर्ध्वं कुतस्तत्स्याद्यत्र स्वगतमप्यसत् ॥ ९० ॥

It may be argued that, if the Self in all bodies is one, even a person who has realized the supreme reality will experience the sufferings of all, since he is connected with the bodies of the unenlightened. It is not so.

Even prior to enlightenment, the suffering which arises in other bodies does not afflict us. How can it afflict us after enlightenment, when even one's own [suffering] is non-existent? (90)

The opponent criticizes the Advaita view by pointing to the undesirable consequence that will arise if the doctrine of the oneness of the Self were to be accepted. The critic argues that, if there is only one Self in all bodies, the enlightened man, though free from the suffering caused by his mind-body complex by virtue of the saving knowledge that has arisen therein, is bound to suffer due to the association of his Self with other mind-body complexes.

This argument, says Sureśvara, is wrong. It is common knowledge that one person does not experience the sufferings of

others, because pain as well as pleasure which is a condition of the mind is private. Advaita holds that the world of plurality, a product of *avidyā*, is illusory; and so the distinction between *one's own* and *other's* which is caused by *avidyā* will cease to be when a person becomes enlightened. It means that a man of knowledge has no suffering whatsoever, one's own or that of others, because *avidyā* which is the root cause of suffering has been sublated. Sureśvara also presents an *a fortiori* argument. If even an ignorant man does not experience the sufferings of others, how can an enlightened man who is free from the illusion of plurality be afflicted by the sufferings of the non-existent others?

[91]

न चेयं स्वमनीषिकेति ग्राह्यम् । कुतः ? श्रुत्यवष्टम्भात् ।

शब्दाद्याकारनिर्भासा हानोपादानधर्मिणी ।
भास्येत्याह श्रुतिर्दृष्टिरात्मनोऽपरिणामिनः ॥ ९१ ॥

It should not be thought that this is imaginary. Why? Because it is supported by *śruti*.

Śruti says that the [modal] cognition which illumines sound and other things, and which is related to objects which are rejected and accepted, is revealed by the unchanging Self. (91)

The word "*dṛṣṭi*" in the second line of the verse means "*vṛtti-jñāna*," *i.e.* cognition through the mental mode, which is different from *svarūpa-caitanya* (= the Self). The internal organ with the help of the consciousness reflected therein reveals objects; and in its turn it is revealed by the Self. But the Self which reveals everything, while not being illumined by anything else, is *svaprakāśa*.

[92]

का त्वसौ श्रुतिः ?

"दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारम्" आत्मानं न पश्येद्दृश्यमानया ।
"विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयाद्" धियां पतिम् ॥ ९२ ॥

What, then, is that *śruti*?

"You cannot see the Self which is the seer of [modal] cognition" by that [mind] which is itself the seen. "By what, my dear, should one know the knower" who is the lord of all minds? (92)

The *śruti* texts cited in this verse are from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3.4.2 and 2.4.14 respectively.

[93]

यस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणोपपन्नोऽयमर्थस्तस्मात् अतोऽन्यथावादिनो जात्यन्धा इवानुकम्पनीया इत्याह ।

तदेतदद्वयं ब्रह्म निर्विकारं कुबुद्धिभिः ।
जात्यन्धगजदृष्ट्येव कोटिशः परिकल्प्यते ॥ ९३ ॥

Since this view is supported by all *pramāṇas*, it is said that those who hold a view different from this are to be pitied like the born-blind.

This non-dual, changeless Brahman is misconceived in crores of ways by men of faulty understanding like the cognition of the elephant by the born-blind. (93)

Though the view that the Self, the supreme reality, is non-dual and immutable, since it is free from *sajātīya-*, *vijātīya-*, and *svagata-bheda* is supported by scripture, inference, and perceptual experience of the wise, others whose understanding is vitiated by faulty logic (*dustarka*) hold different views about it. Sureśvara drives home his point by referring to the oft-quoted example of several born-blind men who, catching hold of the different parts of an elephant, mistakenly thought of each part as the elephant itself.

[94]

प्रमाणोपपन्नस्यार्थस्य असम्भावनात् तदनुकम्पनीयत्वसिद्धिः । तदेतदाह ।

यद्यद्विशेषणं दृष्टं नात्मनस्तदनन्वयात् ।
खस्य कुम्भादिवत् तस्मादात्मा स्यान्निर्विशेषणः ॥ ९४ ॥

Since the view which is established by *pramāṇas* is rejected by them as impossible, it follows that they have to be pitied. [As the explanation of] this view, the following is said.

Whatever attribute is seen [as that of the Self] does not belong to it, because of no connection with it, in the same way as objects such as pot [are not connected with] *ākāśa*. Therefore, the Self is free from attribute. (94)

An attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) is invariably connected with the object it qualifies in such a way that the latter never exists without it, as in the case of the redness of a rose. We have already pointed out (see v. 58) the difference between *viśeṣaṇa* and *upādhi*. Sureśvara emphasizes here the attributeless nature of the Self by showing that whatever attributes are ascribed to the Self do not really belong to it. It will be easy to follow Sureśvara's argument if we first consider the example he gives. Consider the case of ether which is referred to in different ways as "pot-ether" (*ghaṭākāśa*), "jar-ether" (*karakākāśa*), and so on, as if pot, jar, etc. are the *viśeṣaṇas* of ether. Strictly speaking, they are not the *viśeṣaṇas* of ether, because they are not invariably connected with it (*ananvayāt*). The same is the case with the Self which is referred to with the different qualifying features such as the body, the senses, and the mind, though in reality it remains always untouched by them. Again, when we speak of the knowledge of pot, jar, etc., knowledge as such remains unconnected with pot, jar, etc., even though it appears that it is connected with, and qualified by, them.

[95]

अतश्चात्मनो भेदासंस्पर्शो भेदस्य मिथ्यास्वाभाव्यात् । अत आह ।

अवगत्यात्मनो यस्मादागमापायि कुम्भवत् ।
साहङ्कारमिदं विश्वं तस्मात् तत्स्यात् कचादिवत् ॥ ९५ ॥

Therefore, the Self is untouched by difference, for difference is by its nature false. So the following is said.

Since this universe along with the ego, [which is different] from the Self which is consciousness, appears and dis-

appears like a pot, it is, therefore, [false] like the hair-like object, etc. [seen due to eye disease]. (95)

Though the Self is not touched by the pluralistic universe, the latter, it may be argued, exists on its own as different from the Self. This argument is wrong. The pluralistic universe, Sureśvara says, cannot be credited with independent existence because it is *mithyā*. It is well-known that the world which we experience at the waking level ceases to be in the state of sleep. Though its disappearance is not permanent because of the continuance of *avidyā* in the case of an ignorant man who moves back and forth between the states of waking and sleep, its cessation is permanent in the case of an enlightened man. The perception of the world of duality gets sublated by Brahman-realization; and to the vision of the realized man, everything is Brahman, as stated by the *śruti* text (*CU*, 3.14.1). Sureśvara's argument for the illusoriness (*mithyātva*) of the world can be stated as follows: whatever appears and disappears like a pot, is *mithyā*, and since the world appears and disappears, it is *mithyā*. To say that the world is *mithyā* is to say that it does not in reality exist. Sureśvara says that the perception of the world is like that of a hair-like black thing (*kacavat* = *keśoṇḍrakavat*) by a person suffering from some eye disease. When the person is cured of his eye disease, he does not see the hair-like black thing; even so when a person is free from *avidyā*, he no more sees the world of duality. Since the world of duality is *mithyā*, it does not in any way affect the Self which is real.

[96]

सर्वस्यैवानुमानव्यापारस्य फलमियदेव यद्विवेकग्रहणम् । तदुच्यते ।

बुद्धेरनात्मधर्मत्वमनुमानात् प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
आत्मनोऽप्यद्वितीयत्वमात्मत्वादेव सिद्ध्यति ॥ ९६ ॥

The fruit of the entire process of reasoning is just this — knowing the distinction [between the Self and the not-Self]. This is stated.

That the intellect is not the attribute of the Self is established through reasoning. But the non-duality of the Self

is known through [the self-luminous] nature of the Self itself. (96)

The term "*anumāna*" in this context means *anvaya-vyatireka-lakṣaṇa anumāna*, *i.e.* the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*.

Sureśvara says that the logic of *anvaya-vyatireka* which the Advaitin makes use of is for the purpose of distinguishing the Self from the not-Self. This kind of reasoning will help us to know that the mind, the senses, the body, and the things of the world are not-Self, and that they are not, therefore, real. However, it cannot give us the knowledge of the Self, because the Self is not an object of knowledge to be known through any *pramāṇa*. While the absence of a second entity (*dvitīyābhāva*) can be known through reasoning, the non-dual nature of the Self is known through the Self itself by virtue of its being self-luminous.

[97]

यद्यप्ययं गृहीतृग्रहणग्राह्यगृहीतितत्फलात्मक आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तः संसारोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामनात्मतया निर्माल्यवदपविद्धः, तथापि तु नैवासौ स्वतस्सिद्धात्मव्यतिरिक्तानात्मप्रकृतिपदार्थव्यपाश्रयः साङ्ख्यानामिव। किं तर्हि? स्वतस्सिद्धानुदितानस्तमितकूटस्थात्मप्रज्ञानमात्रशरीरप्रतिबिम्बिताविचारित - सिद्धात्मानवबोधाश्रय एव, तदुपादानत्वात् तस्य, इतीममर्थं निर्वक्तुकाम आह।

ऋते ज्ञानं न सन्त्यर्था अस्ति ज्ञानमृतेऽपि तान् ।
एवं धियो हिरुग्ज्योतिर्विविच्यादनुमानतः ॥ ९७ ॥

Though this world of bondage comprising everything from Brahmā down to the clump of grass in the form of knower, the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the act of knowing, and the fruit [of knowledge] has been discarded like faded flowers, since it is known to be not-Self through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, nevertheless it should never be thought that, as in the Sāṅkhya system, it is dependent on *prakṛti* which is self-existent, which is different from the Self, and which is material. What, then, is it? It is dependent only on the ignorance of the Self which is its material cause — the ignorance which arises because

of the lack of inquiry [into the Self] and which is superimposed on the Self which is self-existent, immutable, and of the nature of consciousness and which has neither beginning nor end. Thus desiring to convey this idea, he says [the following].

In the absence of knowledge, objects [of knowledge] do not exist. But knowledge exists even in their absence. Thus, knowledge should be distinguished from the intellect through reasoning. (97)

Sureśvara emphasizes once again the difference between Advaita and Sāṅkhya. The world of our day-to-day experience consists of the knower (*gṛhītṛ*), the means of knowledge (*gṛhyate anena iti grahaṇam = pramāṇam*), objects of knowledge (*grāhya*), the act of knowing (*gṛhīti*), and the resulting knowledge (*phalam = arthāvacchinnam sphuraṇam*). While the Sāṅkhya traces this world to the insentient *prakṛti* which is said to be real and independent of *puruṣa*, Advaita holds that the world is a product of *avidyā*, *i.e.* ignorance of the Self (*ātmānavabodha*). What is the ontological status of this *avidyā* which is the cause of the world? By way of answer to this question, Sureśvara uses two qualifications — "*pratibimbita*" and "*avicāritasiddha*" — with regard to *avidyā*. While the former term conveys the idea that *avidyā* is *adhyasta*, *i.e.* what is superimposed, the latter suggests that it is *anirvacanīya* or *durnirūpa*. It means that *avidyā*, which is the source of the world according to Advaita, has neither independent existence nor reality. Inasmuch as it is the cause of the world, it cannot be a negative entity in the sense of absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*); it is something positive (*bhāvarūpa*).

While the existence (*sattā*) and knowledge (*pratīti*) of objects are always dependent on the Self, the existence and knowledge of the Self are never dependent on objects.

[98]

यस्मात् प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहार आत्मानवबोधाश्रय एव, तस्मात् सिद्धमात्मनोऽप्रमेयत्वम्। नैव हि कार्यं स्वकारणमतिलङ्घ्य, अन्यत्राकारक आस्पदमुपनिबध्नाति। अत आह।

व्यवधीयन्त एवामी बुद्धिदेहघटादयः ।
आत्मत्वादात्मनः केन व्यवधानं मनागपि ॥ ९८ ॥

Since the empirical life involving the distinctions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is dependent on the ignorance of the Self, it is, therefore, established that the Self is not an object of knowledge. Indeed, an effect, leaving its cause, does not rest on another thing which is not its cause. So [the following] is said.

Those objects such as the intellect, body, and pot are mediate alone. For the Self, because it is the Self, through what could there be any mediacy whatsoever? (98)

While the Self is *svatassiddha*, all other entities are dependent on the Self through *avidyā*. So long as there is *avidyā*, we make distinctions such as *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *pramātā*, which are dependent on one another. A *prameya* presupposes a *pramātā* and a *pramāṇa*. One becomes a *pramātā* in relation to a *prameya* with the help of a *pramāṇa*. What is called *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra* exists only in the state of *avidyā*. Sureśvara argues that, while the intellect, senses, body, and objects of the external world, which are characterized as not-Self and which exist in the realm of *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra*, are objects of knowledge, the Self is not an object of knowledge because, unlike other entities, it is not mediate. The argument is: what is mediate (*vyavahita*) is a *prameya*; and since the Self is not mediate, it is not a *prameya*. This argument requires elucidation.

Something becomes an object of knowledge (*prameya*) only when it is separate from the Self; and the degree of separation from the Self will vary from object to object. The intellect which comes into existence due to *avidyā* is removed from the Self by one degree; and it becomes an object of knowledge when there is the reflection of the Self in it. Though it is closest to the Self, still there is separation (*vyavadhāna*) between them because of the intervention of *avidyā*. The senses get further separated from the Self due to the intervention of the intellect; and being separated from the Self by two degrees, they, too, become objects of knowledge. The body, because of the intervention of the intellect and

senses, remains separated from the Self by three degrees. The external objects such as pot are farther away being separated from the Self by four degrees due to the intervention of the intellect, senses and body. All these, starting from the intellect, become objects of knowledge because of the separation from the Self. In other words, all these entities are mediate and so they are *prameya.* But the Self, being what it is, is immediate. Since it is not mediate, it is never an object of knowledge.

[99]

स्वयमनवगमात्मकत्वात्, अनवगमात्मकत्वं च मोहमात्रोपादानत्वात्।

प्रमाणमन्तरेणैषां बुद्ध्यादीनामसिद्धता ।
अनुभूतिफलार्थित्वादात्मा ज्ञः किमपेक्षते ॥ ९९ ॥

[The intellect and other objects are such], because they are insentient, and they are insentient, because they are caused by ignorance alone.

These objects such as the intellect can never be established without *pramāṇa,* because they require the help of knowledge. But what does the Self which is self-luminous require [for its illumination]? (99)

Sureśvara here highlights the difference between the Self and the not-Self by showing that while the former, being self-luminous, does not require the help of anything for its illumination, the latter, being insentient, can be known only through knowledge. Objects which are insentient are known (1) only when there is the mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*) corresponding to the object and (2) when the mental mode is illumined by the Self. But in the case of the Self which itself is knowledge, no other knowledge is required for its illumination. In fact, there is no other knowledge at all, because there is no second Self. Though the Self is not an object of knowledge in the sense in which pot and pan are objects of knowledge, it is spoken of as being known when there is the appropriate mental mode.

[100]

वक्ष्यमाणेतरेतराध्याससिद्ध्यर्थमुक्तव्यतिरेकानुवादः ।

घटबुद्धेर्घटाच्चार्थाद्द्रष्टुर्यद्वद्विभिन्नता ।
अहंबुद्धेरहंगम्याद्दुःखिनश्च तथा दृशेः ॥ १०० ॥

The difference [between the Self and the not-Self] stated earlier is repeated with a view to establish the false identification of the one with the other, which will be stated in the sequel.

Just as the seer [of a pot] is different from pot as well as pot-cognition, even so knowledge is different from the sufferer, which is the object signified by the "I", and the "I"-cognition. (100)

The nature of the Self and the not-Self is such that they cannot be related through *saṁyoga* (conjunction) or *samavāya* (inherence) or *tādātmya* (identity). There is *saṁyoga* relation between two material entites, *e.g.* the table and the ground. The *samavāya* relation holds good between a substance and its quality, between a whole and its parts, between the genus and the individual, and so on. Neither the relation of *saṁyoga* nor that of *samavāya* is possible between the Self which is consciousness and the not-Self which is material. Since they are totally different, *tādātmya* relation also is not possible. However, some kind of relation between them must be posited in order to justify the revealer-revealed relation between the Self and the not-Self. There cannot be any real relation such as *saṁyoga, samavāya*, etc. between the Self and the not-Self, which do not have the same ontological status. Such a relation can only be *ādhyāsika*, what is falsely superimposed; and through the assumption of such a relation, the *prakāśya-prakāśaka-sambandha* (revealed-revealer relation) between the not-Self and the Self is made intelligible at the epistemological level. That is why Sureśvara says that, even though they are totally different, there is a false identification of the one with the other (*itaretarādhyāsa*) due to *avidyā*. Sureśvara will elucidate this false identification in verses (101-102). In the second line of the verse he reminds us once again, before taking up the problem of *itare-*

tarādhyāsa, how the Self which is knowledge is different from the "I" which experiences pleasure and pain.

[101 - 102]

एवमेतयोरात्मानात्मनोः स्वतः परतः सिद्धयोः, लौकिकरज्जुसर्पाध्यारोपवत अविद्योपाश्रय एवेतरेतराध्यारोप इत्येतदाह।

अभ्रयानं यथा मोहाच्छशभृत्यध्यवस्यति ।
सुखित्वादीन् धियो धर्मांस्तद्वदात्मनि मन्यते ॥ १०१ ॥

दग्धृत्वं च यथा वह्नेरयसो मन्यते कुधीः ।
चैतन्यं तद्वदात्मीयं मोहात् कर्तरि मन्यते ॥ १०२ ॥

Thus, the following is said with a view to show how, owing to *avidyā*, there is mutual superimposition between the Self which is self-established and the not-Self which is established by another, in the same way as there is mutual superimposition between the empirical rope and snake.

Just as the movement of clouds is superimposed on the moon due to delusion, even so the qualities of the intellect such as pleasure are thought of [as inherent] in the Self. (101)

Just as an ignorant man ascribes the burning nature of the fire to the [red-hot] iron, even so consciousness which belongs to the Self is ascribed to the agent (*i.e.* the internal organ) due to delusion. (102)

The example of the moon and the moving clouds is given to show how the characteristics of the internal organ are, due to ignorance, illicitly transferred to the Self. The illustration of the red-hot iron elucidates how the nature of the Self is wrongly superimposed on the internal organ. Thus a deluded person who is not able to distinguish the Self from the not-Self wrongly identifies the one with the other.

[103]

सर्वं एवायमात्मानात्मविभागः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणवत्मंन्यनुपतितोऽविद्योत्सङ्गवर्त्येव, न परमात्मव्यपाश्रयः। अस्याश्चाविद्यायाः सर्वानर्थहेतोः कुतो निवृत्तिरिति चेत्, तदाह।

दुःखराशेर्विचित्रस्य सेयं भ्रान्तिश्चिरन्तनी।
मूलं संसारवृक्षस्य तद्बाधस्तत्त्वदर्शनात् ॥ १०३ ॥

The entire distinction between the Self and the not-Self which is comprehended through *pramāṇas* such as perception is based on *avidyā* alone, and not on the supreme Self. If it be asked how this *avidyā* which is the cause of all evil is removed, the following is the answer.

This long-standing *avidyā* is the root of the tree of bondage which is an aggregate of variegated evil. Its removal is through the knowledge of the real. (103)

The Self which is the reality is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which *avidyā* and its effects are superimposed. It is well-known that the knowledge of *adhiṣṭhāna* leads to the removal of *adhyasta*, *i.e.* what is superimposed thereon. When the Self, the substratum, is realized, *avidyā* along with its effects gets sublated.

[104]

तद्बाधस्तत्त्वदर्शनादिति कुतः सम्भाव्यत इति चेत्, अत आह आगोपालाविपालपण्डितमियमेव प्रसिद्धिः।

अप्रमोत्थं प्रमोत्थेन ज्ञानं ज्ञानेन बाध्यते।
अहिरज्ज्वादिवद्बाधो देहाद्यात्ममतेस्तथा ॥ १०४ ॥

If it be asked: "How is it that its removal is through the knowledge of the real?" the reply is that this is, indeed, well-known to everyone — from cowherds and shepherds to learned scholars.

The cognition which arises from error is sublated by the cognition which is valid. Just as there is sublation (of the cognition) of snake by (the cognition of) rope, even so there is sublation of the cognition of the body, etc. as the Self [by the right cognition of the Self]. (104)

Apramottham jñānam is *mithyā-jñānam*. *Pramotthena jñānena* means *samyagjñānena*.

[105]

लौकिकप्रमेयवैलक्षण्यादात्मनः, नेहानधिगताधिगमः प्रमाणफलम् ।

अविद्यानाशमात्रं तु फलमित्युपचर्यते ।
नाज्ञातज्ञापनं न्याय्यमवगत्येकरूपतः ॥ १०५ ॥

Since the Self is different from an empirical object of knowledge, here knowledge of what was not known before is not the result of *pramāṇa*.

Only the destruction of *avidyā* is, indeed, figuratively spoken of as the result. Knowing what was unknown before is not tenable [here], since the Self is of the nature of knowledge alone. (105)

An objection against the self-luminosity of the Self may be considered here. The Bhāṭṭas hold the view that, when an object is known through a *pramāṇa*, it is really modified by the latter, because what was unknown earlier becomes known due to the work of a *pramāṇa*. They argue that "knownness" (*prākaṭya* = *jñātatā*) is a new feature that is brought about in the object by the *pramāṇa* through which it is known. If the state of "knownness" arises in the Self due to the work of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*, then the Advaita claim that the Self is self-luminous is untenable.

Sureśvara says that this argument is wrong as it ignores the basic difference between the Self and empirical objects such as pot and pan. With regard to the latter, knowing what is not known before (*anadhigatādhigama*) holds good, because they are material. But this principle does not hold good in the case of

the Self which is of the nature of knowledge. *Śruti* as a *pramāṇa* removes *ajñāna* which conceals the Self. Its work comes to an end with the removal of *ajñāna*; and it does not produce any new feature in the Self. In the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* (1.1.4) Śaṅkara observes that scripture which is required for the purpose of knowing the Self only removes the wrong notions of difference caused by *avidyā* (*avidyā-kalpita bheda-nivṛttiparatvāt śāstrasya*).

[106]

यस्मादात्मानवबोधमात्रोपादानाः प्रमात्रादयः, तस्मात् ।

न विदन्त्यात्मनः सत्तां द्रष्टृदर्शनगोचराः ।
न चान्योन्यमतोऽमीषां ज्ञेयत्वं भिन्नसाधनम् ॥ १०६ ॥

Since the distinctions such as the knower are dependent on the ignorance of the Self alone, so [the following is said].

The seer, seeing, and the object seen cannot [each of them] know their existence. Nor can they know [one another's existence] mutually. So they become objects of knowledge due to some other means different from them. (106)

The Self cannot be known by the not-Self which is material. On the contrary, the mind which plays the role of the seer, the modifications of the mind, and the external objects are known by the Self which is different from all of them.

[107]

द्रष्ट्रादेरसाधारणरूपज्ञापनायाह ।

बाह्य आकारवान् ग्राह्यो ग्रहणं निश्चयादिमत् ।
अन्वय्यहमिति ज्ञेयः साक्षी त्वात्मा ध्रुवः सदा ॥ १०७ ॥

With a view to convey the distinctive nature of the seer, etc., the following is said.

What is external, having form, is the object of knowledge. Cognition is that which has certitude, etc. What persists [in all cognitions] must be understood as the "I" (*i.e.* the knower). But, the witness [of all these] is the Self which is always unchanging. (107)

Sureśvara explains the distinctive nature (*asādhāraṇa-rūpa*) of of the seer, seeing, and the objects seen with a view to differentiate the Self from all these. An object of knowledge which is external to the Self is characterized by general and specific features. Seeing or cognition which is apprehension of object may be in the form of certitude, memory, doubt, etc. Here "cognition" refers to *vṛtti-jñāna*. The seer or cognizer is the "I" (*i.e.* the internal organ which carries the reflection of consciousness) which is uniformly present in all the different cognitions such as, "*I* know this," "*I* remember this," "*I* am doubtful about this," etc. The Self which is a witness to all these three, which reveals their presence as well as their absence as the case may be, which persists in the state of sleep and liberation, and which remains unchanging all the time (*kuṭasthanityaḥ*) is, therefore, different from the cognized, cognition, and cognizer.

[108]

सर्वकारकक्रियाफलविभागात्मकसंसारशून्य आत्मेति, कारकक्रियाफलविभागसाक्षित्वादात्मनः, तदाह।

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यविभागे योऽविभागवान् ।
हानोपादानयोस्साक्षी हानोपादानवर्जितः ॥ १०८ ॥

Since the Self is the witness to the factors of action, action and result, it is bereft of the entire empirical existence characterized be the distinctions of the factors of action, action and result. It is stated thus.

That which remains undivided in the midst of the distinctions of cognizer, cognition, and the cognized and that which is the witness of their loss and gain (*i.e.* absence and presence), is free from loss and gain. (108)

Sureśvara says that the Self is free from *saṁsāra* or empirical existence, because it is the witness of the latter; and being a witness to it, the Self must be different from it. What, then, is empirical existence? It is *kāraka-kriyā-phalātmaka*, because empirical existence is full of action (*kriyā*), action requires instruments of action (*kāraka*), and the performance of action leads to some result (*phala*). So involvement in the means-end or action-result process is the differentia of empirical existence.

The expression "*hānopādāna*" in the second line of the verse means "*bhāvābhāva*", *i.e.* presence and absence of a thing.

[109]

ग्राहकादिनिष्ठैव ग्राहकादिभावाभावविभागसिद्धिः कस्मान्नेति चेत्, तदाह।

स्वसाधनं स्वयं नष्टो न नाशं वेत्त्यभावतः।
अत एव न चान्येषामतोऽसौ भिन्नसाक्षिकः॥ १०९॥

If it be asked, "Why should it not be said that the presence and absence of the different factors such as the cognizer are known by the cognizer and other factors themselves?" the reply is as follows.

An object which is absent cannot itself know its cause and destruction, because it is non-existent. For the same reason, it cannot know [the cause and destruction] of others. Hence, it has something else as a witness to it. (109)

Of the three factors mentioned in this context, *viz.* cognizer, cognition, and the cognized, can any of them know its cause? The answer is in the negative. Since it was absent before its origination, it cannot know its cause (*svasādhanam*). Can it know itself after it has come into existence? This is impossible, since one and the same entity cannot, in the same act of cognition, be both the knower and the known at the same time. Or can it know its own non-existence or destruction (*svanāśam*)? Even this possibility has to be ruled out for the simple reason that it is non-existent. Is it possible for any of them when they exist to know the cause of other things as well as their persence and absence?

Once again the answer is in the negative. Since it is material, it is not capable of knowledge of anything — the knowledge of the cause of a thing, or of its existence, or of its destruction. Thus of the three factors stated above, the differentiation of the one from the other (*grāhakādi-vibhāga-siddhiḥ*) as well as the cognition of their presence and absence (*grāhakādi-bhāvābhāva-siddhiḥ*) becomes possible because of the Self which is different from them.

[110]

ग्राहकादेरन्यसाक्षिपूर्वकत्वसिद्धेः स्वसाक्षिणोऽप्यन्यसाक्षिपूर्वकत्वात् अनवस्थेति चेत्, तन्न, साक्षिणो व्यतिरिक्तहेत्वनपेक्षत्वात्। अत आह।

धीवन्नापेक्षते सिद्धिमात्माऽन्यस्मादविक्रियः।
निरपेक्षमपेक्ष्यैव सिद्ध्यन्त्यन्ये न तु स्वयम् ॥ ११० ॥

If it be said that, just as the cognizer, etc. are known through a witness different from them, even so the witness, too, must be known through another witness leading to infinite regress, it is not so, because the witness does not require another cause [for proving its existence]. So the following is said.

Unlike the intellect, the unchanging Self does not require another for proving its existence. Other objects are established through that [Self] which is independent; but [the Self] itself is not proved by another. (110)

What is material like the intellect is known through the Self. But, for knowing the Self no other agency is required, because the Self is *svaprakāśa*. The argument that one Self is known through another Self is untenable, because it proceeds on the false assumption that there is more than one Self. The existence of more than one Self cannot be proved. So the suggestion that, if one Self is known through another Self and that if the second Self is known through the third and so on, there will arise the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*), has to be ruled out as it is based on the unwarranted assumption of the existence of a plurality of selves.

[111]

यतो ग्राहकादिष्वात्मभावोऽविद्यानिबन्धन एव, तस्मात् अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विभज्यानात्मनः, स्वयम् ।

उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशेषु योऽवगत्यैव वर्तते ।
जगतोऽविकारयावेहि तमस्मीति न नश्वरम् ॥ १११ ॥

Since the notion of "self" applied to cognizer, etc. is dependent on ignorance alone, separating them from the Self through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*:

He who remains by himself as the unchanging consciousness alone in the midst of the origin, existence, and destruction of the world — know him as "I am He" and not as what is perishable. (111)

Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 2.3.7, that the Self which is eternal presence (*sarvadā vartamānasvabhāva*) can never be denied. The Self constitutes the essential nature of the person who doubts or denies it, and so it cannot be doubted or denied by him. The heat of fire can never be refuted by the fire itself; even so the *jīva* can never refute the Self which is his own nature. Further, whatever be the object — past, present, or future — the Self is uniformly present in all acts of cognition as the knowing subject. For example, we say, "I know now what is present;" "I know the nearer and remoter past;" "I shall know the nearer and remoter future." In all these cases, the object of knowledge changes, but the Self as the knowing subject does not change, for the nature of the Self, Śaṅkara remarks, is eternal presence. It does not cease to be, even when the body is reduced to ashes. It can never become something different from what it is.

[112]

स्वतस्सिद्धात्मचैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बिताविचारितसिद्धिकात्मानवबोधोत्थेतरेतरस्वभावापेक्षसिद्धत्वात् स्वतश्चासिद्धेरनात्मनो द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य ।

न स्वयं स्वस्य नानात्वं नावगत्यात्मना यतः ।
नोभाभ्यामप्यतस्सिद्धमद्वैतं द्वैतबाधया ॥ ११२ ॥

Since the not-Self in the form of the false appearance of duality does not exist by itself, since it exists involving reciprocal dependence, ane since it is caused by the ignorance of the Self—the ignorance which arises because of lack of inquiry and which is superimposed on the self-established Self which is of the nature of consciousness, it follows:

Since the plurality [of the world] is not established by itself, nor by the Self which is of the nature of consciousness, nor by both, non-duality is, therefore, proved by the sublation of duality. (112)

The world of duality which is a false appearance, a magic show (*dvaitendrajāla*), is the not-Self. Sureśvara says that it cannot be reckoned as real in addition to the Self for two reasons. First of all, its appearance is due to *avidyā* which itself is not real, being a false superimposition on the Self. It means that, since *avidyā* is not self-existent, the world which is a projection of *avidyā* is also not self-existent. Secondly, the notion of "difference" (*bheda*) is unintelligible as it involves reciprocal dependence of one thing on another. When I say, "A cow is different from a horse," the cow is *pratiyogin* (counter-correlate) and the horse, *anuyogin* or *dharmi* (correlate). We can speak of one entity as *anuyogin* only when something else is differentiated from it as *pratiyogin*; and one object can be called *pratiyogin* only when something else is differentiated from it as *anuyogin*. Thus, since difference involves reciprocal dependence of one thing on another (*itaretara-svabhāva-apekṣa-siddhatvāt*), it is not real. So the pluralistic universe cannot prove or establish its own reality. Nor can the Self support its reality, because there cannot be any relation between the Self which is real and the world which is false.

See *sambandhokti* to II. 97 for the explanation of the nature of *avidyā*.

[113]

यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तिद्रढिम्ने श्रुत्युदाहरणोपन्यासः ।

नित्यावगतिरूपत्वात् कारकादिर्न चात्मनः ।
" अस्थूलं " " नेति नेती "ति " न जायत " इति श्रुतिः ॥

With a view to strengthen the idea stated earlier, illustrative *śruti* texts are cited.

Since the Self is of the nature of eternal consciousness, factors of action, etc. are absent in the Self. *Śruti* speaks of the Self as "not gross," "not this, not this," and "never born." (113)

That the Self is of the nature of consciousness or knowledge is conveyed by the *śruti* text, "Brahman who is knowledge, bliss, is the final goal" (*BU*, 3.9.28). Another text from the same *Upaniṣad* brings out the absence of factors of action (*kāraka*) such as object, instrument, and so on in the Self as follows: "When to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one see and through what ..." (*BU*, 4.5.15). In the same *Upaniṣad* it is again brought out that the Self is free from all kinds of attributes as follows: "It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long ..." (*BU*, 3.8.8). Commenting on this text, Śaṅkara observes: "The Self is devoid of all attributes, for it is one only without a second; so what is there that can be specified, and through what?" That the Self is immutable is stated by the *śruti* text: "The Self is never born, nor does it die" (*KU*, 1.2.18). Since the Self has neither origination nor end, it is also free from other modifications such as existence, growth, maturity, and decline which characterize all existent things in the world.

[114]

सर्वस्यास्य ग्राहकादेर्द्वैतप्रपञ्चस्यात्मानवबोधमात्रोपादानस्य स्वयं सेद्धुम्-अशक्यत्वात्, आत्मसिद्धेश्चानुपादेयत्वात्।

आत्मनश्चेन्निवार्यन्ते बुद्धिदेहघटादयः।
षष्ठगोचरकल्पास्ते विज्ञेयाः परमार्थतः॥ ११४॥

Since the entire world of duality consisting of the intellect, etc. comes into existence due to the ignorance of the Self alone, it cannot exist by itself; nor can it be accepted that it is established through the Self.

If objects such as the intellect, the body, and a pot are separated from the Self, then they must, in truth, be understood as non-existent. (114)

The world of duality cannot exist apart from the Self. Being a product of *avidyā*, it is insentient and cannot exist by itself. Since the Self which is consciousness cannot be related to the insentient world, the latter cannot be established by the former. It, therefore, follows that the world of duality which is different from the Self and which is also not related to it is in truth non-existent. Though from the *pāramārthika* standpoint the world of duality does not exist, from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint we speak of it as existent. What is said to be existent at the *vyāvahārika* level is *mithyā*.

The expression "*ṣaṣṭhagocara-kalpāḥ*" means "*ṣaṣṭhapramāṇa-gocarakalpāḥ*", *i.e.* non-existence of things known through the *pramāṇa* called *anupalabdhi*.

[115]

कुतो न्यायबलादेवं निश्चितं प्रतीयते ? यस्मात् ।

नित्यां संविदमाश्रित्य स्वतस्सिद्धामविक्रियाम् ।
सिद्धायन्ते धियो बोधास्तांश्चाश्रित्य घटादयः ॥ ११५ ॥

If it be asked: " What is the principle on the strength of which this is known to be certain? " the reason is as follows.

By depending on the eternal, self-established, and immutable consciousness, the cognitions of the intellect take place; and by depending on the latter, pot and other objects are established. (115)

Sureśvara refers to a possible objection to his conclusion that the world of duality is really non-existent. When the objects of of the external world are directly perceived by everyone of us, how can they be treated, it may be asked, as non-existent? Sureśvara's answer is that the immediacy of external objects is not real. The self-luminous Self alone is direct and immediate. On account of the reflection of the Self in the intellect, the *vṛttis* of

the intellect appear to be direct and immediate. When the intellect assumes the forms of the external objects and when these modes of the intellect are illumined by the Self which is reflected therein, the external objects appear to be direct and immediate. So the immediacy of the Self is first of all illicitly transferred to the *vṛttis* of the intellect and then to the external objects with the result that external objects such as a tree and a table appear to us as direct and immediate. Not realizing the pseudo-immediacy of external objects, we think that external objects such as a table and a tree really exist on the ground that they are directly seen by us.

[116]

यस्मान्न कयाचिदपि युक्त्या आत्मनः कारकत्वं क्रियात्वं फलत्वं चोपपद्यते, तस्मात् आत्मवस्तुयाथात्म्यानवबोधमात्रोपादानत्वात् नभसीव रजोधूमतुषारनीहारनीलत्वाद्यध्यासः, यथोक्तात्मनि सर्वोऽयं क्रियाकारकफलात्मकसंसारोऽहंममत्वयत्नेच्छादिमिथ्याध्यास एवेति सिद्धम्। इममर्थमाह।

अहम्मिथ्याभिशापेन दुःख्यात्मा तद्बुभुत्सया।
इतः श्रुतिं तया नेतीत्युक्तः कैवल्यमास्थितः॥ ११६॥

Since it cannot be proved by any kind of argument that the Self is associated with the factors of action, action, and the fruit thereof, it is well-established that the world of bondage, involving action, factors of action, and the resulting fruit as well as the notions of "I" and "mine", will and desire, inasmuch as it is caused by the ignorance of the real nature of the Self alone, is a false superimposition alone on the afore-said Self in the same way as dust, smoke, dew, fog, blueness, etc. are superimpositions on the sky. This idea is stated as follows.

The Self, accursed by the false ego, becomes miserable. With the desire to know its real nature it approaches *śruti*. Being instructed "Not this" by it, the Self remains in the state of liberation. (116)

The bondage of the Self is due to the superimposition of "I" and other features thereon. When a person knows through the

scriptural instruction the true nature of the Self by eliminating all superimposed, limiting adjuncts such as the ego (*adhyastāhankārādikaṁ vihāya*), by removing all specifications, as taught in the *śruti* text "Not this, not this" (*BU*, 2.3.6), he regains the state of freedom.

[117]

तस्यास्य मुमुक्षोः श्रौताद्वचसः स्वप्ननिमित्तोत्सारितनिद्रस्येव इयं निश्चितार्था प्रमा जायते ।

नाहं न च ममात्मत्वात् सर्वदाऽनात्मवर्जितः ।
भानाविव तमोऽध्यासोऽपह्नवश्च तथा मयि ॥ ११७ ॥

To this seeker after liberation, valid cognition whose content is firmly established arises from the words of *śruti* in the same way as the sleep of a person is terminated by what is seen by him in a dream.

I am not the ego; nothing is mine. Being of the nature of the Self, I am always devoid of the not-Self. Just as darkness is superimposed on the sun, [even so they are superimposed on me]. Likewise, their negation too is a superimposition on me. (117)

According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman alone is real and everything else which is other than Brahman-Ātman is *mithyā*. If so, *śruti* too which is undoubtedly different from Brahman-Ātman is *mithyā*. If *śruti* is *mithyā*, *i.e.* illusory, how can it be, so the objection is raised, the source of valid cognition (*pramā*)? Sureśvara answers this objection very briefly in the *sambandhokti*. He says that *śruti*, in spite of being *mithyā*, awakens an ignorant person to the truth in the same way as a dream-lion, which is illusory, wakes up a person to reality. A brief explanation is necessary to drive home Sureśvara's point. Two issues are involved here — one relating to the claim of *śruti* to be a *pramāṇa* and the other to its ontological status. Since the two issues are different, Advaita employs two criteria — one with regard to the claim of *śruti* to be a *pramāṇa* and the other with regard to its ontological status. Advaita holds

the view that the ontological status of *śruti* does not in any way affect its status as a *pramāna*.

The distinctive cause of a valid cognition is a *pramāṇa*. A valid cognition (*pramā*) is one whose content remains unsublated for ever: that is to say, non-sublatability of the content is the criterion of a valid cognition (*abādhitārtha viṣayaṁ jñānam hi pramā*). While a rope-snake and a dream-lion suffer contradiction, Brahman-Ātman which is the content of the cognition produced by *śruti* remains unsublated. Since Brahman-Ātman is eternal, there is no possibility of its sublation at a later time. So the cognition of Brahman-Ātman which *śruti* gives rise to is valid; and by virtue of causing a valid cognition *śruti* is a *pramāṇa*. Instances which show how what is illusory gives rise to valid cognition, *i.e.* knowledge of what is real, are not wanting. For example, the figure of a snake drawn on a paper is not a real snake; nevertheless from the perception of a paper-snake one can get the knowledge of the real snake. The cognition of a rope-snake which is illusory gives rise to what is real such as tears, trembling, perspiration, loss of speech and so on in the person who claims to have seen it. Sureśvara mentions the case of a dream object, *e.g.* a roaring lion, which in spite of being illusory rouses a man from sleep and wakes him up to the truth. It is necessary to bear in mind the point of the analogy. The experience of dream is illusory; even so is the sleep of *avidyā* in which a person is trapped. The roaring of a lion seen in a dream is illusory; even so is *śruti* which functions in the state of bondage. Just as the roaring of a dream-lion terminates the state of sleep and makes the person concerned realize the truth, even so *śruti* puts an end to the beginningless sleep of *avidyā* (*anādyavidyānidrā*) and awakens the person concerned to the truth.

Though *śruti* is a *pramāṇa*, its ontological status cannot be anything but *mithyā*. *Śruti* functions only at the empirical level; and it is valid to one who is ignorant of the truth of non-duality. But to one who has realized the truth, there is no need of *śruti* as it is no more a *pramāṇa* to him. Since *śruti* along with the entire empirical realm suffers sublation at the dawn of knowledge, it is said to be *mithyā* in respect of its ontological status. The ontological status of *śruti* does not in any way jeopardize the functioning of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*.

Though the Self is *nirguṇa*, *i.e.* devoid of qualities and *nirviśeṣa* *i.e.* free from specifications, qualities and specifications are super-

imposed on it due to *avidyā* in the same way as darkness is superimposed on the ever-shining sun. By negating the ego and its characteristics which are superimposed on the Self, one gets the saving knowledge that the Self is *nirguṇa* and *nirviśeṣa*. Though the Self by its very nature is free from the ego, etc., which are not-Self, we superimpose them on it due to ignorance and then negate them. What is wrongly superimposed on a thing alone can be denied. If association of ego and its qualities with the Self is not real, their negation too cannot be real, for the Self is all the time free from ego and its qualities. Though from the *pāramārthika* standpoint there is neither superimposition (*adhyāsa*) nor negation (*niṣedha*), both superimposition and negation hold good at the *vyāvahārika* level which is the standpoint of *avidyā*.

[118 - 119]

सोऽयमेवंप्रतिपन्नस्वभावमात्मानं प्रतिपन्नोऽनुक्रोशति ।

यत्र त्वस्येति साटोपं कृत्स्नद्वैतनिषेधिनीम् ।
प्रोत्सारयन्तीं संसारमप्यश्रौषं न किं श्रुतिम् ॥ ११८ ॥

इत्योमित्यवबुद्धात्मा निष्कलोऽकारकोऽक्रियः ।
विरक्त इव बुद्ध्यादेरेकाकित्वमुपेयिवान् ॥ ११९ ॥

One who has known the nature of the Self as set forth here laments [for his earlier indifference as follows].

Why did I not listen to *śruti* before, which declares with authority, "But when to the knower of Brahman...," negates the entire world of duality, and terminates bondage? (118)

Thus [regretting], he affirms [the truth of the text] by uttering "*aum*" and realizes the Self which is partless, which is without action and factors of action. Being free from the intellect, etc., like the one free from worldly attachment, he attains the oneness of being. (119)

In verse (118) Sureśvara cites the *śruti* text (*BU*, 4.5.15) which speaks about the state of Brahman-realization vis-à-vis the state of ignorance characterized by duality. At the outset the *śruti* text says: "When there is duality as it were, then one sees something, one smells something..." and so on; and then it speaks about the absence of duality of all kinds when one realizes Brahman-Ātman thus: "But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one see and through what...?"

The syllable "*aum*" is uttered for the purpose of giving assent. There is also the implication that "*aum*" is indicative of the supreme Self.

When a person realizes the Self, he remains as the Self, one only without a second, being established on its own greatness (*svamahimni tiṣṭhati*).

CHAPTER III

[1]

सर्वोऽयं प्रमितिप्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमातृलक्षणः, आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तो मिथ्याध्यास एवेति बहुशः उपपत्तिभिरतिष्ठिपम्। आत्मा च जन्मादिषड्भावविकारवर्जितः कूटस्थबोध एवेति स्फुटीकृतम्। तयोश्च मिथ्याध्यासकूटस्थात्मनोर्नान्तरेणाज्ञानं सम्बन्धः, अन्यत्र चोदनापरिप्रापितात् यथा "इयमेवर्गग्निः साम" इति। तच्चाज्ञानं स्वात्ममात्रनिमित्तं न सम्भवतीति कस्यचित् कस्मिंश्चिद्विषये भवतीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

इह च पदार्थद्वयं निर्द्धारितम्—आत्माऽनात्मा च। तत्र अनात्मनस्तावन्न अज्ञानेनाभिसम्बन्धः। तस्य हि स्वरूपमेवाज्ञानम्; न हि स्वतोऽज्ञानस्य अज्ञानं घटते। सम्भवदप्यज्ञानस्वभावेऽज्ञानं कमतिशयं जनयेत्? न च तत्र ज्ञानप्राप्तिरस्ति, येन तत्प्रतिषेधात्मकमज्ञानं स्यात्। अनात्मनश्चाज्ञान-प्रसूतत्वात्। न हि पूर्वसिद्धं सत् ततो लब्धात्मलाभस्य सेत्स्यतः आश्रयस्याश्रयि सम्भवति। तदनपेक्षस्य च, तस्य निस्स्वभावत्वात्। एतेभ्य एव हेतुभ्यो न अनात्मविषयमज्ञानं सम्भवतीति ग्राह्यम्। एवं तावत् न अनात्मनो-ऽज्ञानित्वम्, नापि तद्विषयमज्ञानम्।

पारिशेष्यादात्मन एवास्त्वज्ञानम्, तस्याज्ञोऽस्मीत्यनुभवदर्शनात्। "सोऽहं भगवो मन्त्रविदेवास्मि नात्मवित्" इति श्रुतेः। न चात्मनोऽज्ञानस्वरूपता, तस्य चैतन्यमात्रस्वाभाव्यात्। अतिशयश्च सम्भवति ज्ञानविपरिलोपः, ज्ञानप्राप्तेश्च सम्भवः, तस्य ज्ञानकारित्वात्। न चाज्ञानकार्यत्वं, कूटस्थात्म-स्वाभाव्यात्। अज्ञानानपेक्षस्य चात्मनः स्वत एव स्वरूपसिद्धेर्युक्तमात्मन एवाज्ञत्वम्।

किंविषयं पुनस्तदात्मनोऽज्ञानम्? आत्मविषयमिति ब्रूमः। ननु आत्मनोऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात्, अनन्यत्वात्, आश्रयाश्रयिभावस्य भेदगर्भत्वात्, ज्ञान-प्रकृतित्वात्, असङ्गत्वनित्यमुक्तत्वाच्च* हेतुभ्यो नैवाज्ञानं घटते। घटत एव। कथम्? अज्ञानमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् तद्विभागस्य, सर्पात्मतेव रज्ज्वाः। तस्मात् तदपनुत्तौ द्वैतानर्थाभावः। तदपनोदश्च वाक्यादेव तत्पदपदार्थाभिज्ञस्य। अतो वाक्यव्याख्यानायाध्याय आरभ्यते।

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*ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वादनन्यत्वाच्च ज्ञानप्रकृतित्वादिभ्यश्च (H). The reading I have followed is on the basis of the lemma in the *Candrikā* of Jñānottama.

तत्र यथोक्तेन प्रकारेण तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योपनिविष्टपदपदार्थयोः कृतान्वयव्यतिरेकः।

यदा ना तत्त्वमस्यादेर्ब्रह्मास्मीत्यवगच्छति ।
प्रध्वस्ताहंममो नैति तदा गीर्मनसोः सृतिम् ॥ १ ॥

That this entire world from Brahmā down to the clump of grass involving the distinctions of cognition, source of cognition, object of cognition, and cognizer is but a false superimposition, has been established through many arguments. It has also been clearly stated that the Self, which is devoid of the sixfold changes,such as origination, of existent objects, is of the nature of immutable consciousness alone. Even though in other places, as in the case of "This [earth] is verily the *Ṛk*, and fire is the *Sāman*," one thing is thought of as another [for the purpose of meditation] on the basis of scriptural injunction, here the relation between [the world] which is a false superimposition and the immutable Self cannot take place without ignorance. And since this ignorance cannot be by itself [without depending on another thing for its locus and content], it has to be admitted that ignorance is of some one and is about something.

Moreover, here [in the Advaita system] two categories have deen determined: they are the Self and the not-Self. Of these two, the not-Self cannot be the locus of ignorance, because ignorance is its very nature; and what is of the nature of ignorance cannot, indeed, be the locus of ignorance. Even if it were possible, what change could this ignorance bring about in the locus which is of the nature of ignorance? The not-Self does not have the possibility of attaining knowledge; should there be this possibility, it could be said that ignorance which is by nature the negation of knowledge is located in it. Further, since the not-Self is a product of ignorance, [it cannot be the locus]. Indeed, what exists earlier cannot be located in that which itself comes into being from that [earlier] thing. There is also the reason that the not-Self has no nature of its own independently of

ignorance. Owing to these very reasons it should be known that ignorance is not about the not-Self. Thus, the not-Self is not the locus of ignorance; nor does ignorance have the not-Self as its content.

It has, therefore, to be concluded as the only remaining alternative that the Self alone is the locus of ignorance [as well as the content of ignorance], for it is seen that the Self has the experience, "I am ignorant." Also, there is the *śruti* text, "Revered Sir, as I am, I know only the *mantras*; I know not the Self." The Self is not of the nature of ignorance, because it is consciousness alone by its essential nature. Also, ignorance can produce a change in it such as lapse of knowledge. Attainment of knowledge too is possible in it, since it is the source of knowledge [through the *vṛtti* of the mind]. Further, it is not a product of ignorance, because it is of the nature of the immutable Self. Since the Self, being independent of ignorance, exists by itself, it is proper to say that the Self alone is the locus of ignorance.

What, then is the content of ignorance which is located in the Self? We say that the Self is the content [of ignorance]. It may be objected that ignorance is incompatible with the Self for the reason that the Self is of the nature of knowledge, that it is without a second to it, that the relation between the locus and the contained involves difference, that the Self is the source of knowledge, and that it is unattached and ever free. The reply is that it is compatible. If it be asked, "How?" the reply is that the differentiation in the Self is due to ignorance alone like the snakeness of the rope. Therefore, when ignorance is removed, the evil of duality ceases to be. Also, its removal takes place only through [the knowledge obtained from] the scriptural text to one who has understood the words [of the text] and their meanings. So this chapter is begun for the purpose of the explanation of the scriptural text.

Here one who has applied, in the manner in which it has been stated, the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* to the words

and their meanings contained in the texts such as "That thou art" [attains the knowledge of Brahman].

When a person knows "I am Brahman" from texts such as "That thou art," then being free from the notions of "I" and "mine" he does not attain the path of mind and speech. (1)

In Chapter II it has been shown that the empirical world which involves distinctions such as cognizer, cognitum, cognition, and source of cognition (II. 108) and which is replete with action, instrument of action, and the ensuing result (II. 51) is *mithyā*. By contrast to the empirical world which is not-Self, the Self is immutable consciousness, one and non-dual. The entire world of plurality, it has been said, is a superimposition on the immutable Self. It is well-known that, though the object in front is only a rope, it is nevertheless perceived as a snake due to ignorance. In the same way the non-dual Self which is the reality is perceived as the pluralistic universe due to ignorance. The perception of one thing as another due to ignorance is called *adhyāsa*: it is, to use the celebrated words of Śaṅkara, *atasmin tadbuddhi*. It is necessary in this connection to distinguish the case of *adhyāsa* caused by ignorance from that of *upāsanā* enjoined by scripture. Not every case of perceiving one thing as another can be called *adhyāsa*. In meditation (*upāsanā*) one object is cognized as another as enjoined by scripture. Sureśvara, for example, refers to the method of meditating on the *udgītha* as taught in the *Upaniṣad* (*CU*, 1.6.1). The text says: "This (earth) is verily the *Ṛk*, and fire is the *Sāman*." Here the *Ṛk* should be viewed as the earth and the *Sāman*, as fire for the purpose of meditation on the authority of scripture. Unlike the rope-snake example where a person, not knowing the object in front as a rope, cognizes it as a snake, here the meditator knowing the *Ṛk* as what it is nevertheless cognizes it as the earth not because of ignorance, but because of scriptural injunction (*codanāpariprāpitāt ṛci pṛthivī dṛṣṭiḥ*). So *adhyāsa* caused by ignorance is different from *adhyāsa* which one deliberately practises due to scriptural injunction.

The nature of *ajñāna* is such that it is always dependent on something else both for its existence and revelation. It requires the Self for its locus as well as for its revelation. Knowledge, as

ordinarily understood, is relational; it belongs to some one and is about something. Like knowledge, ignorance too involves subject-object relation. Ignorance must always be ignorance *of* some one and must be *about* something. In other words, it requires a locus (*āśraya*) and a content (*viṣaya*). Sureśvara discusses this question at some length in the *sambandhokti* at the commencement of Chapter III. Of the two entities we speak of at the *vyāvahārika* level, *viz.* the Self and the not-Self, the Self alone, declares Sureśvara, is both the locus and the content of *ajñāna*. He adduces four reasons to show why the not-Self cannot be its locus. First of all, the not-Self is of the nature of ignorance; and it makes no sense to say that ignorance is located in the not-Self which is also ignorance. Secondly, *ajñāna* by its very nature is capable of concealing the truth and projecting the false. But it will not have any scope for its work of concealment and distortion even if it should rest in the not-Self, because the latter does not admit of concealment. There is the principle that knowledge and ignorance must have the same locus (*ekādhikaraṇa*) if they should be mutually exclusive. Since the not-Self which is material is incapable of acquiring knowledge, it cannot be invested with ignorance. It follows that *ajñāna* which is the negation of knowledge (*jñāna-pratiṣedhātmakam*) cannot be located in the not-Self as it will not have any work to do therein. Thirdly, since the entire not-Self is a product of *ajñāna*, it cannot be the locus of its own cause which is antecedent to it. Reference may be made in this connection to an oft-quoted statement of Sarvajñātman, which echoes Sureśvara's view: "*pūrvasiddhatamaso hi paścimo nāśrayo bhavati nāpi gocaraḥ*" (*Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, I. 319). Fourthly, it is well-known that anything which serves as a locus has a nature of its own independently of what is located in it. Since the not-Self has no nature of its own independently of *ajñāna*, it cannot be the locus therefor. For these reasons the not-Self, Sureśvara concludes, cannot be the locus of *ajñāna*.

The reasons given above, according to Sureśvara, will also prove that the not-Self is not the content (*viṣaya*) of *ajñāna*. Though Sureśvara has not elucidated the position, Jñānottama in his commentary, which is very terse, but profound, shows the applicability of all the arguments in the present case. First of all, since the not-Self is of the nature of ignorance, to say that the not-Self is the content of ignorance amounts to saying that igno-

rance is the content of ignorance, which is absurd. Secondly, the not-Self which is material is not fit enough to be concealed by ignorance; consequently, it cannot be the object of ignorance. Thirdly, the not-Self is a product of ignorance. That which is an effect of ignorance cannot be its content. For example, the illusory silver which is a product of *ajñāna* is not the content thereof. In this case knowledge of shell (*śuktiviṣayakajñāna*) removes ignorance of shell (*śuktiviṣayaka ajñāna*). It means that, while shell is the content of ignorance, silver is its effect. If so, silver which is the effect of ignorance cannot be its content. In the same way, the not-Self which is the effect of ignorance cannot be its content. We may drive home this point in another way. The not-Self comes into existence from *ajñāna* which has already the Self as its locus and content: that is to say, *ajñāna* which is located in the Self conceals the nature of the Self and then projects the not-Self. So the not-Self, being a product of *ajñāna* which has already the Self as its content, cannot be the content of *ajñāna*. Fourthly, in the case of shell-silver illusion, shell is the content of ignorance; when the right knowledge arises, silver which is a product of ignorance gets negated. It means that in this case there is an object, *viz.* shell, which is fit enough to be the content of ignorance and which is different from that (silver) which is negated by the right knowledge of the shell. This principle does not hold if we say that the not-Self is the content of ignorance. If the not-Self is the content of ignorance, what is that which, being different from the not-Self, will be negated by the right knowledge? This question cannot be answered because of the wrong supposition that the not-Self is the content of ignorance.

In justification of his view that the Self is both the locus and the content of *ajñāna*, Sureśvara invites our attention to our own experience. At some stage or other, every one says: "I am ignorant" (*ajño'smi*); but an insentient object like a pot does not declare that it is ignorant. This clearly shows that the Self alone can be the locus of ignorance. Sureśvara also refers to Nārada's confession to Sanatkumāra: "Revered Sir, as I am, I know only the *mantras*; I know not the Self" (*CU*, 7.1.3), a confession which comes from one who knows that the knower of the Self alone crosses over sorrow (*tarati śokam ātmavit*). It is necessary to bear in mind two points in this connection. First of all, there is no

doubt in the mind of Nārada whether he is ignorant or not. On the contrary, he knows that he is ignorant. Secondly, knowing that he is ignorant of the Self, he approaches Sanatkumāra with the request to teach him the knowledge of the Self for overcoming his ignorance. It means that the Self is the locus as well as the content of ignorance.

Sureśvara also shows that the view that the Self is the locus of *ajñāna* can meet the objections raised by him against the opposite view. First of all, the Self being of the nature of consciousness can be the locus of ignorance. Secondly, since the Self is self-luminous consciousness, *ajñāna* can, by indwelling in the Self, do the work of concealment and distortion of the truth; and it can also be removed through *pramāṇa-jñāna* for the attainment of which there is scope in it. Consider, for example, the following statements: "Now I do not know," and "Now I know." While the former statement suggests the presence of ignorance which is by nature the negation of knowledge (*jñānapratiṣedhātmakam ajñānam*), the latter implies the rise of knowledge which removes ignorance (*ajñāna-vināśaka-jñānotpatti*). Thirdly, the Self which is *anādi* is not a product of ignorance; and so it can be the locus for the latter. Finally, the Self which is consciousness is capable of revealing *ajñāna* which is material; consequently the Self, having a nature of its own independently of ignorance, can be the locus for it.

If the Self is the locus of ignorance, it cannot also, the opponent argues, be the content of ignorance. What holds good in the case of knowledge also holds good in the case of ignorance. Knowledge is in some one and it is about something else. It means that the locus of knowledge is different from the content of knowledge. In the same way, if ignorance is in some one and if it is about something else, then its locus must be different from its content. In other words, one and the same entity cannot be both the locus and the content of ignorance. Since the Self is one and non-dual, homogeneous and partless, it is not possible to suggest, the critic argues, that ignorance is located in one part of the Self which is known and that its content will be the other part of the Self which is not known. So, if the Self is the locus of ignorance, it cannot, the critic concludes, be the content of ignorance as well.

By way of answering this objection Sureśvara says that the Self is the content of ignorance (*ātmaviṣayamiti brūmaḥ*); he does not, however, indicate the manner in which the objection is to be met. Jñānottama in his commentary provides the answer. It is a matter of common experience for us to say: "I know myself," and also "I do not know myself." In the former case, one who has knowledge as well as the content of knowledge is one and the same person. In the latter case also, one and the same person is both the locus and the content of ignorance, *viz.* myself. The same line of explanation may be adopted to show that the Self is both the locus and the content of ignorance. So long as there is *vyavahāra*, the Self is *saviśeṣa*; and so we speak of its general and specific features and also of its being known and unknown. While existence (*sadrūpam*) which is its general feature is known, non-duality and bliss (*advitīyānandarūpam*) which are its specific features are not known. That aspect of the Self which is known is not concealed by *ajñāna*; and that aspect which is not known is concealed by it. So the statement, "I do not know myself," conveys the idea that, even though I know myself in a general way as one existing, I do not know the special features in me such as non-duality and bliss. So Sureśvara's view that *ajñāna* is not only located in, but also has, the Self as its content is tenable.

Sureśvara considers the possible objections against the view that the Self is the locus of ignorance. Every one of these objections requires some brief explanation. (1) *Jñānasvarūpatvāt*: Knowledge and ignorance are mutually exclusive; if so how can ignorance be located in the Self which is of the nature of knowledge? (2) *Ananyatvāt*: Since the Self is without a second, how can *ajñāna* which is different from it be located in it? (3) *Āśraya-āśrayibhāvasya bhedagarbhatvāt*: Since the relation of the locus and the contained involves difference, it is incompatible with the non-dual nature of the Self. (4) *Jñānaprakṛtitvāt*: Since the Self is the source of *pramāṇa-jñāna* which removes ignorance, it cannot be the locus of ignorance any more than the sun could be the locus of darkness. (5) *Asaṅgatvāt, nityamuktatvāt ca*: The Self by its very nature is unattached because there is no second to it; it is ever free such that there cannot be any blemish whatsoever in it and so *ajñāna* cannot be associated with it. In support of this there are *śruti* texts, *e.g. BU*, 4. 3. 15 and *SU*, 6. 19. Sureśvara's answer is that there is no incompatibility between the Self and

ajñāna and that the partless and non-dual Self appears to be differentiated and relational due to ignorance alone (*ajñānamātranimittatvāt*). Though Sureśvara does not elaborate his answer, Jñānottama in his commentary shows how every one of the objections stated above can be set aside in terms of one and the same answer given by Sureśvara — "*ajñānamātranimittatvāt tadvibhāgasya*".

In order to answer the first objection it is necessary to clarify the sense in which the Self is said to be of the nature of knowledge. The Advaitin makes a distinction between *pramāṇa-jñāna* and *svarūpa-jñāna.* The latter is also called *sākṣi-caitanya.* Of the three epistemological factors, *viz.* the knower, the known, and the resulting knowledge, which are set up by *ajñāna*, what is called *pramāṇa-jñāna* is one of them. Inasmuch as it is part of the triple distinction projected by *ajñāna*, it cannot constitute the nature of the Self. The Advaitin does not say that this *pramāṇa-jñāna* is the locus of *ajñāna.* On the contrary, *sākṣi-caitanya*, otherwise called *svarūpa-jñāna*, is the locus of *ajñāna.* The second objection also can be answered only by presupposing *ajñāna.* Since *sākṣi-caitanya* and *ajñāna* are related as the revealer and the revealed, they are not opposed to each other. The former can, therefore, be the locus for the latter. The real position is that from the standpoint of the Self, there is no *ajñāna* at all. Since *ajñāna* has to depend upon the Self both for its existence and cognition, in the same way as the illusory snake has to depend upon the rope both for its existence and cognition, it is but a superimposition on the Self and cannot, therefore, be reckoned as a real entity different from the Self. When we explain the relation between the Self which is the Witness-consciousness and *ajñāna* in terms of the revealer and the revealed, or in terms of the locus and the contained, we presuppose *ajñāna.* That is why Sureśvara says that these relations are, indeed, dependent on *ajñāna*, while the truth is that the Self *per se* is neither the revealer nor the locus of *ajñāna.* Since the relation of the locus and the contained is from the standpoint of *ajñāna* alone and not from the standpoint of the Self, the third objection too is of no avail: the non-dual nature of the Self remains untouched, whatever relation is superimposed thereon through *ajñāna.* The fourth objection also can be answered in terms of *ajñāna.* The *pramāṇa-jñāna* which removes *ajñāna* can arise only if there is the internal organ which is a product of *ajñāna.* Finally, the Self in itself is said to be unattached

and ever free. If we view the non-relational Self as relational through *ajñāna*, it does not in any way affect the Self: the Self remains the same, notwithstanding the superimposition of relations and qualities thereon through *ajñāna*.

Sureśvara argues that the non-dual Self which is of the nature of consciousness and the pluralistic universe which is material can be related as the substratum and the superimposed respectively as in the case of the rope and the snake, only by means of ignorance. The primal ignorance which conceals the non-dual Self and projects the false appearance of the pluralistic universe can be removed through the knowledge to be obtained only from the principal *śruti* texts such as "*tat tvam asi*". It is necessary in this connection to bring out the relation between the previous chapter and the present one. By means of arguments of various kinds it was shown in the previous chapter that, while the world of plurality is illusory, the non-dual Self which is the ground of the world is real. This, however, is not enough. Reasoning by itself cannot establish the ultimate truth. Since the nature of the Self as identical with Brahman can be known only through the *śruti* text (*vākyādeva*) and not through inference and other *pramāṇas*, the present chapter which will bring out the import of the *mahāvākyas* is commenced. This does not mean that reasoning can be dispensed with and that one can straight away start with the study of the *śruti* texts. Following Śaṅkara, Sureśvara says that the import of the principal texts can be comprehended only by one who has identified the words of the text and clarified their meanings by the application of the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* to both the words and their meanings. Śaṅkara's declaration in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (18.96), which Sureśvara faithfully follows, is relevant in this context:

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ हि पदार्थस्य पदस्य च ।
स्यादेतदहमित्यत्र युक्तिरेवावधारणे ॥

The meaning of this verse is: "For ascertaining the meaning of the word 'I', reasoning alone in the form of *anvaya-vyatireka* as applied to the words and their meanings will do." Rāmatīrtha in his commentary on this verse explains *pada anvaya-vyatireka* as well as *padārtha anvayavyatireka* referred to by Śaṅkara. One should first of all identify the set of words such as "*ātmā*", "*caitanyam*", "*prajñānam*", "*brahma*", "*sat*" each of which refers to the pure Self

which is neither qualified by, nor a qualification of, anything, and contrast them with another set of words such as "*kartā*" "*bhoktā*", "*jñātā*", "*gantā*" each of which refers to the Self as qualified by the empirical adjuncts such as the body, the senses, and the mind. This line of reasoning is what is called "*padasya anvayavyatireka*". In addition to this there is also the need for the reasoning called "*padārthasya anvayavyatireka*" in which we examine the nature of the Self vis-à-vis the not-Self by applying a set of arguments, *viz.* (1) *dṛg-dṛśya anvaya-vyatireka*, (2) *sākṣi-sākṣya anvaya-vyatireka*, (3) *āgamāpāyi-tadavdhi anvayavyatireka*, and (4) *anuvṛtta-vyāvṛtta anvaya-vyatireka*. These arguments help us to know that the Self is the seer and the Witness-consciousness, that it is eternal enduring through time, and all-pervasive transcending the limitations of space, while the not-Self is what is seen and witnessed to, what is limited by both time and space. Though reasoning will help us to differentiate the Self from the not-Self, it cannot give us the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman identity. And this knowledge which destroys the primal ignorance root and branch can be obtained only from the *śruti* text.

[2]

यदैव तदर्थं त्वमर्थेऽवैति तदैव अवाक्यार्थतां प्रतिपद्यते गीर्मनसोः सृतिं न प्रतिपद्यत इति । कुत एतदध्यवसीयते ? यस्मात् ।

तत्पदं प्रकृतार्थं स्यात् त्वं पदं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
नीलोत्पलवदेताभ्यां दुःख्यनात्मत्ववारणे ॥ २ ॥

When a person understands that the meaning of the word "that" is identical with the meaning of the word "thou", then itself he attains the non-sentential sense and goes beyond the realm of mind and speech. How is this [identity] established? For this reason.

The word "that" refers to the topic under discussion. The word "thou" means the Self. As in the case of the sentence "the blue lotus," "being subject to suffering" and "not-being-the-Self" are removed by these two words. (2)

In the principal text, "*tat tvam asi*", the word "*tat*" (that) signifies the non-dual Brahman which is bliss by its very nature. The word "*tvam*" (thou) signifies the inward Self which is the witness to the intellect. The import of the text is identity or oneness of Brahman and the Self. "*Vākyārtha*" means sentence sense. Though ordinarily a sentence may convey the sense of difference (*bheda*) among the things denoted by the several words in it as in the case of "Bring that cow by means of a stick," or the sense of relation (*samsarga*) suggesting difference as in the case of "The lotus is blue" (*i.e.* the lotus qualified by blueness), here the sentence "*tat tvam asi*" does not convey the sense of difference in any way — either difference among things or difference between substance and attribute. On the contrary, it conveys the sense of oneness or identity (*abheda*). So Sureśvara says that from the sentence "*tat tvam asi*" we are able to construe the non-sentential sense (*avākyārtha*), *viz.* oneness or identity (*vākyāt avākyārthapratipattiḥ saṅgacchate*). It is the sense which is outside the reach of words and mind.

What is it that takes place as a result of the identification of the meanings of the two words, "*tat*" and "*tvam*"? We think of the Self of the individual as what is subject to suffering. By identifying Brahman, which is bliss by nature and which is the meaning of "*tat*", with the Self, the suffering nature (*duḥkhitvam*) associated with the Self is removed. We think of Brahman as not-Self, as different from the Self. By identifying the Self, which is the meaning of "*tvam*", with Brahman, the not-Self nature (*anātmatvam*) associated with Brahman is removed. It means that Brahman is no other than the inward Self; and the inward Self is bliss indeed. In order to drive home this mode of explanation of the text, Sureśvara gives the example of a secular sentence, "the blue lotus" (*nīlam utpalam*). The two words "*nīlam*" and "*utpalam*" are in grammatical coordination. There may be a lotus which is not blue. Here, since the word "blue" is associated with "lotus", the non-blueness of the lotus (*utpalasya anīlatvam*) is excluded. Similarly, though there may be many things which are blue, the association of the word "lotus" with "blue" helps us to eliminate the non-lotushood of the blue (*nīlasya anutpalatvam*). In other words, we get the idea that what is blue is lotus and that lotus is blue. In the same way, since the two words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" are in grammatical coordination, the association of the word "*tat*" with

"*tvam*" helps us to remove the *duḥkhitvam* of the Self; and the association of the word "*tvam*" with "*tat*" helps us to remove the *anātmatvam* of Brahman.

[3]

एवं कृतान्वयव्यतिरेको वाक्यादेव अवाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यत इत्युक्तम्। अतः तद्व्याख्यानाय सूत्रोपन्यासः।

सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता।
लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनाम्॥ ३॥

It has been stated that a person who thus makes use of the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* [with regard to the words of the text as well as their meanings] comprehends the non-sentential sense from the sentence itself. For the explanation of this, the following is, therefore, stated in an aphoristic way.

Grammatical coordination, the relation of the qualification and the qualified, the relation of the implication and the implied — these are the relations applicable to the [two] words, their meanings, and the word-meanings and the inward Self. (3)

Sureśvara says that there are three stages that one has to go through for comprehending the import of the sentence, "*tat tvam asi*:" (1) knowledge of the grammatical coordination (*sāmānādhikaraṇya-jñāna*), (2) knowledge of the relation of the qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā-jñāna*), and (3) knowledge of the relation of the implication and the implied (*lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-sambandha-jñāna*). It will be helpful at this stage to consider how the meaning of the sentence, "*nīlamutpalam,*" is construed. The two words "*nīlam*" and "*utpalam*" convey different meanings — the former signifies a colour characterized by the quality of blueness (*nīlatva*), while the latter, a substance possessing the property of lotusness (*utpalatva*). Since the two words differ in their connotation, one will presume that their denotation will also be different. However, since the two words are in grammatical coordination, we have to say that they denote one and the same

object in spite of their different connotation. This marks the first stage. In the second stage with a view to justify the common denotation of the two words, we relate their meanings as *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*, *i.e.* as qualification and the qualified and thereby we construe the meaning: "That which is lotus is blue," or "That which is blue is lotus." So far the method of interpreting the sentence "*tat tvam asi*" will be the same. However, in this case we cannot stop at this stage; for, the primary meanings (*vācyārtha*) of these two words cannot be related as *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* as they are incompatible. The primary meaning of the word "*tat*" is consciousness qualified by remoteness, omniscience, etc., whereas the primary meaning of "*tvam*" is consciousness qualified by immediacy, parviscience, etc. Here, consciousness is qualified by two sets of determinants which are incompatible; and so we have to go beyond the stage of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā-jñāna*. Since oneness or identity (*abheda*) which is the import of the sentence cannot be established if we consider the primary meanings of the words, we resort to their secondary or implied meaning (*lakṣyārtha*). By dropping the two sets of determinants — remoteness, omniscience, etc. in the case of "*tat*" and immediacy, parviscience, etc. in the case of "*tvam*" — which are incompatible, we retain only "consciousness" as the implied meaning of the two words. This is the third stage in which one has the *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-sambandha-jñāna*. When a person understands the meaning of the sentence in this way, he attains the non-sentential sense of oneness from the sentence.

[4 - 5]

अस्मिन् सूत्रे उपन्यस्ते कश्चिच्चोदयति—"योऽयं वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तौ पूर्वाध्याये-नान्वयव्यतिरेकलक्षणो न्यायः सर्वकर्मसन्न्यासपूर्वकोऽभिहितः, किमयं विधिपरिप्रापितः, किं वा स्वरसत एवात्र पुमान् प्रवर्तत इति। किञ्चातः? शृणु। यद्यात्मवस्तुसाक्षात्करणाय विधिपरिप्रापितोऽयं न्यायः, तदा अवश्यं आत्मवस्तुसाक्षात्करणाय व्यावृत्तशुभाशुभकर्मराशिः, एकाग्रमनाः, अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्ताभ्यामात्मदर्शनं करोति। अपरिसमाप्यात्मदर्शनं ततः प्रच्यवमान आरूढपतितो भवति। यदि पुनः, यदृच्छातः प्रवर्तते, तदा न कश्चिद्दोषः" इति। विधिपरिप्रापित इति ब्रूमः। यत आह।

शमादिसाधनः पश्येदात्मन्यात्मानमञ्जसा।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां त्यक्त्वा युष्मदशेषतः॥ ४॥

युष्मदर्थे परित्यक्ते पूर्वोक्तैर्हेतुभिः श्रुतिः ।
वीक्षापन्नस्य कोऽस्मीति तत्त्वमित्याह सौहृदात् ॥ ५ ॥

When this aphoristic statement is made, someone raises the following objection: "Is this way of reasoning through the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*, preceded by the renunciation of all action which has been spoken of in the previous chapter for the purpose of understanding the meaning of the *śruti* text, based on scriptural injunction? Or, does a person of his own natural inclination pursue it? If it be asked, 'What does it matter?' then listen. If this way of reasoning is enjoined by scripture for the purpose of realizing the Self, then a person by giving up the whole series of good and bad actions and with a concentrated mind, should pursue Self-realization through the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* as stated earlier. However, if, on account of not being able to attain Self-realization, he lapses, he falls down. If, on the other hand, he pursues it of his own natural desire, then such a defect will not arise." We reply that because of scriptural injunction [one practises the discipline]. So the following is said.

A person who possesses qualities such as control of the mind should, in the proper perspective, see the Self in the self through the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*, after abandoning the entire world of objects. (4)

To one who has renounced the objects by following the reasons stated earlier and who is desirous of knowing, "Who am I ?" *śruti* out of affection declares, "You are that." (5)

In the *sambandhokti* to verse (4) Sureśvara discusses the question whether one pursues and practises the discipline for attaining Self-realization following the scriptural injunction or not. The opponent argues that even in the absence of any injunction one may resort to the discipline which is appropriate. It is well-known that, when knowledge arises, ignorance goes away, and so the removal of ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) is the perceptible result (*dṛṣṭa-*

phala) of knowledge. Since knowledge is not *puruṣa-tantra*, *i.e.* person-dependent, it cannot be enjoined. That *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc. are the means to knowledge is well-known in our experience: one who resorts to these attains knowledge, whereas one who does not make use of them does not get it. Therefore, a person who is desirous of knowledge, so the opponent argues, will resort to the discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana* of his own accord without any scriptural injunction. Why, then, should the Advaitin say that only an eligible person (*adhikārin*) who has renounced all actions and who has made use of the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* in the manner described should go in for Self-realization? In fact, it is better to pursue the appropriate discipline of one's own accord, if one is inclined to, without scriptural injunction, for the reason that a person, who does not reach the goal of Self-realization even after following the discipline enjoined therefor by scripture and who is guilty of lapse, will fall down.

Sureśvara refutes the opponent's argument by holding that the pursuit of the appropriate discipline is enjoined by scripture and that there is scripture-stipulated eligible person (*viśiṣṭādhikārin*) who alone is qualified for Self-realization. In support of his position he invites our attention, in verse (4) to the *śruti* text (*BU*, 4.4.23) which says: "Therefore, he who knows it as such becomes self-controlled, calm, withdrawn into himself, enduring and concentrated, and sees (or should see) the Self in his own self." Since knowledge cannot be enjoined and since the *śruti* text says that one who is equipped with self-control and other qualities shall see the Self (*yatpaśyet tacchāntyādiguṇayukto bhūtvā*), we have to say that the injunction is applicable only to the means of knowledge (*jñāna-sādhana*). Just as *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are enjoined (See *BU*, 2.4.5, which says: "The Self ... should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon."), even so self-control, calmness, renunciation, etc. are enjoined. Even though *śravaṇa*, etc. are *dṛṣṭa upāya*, *i.e.* means already known to us as capable of leading to knowledge, one may ignore them and try to attain Self-realization through other means. The scriptural injunction imposes a restriction that one should pursue Self-realization only through the discipline of *śravaṇa*, etc. Just as the injunction restricts that husking shall be done by threshing only, even so there is the restrictive injunction that one should possess qualities such as self-control and practise *śravaṇa*, etc. for attaining Self-realiza-

tion. It has to be done in the way in which it has been enjoined as some unseen potency (*adṛṣṭa*) arises thereby. There is, therefore, scripture-stipulated eligible person. Such a person, by renouncing the whole of *yuṣmat*, *i.e.* all objects which are not-Self, and by following the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, should realize the Self. If one is a scripture-stipulated eligible person, one is sure to reach the destination. There is, therefore, no possibility of lapse on the part of an eligible person, as imagined by the critic.

[6]

अत्रापि चोदयन्ति साङ्ख्याः — "शरीरेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिषु अनात्मसु, आत्मेति निस्सन्धिबन्धनं मिथ्याज्ञानमज्ञानम्। तन्निबन्धनो ह्यात्मनोऽनेकानर्थसम्बन्धः। तस्य च अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेव निरस्तत्वात्, निर्विषयं तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं प्राप्तम्। तस्माद्वाक्यस्य चैष महिमा योऽयमात्मानात्मनोर्विभाग" इति। तन्निराकरणाय इदमुच्यते।

भेदसंविदिदं ज्ञानं भेदाभावश्च साक्षिणि।
कार्यमेतदविद्याया ज्ञात्मना त्याजयेद्वचः ॥ ६ ॥

Here again the Sāṅkhyas raise an objection: 'The unobstructed false cognition of the body, the senses, the mind, and the intellect as the Self is ignorance. The association of the Self with many evils [such as birth and death] is, indeed, dependent on it. Since this ignorance is removed through the reasoning based on the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*, sentences such as "*tat tvam asi*" will have no work to do. Therefore, [with a view to provide scope for such sentences] it may be said that the greatness of this sentence consists in the discrimination between the Self and the not-Self (brought about by it).' To refute this the following is said.

This [discriminative] cognition is cognition of difference; but in the Witness-self there is no difference. This [cognition of difference] is an effect of ignorance. The sentence removes it through [generating the knowledge of the non-dual] consciousness. (6)

The Sāṅkhya philosophy which is dualistic accepts two ultimate categories — *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. While the former which is pure, eternal, all-pervading consciousness is inactive, the latter which is material, eternal, and all-pervading, is the first cause of all things. It holds that the first evolute of *prakṛti* is *mahat* or *buddhi*. The former name is given to it from its cosmic aspect, and the latter, from its individual aspect. The *sāttvika* form of *buddhi* has such attributes as virtue (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), detachment (*vairāgya*), and power (*aiśvarya*). But when *tamas* is predominant in it, it is characterized by the opposite qualities — vice (*adharma*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), attachment (*āsakti*), and lack of power (*anaiśvarya*). So according to Sāṅkhya, *ajñāna* is a mode of the intellect (*buddhi-vṛtti*), is something positive (*bhāvarūpa*), and has a beginning (*sādi*). Since the Self or *puruṣa* is different from the body, the senses, the mind, and the intellect which are all the evolutes of *prakṛti*, to identify the Self with them is ignorance (*ajñāna*); it is, that is to say, a case of false cognition (*mithyā-jñāna*). The suffering of the Self in transmigratory existence is due to this ignorance which causes the wrong identification of the Self with the not-Self, or the non-discrimination between them; and it can be removed by the knowledge of discrimination (*vivekajñāna*) between them.

The Sāṅkhya philosopher argues that, if the discrimination between the Self and the not-Self can be made through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* as suggested by the Advaitin, then there will be no work to be done by the *mahāvākya*, for the discriminative cognition produced by the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* will destroy ignorance, and there ends the matter. However, the *mahāvākya* should not be rendered useless. So with a view to provide scope for it, the Sāṅkhya philosopher suggests that the discrimination between the Self and the not-Self is done by the *mahāvākya* with the support provided by the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*. From the above argument of the Sāṅkhya philosopher the following points emerge. (1) Apart from *ajñāna*, which is only *mithyā-jñāna*, as understood by him, there is no *ajñāna* which is *anādi* and *bhāvarūpa* as upheld by the Advaitin. (2) The *mahāvākya* generates the discriminative cognition between the Self and the not-Self.

Sureśvara refutes the above argument in verse (6). What the Sāṅkhya philosopher calls *viveka-jñāna* is cognition of difference

between the Self and the not-Self; and such a cognition, it has already been stated, is a product of *avidyā* (see *sambandhokti* to II. 103). *Śruti* says that the Self "should be realized in one form only" (*BU*, 4.4.20), *i.e.* as one and homogeneous without any division in it. If so, the very distinction between the Self and the not-Self, which is supposed to destroy ignorance according to the Sāṅkhya philosopher, is due to *avidyā*; consequently it cannot destroy *avidyā*. Sureśvara says that it is the knowledge of the Self as one and non-dual that will remove *avidyā* as well as the distinctions — such as the Self and the not-Self, the triple factors of cognizer, cognitum and cognition, action and its result — projected by it. The *mahāvākya* does not become futile since the saving knowledge can be obtained only from it. Nor can it be said that it conveys the knowledge of difference, *i.e.* the discrimination between the Self and the not-Self. It is obvious from what has been stated above that the Advaita view that *ajñāna*, though *bhāva-rūpa*, is *anādi* is different from the Sāṅkhya conception of *ajñāna*.

[7]

ज्ञात्मना त्याजयेद्वच इत्युपश्रुत्याह कश्चित् —'मिथ्याज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण अत्मानवबोधस्याभावात् किं वाक्येन निवर्त्यते? अज्ञानं हि नाम ज्ञानाभावः। तस्य च अवस्तुस्वाभाव्यात् कुतः संसारकारणत्वम्? न ह्यसतः सज्जन्मेष्यते। "कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यात्" इति, "कथमसतः सज्जायेत" इति श्रुतेः' इति। अत्रोच्यते।

अज्ञात एव सर्वोऽर्थः प्राग्यतो बुद्धिजन्मनः।
एकेनैव सता संश्च सन्नज्ञातो भवेत्ततः॥ ७॥

Hearing that the sentence removes [the cognition of difference] through [generating the knowledge of the non-dual] consciousness, someone argues as follows: 'Since there is no ignorance of the Self other than false cognition, what is it that is removed by the sentence? What is called ignorance is, indeed, absence of knowledge. And, since it is not something existent, how can it be the cause of bondage? From the non-existent, the origination of anything existent can never be thought of; that is why *śruti* asks: "But how, indeed, my dear, could it be thus?... how could anything existent arise from the non-existent?"' We reply as follows.

Before the rise of knowledge, all objects are but unknown. Through that one Being alone everything exists. So Being remains as unknown. (7)

In the *sambandhokti* to verse (7) Sureśvara refers to the objection that *ajñāna* which is *anādi* according to the Advaitin cannot be the cause of the world on the ground that (1) *ajñāna* is absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*), (2) that it is, therefore, negative (*abhāva* or *avastu*), and (3) what is negative or non-existent cannot be the cause of the existent world. In justification of his stand, the critic cites the *śruti* text (*CU*, 6.2.2) which says: "How could anything existent arise from the non-existent?"

Sureśvara replies to the objection in verse (7). Advaita holds the view that *ajñāna* is not *jñānābhāva*, but *bhāvarūpa*, *i.e.* something existent. The case of deep sleep (*suṣupti*) proves that *ajñāna* is not mere absence of knowledge. A person, let us say, recollects his experience of deep sleep by saying: "I did not know anything then." Recollection presupposes prior experience. When the person claims that he was ignorant then, it means that he had at that time the experience of *ajñāna*. The question to be considered is whether the *ajñāna* experienced by him in deep sleep can be treated as *jñānābhāva*, *i.e.* absence of knowledge, which is *abhāva*. The answer is in the negative. The general rule is that knowledge of *abhāva* requires the knowledge of both the locus (*dharmin*) and the correlate (*pratiyogin*). One cannot speak of mere absence or non-existence as it would convey no sense at all. Rather, one must say what is absent (say, a pot) and where it is absent (say, in the ground). Having the knowledge of both the pot (the correlate) and the ground (the locus), one can speak of the absence of the pot in the ground. If *ajñāna* experienced in deep sleep is interpreted as *jñānābhāva*, then the person concerned must have had knowledge of both the locus and the correlate at that time. Since the mind was wholly quiescent then, this required knowledge was impossible; if so, the experience of *jñānābhāva* at that time must be ruled out. On the contrary, what was experienced in deep sleep, was *ajñāna*, which is positive. What is true of *ajñāna* experienced in deep sleep is also true of *ajñāna* in general. So the meaning of the first line of verse (7) is: *buddhijanmanaḥ prāk*: even without getting the knowledge of *dharmin* and *pratiyogin*, there is experience of *ajñāna* in that state (of sleep); it means that *sarvo'rthaḥ ajñāta eva*: all objects are but unknown to him then.

If a person is ignorant about all objects in sleep, then one may argue that the Self is not the *viṣaya* of ignorance. This argument is not acceptable. The states of sleep and waking are comparable to dissolution and creation. Just as the entire world gets dissolved in Being at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) and becomes manifest once again at the time of creation (*sṛṣṭi*), even so all objects of our waking experience get merged in the Self during sleep and become manifest during waking experience. The following text from *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* (3.3) is relevant in this context: "When a person is so asleep that he sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that breathing Self alone. When he awakes, even as sparks proceed in all directions from a blazing fire, even so from this Self ... come out the world of objects." Just as an object (say rope-snake) which is *mithyā* has no existence independently of its substratum (rope), but exists only through it, even so all the objects, *ekenaiva sattā san*, exist only through the Self or Being in deep sleep, not having any existence independently of it. So, *san ajñāto bhavet*: Being or the Self remains as unknown at that time. In other words, Being alone is the *viṣaya* of *ajñāna*.

Jñānottama explains verse (7) in a different way to show that *ajñāna* is *bhāvarūpa* without bringing in the case of deep sleep. Generally speaking, every object such as a pot or a pan remains unknown before it is known in our normal waking experience. This is what is conveyed by Sureśvara in the first line of the verse: *buddhijanmanaḥ prāk sarvo'rthaḥ ajñāta eva.* What does this mean? It implies that knowledge of an object as such-and-such is preceded by ignorance about it. When a person is ignorant about an object, he cannot spell out what he is ignorant about in a specific way. It will be a contradiction in terms to say, "I am ignorant about a pot when the pot is not known to me," for what is unknown cannot be spoken about as that-which-is-unknown (*ajñātākārasya anuvādāyogāt*); and since this is a state of affairs totally different from *jñānābhāva* where one is required to know both the *dharmin* and the *pratiyogin*, we have to say that *ajñāna* is something positive which veils the nature of the object. If every object remains as unknown before it is known through *pramāṇa-jñāna*, then it alone, and not Being or the Self, one may argue, is the content of *ajñāna*. It has already been stated that a material object which has no possibility of getting knowledge cannot be the content of ignorance. Being alone which is present in all objects remains as

unknown; and it is that alone which has to be known (*sarvaviśeṣa-anugatasadbhāvasyaiva ajñātatvāt prameyatvam*). That is why Sureśvara says: "*sannajñāto bhavet.*"

[8]

सन्नज्ञातो भवेत्तत इत्युक्तमधस्तनेन श्लोकेन। कोऽसौ सन्नज्ञात इत्यपेक्षायां तत्स्वरूपप्रतिपादनायाह।

प्रमित्सायां य आभाति स्वयं मातृप्रमाणयोः।
स्वमहिम्ना च यस्सिद्धः सोऽज्ञातार्थोऽवसीयताम् ॥ ८ ॥

That Being remains as unknown has been stated in the previous verse. Anticipating the question, "What is that Being which remains as unknown?" the following is said with a view to set forth its nature.

That which shines by itself in the cognizer and the source of cognition when there is the desire to know objects, and that which shines by its greatness [even in the absence of cognizer and the source of cognition in conditions such as *suṣupti*] — that should be understood as the unknown. (8)

[9]

अत्र केचिदाहुः —'यत्किञ्चिदिह वाक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं वा तत्सर्वं संसर्गात्मकमेव वाक्यार्थं गमयति। अतः तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येभ्यः संसर्गात्मकम् "अहं ब्रह्म" इति विज्ञाय, तावन्निदिध्यासीत यावदवाक्यार्थात्मकः प्रत्यगात्मविषयोऽवबोधः "अहं ब्रह्म" इति समभिजायते, तस्मादेव विज्ञानात् कैवल्यमाप्नोति' इति। तन्निराकरणायेदमुच्यते।

सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्घटेतरखयोरिव।
व्यावृत्तेः स्यादवाक्यार्थः साक्षान्नस्तत्त्वमर्थयोः ॥ ९ ॥

In this connection some argue as follows: 'Every sentence, be it scriptural or secular, conveys only a relational sense as its meaning. So after getting the relational knowledge

of "I am Brahman" from sentences such as "*tat tvam asi*," one must meditate on that [relational knowledge] till one attains the non-sentential knowledge of the inward Self as "I am Brahman." From that knowledge alone does one attain liberation.' With a view to refute this argument the following is said.

The non-sentential sense dawns on us directly [from the sentence] with the removal [of the incompatible determinants] in the meanings of the words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" by following the principle of grammatical coordination, etc., in the same way as [the oneness of ether is realized] with the removal of the incompatible determinants of the pot-ether and the other ether. (9)

Sureśvara recalls in the *sambandhokti* to verse (9) the view of Maṇḍana, which has already been stated and refuted in I. 67. See the passage beginning with "*apare tu*" in the *sambandhokti* in p. (64) and the analysis of Maṇḍana's view in p. (66). The purpose of recalling Maṇḍana's view is to explain *how* from the scriptural text arises the non-sentential knowledge which destroys ignorance. See the explanation of the three stages beginning with *sāmānādhikaraṇya-jñāna* which one has to go through for ascertaining the import of the text, "*tat tvam asi*," given in III. 3.

[10]

कुतोऽवाक्यार्थोऽवसीयत इति चेत्, तत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं विशेषणविशेष्ययोः सामर्थ्योक्तिः।

निर्दुःखित्वं त्वमर्थस्य तदर्थेन विशेषणात्।
प्रत्यक्ता च तदर्थस्य त्वंपदेनास्य सन्निधेः ॥ १० ॥

If it be asked, "How is the non-sentential sense known?" the capacity of the relation of the qualification and the qualified is explained to facilitate the understanding of this point.

Being free from suffering is said of the *jīva* which is the meaning of "*tvam*", since it is qualified by [Brahman which

is] the meaning of "*tat*". Inwardness is said of Brahman which is the meaning of "*tat*" through the proximity of [the *jīva* which is] the meaning of "*tvam*". (10)

Once again the objection is raised that a sentence can convey only a relational sense and not the non-sentential sense of oneness. A sentence consists of a group of words, and every word in a sentence has its own meaning. Since the different words, each conveying its sense, are related with one another, a sentence can convey only a relational sense. The critic places the Advaitin in a dilemma. If the different words of a sentence convey the same sense, it amounts to saying that what is conveyed by one word is also conveyed by another word, and so there will be the defect of repetition (*punarukti*). If, on the other hand, there is no repetition of the same meaning by the different words, then the sentence cannot convey the non-sentential sense of oneness. This argument, Sureśvara says, is unsound. In the sentence "*tat tvam asi*," the word "*tvam*" signifies the *jīva* who is subject to suffering, and the word "*tat*" signifies Brahman which is bliss by nature. So the words are not synonymous. At the same time, the two words which are placed in grammatical coordination qualify each other in such a way that one removes the incompatible feature in the other. Since "*tvam*" is qualified by "*tat*", the suffering nature (*duḥkhitvam*) of the *jīva* which is incompatible with the meaning of "*tat*," is removed by the latter. Similarly, since the word "*tat*" is qualified by "*tvam*", the *anātman* feature, *i.e.* being-other-than-the-Self, of Brahman is removed by the meaning of "*tvam*". It means that if *jīva* is Brahman, then it is not really a sufferer (*duhkhī*); and if Brahman is *jīva*, then it is not really not-Self (*anātman*). The two words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" which are in grammatical coordination must have the same denotation; and this the Advaitin establishes not by retaining the primary sense of the words, but by adopting their implied sense. Since the primary meanings of the words are different, there is no scope for the defect of *punarukti*; and since the unitary sense can be construed through implication, the criticism that the sentence cannot convey the non-sentential sense of oneness is of no avail.

[11]

उक्तं सामानाधिकरण्यं विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च सङ्क्षेपतः । अथ लक्ष्यलक्षण-व्याख्यानायाह ।

कूटस्थबोधप्रत्यक्त्वमनिमित्तं सदात्मनः ।
बोद्धृताऽहंतयोर्हेतुस्ताभ्यां तेनोपलक्ष्यते ॥ ११ ॥

The relation of grammatical coordination as well as the relation of the qualification and the qualified has been explained briefly. Then, with a view to explain the relation of the implication and the implied, the following is said.

Immutable consciousness and inwardness constitue the nature of the Self always. The Self [through its consciousness and inwardness] is the cause of the cognizership as well as the "I"-sense of the intellect. Through this relation [of cause and effect], the Self is indicated by these two [characteristics of the intellect]. (11)

Being material, the intellect by itself cannot cognize anything. Nor is it inward. However, when it serves as the adjunct of the Self (or when the Self is qualified by it), it plays the role of a cognizer and becomes inward because of the Self, which is consciousness and inward by its very nature. What constitutes the nature of the Self is now ascribed to the intellect. Since the Self is responsible for these two characteristics of the intellect, the former, says Sureśvara, is the cause of the latter. The primary meaning of the word "*tvam*" is the Self or consciousness qualified by the two characteristics of the intellect. The pure consciousness which is devoid of the adjunct is the implied or secondary meaning of "*tvam*".

[12]

बुद्धेः कूटस्थबोधप्रत्यक्त्वनिमित्ते बोद्धृताप्रत्यक्त्वे ये त्वसाधारणे, तयोर्विशेषवचनम् ।

बोद्धृता कर्तृता बुद्धेः कर्मता स्यादहंतया ।
तयोरैक्यं यथा बुद्धौ पूर्वयोरेवमात्मनि ॥ १२ ॥

The difference of the cognizership and the inwardness which are the specific qualities of the intellect and which are caused

by the immutable consciousness and inwardness [of the Self] will now be explained.

The cognizership of the intellect is its being the subject [of knowledge through the modifications it undergoes]; and through the "I"-sense it becomes an object [of consciousness]. Just as these two [characteristics] co-exist in the intellect, even so the two aspects of the Self [which are their cause] co-exist in the Self. (12)

If consciousness and inwardness are associated with both the Self and the intellect, then how do consciousness and inwardness of the Self differ from those of the intellect? The intellect, which is the internal organ, undergoes manifold modifications called *vṛttis* according to the objects which are presented to it; and carrying the reflection of consciousness which illumines modifications, it becomes the cognizer, the subject of knowledge. So, while the cognizership of the intellect is through its modifications into various cognitions of objects being inspired by consciousness, the Self which is referred to as the Seer is immutable consciousness. Secondly, since the "I"-notion which arises in the intellect is revealed by the Self, it becomes an object of the Self. Though the intellect *qua* cognizer is inward vis-à-vis other things which are external to it, it is, indeed, external to the Self. It means that, while the inwardness of the intellect is relative, that of the Self is absolute. Being the characteristics of one and the same intellect, the cognizership and the inwardness of the "I" are thus united, *i.e.* co-exist. Even so, consciousness and inwardness spoken of with reference to the Self exist united in the Self. It must be borne in mind that the analogy between the Self and the intellect holds good so far. Sureśvara will bring out the difference between them in the sequel.

[13]

यथा बुद्धौ पूर्वयोरेवमात्मनि इत्यतिदेशेन बुद्धिसाधर्म्यविधानात्, नानात्वप्रसक्तौ तदपवादार्थमाह ।

धर्मधर्मित्वभेदोऽस्याः सोऽपि नैवात्मनो यतः ।
प्रत्यग्ज्योतिरतोऽभिन्नं भेदहेतोरसम्भवात् ॥ १३ ॥

Since the Self is said to be similar to the intellect through the analogy contained in the statement, "Just as these two [characteristics] co-exist in the intellect, even so the two aspects of the Self [which are their cause] co-exist in the Self," there is scope for plurality. With a view to deny it, the following is said.

The distinction between substance and attribute arises only for the intellect. But never does it arise for the Self. So the Self which is inward light is undifferentiated, as there is no reason for differentiation in it. (13)

Sureśvara argues that, since the Self is essentially different from the intellect, what holds good for the latter does not hold good for the former. Being an object of knowledge, the intellect admits of substance-attribute distinction. Unlike the intellect, the Self is not an object of knowledge; and so it can never be a substance possessing attributes. By its very nature it is one and homogeneous (*abhinnam = ekarasam*), and there are no reasons to prove the contrary.

[14]

भेदहेत्वसम्भवं दर्शयन्नाह ।

न कस्याञ्चिदवस्थायां बोधप्रत्यक्त्वयोर्भिदा ।
व्यभिचारोऽथवा दृष्टो यथाहंतद्विदोस्सदा ॥ १४ ॥

Showing why there is no reason for differentiation [in the Self], the following is said.

The distinction between consciousness and inwardness, or the existence of the one without the other, is never seen in any state, just as it is always seen in respect of the "I" and its knower. (14)

If differentiation in the Self is to be proved, then one must show that consciousness and inwardness spoken of in respect of the Self are different from one another, or that the Self is differ-

ent from consciousness and inwardness on the ground that it is the substance of which they are the attributes. Sureśvara points out that first of all there is no essential difference between consciousness and inwardness: what is called consciousness is inward, and what is inward is consciousness. Nor does the one exist without the other. So it is not possible to establish difference between consciousness and inwardness. Also, it is not possible to differentiate the Self from consciousness or inwardness in terms of substance-attribute relation, for the Self by its very nature is consciousness and is always inward. This, however, is not true with regard to the intellect. There is, first of all, difference between the cognizership and the "I"-sense of the intellect: it is the differrence between the subject and the object. Also, it is not the case that the intellect is always the subject or always the object: it all depends on how it is viewed, on the point of reference in the context. Secondly, the intellect which is subject to change of states must be differentiated from the changing states. So the analogy between the Self and the intellect should not be stretched too far. The purpose of analogy is to show how the Self can be indirectly indicated by the cognizership and the "I" of the intellect.

[15]

यस्मादज्ञानोपादानाया एव बुद्धेर्भेदो नात्मनः, तस्मादेतत् सिद्धम् ।

कूटस्थबोधतोऽद्वैतं साक्षात्त्वं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
कूटस्थबोधाद्बोद्ध्री धीः स्वतो हीयं विनश्वरी ॥ १५ ॥

Since the [above-mentioned] distinction arises for the intellect alone which is a product of ignorance, and not for the Self, this is established.

The non-duality as well as immediacy of the inward Self is due to the reason that the Self is of the nature of immutable consciousness. The intellect is the cognizer because of the immutable consciousness. By itself it is, indeed, perishable. (15)

[16 - 17]

अथाधुना प्रकृतस्यैव परिणामिनः कूटस्थस्य च लक्षणमुच्यते ।

विशेषं कञ्चिदाश्रित्य यत्स्वरूपं प्रतीयते ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रमाणेन परिणामी स देहवत् ॥ १६ ॥

सामान्याच्च विशेषाच्च स्वमहिम्नैव यो भवेत् ।
व्युत्थायाप्यविकारी स्यात् कुम्भाकाशादिवत्तु सः ॥ १७ ॥

Then, the definitions of that which is subject to modification and that which is immutable, which have been spoken about in the present context, are now given.

That which is known by means of recognition as the identical factor persisting through different states — that is the changing factor, like the body. (16)

That which transcends the universal and the particular and remains by its own greatness alone — that is immutable, like the ether enclosed by pot and other objects. (17)

Sureśvara elucidates the nature of the intellect and the Self in verses (16) and (17) respectively. It is well-known that everyone goes through different states of experience from time to time. For example, a person says at one time: "I am miserable;" at another time he says: "I am happy." Though his experience varies from time to time, he recognizes an identical factor in him persisting through his different states of experience separated by time, as he is able to say: "I who am happy now was suffering earlier;" and that identical factor is the intellect, which is the internal organ. Though the intellect is the element of identity in the midst of changes, it is not strictly speaking unchanging: it is *pariṇāmī*. Sureśvara drives home the point by giving the example of the body. There are different states for the body such as childhood, youth, and old age; still one is able to recognize the identity of the body which persists through them. Just as there is recognition of the identity of the body, which is really subject to

change, in a changing series, even so there is the identity of the intellect, which is subject to change, in a changing series of states.

Consciousness is the witness to the changing series as well as to what is constant therein. There is the "I" (*aham*), the first person singular, in all the changing states of experience such as "*I* know this," "*I* know that," "*I* am miserable," "*I* am happy," and so on. Sureśvara says that the Self by its own greatness alone, *i.e.* by its self-luminous nature alone (*svamahimnaiva* = *svaprakāśatayaiva*), remaining unaffected by the changing states as well as by the identical factor therein, reveals them. He illustrates this point with the example of ether (*ākāśa*) which is enclosed for example, by pot, pan, and other objects made of clay. Though these objects are different from one another, clay of which they are made is uniformly present in all of them. However, the ether enclosed by these objects made of clay remains unchanging, unaffected by the different objects as well as by the identical factor therein. Even so does the Self remain unchanging, unaffected by the changing states and their unifying principle. It is, therefore, *avikārī*.

[18 - 19]

आत्मनो बुद्धेश्च बोधप्रत्यगात्मत्वमभिहितम्। तयोरसाधारणलक्षणाभिधानार्थमाह।

बुद्धेर्यत् प्रत्यगात्मत्वं तत् स्याद्देहाद्युपाश्रयात्।
आत्मनस्तु स्वरूपं तन्नभसः सुषिता यथा ॥ १८ ॥

बोद्धृत्वं तद्वदेवास्याः प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतुतः।
आत्मनस्तु स्वरूपं तत्तिष्ठन्तीव महीभृतः ॥ १९ ॥

Consciousness and inwardness were spoken of in respect of the Self and the intellect. The following is said with a view to set forth their specific nature.

The inwardness of the intellect is relative to objects such as the body. But the inwardness of the Self is its essential nature, as openness is the essential nature of ether. (18)

In the same way, the cognizership of the intellect arises from its being the cause of the origination of cognitions. But the cognizership of the Self is its essential nature, as stationariness is the essential nature of the mountain. (19)

Just as it is the very nature of ether to be open and thereby to provide space (*avakāśa-svarūpa*) for objects, even so inwardness is the very nature of the Self. But the inwardness of the intellect is only relative, as it is dependent on objects such as the body which are external to it.

The intellect is said to be the cognizer by virtue of the *vṛtti-jñānas* which arise in it. So its cognizership is *sāpekṣa*. But the Self is always the seer, the cognizer, by its very nature, just as the mountain is stationary by its very nature all the time. When animals do not move, we say that they are standing (*tiṣṭhanti*). Though we use the expression, "*parvatāḥ tiṣṭhanti*," *i.e.* the mountains stand still, it does not mean that the mountains, like animals, stand still for sometime, as if they too are capable of movement. On the contrary, stillness is the very nature of the mountain. Even so eternal revelation is the essential nature of the Self.

[20]

तयोः कूटस्थपरिणामिनोः आत्मानवबोध एव सम्बन्धहेतुः, न पुनर्वास्तवः कश्चिदपि सम्बन्ध उपपद्यत इत्याह।

सम्यक्संशयमिथ्यात्वैः धीरेवेयं विभज्यते।
हानोपादानताऽमीषां मोहादध्यस्यते दृशौ ॥ २० ॥

The cause of the relation between the immutable Self and the changing intellect is the ignorance of the Self alone. No real relation whatsoever [between them] is tenable. So it is said.

This intellect alone undergoes differentiation as valid, doubtful, and erroneous cognitions. Their appearance and disappearance are superimposed on the consciousness due to delusion. (20)

It has been stated that the Self is the *lakṣya* and the intellect, its *lakṣaṇa*. If so, the question is asked: are the Self and the intellect related or not? If they are related, the Self becomes *saviśeṣa*; and if they are not related, there cannot be *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-sambandha* between them. Sureśvara's answer is that there cannot be any real relation between the Self and the intellect inasmuch as they do not have the same ontological status. While the Self is real, the intellect, being a product of *avidyā*, is *mithyā*. But it does not mean that there is no relation at all between them. There is the relation of the substratum and the superimposed (*adhiṣṭhāna-adhyasta-sambandha*) between them. And this relation, which may be characterized as *ādhyāsika-sambandha*, is enough to justify the role of the intellect as the indicator of the Self. Nor does it make the Self *saviśeṣa*, for at no time is the substratum affected by the superimposed. What are called valid, doubtful, and erroneous cognitions are the modes of the intellect, which come and go. The appearance and disappearance, or the presence and absence, of these modes of the intellect (*dhīdharmāṇām hānopādānatā-sadasatvam*) is witnessed to by the Self. What really belongs to the intellect is illicitly transferred to, or superimposed on, the Self which is its substratum. Sureśvara points out in the sequel that these modes of the intellect cannot by themselves reveal their presence or absence. On the contrary, they have to be revealed only by the Witness-consciousness, which is different from them.

[21]

कुतः कूटस्थात्मसिद्धिरिति चेत्, यतः ।

न हानं हानमात्रेण नोदयोऽपीयता यतः ।
तत्सिद्धिः स्यात्तु तद्धीने हानादानविधर्मके ॥ २१ ॥

If it be asked: "How is the immutability of the Self established?" it is for the following reason.

The disappearance [of a mode of the intellect] cannot be established just by its disappearance. Nor can its appearance be established just by its appearance. They are established by the Witness-consciousness which neither appears

nor disappears and which is devoid of the intellect and its modes. (21)

[22]

एवम् ।

आगमापायिहेतुभ्यां धूत्वा सर्वाननात्मनः ।
ततस्तत्त्वमसीत्येतद्धन्त्यस्मदि निजं तमः ॥ २२ ॥

Thus:

After a person has discarded the entire not-Self for the reasons that it appears and disappears, the sentence, "That thou art," destroys his ignorance about the Self. (22)

Sureśvara recalls here what has already been stated, *viz.* that the sentence alone, by generating the unitary sense, removes the primal ignorance about the Self, and not the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*. The latter is necessary to identify the not-Self for the purpose of discarding it. Sureśvara has given in Chapter II, verses (11) to (21) several reasons by which the Self can be differentiated from the not-Self.

[23-24]

इत्यादि पुनः पुनरुच्यते ग्रन्थलाघवाद् बुद्धिलाघवं प्रयोजकमिति। तत्र यद्यपि तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यात् उपादित्सिताद्वितीयात्मार्थवत् पारोक्ष्यसद्वितीयार्थं प्रतीयते। तथापि तु नैवासावर्थः श्रुत्या तात्पर्येण प्रतिपिपादयिषितः, प्रागप्येतस्य प्रतीतत्वात् इति इममर्थमाह ।

तदित्येतत्पदं लोके बह्वर्थप्रतिपादकम् ।
अपरित्यज्य पारोक्ष्यम् अभिधानोत्थमेव तत् ॥ २३ ॥

त्वमित्यपि पदं तद्वत् साक्षान्मात्रार्थवाचि तु ।
संसारितामसन्त्यज्य सापि स्यादभिधानजा ॥ २४ ॥

In this way, the same point has been stated again and again for the purpose of easy understanding by rendering the

text simple. Now, even though the sense of inward Self and non-duality which is the intended meaning has been obtained from the sentence, " That thou art, " the sense of mediacy and duality is also comprehended from it. However, this [idea of mediacy and duality] is not the sense intended to be conveyed as its import by the *śruti* text, for it is already known to us. Thus, to convey this idea we say the following.

In ordinary discourse the word "that" is used to convey many meanings without abandoning the sense of mediacy. This sense of mediacy arises from the word ["that"] itself. (23)

In the same way, the word "thou", without abandoning the sense of transmigratoriness refers primarily only to a person who is immediate. (24)

Though the non-dual consciousness which is the implied meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) is the import of the sentence, what is mediate and what has duality have been signified by it through its primary meaning (*vācyārtha*). Ordinarily the word "that" (*tad*) is used to refer to something which is remote, whatever may be the context of its usage such as recalling something seen or experienced before, for the present discussion. In the same way the word "thou" (*tvam*) primarily signifies a person who is not only immediate, but who is also in transmigratory existence. Let us now consider the meanings of these two words as used in the sentence, "*tat tvam asi.*" The primary meaning of "*tat*" is that (Brahman) which is remote and which is the cause of the world, whereas the primary meaning of "*tvam*" in the context is Śvetaketu, *i.e.* a person who is immediate and who is caught in transmigratory existence. If so, why should we not accept, it may be asked, the primary meaning of the sentence? There are three reasons for rejecting the primary meaning in the present case. First of all, it is opposed to the meaning which has been ascertained to be the purport of the sentence by applying the sixfold criteria such as the harmony between *upakrama* and *upasaṁhāra*. Secondly, comprehension of the primary meaning is not conducive to the attainment of liberation. Thirdly, one already knows that the *jīva* is a

person who is in bondage, whereas the cause of the world, whatever be the name given to it, is remote. What is already known need not be conveyed by the scriptural text; and if it conveys what is already known, it means it is only of the nature of a restatement (*anuvāda*); consequently it will cease to be a *pramāṇa*. So by resorting to the secondary meaning of the sentence we have to say that its import is in the unitary consciousness; and this knowledge of the unitary consciousness, which liberates the *jīva*, can be obtained only from the *śruti* text.

[25]

विरुद्धोद्देशनत्वाच्च पारोक्ष्यदुःखित्वयोरविवक्षितत्वम् इत्याह ।

उद्दिश्यमानं वाक्यस्थं नोद्देशनगुणान्वितम् ।
आकाङ्क्षितपदार्थेन संसर्गं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ २५ ॥

Since the primary meanings are contradictory, it is said that mediacy and being subject to suffering are not the meanings intended to be conveyed.

What is signified by the subject in the sentence, associated as it is with the quality [of suffering], does not admit of relation with what is signified by the predicate. (25)

In the sentence, "*tat tvam asi*," "*tvam*" is the subject (*uddeśya*) and "*tat*" is the predicate (*vidheya*). The sense of suffering conveyed by the primary meaning of "*tvam*" is opposed to the absence of suffering conveyed by the primary meaning of "*tat*"; that is to say, being free from suffering cannot be predicated of what is subject to suffering; consequently the two words cannot be related with each other, if their primary meanings are considered.

[26]

यत एतदेवम्, अतोऽनुपादित्सितयोरपि तत्त्वमर्थयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो भेदसंसर्गरहितवाक्यार्थलक्षणयैव इत्युपसंहारः ।

तदो विशेषणार्थत्वं विशेष्यत्वं त्वमस्तथा ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धस्तयोः स्यात् प्रत्यगात्मना ॥ २६ ॥

This being the case, it should be concluded that the relation of the qualification and the qualified between the meanings of the two words "*tat*" and "*tvam*", which is not intended, is for the purpose of indicating the sentence-sense which is devoid of difference as well as relation.

The word "that" is used in the sense of qualification; and the word "thou" is used in the sense of the qualified. The two words come to have the relation of the implication and the implied by the inward Self [which is the import of the sentence]. (26)

From the sentence "*nīlam utpalam*" we get only a qualified sense (*viśiṣṭārtha*) involving difference. It is true that the object denoted by this sentence is one; but it is characterized by "*utpalatva*" as well as "*nīlatva*." Hence, this sentence has its purport in *abheda-saṁsarga*, *i.e.* oneness involving relation. However, the sentence "*tat tvam asi*" cannot be interpreted in terms of the relation of the qualification and the qualified, whether we take "*tat*" as the qualification of "*tvam*", or whether we take each word as the qualification of the other, as the unitary sense which discards all adjectives or predicates and which is the import of the sentence, cannot be obtained through such an interpretation. Hence, we have to interpret this *mahāvākya* in terms of *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-sambandha*.

[27]

कथं पुनरविवक्षितविरुद्धनिरस्यमानस्य लक्षणार्थत्वम् ?

लक्षणं सर्पवद्रज्ज्वाः प्रतीचः स्यादहं तथा ।
तद्बाधेनैव वाक्यार्थं वेत्ति सोऽपि तदाश्रयात् ॥ २७ ॥

It may be objected: "How can that which is not intended, which is opposed, and which has [therefore] to be discarded be the indicator?"

Just as the [illusory] snake indicates the rope, even so the " I " indicates the inward Self. One understands the meaning of the sentence ["The snake is the rope"]

through the snake and by sublating it. Even so, one understands [the meaning of the sentence, "That thou art," through the intellect and by sublating it]. (27)

There is an objection questioning the adoption of the secondary meaning in the present case, though it can be justified elsewhere, *e.g.* in the interpretation of the sentance, "*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ prativasati*," which literally means that "the village is in the Ganges." In order to see the force of this objection let us consider the reason why we adopt the secondary meaning here. We know that the word "*gaṅgā*" literally means the flowing stream of water (*jalapravāha*). Finding that the literal meaning is discrepant with our experience as there cannot be a village in the flowing stream of water, we extend the scope of the meaning of the word "*gaṅgā*" to include what is implied by the secondary meaning also, without abandoning its primary meaning. This mode of interpretation for construing the secondary sense is called "*ajahallakṣaṇā*". (See pp. 163-164 for an explanation of the three kinds of secondary sense.) With a view to highlight the tenability of his objection the opponent invites our attention to the following points that emerge in this interpretation. First of all, since a breezy atmosphere is suggested by the stream of water, the primary meaning of the word "*gaṅgā*" is not unintended (*vācyasya na avivakṣitatvam*). Secondly, there is no conflict between the primary and the secondary meanings of the word, as there is inseparable relation between the water and the bank (*nāpi viruddhatā, avinābhāvasambandhāt*). Thirdly, what is conveyed by the primary meaning of the word should not be discarded by adopting the secondary meaning. Consequently, there is no difficulty in saying that the word "*gaṅgā*" indicates secondarily the bank of the river. What has been said above, the opponent argues, does not hold in the case of the intellect which, according to Sureśvara, is the indicator (*lakṣaka*) of the inward Self. It is not what is intended to be conveyed by the *śruti* text, as it is not at all conducive to the attainment of *puruṣārtha*, *viz.* liberation (*apumarthatvena avivakṣitatvāt*). Secondly, there is conflict here between the primary and the secondary meanings. While the intellect is *mithyā*, the inward Self is real; and so opposed as they are, they cannot be combined or related (*anṛtādisvabhāvena viruddhatvāt*). Thirdly, the intellect suffers sublation by the knowledge of the inward Self which is the indicated (*lakṣyajñānāt bādhyatvāt*). Under these circumstances the

intellect, argues the opponent, cannot be the indicator of the inward Self.

Sureśvara rejects the above argument on the ground that the role of the intellect as the indicator is not like that of "*gaṅgā*", but like that of the illusory snake. A trustworthy person who knows that the object in front is a rope tells his friend who has mistaken it for a snake, "The snake is the rope." What he means is that the object cognized by his friend as a snake is, indeed, the rope. Here, the trustworthy person who utters the statement does not intend to convey the knowledge of the snake, though he speaks about it. Secondly, while the snake is illusory, the rope which is its substratum is real. Owing to the difference in their ontological status, the former cannot have any real relation with the latter. Thirdly, the illusory snake suffers sublation by the knowledge of its substratum. Nevertheless, it indicates the rope. Without making reference to the snake already known, the trustworthy person cannot convey the knowledge of the rope which is not known. Though the cognition of the snake has been made use of for getting the cognition of the rope, it is also sublated by the latter. In the same way, since the inward Self is erroneously cognized as the "I", the person who has committed the mistake has to be told: "The I (ego) is the Self." Like the illusory snake, the "I" is not what is intended to be conveyed by the sentence; being illusory, it is different from, and cannot have any real relation with, the Self which is real; and it suffers sublation from the knowledge of the Self. Nevertheless, it indicates the Self, a role which it plays for its own annihilation.

[28]

इयं च अवाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिः अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभिज्ञस्यैव । यस्मात् ।

यावद्यावन्निरस्यायं देहादीन् प्रत्यगञ्चति ।
तावत्तावत् तदर्थोऽपि त्वमर्थं प्रविविक्षति ॥ २८ ॥

This comprehension of the non-sentential sense is possible only for one who has known the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* [and discriminated the Self from the not-Self].

As much as a person rejects objects such as the body [as not-Self] and moves towards the Self, so much does the meaning of " that " tend to enter into the meaning of " thou ". (28)

If a person does not get the non-sentential sense of oneness from the sentence, then the fault lies in him and not in the sentence. It has already been stated that the knowledge of the difference between the Self and the not-Self is the prerequisite for getting the unitary sense from the *mahāvākya* and that this discriminating knowledge can be obtained through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*. A *pramāṇa* will give rise to the knowledge it is capable of only when there is no obstruction to its work, but not otherwise. To think of the not-Self — the body, the senses, the mind, and so on — as the Self is the obstruction that prevents one from getting the non-sentential sense of oneness from the *śruti* text; and this obstruction can be removed through the help of the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*. As much does a spiritual aspirant discard the not-Self, so much does he progress towards the Self. The closer a person moves towards the Self, the nearer comes the "that" to the "thou." It may be noted that there is progress only in the discipline and not in the revelation of the truth by the *śruti* text.

[29]

कस्मात् पुनः कारणात् देहाद्यनात्मत्वप्रतिपत्तावेव आत्मा तदर्थमात्मत्वेनाभिलिङ्गते, न विपर्यय इति? उच्यते। प्रत्यगात्मानवबोधस्य अनात्मस्वाभाव्यात्, तदभिनिर्वृत्तश्चायं बुद्ध्यादिदेहान्तः; तस्मिन्नात्मत्वम् अविद्याकृतमेव। आत्मत्वमिव अनात्मत्वमपि साविद्यस्यैव। यतो निरविद्यो विद्वान् अवाक्यार्थरूप एव केवलोऽवशिष्यते। तस्मादुच्यते।

देहादिव्यवधानत्वात् तदर्थं स्वयमप्यतः।
पारोक्ष्येणैव जानाति साक्षात्त्वं तदनात्मनः ॥ २९ ॥

Why is it that the Self becomes one with the meaning of " that " only when the body and other objects are apprehended as not-Self, and not otherwise? We reply as follows. Since the ignorance of the inward Self is of the nature of

not-Self, all these objects from the intellect down to the body are the products of ignorance. The cognition of these objects as the Self is due to ignorance alone. Just as the cognition of these objects as the Self [is due to ignorance], even so the cognition of them as not-Self is also due to ignorance. Since the man of wisdom, free from ignorance, remains alone as the non-sentential import, the following is said.

Even though what is signified by the word " that " constitutes his very nature, a person thinks of it only as remote because of the intervention of objects such as the body. However, when these objects are known as the not-Self, that which is signified by the word " that " becomes immediate. (29)

The *sambandhokti* to verse (29) contains an objection as well as the answer thereto. The objection can be formulated as follows. When the erroneous cognition of snake is removed, the rope which is the substratum of the snake is cognized as rope alone and not in some other form. In the same way, when the erroneous cognition of the body, etc., which are not-Self is removed, the inward Self which is their substratum and which is signified by "*tvam*" must be cognized as the inward Self alone and not in some other form, *i.e.* as Brahman which is signified by "*tat*." Alternatively, since objects such as the body, being the effects of Brahman, are of the nature of Brahman, should it not be said that the apprehension of the former amounts to the apprehension of the latter? This objection, Sureśvara says, is untenable. The immutable Brahman is not the cause of body and other objects. On the contrary, *avidyā* is their cause. There are many reasons to show why *avidyā* is not-Self. Advaita holds that *avidyā* is not-Self, since it is material (*jaḍatvāt*), since it is cognized (*dṛśyatvāt*), since it is removable by knowledge (*jñānanivartyatvāt*), and so on. Consequently, body and other objects derive their not-Self nature from their cause. Sureśvara observes that *avidyā* is responsible not only for cognizing body and other objects as the Self, but also for the very distinction between the Self and the not-Self. Further, since the Self is immutable and homogeneous, one and non-dual, it is Brahman itself. So, when the erroneous cognition of the not-Self is removed, the Self which is its substratum is cognized

as Brahman itself which constitutes the nature of the Self. The enlightened man (*vidvān*), *i.e.* the knower of truth, who is free from *avidyā* (*niravidyaḥ*), *i.e.* who neither perceives the not-Self as the Self nor functions on the basis of the dichotomy between the Self and the not-Self, remains as the non-dual reality, the import of the principal texts of the *Upaniṣads*.

The central idea of verse (29) is: to one who has the conviction of the falsity (*mithyātva-niścaya*) of the not-Self, Brahman is immediate; on the contrary, it is remote to one who has the conviction of the immediacy of the not-Self.

[30]

यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तिसौकर्याय दृष्टान्तोपादानम् ।

प्रत्यगुद्भूतपित्तस्य यथा बाह्यार्थपीतता ।
चैतन्यं प्रत्यगात्मीयं बहिर्वद्दृश्यते तथा ॥ ३० ॥

The following example is given with a view to facilitate easy comprehension of what has been stated.

Just as [the yellowness] of the bilious matter which is in one's own body appears as the yellowness of an external object, even so the consciousness which constitutes the nature of the inward Self is seen as something external. (30)

[31]

यस्मादेवम्, अतो विशुद्धमवसीयताम् ।

पदान्युद्धृत्य वाक्येभ्यो ह्यन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
पदार्थाँल्लोकतो बुद्ध्वा वेत्ति वाक्यार्थमञ्जसा ॥ ३१ ॥

This being the case, the true meaning of the sentence should be determined.

By separating words from the sentences [in which they occur], by knowing the meaning of words through observing the repetition and change of words, and by noticing

the use of words [by the elders], one understands in the proper perspective the meaning of a sentence. (31)

The separation of words from a sentence is for the purpose of ascertaining the expressive power of each word as used in a sentence. After knowing the expressive power of each word, one understands the meanings of words by noticing how the same word (say, cow) is used in association with other words in sentences: *e.g.* "Bring the *cow*," "Tie the *cow*," "*Bring* the cow" "*Bring* the horse;" the person, that is to say, pays attention to the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* of words. Also, he observes the appropriate actions executed by someone listening to the orders of an elderly person: this is what is called *vṛddha-vyavahāra*. Thereafter, he learns the purport of the sentence, *i.e.* the meaning intended to be conveyed by the sentence. What holds good in the case of an ordinary secular sentence also holds good in the case of the scriptural sentence such as "*tat tvam asi*".

[32]

कुतः पुनः सामान्यमात्रवृत्तेः पदस्य वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वमिति ? बाढम् ।

सामान्यं हि पदं ब्रूते विशेषो वाक्यकर्तृकः ।
श्रुत्यादिप्रतिबद्धं सद् विशेषार्थं भवेत् पदम् ॥ ३२ ॥

It may be asked: "How can a word which signifies the universal lead to the cognition of [something specific or particular] as the meaning of a sentence?" Be it so.

Indeed, a word signifies the universal. But a particular (*i.e.* the specific meaning which is the purport) is conveyed by a sentence. A word [coming into relation with other words] conveys a specific meaning, controlled as it is by principles such as direct assertion. (32)

According to the Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaitins, the primary meaning of a word is the universal. Since a sentence consists of a group of words, it must also, so the critic argues, convey what is universal. If so, how can a sentence convey a specific meaning (*viśeṣārtha*)? Sureśvara says that, though it is true that a word signifies the universal (*sāmānyamātraviṣaya*), there is no

difficulty in its conveying a specific meaning when it comes into relation with other words. In the second line of verse (32) Sureśvara refers to the six principles — *śruti* (direct assertion), *liṅga* (indication), *vākya* (syntactical connection), *prakaraṇa* (context), *sthāna* (position), and *samākhyā* (designation) — by means of which the specific meaning of a word used in a Vedic text is ascertained according to the Mīmāṁsakas. How the meaning of a word becomes specific when it is restricted by context can be illustrated by an example. Consider the statement: "Let all the Brahmins be fed." Here the word "all" signifies only those Brahmins who have been invited (*nimantrita-brāhmaṇa-viṣayo bhavati*). If it is otherwise, a specific thing which is intended to be achieved cannot be accomplished. The same principle holds good in the interpretation of the words of the sentence, "*tat tvaṁ asi.*"

[33]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकपुरस्सरं वाक्यमेव सामानाधिकरण्यादिना अविद्यापटलप्रध्वंसद्वारेण मुमुक्षुं स्वाराज्येऽभिषेचयति । न तु अन्वयव्यतिरेकमात्रसाध्योऽयमर्थं इत्याह ।

बुद्ध्यादीनामनात्मत्वं लिङ्गादपि च सिद्ध्यति ।
निवृत्तिस्तावता नेतीत्यतो वाक्यं समाश्रयेत् ॥ ३३ ॥

Following the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, the sentence itself, when interpreted through grammatical coordination, etc., establishes the seeker after liberation in the realm of self-sovereignty by destroying the veil of ignorance. This, we say, cannot be achieved through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* alone.

The not-Self nature of the intellect and other objects can be established through reasoning also. However, the removal [of ignorance] does not take place through it. So the sentence should be sought after [for destroying ignorance]. (33)

[34]

न केवलम् अनुमानमात्रशरणोऽभिलषितमर्थं न प्राप्नोति इति, अनर्थं च आप्नोति इत्याह ।

अनादृत्य श्रुतिं मोहात् अतो बौद्धास्तमस्विनः ।
आपेदिरे निरात्मत्वम् अनुमानैकचक्षुषः ॥ ३४ ॥

One who depends on mere inference (*i.e.* reasoning) not only does not reach the desired goal, but also attains the evil. So it is said.

Disrespecting *śruti* because of delusion, the ignorant Buddhists who made use of inference as their sole guide got the no-Self doctrine. (34)

[35]

न च अनादरे कारणमस्ति । यस्मात् सर्वत्रैव अनादरनिमित्तं प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नप्रतिपादनं वा, विपरीतप्रतिपादनं वा, संशयितप्रतिपादनं वा, न वा प्रतिपादनम् इति । न च एतेषामन्यतमदपि कारणमस्ति । यत आह ।

मानान्तरानवष्टब्धं निर्दुःख्यात्मानमञ्जसा ।
बोधयन्ती श्रुतिः केन न प्रमाणमितीर्यते ॥ ३५ ॥

There is no reason for disrespecting *śruti*. For, the reason for disregarding a source of knowledge anywhere must be that it establishes what is known through another source of knowledge, or that it establishes what is opposed to another source of knowledge, or that it establishes what is doubtful, or that it does not establish anything at all. None of these reasons holds good [in the present case]. Therefore, it is said.

On what ground can it be said that *śruti*, which teaches truly the non-suffering nature of the Self, not conveyed by other sources of knowledge, is not a *pramāṇa* ? (35)

The Buddhists argue that there is reason for not accepting *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*. A secular sentence accepted as a *pramāṇa* conveys some information by depending on some other *pramāṇa*. For example, when the sentence, "There are fruits in the trees on the

bank of the river," uttered by a trustworthy person is accepted as a *pramāṇa*, it is well-known that what it conveys has been obtained by the speaker through the help of perception. This, however, is not possible in the case of *śruti* which is *apauruṣeya*. The Buddhists, therefore, maintain that *śruti* cannot be accepted as a *pramāṇa*.

With the view to set aside the above argument, Sureśvara enumerates in the *sambandhokti* to verse (35) four reasons on the basis of which alone what is claimed to be a *pramāṇa* can be questioned. First of all, if a sentence conveys what is already known through another source, then it will cease to be a *pramāṇa*. For example, one may question the authority of a secular sentence like "There are fruits (in the trees) on the bank of the river" (*nadyāstīre phalāni santi*) on the ground that it restates what is already conveyed by another *pramāṇa*. Or, one may argue that an eulogistic corroborative statement (*praśaṁsārthavāda*) like "The wind is, indeed, a very swift deity" (*vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā*) which does not have any independent validity, becomes meaningful by praising what is already enjoined. Secondly, if a sentence conveys what is contradicted by another *pramāṇa*, then it can be set aside, or its meaning has to be construed in a different way to overcome the contradiction with another *pramāṇa*. Consider the case of *guṇavāda*, which is a kind of *arthavāda*. A *guṇavāda* is a sentence which conveys what is contradicted by another *pramāṇa*; *e.g.* there is the statement, "*Ādityo yūpaḥ*," which means that the sacrificial post is the sun. What is conveyed by this sentence cannot be accepted literally as it is contradicted by perception. For the purpose of overcoming this conflict, its meaning is construed in a secondary sense. Thirdly, if a sentence, *e. g.* "The object is either a post or a man" (*sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā*), conveys some information in a doubtful way, it cannot be accepted as a *pramāṇa*. Finally, if it does not convey anything at all, it cannot be a *pramāṇa*. Sureśvara holds that the authority of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa* cannot be questioned for any of these reasons.

Sureśvara eliminates the first two reasons in verse (35). The *śruti* text about the Self is not of the nature of a restatement (*anuvāda*) like "Fire is the antidote for cold" (*agnirhimasya bheṣajam*), or "The wind is, indeed, a very swift deity." It says that the inward Self is free from suffering — an information which cannot be known through any other *pramāṇa*. Since the subject matter

of the Upaniṣadic text is outside the scope of other *pramāṇas*, there cannot be any conflict between *śruti* and other *pramāṇas*. In other words, the Upaniṣadic text does not face the problem of contradiction by another *pramāṇa* like the sentence, "The sacrificial post is the sun."

[36]

न च संशयितव्यम् अवगमयति। यतः।

सर्वसंशयहेतौ हि निरस्ते कथमात्मनि।
जायेत संशयो वाक्यात् अनुमानेन युष्मदि ॥ ३६ ॥

Nor does it convey what is doubtful. For:

When the not-Self, the cause of all doubt, has been removed, how can any doubt arise at all from the sentence in respect of the Self? (36)

Sureśvara eliminates the third reason in verses (36) and (37).

[37]

अपि च।

यत्र स्यात् संशयो नासौ ज्ञेय आत्मेति पण्डितैः।
न यतः संशयप्राप्तिः आत्मनोऽवगतित्वतः ॥ ३७ ॥

Moreover:

That which is open to doubt should not be considered to be the Self by the learned; for, there is no scope for doubt in the Self since it is of the nature of consciousness. (37)

Doubt may arise because of *pramāṇa* or *prameya*. Sureśvara suggests in verse (36) that the nature of *śruti* is such that it cannot be a source of doubt. The self-luminous Self which is free from qualities and relations is always immediate. So Sureśvara says in verse (37) that considering the nature of the Self also there is no scope for doubt.

[38]

अनवबोधकत्वं तु दूरोत्सारितमेव। यत आह।

बोध्येऽप्यनुभवो यस्य न कथञ्चन जायते।
तं कथं बोधयेच्छास्त्रं लोष्टं नरसमाकृतिम् ॥ ३८ ॥

The argument that nothing is revealed [by *śruti*] is thrown off far away.

How can scripture teach one, a clod of clay in the human form, who is not at all capable of understanding the subject, though it is fit enough for easy comprehension? (38)

It is well-known that a blockhead does not understand even a simple thing, fit enough for easy understanding. It means that the fault is in the person and not in the object. There is the general principle that the *Veda* is the source of knowledge to one who is the eligible person (*adhikāriṇaḥ pramiti-janako vedaḥ*). If a person does not understand the Self even after hearing the *śruti* text, it only means that he is not the scripture-stipulated eligible person.

[39]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकपुरस्सरं वाक्यमेव अवाक्यार्थरूपमात्मानं प्रतिपादयति इत्यस्य पक्षस्य द्रढिम्ने श्रुत्युदाहरणम् उपन्यस्यति।

जिघ्राणीममहं गन्धम् इति यो वेत्त्यविक्रियः।
स आत्मा तत्परं ज्योतिः शिरसोदं वचः श्रुतेः ॥ ३९ ॥

For the purpose of strengthening the view that, subsequent to the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, the sentence itself reveals the Self which is the non-sentential import, the *śruti* text is cited in the sequel as illustration thereof.

There is the statement of the *Upaniṣad*: The Person who knows "I smell this smell" — that unchanging Person is the Self, the highest Light. (39)

In verse (39) Sureśvara refers to a subsidiary statement (*avāntara-vākya*) in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.12.4), which elucidates and thereby supports the *mahāvākya*, "*tat tvam asi*" which occurs first of all in 6.8.7 of the same *Upaniṣad*. In the statement, "*ahaṁ imaṁ gandhaṁ jighrāṇi*", the "I" (*aham*) is the intellect which is the knower (*pramātā*), which is subject to modification as the agent and the enjoyer. The Person who knows the knower (*pramātāraṁ yo vetti*), *i.e.* that unchanging Self which is the witness to the changing intellect, that Person is the Self (*sa ātmā*) which has been spoken about earlier in 6.8.7; and that is the highest Light (*param jyotiḥ*) mentioned in 8.12.3. The idea which is sought to be conveyed here is that when a person has differentiated the Self from the intellect, etc., which are not-Self, then he is able to realize the identity of the Self and Brahman.

[40]

यथा "तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि" इत्यस्य शेषत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकश्रुतिर्यथा "य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते" इत्याद्या "अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणि" इत्यन्ता, तथा "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इत्यस्य शेषः ।

अहमः प्रत्यगात्मार्थो निरस्ताशेषयुष्मदः ।
बम्भणीति श्रुतिर्न्याय्या योऽयमित्यादिनाऽसकृत् ॥ ४० ॥

Just as the *śruti* passage, beginning with "The Person that is seen in the eye..." and ending with "Now he who knows 'I smell this,'" which discriminates the Self from the not-Self, is subsidiary to the text, "That is the real; that is the Self; that thou art," even so the *śruti* text "I am Brahman" has the following as its subsidiary.

Śruti, which is supported by reasoning, says repeatedly through texts like "This Person that is [identified with the intellect...]" that the word "I" signifies the inward Self which is free from the entire not-Self. (40)

Sureśvara says that in the case of the *mahāvākya*, "I am Brahman" (*aham brahmāsmi*, *BU*, 1.4.10) there is in the sequel a subsidiary text (*BU*, 4.3.7) which supports it by discriminating the Self from the not-Self. The subsidiary text referred to in verse

(40) reads: "*yo'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ.*" It means: "This Person that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs, the (self-luminous) Light within the heart (intellect)." Śaṅkara in his commentary shows how this text emphasizes the distinction between the Self and the not-Self by means of reasoning implicit in it. The expression "*yo'yam*" is used with reference to the Self. "*Vijñānamaya*" means identified with the intellect. Śaṅkara observes that the Self is so called because of our failure to discriminate it from its empirical adjunct, *viz.* the intellect, for it is perceived as associated with the intellect. The truth is that the Self which is consciousness is essentially different from the intellect which is material. Again, the locative case in the term "*prāṇeṣu*", *i.e.* in the midst of the organs, indicates that the Self is different from the organs, just as the expression "*pāṣāṇeṣu vṛkṣaḥ*" shows that the tree is different from the rocks. The word "*hṛdaya*" here means the intellect which has its seat in the heart. So the expression "*hṛdyantarjyotiḥ*" (the Light within the heart) means the self-effulgent Self within the intellect. It is because of this Light in it, *i.e.* because of the reflection of consciousness in it, that the intellect appears as if it is sentient. This once again shows that the Self is different from the intellect. Śaṅkara remarks that the Self successively illumines with its own self-luminous consciousness the intellect, then the mind, thereafter the organs, and finally the body. The Self is, therefore, different from all these which are not-Self (*yuṣmad*). On the strength of the discrimination between the Self and the not-Self and considering the import of the sentence as determined by the *tātparya-ṣaḍliṅga*, we have to say that the word "*aham*" in the sentence "*aham brahmāsmi*" implies the inward Self which is free from *yuṣmad*, the not-Self.

[41]

कथं पुनः अयमर्थोऽवसीयते अहंव्याजेन अत्रात्मार्थो बुबोधयिषित इति ? यतः।

एष आत्मा स्वयंज्योती रविसोमाग्निवाक्षु सः।
इतेष्वस्तं दृगेवास्ते भासयंश्चित्ताचेष्टितम् ॥ ४१ ॥

It may be asked: How is this idea that the Self is sought to be conveyed by means of " I " arrived at? It is as follows.

This Self is self-luminous. When the sun, the moon, fire and speech set, it alone remains as the Seer illumining the activities of the mind. (41)

In the present verse Sureśvara refers to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, 4. 3. 6 with the view to show the logical sequence between this text and the one referred to (*BU*, 4. 3. 7) in the previous verse. The context is the dialogue between King Janaka and Yājñavalkya. The king initiates the discussion in 4. 3. 2 by raising the question: "What is it that serves as the light for man?" In the course of the discussion Yājñavalkya said that the sun, the moon, fire, and speech serve as the light for a man depending upon the situation. Then, to Janaka's question, "When the sun, and the moon have both set, when the fire has gone out, and the speech has stopped, what serves as the light for a man?" Yājñavalkya replies (4.3.6) that the Self is his light (*ātmaiva asya jyotirbhavati*). What the latter means is that when there is no extraneous light provided by the sun, the moon, fire, and speech in the states of dream and deep sleep, the Self serves as the light. Thus far is the discussion in 4.3.6.

Then the question arises: "What is this Self?" This question raised by Janaka as well as Yājñavalkya's answer to that which is in the *śruti* text, *BU*, 4. 3. 7, is brought out by Sureśvara in the following verse.

[42]

निर्णेनेक्ति च पृष्टो मुनिः।

आत्मनैवेत्युपश्रुत्य कोऽयमात्मेत्युदीरिते ।
बुद्धेः परं स्वतो मुक्तम् आत्मानं मुनिरभ्यधात् ॥ ४२ ॥

The sage, when questioned, answered by specifying its nature.

Having heard the words, "By the Self alone," the king asked: "What is this Self?" The sage [in the reply] spoke of the Self which is beyond the intellect and which is free by its very nature. (42)

The explanation of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, 4. 3. 7, has already been given in verse (40).

[43]

यस्माच्चात्मा अत्र अहंव्याजेन प्रत्यङ्मात्रो जिग्राहयिषितः, तस्मात् अहंवृत्तिः स्वरूपस्य विलयेनैव वाक्यार्थावगमाय कारणत्वं प्रतिपद्यत इति इममर्थमाह ।

अहंवृत्त्यैव तद्ब्रह्म यस्मादेषोऽवगच्छति ।
तत्स्वरूपलयेनातः कारणं स्यादहङ्कृतिः ॥ ४३ ॥

Since in the present context the inward Self alone is sought to be comprehended by means of the "I", the "I"-notion, through its own dissolution, becomes the cause of the comprehension of the sentence-sense.

Since a person understands that Brahman by means of the "I"-notion alone, it follows, therefore, that the "I"-notion becomes the cause thereof through its own disappearance. (43)

It may be thought that the "I" which indicates the inward Self will continue to exist even after doing its work with the result that there will be two entities — the "I" which is the *lakṣaka* and the inward Self which is the *lakṣya.* This, Sureśvara says, is not possible. While the Self by its very nature is one and non-dual, the "I" or the ego is what is superimposed on the Self. As soon as the ego reveals the inward Self, it disappears itself, complying with the nature of what has been implied by it (*lakṣya-svarūpānurodhena*). Just as the illusory snake ceases to exist the moment the rope which is its substratum is shown by it, so does the ego, after showing the inward Self which is its substratum.

[44]

अत एव च यः प्रतिज्ञातोऽर्थो "नाहंग्राह्ये न तद्धीने" इत्यादिः, स युक्तिभिः उपपादित इति कृत्वोपसंह्रियते।

गृहीताहंपदार्थश्चेत् कस्माज्ज्ञो न प्रपद्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधाच्चेत् प्रतीच्युक्तिर्न युष्मदि ॥ ४४ ॥

Thus, since what was stated as a proposition to be proved in verses such as "*nāhaṁgrāhye na taddhīne*" (II. 5) has

been established by many a reasoning, it is now concluded as follows.

If a person has known the meaning of " I ", why should he not understand the import of the sentence [" I am Brahman "]? If it be said that, because of conflict with *pramāṇas* such as perception, [the import is not comprehended], it is not so, because the *śruti* text has its purport in the inward Self and not in the external objects. (44)

The proposition that there is no conflict between *śruti* and other *pramāṇas* stated in II. 5 was justified by many arguments in the sequel. Sureśvara reverts to this point once again by way of conclusion.

In the first line of verse (44) Sureśvara says that there is no reason why a person who has understood the implied meaning of "I" cannot comprehend the import of the text, "I am Brahman." The second line of the verse contains an objection and the answer thereto. The objection is that, since the evidence of perception and other *pramāṇas* goes against what the *śruti* text intends to convey, one fails to understand the import of the text. This objection, says Sureśvara, does not hold good. There is no scope for conflict between *śruti* and other *pramāṇas*, because the inward Self which is the subject matter of the former is outside the scope of the latter. Under the circumstances it is but proper to say that a person who has clarified the meaning of "I" and has understood its implication does comprehend the import of "I am Brahman."

[45]

पूर्वस्यैव श्लोकार्थस्य विस्पष्टार्थमाह ।

पराञ्च्येव तु सर्वाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि नात्मनि ।
प्रतीच्येव प्रवृत्तं तत् सदसीति वचोऽञ्जसा ॥ ४५ ॥

With a view to clarify further the meaning of the previous verse the following is said.

Perception and other *pramāṇas* are concerned with external objects and not with the Self. But the scriptural statement, "You are that Being," relates truly to the inward Self alone. (45)

[46]

तस्मात् , प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयेभ्यो हीयमानोपादीयमानेभ्योऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां मुञ्जेषीकावत् अशेषबुद्धिविक्रियासाक्षितया आत्मानं निष्कृष्य , तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येभ्योऽपूर्वादिलक्षणम् आत्मानं विजानीयात् । तदेतदाह ।

अहं दुःखी सुखी चेति येनायं प्रत्ययोऽध्रुवः ।
अवगत्यन्त आभाति स म आत्मेति वाक्यधीः ॥ ४६ ॥

Hence, just as one differentiates a stalk from *muñja* grass, even so, after differentiating the Self, which is the witness to the entire modifications of the intellect, from the not-Self comprising cognizer, cognitum, and the source of cognition which are fit enough for acceptance and rejection, through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, one should know the Self which is without cause, etc. from the sentences such as "That thou art." This we convey as follows.

That is my Self — that by which these impermanent mental states such as "I am miserable, " " I am happy," are revealed till the attainment of knowledge — such is the knowledge which arises from the sentence. (46)

The following stages have to be gone through before one gets the *avākyārtha-jñāna* from the sentence. Discrimination between the Self and the not-Self through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* is the first stage. Then, there is the work of elimination following the guidance of the negative scriptural texts (*niṣedhavākya*) which help to negate every quality and specification superimposed on the Self. There is, for example, the text (*BU*, 2.5.19) which says: "That Brahman is without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior." What this text conveys is that Brahman has neither cause nor effect, that it is one and homogeneous. There are other negative texts such as "Not this, not this" (*BU*, 2.3.6), "Not

gross, not fine ..." (*BU*, 3.8.8) which do the same work of elimination of everything that is superimposed on Brahman-Ātman. Negation alone will not do. It has to be followed by affirmation of the nature of Brahman. For this one has to follow the affirmative *śruti* texts such as "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite" (*TU*, 2.1.1) which reveal the specific nature of Brahman. One who has gone through the stages of discrimination between the Self and the not-Self, negation of the superimposed, and apprehension of the essential nature, will be able to comprehend the import of the sentence.

[47 - 48]

प्रमाणान्तरानवष्टब्धं निरस्ताशेषकार्यकारणात्मकद्वैतप्रपञ्चं सत्यज्ञानानन्दलक्षणम् आत्मानम् "तत्त्वमसि", "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि", इत्यादिवाक्यं संशयितमिथ्याज्ञानाज्ञानप्रध्वंसमुखेन साक्षादपरोक्षात् करतलन्यस्तामलकवत् प्रतिपादयत्येव इत्यसकृदभिहितम्। तत्र केचिदाहुः — 'तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यैः यथावस्थितवस्तुयाथात्म्यान्वाख्याननिष्ठैः, न यथोक्तोऽर्थः प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते, अभिधाश्रुतित्वात् तेषाम्। न हि लोकेऽभिधाश्रुतेः प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षाया "नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति" इत्यादिकायाः प्रामाण्यमभ्युपगतम्। अतो नियोगमुखेनैव अभिधाश्रुतेः प्रामाण्यं युक्तं, प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षत्वात् नियोगस्य।' अस्य परिहारार्थम् अशेषप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमेयत्वनिराकरणद्वारेण अतीन्द्रियार्थविषयत्वादभिधाश्रुतेः प्रामाण्यं सुप्तपुरुषप्रबोधकवाक्यस्येव वक्तव्यम् इत्ययमारम्भः।

नित्यावगतिरूपत्वात् अन्यमानानपेक्षणात्।
शब्दादिगुणहीनत्वात् संशयानवतारतः॥ ४७॥

तृष्णानिष्ठीवनैर्नात्मा प्रत्यक्षाद्यैः प्रमीयते।
प्रत्यगात्मत्वहेतोश्च स्वार्थत्वादप्रमेयतः॥ ४८॥

It has been stated many times that sentences such as "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" establish directly and immediately, like an *āmalaka* fruit in the palm of the hand, the Self which is real, consciousness, and bliss by its very nature, which is free from the entire world of duality consisting of objects related as cause and effect, and which is

not within the range of other *pramāṇas*, by destroying doubt, erroneous cognition, and ignorance. Here some raise an objection as follows: 'It will not be possible to convey the above mentioned meaning by sentences like "That thou art," which seek to convey the real nature of the object as it exists, since these sentences are existential. Indeed, it is known in our experience that existential sentences like "There are fruits [in the trees] on the river bank" are not accepted to be valid, if they convey their meaning independently of another *pramāṇa*. So it is proper to say that the validity of existential *śruti* texts is only through injunctive texts [to which they are subservient], since an injunctive sentence is independent of another *pramāṇa*.' With the view to answer this objection, it has to be said that the existential *śruti* texts, which deal with a subject matter not knowable through all these *pramāṇas* such as perception and which is, therefore, beyond these senses, have validity in the same way as a sentence which awakens a person from sleep has validity. So the following is commenced.

Since the Self is of the nature of eternal consciousness, since it is not dependent on another *pramāṇa*, since it is devoid of qualities such as sound, since its nature is such that there cannot be any doubt about it, since it is inward, since it is an end in itself, and since it is not an object of knowledge, it cannot be known through perception, etc., which function impelled by worldly desires. (47-48)

In the *sambandhokti* Sureśvara first of all recalls in a summary way what was stated earlier and then introduces an objection by the Mīmāṁsaka. Sentences like "*tat tvam asi*" which are only informative about an existent entity are called *abhidhā-śruti*: they are assertive sentences, sentences which do not contain the injunctive word (*vidhipadarahitavākya*). Since a secular sentance like "There are fruits (in the trees) on the river bank," which is existential, has to depend on another *pramāṇa* for what it conveys, it has no validity (*sāpekṣatvena aprāmāṇyam bhavati*). On the other hand, if a sentence is injunctive, what it enjoins cannot be within the range of another *pramāṇa*; and so it will have independent validity. Applying the same principle to *śruti* texts which are

existential, the Mīmāṁsaka argues that they should be treated as injunctive, or construed with injunctive texts for preserving their independent validity. This argument is untenable. It should be noted that dependence on another *pramāṇa* is not due to a sentence being existential, for there is such dependence even for an injunctive sentence like "Bring the cow." The reason for dependence on another *pramāṇa* is elsewhere. A sentence uttered by a human being will have to depend on another *pramāṇa* for what it conveys, irrespective of the fact whether it is existential or injunctive. Only the human origin of a sentence is responsible for its dependent nature. This difficulty does not arise in the case of *śruti* texts like "That thou art," since they are *apauruṣeya*. The subject matter of these texts is beyond the range of the senses (*atīndriya-viṣaya*); consequently it cannot be dealt with by perception and other *pramāṇas*.

In verses (47) and (48) Sureśvara gives reasons to show why the Self cannot be known through perception and other *pramāṇas*. A *pramāṇa* is required for the manifestation of an object which is not self-revelatory. Since the Self which is of the nature of consciousness is self-luminous, it does not require the help of a *pramāṇa* for its revelation. It follows that it is not an object of knowledge at all. That the Self is eternal consciousness is stressed by the *śruti* text (*BU*, 4. 3. 30): "There is no cessation of the knowing of the knower, because it is imperishable." Secondly, an object which possesses qualities like sound, touch, colour, etc. can be known through perception and other *pramāṇas*. Since the Self is soundless (*aśabdam*), touchless (*asparśam*), colourless (*arūpam*), etc., as *śruti* says (*KU*, 1. 3. 15), it cannot be known by these *pramāṇas*. Thirdly, the Self which is direct and immediate, as *śruti* points out (*BU*, 3. 4. 1) can never be doubted; and this rules out the work of inference in this case. Fourthly, what is outward alone can be known through perception or inference. Since the Self is inward, it is outside the purview of these *pramāṇas*. Fifthly, only what exists for the enjoyment of others has to be known through a *pramāṇa* and then enjoyed. But since the Self exists in itself and for itself (*svārthatvāt*), the question of its being known by a *pramāṇa* does not arise. So Sureśvara concludes that the Self cannot be known through perception and other *pramāṇas*, which serve only empirical purposes impelled by desires of various kinds.

[49 - 50]

श्रुतिरपि इममर्थं निर्वदति ।

दिदृक्षितपरिच्छिन्नपराग्रूपादिसंश्रयात् ।
विपरीतमतो दृष्ट्या स्वतोबुद्धं न पश्यति ॥ ४९ ॥

न्यायसिद्धमतो वक्ति दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारमात्मनः ।
न पश्येत्प्रत्यगात्मानं प्रमाणं श्रुतिरादरात् ॥ ५० ॥

Śruti, too, speaks of this point.

The Self is different from objects which are perceived due to desire, which are limited and outward, and which are the substrata of colour and other qualities. So one cannot see the Self which is of the nature of consciousness through [perceptual] cognition. (49)

So, *śruti* which is authoritative and supported by reasoning says with great care that "You cannot see the Seer of seeing," *i.e.* you cannot see your own inward Self. (50)

Sureśvara cites the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, 3.4.2, in verse (50) in support of the view that the inward Self, the Seer, which is the witness of the ordinary seeing of the mind — a seeing which is but a *vṛtti* of the mind connected with, and coloured by, the objects and which has, therefore, a beginning and an end — cannot be seen.

[51]

अनुमानाविषयत्वेऽन्यदपि कारणमुच्यते ।

प्रत्यक्षस्य पराक्त्वान्न सम्बन्धग्रहणं यतः ।
आत्मनोऽतोऽनुमित्यास्यानुभवो न कथञ्चन ॥ ५१ ॥

Another reason for its not being an object of inference is now stated.

Since perception is concerned with external object, it cannot comprehend the invariable relation [of the Self and the *hetu*]. So the experience of the Self can never be obtained from inferential knowledge. (51)

To establish anything by means of inference, knowledge of the invariable relation between the middle term and the major term, *i.e.* between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, is required. Perception by its very nature is concerned with external objects characterized by general and particular qualities. The Self is inward; it is devoid of qualities, general as well as specific; it is not related to anything external; consequently no relation between the inward Self and an external mark (*liṅga* = *hetu*) is possible. Though a *hetu* which is external can be perceived by perception, the relation between the external *hetu* and the inward Self cannot be perceived by it. In the absense of the knowledge of the invariable relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, inference is not possible.

[52]

एवमयं प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः सर्व एव पराचीनविषय एव, न प्रतीचीनमात्मानम् अवगाहयितुमलम्। एवं च सति, अनेनैव यथोक्तोऽर्थोऽवसातुं शक्यत इत्याह।

प्रमाणव्यवहारोऽयं सर्व एव पराग्यतः ।
सुविचार्याप्यतोऽनेन युष्मद्येव दिदृक्षते ॥ ५२ ॥

Thus, the entire empirical analysis in terms of cognizer, source of cognition, and cognitum is concerned with external objects; it is not competent enough to comprehend the inward Self. This being the case, the point stated above can be concluded as follows.

Since the entire empirical analysis of *pramāṇa* (and other factors) relates to external objects, one will desire to perceive only external objects by perception, etc., even after proper inquiry. (52)

[53]

यस्मात् लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानधिगम्योऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीति वाक्यार्थः तस्मात् ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निरस्याप्राणतो यतः ।
वीक्षापन्नस्य कोऽस्मीति तदसीति श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥ ५३ ॥

Since the import of the sentence, " I am Brahman, " cannot be known through perception and other empirical means of knowledge, therefore it is said.

To the enquirer who, after rejecting all objects upto the vital breath [as not-Self] by the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, is desirous of knowing " Who am I ? " *śruti* replies, "You are that." (53)

[54]

सोऽयम् अन्वयव्यतिरेकन्याय एतावानेव यदवसानो वाक्यार्थस्तदभिज्ञस्य " अहं ब्रह्मास्मि " इत्याविर्भवति । द्रष्टृदृश्यविभागेन आगमापायिसाक्षि-विभागेन च श्रुत्यभ्युपगमतः सङ्क्षिप्योच्यते ।

दृश्यत्वाद् घटवद्देहो देहवच्चेन्द्रियाण्यपि ।
मनश्चेन्द्रियवज्ज्ञेयं मनोवन्निश्चयादिमत् ॥ ५४ ॥

The reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* goes so far as the ascertainment of the import of the sentence. To one who has comprehended this, the knowledge of "I am Brahman" manifests. The distinction between the Seer and the seen, as well as the distinction between what appears and disappears and the witness thereof, which is accepted by *śruti*, will be stated briefly in the sequel.

The body, since it is seen, is like a pot. The senses, too, are in the same way as the body. The mind also must be understood in the same way as the senses. Like the mind, the determinative instrument (*i.e.* the intellect) must be understood. (54)

Of the two kinds of *anvaya-vyatireka* reasoning, the first one which emphasizes the distinction between the Seer and the seen is brought out in verse (54) to show the difference between the Self and the not-Self. The pot which is perceived is different from the Self; even so the body which is perceived is different from the Self. This reasoning must be extended to the senses, the mind, and the intellect.

[55]

तथा सकलकार्यकारणागमापायिविभागसाक्षित्वेनापि ।

प्रागसद्याति पश्चात् सत् सच्च यायादसत्तथा ।
अनात्माभिजनं तत्स्याद्विपरीतः स्वयं दृशिः ॥ ५५ ॥

In the same way [the other kind of *anvaya-vyatireka* reasoning can be stated] by the distinction between the entire realm of objects related as cause and effect, which come and go and the witness of them.

What is non-existent earlier becomes existent later. Likewise, what is [now] existent becomes non-exitent [later]. This is the nature of the not-Self. Different from this is the Self which is knowledge by its very nature. (55)

Here Sureśvara refers to *āgamāpāyi-tadavadhi anvaya-vyatireka* for bringing out the distinction between the enduring Self and the impermanent not-Self which come and go. An effect qua effect is non-existent prior to its origination. An object which is existent ceases to be when it is destroyed. In other words, it is the very nature of material objects which are related as cause and effect to come and go. That they come and go can be known only through the Self which is a witness thereto; and so the Self must be different from them.

[56]

तत्र घटाधीनां दृश्यानामनात्मत्वं द्रष्ट्रात्मपूर्वकं प्रत्यक्षेणैव प्रमाणेन उपलभ्य अनात्मनः च असाधारणान् धर्मान् अवधार्य, तैः दृश्यत्वागमापायादिभिः धर्मैः शरीरेन्द्रियमनोनिश्चयादिवृत्तीरनात्मतया व्युदस्य, अहंवृत्तिमतोऽपि दृश्यत्वाविशेषात् द्रष्टृपूर्वकत्वम् अवसीयते । तदेतदाह ।

घटादयो यथा लिङ्गं स्युः परम्परयाऽहमः ।
दृश्यत्वादहमप्येवं लिङ्गं स्याद्द्रष्ट्रात्मनः ॥ ५६ ॥

Now, knowing by means of perception alone that objects such as pot which are seen are not-Self inasmuch as they presuppose the Seer (to be seen); ascertaining the special qualities of the not-Self; rejecting the body, the senses, the mind, and the determinative modes of the intellect as not-Self by the qualities such as being perceived and being subject to origination and cessation; it is decided that the internal organ also, which has the "I"-notion, presupposes the Seer, since it does not differ from other objects [such as the body] in respect of being perceived. This we state as follows.

Just as objects such as pot successively serve as the reason for inferring the existence of the "I", even so the "I", since it is seen, serves as the reason for inferring the existence of the Seer-Self. (56)

Sureśvara wants to establish here that the "I" (*ahaṅkāra*) which passes for the Self is, indeed, in the category of objects which are not-Self. Being an object of perception and being subject to origination and cessation are the special qualities (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*) of the not-Self. The "I" or the ego is perceived; also it appears and disappears; and so it is not-Self. Sureśvara says that the very fact that every one of them — the body, the senses, the mind, and the intellect — is perceived, just as a pot is perceived, is the reason (*hetu* = *liṅga*) through which we can establish the Seer-Self. The inference can be formulated as follows:

This body presupposes the Seer-Self.
Because it is perceived (*dṛśyatvāt*).
Whatever is perceived presupposes the Seer-Self, e.g. a pot.

[57]

ननु द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु, आगमापायदर्शनात् यत् साक्षिकौ तेषामागमापायौ, स आगमापायविभागरहित आत्मा यथा यन्निबन्धनौ जगतः प्रकाशाप्रकाशौ, स प्रकाशाप्रकाशविभागरहितः सूर्य इति। यदा चैवं, तदा

वाक्यावगम्यस्य अर्थस्य अनुदितानस्तमितविज्ञानमात्रस्वभावस्य अनुमानेनैव प्रतिपन्नत्वात् पुनरपि वाक्यस्य निर्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गः। नैष दोषः। लिङ्ग-व्यवधानेन तत्प्रतिपत्तेः।

ननु साक्षादपरोक्षादात्मस्वभावेन अनात्मनो हानोपादानयोः सम्बन्ध-ग्रहणात्, कमतिशयं वाक्यं कुर्यात्? मैवं वोचः। लिङ्गाधीनत्वात् तत्प्रतिपत्तेः। न हि लिङ्गव्यवधानेनात्मप्रतिपत्तिः साक्षात्प्रतिपत्तिः भवति, "यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः" इति श्रुतेः। अत आह।

लिङ्गमस्तित्वनिष्ठत्वान्न स्याद् वाक्यार्थबोधकम् ।
सदसद्व्युत्थितात्माऽयमतो वाक्यात् प्रतीयते ॥ ५७ ॥

It may be objected: "Since the triple factors of cognizer, cognition, and cognitum are found to have origination and cessation in the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, that which is the witness to their origination and cessation is the Self which is devoid of origination and cessation, in the same way as the day and the night of the the world are dependent on the sun which is itself free from day and night. This being the case, it follows that, since the Self which is of the nature of consciousness alone that neither rises nor sets and which is said to be known through the *Śruti* text can be known through inference itself, the *Śruti* text, once again, has nothing to convey." This objection is untenable, because in [inference] one gets the knowledge of the Self through the mediation of the reason.

There is again the objection: "Since the not-Self which is accepted as well as rejected is apprehended in relation with the Self which is direct and immediate, what more could the *Śruti* text accomplish?" Do not say so, because [in the case of inference] the knowledge of the Self is dependent on the reason. Indeed, the knowledge of the Self obtained through the mediation of the reason is not immediate knowledge, for there is the *Śruti* text, "That [Self] indeed this [aspirant] prays to, by that [Self which constitutes the nature of the seeker, the Self] is known." Therefore, the following is said.

Since the reason can prove only the existence of the Self, it cannot establish what is signified by the sentence. So, the Self which is different from the existent and the non-existent is known through the sentence. (57)

The two objections stated and then refuted in the *sambandhokti* to verse (57) relate to the limitation of inference as a *pramāṇa*.

First objection: Objects, which a person cognizes, pursues, and attains in the waking state cease to exist in the dream state. It also works out the other way. Also, whatever is apprehended and appropriated in the waking and dream states ceases to exist in deep sleep as the internal organ responsible for every kind of activity — cognitive, affective, and conative — ceases to function at that time. But the Self which is a witness to the appearance and disappearance, acceptance and rejection, of objects remains constant, unaffected by them in the same way as the sun responsible for what we call the day and the night remains the same all the time unaffected by the alteration of both day and night. Since the Self can be inferred from the triple factors of cognizer, cognition, and cognitum as a witness to them, there is, the critic argues, no need for *śruti*; consequently there arises the defect of the *śruti* text becoming *nirviṣaya*. Sureśvara rejects this argument on the ground that inference by its very nature can give us only mediate knowledge (*parokṣa-jñāna*) as it functions through the mediation of *liṅga* or *hetu* which is the reason for inferring something. However, we require immediate knowledge (*aparokṣa-jñāna*) of the Self; and this can be obtained only through the *śruti* text and not through inference.

Second objection: It cannot be said that *śruti* is needed for getting the immediate knowledge of the Self, for the Self which is direct and immediate is already in relation with the not-Self as the witness to it; and by this witness-witnessed relation (*sākṣi-sākṣya-sambandha*) between them, the Self which is direct and immediate can be inferred. So the *śruti* text, the critic concludes, is not required for getting the immediate knowledge of the Self.

This objection, too, like the previous one, is untenable. According to Sureśvara, one could at the most infer that there must be the Seer-Self from objects that are seen. However, it does not follow from this that there is immediate apprehension of the Self.

To infer the Self on the basis of its relation with a *hetu* is not to directly perceive it, just as to infer fire from smoke is not to directly perceive it. Some elucidation will be helpful in this connection. Though the Self by its very nature is non-relational, we view it as relational for epistemological analysis from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint. The Self has two aspects, relational and non-relational, of which the first is *adventitious*, while the second is *essential*, to it. We know that fire can be inferred from smoke because of the relation between them. Just as fire is relational, even so the Self which is to be inferred must be relational. What is non-relational can never be an object of inference. So, if a person does not know that the Self exists, then his ignorance about the existence of the Self can be removed by means of knowledge and the inferential knowledge of the Self is only *mediate* knowledge. The relational aspect of the Self, called *sādhāraṇasvabhāva*, though adventitious, is helpful to infer its existence. But the direct perception of it will be possible only if one knows it as non-relational, as neither existent nor non-existent, as something which transcends the three states (*avasthātrayātīta*), which is its *asādhāraṇasvabhāva*. And for this direct perception of the Self *śruti* is needed.

[58]

ननु यदि व्यावृत्तसदसद्विकल्पजालं वस्त्वभीष्टं वाक्याद्भवतः, तथापि तूत्सार्यते वाक्यविषया तृष्णा। यस्मादन्तरेणापि वाक्यश्रवणं निरस्ताशेषविकल्पम् आगोपालाविपालपण्डितं सुषुप्ते वस्तु सिद्धम्, अतो नार्थो वाक्यश्रवणेन। नैतदेवम्। किं कारणम्? सर्वानर्थबीजस्य आत्मानवबोधस्य सुषुप्ते सम्भवात्। यदि हि सुषुप्तेऽज्ञानं नाभविष्यत्, अन्तरेणापि वेदान्तवाक्यश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनानि "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इत्यध्यवसायात् सर्वप्राणभृतामपि स्वरसत एव सुषुप्तप्रतिपत्तेः सकलसंसारोच्छित्तिप्रसङ्गः। न च कैवल्यात् पुनरुत्थानं न्याय्यम्, अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात्। न च "अन्य एव सुषुप्तः, अन्य एवोत्थितः" इति शक्यं वक्तुम्, "नाद्राक्षमहं सुषुप्तेऽन्यत् किञ्चिदपि" इति उत्थितस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनात्। तस्मात्, अवश्यं सुषुप्तेऽज्ञानमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

ननु यदि तत्राज्ञानम् अभविष्यत्, रागद्वेषघटाज्ञानादिवत् प्रत्यक्षम् अभविष्यत्, यथेह लोके "घटं न जानामि" इत्यज्ञानमव्यवहितं प्रत्यक्षम्। अत्रोच्यते। न। अभिव्यञ्जकाभावात्। कथं अभिव्यञ्जकाभाव इति चेत्, शृणु।

बाह्यां वृत्तिमनुत्पाद्य व्यक्तिः स्यान्नाहमो यथा ।
नर्तेऽन्तःकरणं तद्वद् ध्वान्तस्य व्यक्तिराञ्जसी ॥ ५८ ॥

It may be argued: "It is desired by you that the knowledge of the reality which is free from the distinctions of the existent and the non-existent is obtained from the *śruti* text; and [when this reality is known] the desire to know what is conveyed by the sentence comes to an end. However, since even without the hearing of the sentence the reality which is free from the entire range of distinctions is attained by everyone, from cowherds and shepherds to learned men, in the state of sleep, there is nothing to be gained by the hearing of the sentence." We reply: it is not so. "Why is it not so?" It is for the reason that ignorance of the Self which is the root cause of all evil exists in the state of sleep. If ignorance were not present in sleep, then even without the hearing of the *Vedānta* text, reflection on it, and meditation upon it, one should be able to have the knowledge, "I am Brahman;" in that case, since all living beings naturally have the experience of sleep, it would result in the destruction of bondage in its entirety [then itself]. Returning to the waking state from the condition of liberation [which one is supposed to attain in sleep] is not proper as it will make liberation impermanent. Nor can it be said, " The person who wakes up is different from the one who was asleep [and attained liberation], " for the person who wakes up has the recognition, "I did not see anything whatsoever in sleep." Hence, the existence of ignorance in sleep has to be accepted.

It may be argued: "If ignorance were present in the state of sleep, then it should have been directly known in the same way as we directly know our desire and aversion as well as our ignorance about objects such as pot [in the waking state]; here in our day-to-day experience there is the direct perception of ignorance in the form, 'I do not know the pot.'" This argument, we reply, cannot be accepted. [The presence of ignorance in the state of sleep is

not known at that time] because of the absence of the manifester (viz. the internal organ then). If you ask: "How is the manifester absent [at that time]?" then listen.

Just as the "I" does not manifest itself without originating the modes of the external objects, even so there is no direct manifestation of ignorance in the absence of the internal organ. (58)

Once again there is the objection that there is no need for *śruti* since the Self, the non-dual reality, which the *śruti* text signifies, is accessible to everyone, whether ignorant or learned in the state of sleep. This objection, argues Sureśvara, is untenable. First of all, though it is true that the Self to which one has access in sleep is free from distinctions arising from the *upādhis* such as the body, the senses, and the mind, which are all products of *ajñāna*, it is not left alone as it is associated with *ajñāna* which is the *kāraṇopādhi* at that time. In other words, the Self one attains in sleep is not totally *nirvikalpaka*, whereas the Self which is the import of the *śruti* text is absolutely *nirvikalpaka*. So, there is the need for the *śruti* text. Secondly, if everyone realizes the non-dual Self in the state of sleep without the help of the *śruti* text, then it follows that everyone automatically gets liberated in the state of sleep itself. This, however, is absurd for two reasons. If a person attains liberation in sleep itself, then he should not get up from sleep and return to the waking state and transact business as before. Moreover, since liberation is a permanent condition, it is absurd to say that a person, having attained liberation, returns to the worldly life. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the opponent's contention that the highest reality free from all distinctions is attained by all in the state of sleep without the help of the *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana* discipline. It should, therefore, be said that there is *ajñāna* in the state of sleep and that its existence is revealed by the Witness-Self (*sākṣi-vedya*).

Why is it, it may be asked, that *ajñāna* which is *sākṣi-vedya* is not directly known in deep sleep, even though subjective states such as desire and aversion as well as *ajñāna* are directly known in the waking state? For example, we do say in our waking state: "I like this object," "I dislike this object," "I am ignorant of that object," and so on. It means that we directly know in the

waking state our desire, aversion, and ignorance which are *sākṣi-vedya*; even so, the critic argues, *ajñāna* which is supposed to exist in the state of sleep should have been directly seen then itself.

This argument has no force. One does not have direct perception of *ajñāna* in deep sleep in the *tripuṭī* form such as "I am ignorant of Brahman," because the internal organ, which is the manifester of it (*abhivyañjakam antaḥkaraṇam*), does not function in the state of sleep. If we have *tripuṭī-* or *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* in dream and waking states, it is because of the functioning of the internal organ in these states. Sureśvara drives home this point by citing the case of the "I" in verse (58). Though the "I" is present and is revealed by the Witness-consciousness in the waking state, it is not clearly noticed in the absence of the modes of the mind. On the contrary, one knows the "I" explicitly only when there is *tripuṭī-jñāna* such as "I know this pot," which presupposes the functioning of the internal organ manifesting *viśiṣṭa-vṛtti*. The same holds good in the case of *ajñāna*. Since the internal organ does not function in sleep, there is no *viśiṣṭa-vṛtti* such as "I do not know Brahman" at that time; consequently there is no direct perception (*avyavahitam pratyakṣam*) of *ajñāna* then.

[59]

कश्चित् अतिक्रान्तं प्रतिस्मृत्य "दृश्यत्वादहमप्येवं लिङ्गं स्यात् द्रष्टुरात्मनः" इति निर्युक्तिकमभिहितमित्याह। किं कारणम् ? अहंतज्ज्ञात्रोर्विवेकाप्रसिद्धेः। यथेह घटदेवदत्तयोः ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वेन स्फुटतरो विभागः प्रसिद्धो लोके, न तथेह अहङ्कारतज्ज्ञात्रोर्विभागोऽस्तीति। तस्मात्, असाध्वेतदभिहितमिति। अत्रोच्यते।

दाह्यदाहकतैकत्र यथा स्याद् वह्निदारुणोः।
ज्ञेयज्ञातृकतैवं स्यादहंज्ञात्रोः परस्परम् ॥ ५९ ॥

Someone remembering what was stated earlier, *viz.* "Even so the 'I', since it is seen, serves as the reason for inferring the existence of the Seer-self" (II. 56) says that it is untenable. Why? Because the distinction between the "I" and its knower, he says, cannot be established. Just as in our day-to-day experience the distinction between a

pot and Devadatta is very clearly established as that between the known object and its knower, even so there is no such distinction between the "I" and its knower; and so what was stated earlier is not correct. We reply as follows.

Just as in the case of fire and wood, the burnt object and the burning agent exist together in the same place [in an indistinguishable form], even so in the case of the "I" and its knower, what is known and its knower exist together in the same place being mutually indistinguishable. (59)

Sureśvara goes back to what was discussed in III. 56 by introducing an objection in the *sambandhokti*. When a person sees an external object, say a pot, the distinction between the seer and the seen is obvious; but we are not able to distinguish, the critic argues, the "I", which is said to be in the same class of objects which are designated as "*dṛśya*", *i.e.* objects which are seen, from its seer (*draṣṭṛ = jñātṛ*). The issue here is further complicated by the fact that the "I" appears to be the seer or knower, *i.e.* the subject of knowledge, as when we say "I know." If so, it is not proper to say, the critic maintains, that the "I" is an object seen and that the Self can be inferred from it.

Sureśvara rejects this argument on the ground that the difficulty in clearly distinguishing the "I" from the knower or seer of the "I" will not alter the object-status of the "I". Let us first of all clarify the nature of the "I" which is said to be the knower or the subject of knowledge as claimed by the critic on the strength of statements such as "I know." The internal organ as such is not and cannot be the knower, because it is material. However, when it carries the reflection of consciousness, it becomes sentient as it were and plays the role of a knower, the subject of knowledge, in respect of things external to it. The internal organ and the consciousness reflected in it become indistinguishable in the same way as in the "red-hot iron" fire and iron are indistinguishable, though they are undoubtedly different from each other. The example of a piece of wood which is burning mentioned by Sureśvara in the verse shows how we not only fail to distinguish fire from wood, but also superimpose the burning capacity, which really belongs to fire, on the wood. Even so do we illicitly transfer the power of knowing or seeing, which really belongs to the

Self, to the internal organ. So the "I"-sense, being only a mode of the internal organ when it is illumined by consciousness, is *dṛśya* and not *draṣṭṛ*. The case of deep sleep clearly shows that the "I" which is a mode of the internal organ is not the seer or the knower. In deep sleep the Witness-self is present, but not the internal organ; that is why there is no "I"-sense or "I"-notion, which is only a mode of the internal organ, at that time. If the "I" itself is the Seer-self, then the absence of the internal organ in sleep must mean the absence of the Seer-self at that time, or the presence of the Seer-self at that time must mean the presence of the "I" then; neither of these alternatives is tenable. Further, since pleasure, pain, etc., which are the characteristics of the internal organ are known, it follows that the internal organ too comes under the category of *dṛśya*.

[60]

एवं तावदविद्योत्थस्य अन्तःकरणस्य बाह्यविषयनिमित्तरूपावच्छेदाय अहंवृत्तिः व्याप्रियते । तयावच्छिन्नं सत् कूटस्थप्रत्यगात्मोपादानावबोधरूपस्य अव्यवधानतया विषयभावं प्रतिपद्यत इति । तत्र तयोर्ज्ञात्रहन्तारूपयोः अवभासकावभास्यत्वसम्बन्धव्यतिरेकेण नान्यत् सम्बन्धान्तरम् उपपद्यते । अहन्तारूपं तु आत्मसात् कृत्वा अहंकञ्चुकं परिधाय उपकार्यत्वोपकारकत्वक्षमः सन्, बाह्यविषयेणोपकारिणा अपकारिणा वा आत्मात्मीयं सम्बन्धं प्रतिपद्यते । तदभिधीयते ।

इदं ज्ञानं भवेज्ज्ञातुर्ममज्ञानं तथाऽहमः ।
अज्ञानोपाधिनेदं स्याद् विक्रियातोऽहमो मम ॥ ६० ॥

Thus, the internal organ, which is a product of *avidyā*, undergoes modification due to its relation with external objects; and there arises the "I"-notion in it for delimiting its modification [as such-and-such]. The internal organ, being delimited by the "I"-notion, becomes an object directly to the reflected consciousness (*i.e. cidābhāsa*) of which the immutable inward Self is the cause. Now, excepting the relation of the revealer and the revealed, no other relation is tenable between the "I" and its knower. Appropriating the internal organ as its own and putting on the mask of

the "I", the Self becomes fit enough for the helped-helper relation, and comes to be related with the external object, helpful or harmful as the case may be, claiming it its own. This is stated now.

To the knower-Self there arises the cognition as "this" [in respect of the internal organ delimited by the " I "]; and to the " I " there arises the cognition as " mine " [in respect of pot, etc.]. The cognition as " this " is through *cidābhāsa* which has *ajñāna* for its adjunct; and the cognition as "mine" is from the "I" of the internal organ which is subject to modification [because of its relation with external object]. (60)

If the "I" is on a par with external objects such as pot inasmuch as all of them are *dṛśya*, why is it, it may be asked, that the "I" is always known as "this", whereas an external object like a pot is cognized as "mine"? In order to answer this question Sureśvara refers to two kinds of relation, *viz.* the revealer-revealed relation (*avabhāsaka-avabhāsya sambandha*) and the helped-helper relation (*upakārya-upakāraka-lakṣaṇa sambandha*). The first relation holds good between the knower-Self and the "I", while the second one obtains between the "I" and the external object such as body, pot, etc. If the non-relational Self becomes relational as it were, it only shows that it has suffered a fall or lapse due to *avidyā*, which takes place in two stages. In the first stage when it is conditioned by *avidyā* alone it has its rapport with the "I"; and in the second stage when it identifies itself with the "I" and is, therefore, conditioned by the internal organ, it meets with external objects which it views as helpful or harmful. In the first stage, there is the cognition of the "I" as "this"; and in the second stage there is the cognition of external objects as "mine".

The inward Self by its very nature is consciousness. The internal organ, though a product of *avidyā*, is essentially pure (*svaccha*) as it arises from the *sattva* aspect of all the five *tanmātras*. By virtue of its "pure" nature and being closest to the inward Self, it carries the reflection (*pratibimba*) or semblance (*ābhāsa*) of consciousness. Since it is material, it is subject to modifications of various kinds. These modifications of the internal organ are

called *vṛttis* or modes. What is called the "I"-sense is a mode of the internal organ which is "directly" revealed by the *cidābhāsa*, the reflected consciousness in it, without the intervention of the sense organ; thus it becomes an object directly to the *cidābhāsa*: the two, that is to say, are related as the revealed and the revealer respectively (*cidābhāsasya indriyavyavadhānamantareṇa ahaṁvṛttyavacchinnam antaḥkaraṇaṁ viṣayatvam pratipadyate*).

Thereafter the *cidābhāsa* identifies itself with the "I". The internal organ undergoes modifications in accordance with the objects which are presented to it. The *cidābhāsa*, having put on the mask of the "I" (*ahaṁkañcukam paridhāya*), can no more be indifferent to the objects. It develops pragmatic attitude towards them through the *vṛttis* which have assumed the forms of the objects (*viṣayākāra-vṛtti*) and which are illumined by it, considers them as what is helpful to it and so on, comes to be related with them in terms of the helped-helper relation (*upakārya-upakāraka bhāva-sambandha*), and claims ownership of them.

If we can conceptualize the empirical journey of the Self, we notice the following milestones in its journey.

(1) Before the commencement of the journey it is non-relational.

(2) There is the emergence of the "I" in the internal organ, which is revealed by the *cidābhāsa*, the name given to the empirical Self. The only relation that obtains between the *cidābhāsa* and the "I" is the revealer-revealed relation.

(3) Then the *cidābhāsa* identifies itself with the "I", *i.e.*, it becomes the "I", and comes to be related with external objects, developing "*mama-buddhi*". It plays the role of *jñātā*, *kartā*, and *bhoktā*.

Jñānottama in his commentary interprets the second line of verse (60) in two ways. The first interpretation has already been mentioned: when *ajñāna* alone is the *upādhi*, there arises the cognition of "this"; and when the utilitarian consideration arises in the internal organ which serves as the *upādhi*, there takes place the cognition of "mine". According to the second interpretation, every object can be cognised as "this" or as "mine". If

the knower is conditioned by *ajñāna* alone, then the object is cognized as "this"; if the knower, in addition to being conditioned by *ajñāna*, develops pragmatic attitude towards the object, then he cognizes the object as "mine".

[61]

एकस्यैव ज्ञातुः, अन्तर्बाह्यनिमित्तभेदात् विभिन्नेऽपि विषये "इदं" "मम" इति ज्ञानद्वैरूप्यं जायत इत्युक्तम् । अत्र उपक्रियमाणापक्रियमाणस्यैव ज्ञातुर्विषये ममप्रत्ययो भवति । विपर्यये च इदंप्रत्यय इति कथमवगम्यते? अवगम्यतामन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् । तत् कथमित्याह ।

अनुपक्रियमाणत्वान्न ज्ञातुः स्यादहं मम ।
घटादिवदिदं तु स्यान्मोहमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ॥ ६१ ॥

It has been stated that two kinds of cognition, the cognition of "this" and the cognition of "mine", arise in respect of the same object for one and the same knower due to the difference between what is internal (*i.e.* the *cidābhāsa* conditioned by *ajñāna*) and what is external (*i.e.* the modification of the internal organ developing the pragmatic attitude towards objects) which are their causes. Here it may be asked: "How is it known that to the knower there arises the cognition of 'mine' in respect of objects which are thought of as helpful or harmful, and on the contrary there arises the cognition of 'this' [when there is *ajñāna* alone as the adjunct]?" The reply is that it is known through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*. To explain how it is known, the following is said.

The "I" does not appear as "mine" to the knower in the same way as pot and other objects [appear as "mine"], since it does not help [or hinder the knower]. However, it appears as "this", since it has *ajñāna* alone as its adjunct. (61)

[62]

मोहतत्कार्याश्रयत्वात्, ज्ञातृत्वविक्रिययोः पूर्वत्र इदंममज्ञानान्वयः प्रदर्शितः । अथाधुना तद्व्यतिरेकेण व्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनार्थमाह ।

विक्रियाऽज्ञानशून्यत्वान्नेदं न च ममात्मनः ।
उत्थितस्य सतोऽज्ञानं नाहमज्ञासिषं यतः ॥ ६२ ॥

Earlier it has been shown that the knower and the "I" get the cognition of "this" and "mine" respectively, since they have *ajñāna* and its effect (*i.e.* the mutable internal organ) as their respective adjuncts. Now the following is said with a view to show that these two cognitions are absent when these two adjuncts are absent.

Neither the cognition of "this" nor that of "mine" arises to the Self [in deep sleep], since it is bereft of the mutable internal organ and *ajñāna* [at that time]; for, only when a person wakes up he knows his ignorance [through recollection] in the form, "I did not know [anything then]." (62)

In the waking state, as also in dream, one gets the cognition of "this" as well as the cognition of "mine" since both *ajñāna* and *antaḥkaraṇa* function then. The internal organ, however, does not function in sleep. Though *ajñāna* is present in the state of sleep, there is no cognition of the "I" then; consequently, it is as good as non-existent. That is why Sureśvara says in the first line of verse (62) that *ajñāna* is absent then. Only when a person recollects his previous experience of deep sleep after waking up, he is able to know that it was present at that time.

[63]

आत्मानात्मविवेकस्य इयत्ताप्रदर्शनार्थमाह ।

वाक्यप्रत्यक्षमानाभ्यामियानर्थः प्रतीयते ।
अनर्थकृत्तमोहानिर्वाक्यादेव सदात्मनः ॥ ६३ ॥

With a view to show the limit of the discrimination between the Self and the not-Self, the following is said.

From the [subsidiary] scriptural text and perceptual evidence, this much is known. But the destruction of igno-

rance which is the cause of evil to the real Self takes place only from the [principal] text. (63)

That there is the Witness-self different from the not-Self can be known through the subsidiary *śruti* texts such as "Which is the Self?" (*BU*, 4.3.7), "What is it that we worship as the Self?" (*AI*, 3.1) as well as through the perceptual experience of the distinction between the Self and the not-Self caused by the *anvaya-vyatireka* reasoning. However, *ajñāna*, the root cause of all evil, can be destroyed only through the knowledge which arises from the *mahāvākya*.

In the first line of verse (63) the word "*vākya*" refers to the subsidiary *śruti* texts which help to clarify the meaning of "*tvam*", and the word "*pratyakṣa*" is used in the sense of the realization of the distinction between the Self and the not-Self through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*. The word "*vākya*" in the second line refers to "*mahāvākya*".

[64]

द्वितीयाध्यायादौ श्रोतृचतुष्टयमुपन्यस्तम्। तत्र कृत्स्नानात्मनिवृत्तौ सत्यां यः प्रत्यगात्मन्यवाक्यार्थतां प्रतिपद्यते, स क्षपिताशेषान्तरायहेतरिति, न तं प्रति वक्तव्यं किञ्चिदपि अवशिष्यते। योऽपि वाक्यश्रवणमात्रादेव प्रतिपद्यते, तस्यापि अतीन्द्रियशक्तिमत्त्वात् न किञ्चिदपि अपेक्षितव्यमस्ति। यश्च श्राविततत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यः स्वयमेवान्वयव्यतिरेकौ कृत्वा, तदवसान एव वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यते, असावपि यथार्थं प्रतिपन्न इति पूर्ववदेवोपेक्षितव्यः। यः पुनः अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ कारयित्वापि पुनः पुनर्वाक्यं श्राव्यते यथाभूतार्थप्रतिपत्तये, तस्य कृतान्वयव्यतिरेकस्य सतः कथं वाक्यं श्राव्यत इति ? उच्यते।

नवसङ्ख्याहृतज्ञानो दशमो विभ्रमाद्यथा।
न वेत्ति दशमोऽस्मीति वीक्षमाणोऽपि तान्नव ॥ ६४ ॥

At the beginning of the second chapter, four classes of disciples were mentioned. Of these, a person [like Virāj], having rejected the entire not-Self, comprehends the non-sentential import in respect of the inward Self; since he has removed the cause of all impediments, there is nothing else which remains to be communicated to him. Also, a person

[like Piśācaka] who comprehends the truth by the mere hearing of the text does not require anything more, as he is in possession of extra-sensory power. Further, a person [like Śvetaketu] who, hearing the text, "That thou art," etc. resorts to the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* on his own, and comprehends the import of the text at the end of this reasoning process, can be left alone like the [two] previous ones, for the reason that he too has known the truth as it is. But in the case of a person who, even after being made to go through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* repeatedly, has to hear the text again and again for the purpose of knowing the reality as it is — for him who has already applied the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* [to the text], why is the text heard [again and again]? The reply is as follows.

It is just like the case of the tenth man who, even though looking at the nine people, does not know, "I am the tenth man," being overwhelmed by the number "nine" due to delusion. (64)

In the *sambandhokti* Sureśvara recalls the four classes of pupils mentioned in Chapter II. 2-3. What Sureśvara wants to convey here is that hearing of the text once is enough for an *adhikārin* for whom there is no obstruction standing in the way of comprehending the import of the *śruti* text. But in the case of one who is not free from obstruction hindering the comprehension of the final truth, there is the need for the hearing of the text many a time.

[65]

अथ दृष्टान्तगतमर्थं दार्ष्टान्तिकार्थे समर्पयिष्यन्नाह ।

अपविद्धद्वयोऽप्येवं तत्त्वमस्यादिना विना ।
वेत्ति नैकलमात्मानं नान्वेष्यं चात्र कारणम् ॥ ६५ ॥

Now, applying the meaning sought to be conveyed by the example to the exemplified, the following is said.

In the same way, though the Self is free from duality, one does not know the only Self without texts like "That thou art." The reason for this need not be searched. (65)

Though the person who counts is the tenth man, he does not realize it as his understanding is carried away or overwhelmed by the thought of nine (*navasaṅkhyayaiva apahṛtajñāno daśamaḥ*); he knows the truth only when he is told by a trustworthy person that he is the tenth. Even so, though the inward Self is, indeed, one and non-dual and is free from bondage, the *jīva* thinks of it as a *saṁsārin*, since its real nature is concealed or overwhelmed by *ajñāna* (*ajñāna-apahṛta svabhāvatvīt*); and without being told that he is the *supreme* non-dual reality which is free from bondage, he does not realize the truth. Since *ajñāna* is only an appearance (*pratibhāsamātraśarīratvāt*), it cannot stand examination. The utterance of the *śruti* text, "You are that Reality," is enough to remove the veil of ignorance and make him realize that he is Brahman-Ātman.

[66]

"नान्वेष्यं चात्र कारणमित्युक्तम्, तत् कस्मात्?" इति चोदिते प्रत्याह अन्वेषणासहिष्णुत्वात्। "तत् कथमिति?" आह।

सेयं भ्रान्तिर्निरालम्बा सर्वन्यायविरोधिनी ।
सहते न विचारं सा तमो यद्वद्दिवाकरम् ॥ ६६ ॥

If it be asked: "It has been stated that the reason for this need not be searched. Why is it so?" we reply that it cannot stand the search. To the question, "How is it so?" we reply as follows.

This ignorance is without any support. It is opposed to all logic. It cannot endure inquiry in the same way as darkness cannot endure the sun. (66)

Sureśvara says that *ajñāna* which plays the dual role of suppressing the real nature of the Self and suggesting what is not in the Self is without any cause in support of it (*nirālambā = klṛpta-kāraṇa-śūnyā*). Just as we can point to clay as the cause of pot,

there is nothing which we can point out as the cause of *ajñāna*. Further, it is opposed to all logic, because the commonly accepted principles relating to the ontological status (*sattā*), existence (*sthiti*), and cognition (*pratīti*) of a thing, through which we understand the things of the world, break down in the case of *ajñāna*. Every object must be either real or unreal; and there is no third alternative which is tenable. But *ajñāna* is said to be neither real nor unreal (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*) in total disregard of the principle of disjunction. Again, what exists can never be sublated. But *ajñāna*, though something existent, suffers sublation. Also, the principle that what does not exist can never be experienced does not hold good in the case of *ajñāna*. Since the usual principles relating to *sattā*, *sthiti*, and *pratīti* break down in the present case, Sureśvara says that *ajñāna* is *sarvanyāyavirodhinī*. Though it is a puzzle to start with, it does not brook inquiry. It is a problem so long as it is not inquired into.

[67]

तस्याः खल्वस्या अविद्याया भ्रान्तेः सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण निवृत्तिः ।

बुबुत्सोच्छेदिनी चास्य सदसीत्यादिना दृढम् ।
प्रतीचि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यान्नासौ मानान्तराद्भवेत् ॥ ६७ ॥

The removal of this illusion of ignorance takes place through the rise of the right knowledge.

From texts such as "You are that Being," which remove the desire for further inquiry, certain knowledge about the inward Self does arise; and this [knowledge] cannot be obtained from other sources. (67)

Since *ajñāna* can be removed by *pramāṇa-jñāna*, *i.e.* knowledge produced by a *pramāṇa*, why should it not be said, it may be asked, that *ajñāna* can also be removed through the knowledge produced by other *pramāṇas* such as perception? We have already stated that the Self alone is the content (*viṣaya*) of *ajñāna*. Only if perception and other *pramāṇas* can reveal the Self, it can be said that they too can remove our *ajñāna* about the Self. Since they cannot, the question of the removal of *ajñāna* by them does

not arise. Sureśvara uses the word "*pratīci*" in the second line of the verse to suggest that the Self which is inward cannot be known through other *pramāṇas* which are competent to reveal only external objects. The expression "*sadasi*" which occurs in the first line of the verse shows that the Self can be known only through the *śruti* text and not through ordinary sentences inasmuch as they are dependent on another *pramāṇa* for the information which they convey.

[68]

कथं पुनर्वाक्यं प्रतिपादयत्येव इति चेत्, दृष्टान्तोक्तिः।

जिज्ञासोर्दशमं यद्वत् नवातिक्रम्य ताम्यतः ।
त्वमेव दशमोऽसीति कुर्यादेवं प्रमां वचः ॥ ६८ ॥

If it be asked again: "How could it be said with certainty that the sentence conveys this knowledge?" the following example is given [to answer the question].

Just as the sentence, "You alone are the tenth" [conveys the desired knowledge] to the suffering inquirer who wants to know the tenth man after counting nine persons, even so does the [scriptural] sentence produce [the desired] knowledge. (68)

[69 - 70]

सा॰ च तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यश्रवणजा प्रमोत्पन्नत्वादेव। न च नैवमिति प्रत्ययान्तरं जायते। तदेतद् दृष्टान्तेन प्रतिपादयति।

दशमोऽसीति वाक्योत्था न धीरस्य विहन्यते ।
आदिमध्यावसानेषु न नवस्वस्य संशयः ॥ ६९ ॥

एवं तत्त्वमसीत्यस्माद् द्वैतनुत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सम्यग्ज्ञाततत्वमर्थस्य जायेतैव प्रमा दृढा ॥ ७० ॥

This knowledge which arises from the hearing of texts such as "That thou art" [does not suffer sublation] just because

it has come into existence [after destroying all duality]. No other cognition to the effect "It is not so" arises [subsequently]. This is established by the example [given below].

His knowledge which arose from the sentence "You are the tenth man" does not suffer sublation. He has no doubt in respect of the nine persons [whom he has counted] before, or during, [or after], the rise of knowledge. (69)

Thus, from the sentence. "That thou art," there does arise firm knowledge of the inward Self which dispels duality to one who has correctly understood the meaning of "Thou". (70)

[71]

प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रमा उपजायत इत्युक्तम् । तत्र चोद्यते—" किं यथा घटादिप्रमेयविषया प्रमा कर्त्रादिकारकभेदानपह्नवेन जायते तथैव, उत अशेषकारकग्रामोपमर्देन कर्तुः प्रत्यगात्मनि ?" — इति । उच्यते ।

प्रत्यक्ताऽस्य स्वतोरूपं निष्क्रियाकारकाफलम् ।
अद्वितीयं तदिद्धा धीः प्रत्यगात्मेव लक्ष्यते ॥ ७१ ॥

It has been stated that knowledge of the Self arises [from the sentence]. Now an objection is raised [with regard to this knowledge]: "Does it arise like the knowledge of pot and other objects without removing the distinctions of the factors of action such as the agent? Or, does it arise in the Self of the agent by destroying the entire set of the factors of action?" We reply as follows.

Inwardness is the intrinsic nature of the Self which is non-dual and which is free from action, factors of action and the fruits of action. The intellect, being illumined by it, is designated as if it is the inward Self. (71)

Ordinarily knowledge arises through factors such as the agent, the object, the instrument, etc. And, after its rise it does not do away with these factors which have been instrumental to its origi-

nation. Applying this principle to the knowledge of the Self, the critic places the Advaitin in a dilemma. If the factors instrumental to the rise of the knowledge of the Self persist even after its rise, then there is no non-duality. If they disappear before the rise of the knowledge of the Self, then the latter cannot arise at all.

There is no force in this objection. On the basis of the principle, "As the object, so the knowledge," we have to say that, if the inward Self is one and non-dual, devoid of all distinctions, then the resulting knowledge of the Self must be of the same nature, being true to its content. Before the rise of the knowledge of the Self, distinctions such as cognizer, act of cognition, instrument of cognition, exist, being superimposed on the non-dual Self due to *ajñāna*. So the origination of the knowledge of the Self is not at all hindered. Once the knowledge of the Self arises, they cease to exist along with *ajñāna*; and so non-duality is not in jeopardy.

If the Self by its very nature is one and non-dual, devoid of the distinctions such as the agent, the instrument, etc., then how is it that the Self is ordinarily known as the subject of knowledge, agent of action, and so on? Sureśvara answers this question in the second line of the verse. When the Self is qualified by the internal organ which is its empirical adjunct, then it passes for the subject of knowledge (*jñātā*), the agent of action (*kartā*), etc. Neither the Self *per se* nor the internal organ in itself is *jñātā*, or *kartā*, or *bhoktā*. On the contrary, it is *cidābhāsa* that is *jñātā*, *kartā*, and *bhoktā*. *Cidābhāsa* is the semblance of consciousness in the internal organ. Being a blend of the internal organ and the reflected consciousness, it is a complex entity. When the internal organ which is material is illumined by the consciousness reflected in it, it becomes a knower, an agent, and an enjoyer. So the internal organ being illumined by the consciousness reflected therein (*iddhā dhīḥ = caitanyābhāsa-dīptā dhīḥ*) appears to be the inward Self in relation to things which are outward to it.

[72]

यस्मादेवम् ।

विपश्चितोऽप्यतस्तस्यामात्मभावं वितन्वते ।
दवीयस्स्विन्द्रियार्थेषु क्षीयते ह्युत्तरोत्तरम् ॥ ७२ ॥

Hence it follows.

So even the wise look upon the intellect as the Self [in their day-to-day life]. But in respect of the distant senses and their objects, the notion of the Self decreases successively indeed [as one moves outward from the intellect]. (72)

[73]

आह — यदि वाक्यमेव यथाभूतार्थावबोधकम्, अथ कस्य हेतोः अविद्योत्थापितस्य कर्तृत्वादेरुपदेश इति ? उक्ते प्रतिविधीयते ।

भ्रान्तिप्रसिद्ध्याऽनूद्यार्थं तत्तत्त्वं भ्रान्तिबाधया ।
अयं नेत्युपदिश्येत तथैवं तत्त्वमित्यपि ॥ ७३ ॥

One may argue: "If the sentence itself conveys the knowledge of the reality as it is, then why should the agency of the Self, etc., which are caused by *avidyā*, be taught?" To this we reply as follows.

By restating the object of erroneous perception, the sentence, "It is not so," teaches the truth of it by negating erroneous perception. Likewise, the sentence, "You are that," [teaches the real nature of the *jīva* by negating what is superimposed on it]. (73)

When the wrong notion of a thing has to be corrected by the right one, a restatement (*anuvāda*) of the former is necessary before the communication of the truth about it. For example, when someone mistakes a post for a man, he is told: "The man is the post" (*puruṣaḥ sthāṇuḥ*). What this sentence conveys is that the object wrongly perceived as a man is a post. When there are two notions about a thing of which one is the wrong one and the other, the right one, the former is sublated by the latter as they are incompatible; and their incompatibility can be brought out if the wrong one is first restated before the communication of the right one. The *Upaniṣad* follows the same technique. We think of the Self as knower, agent and enjoyer while the truth is that it is not any of these. For example, there is a description of the Self as

"the seer, feeler, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, ascertainer, doer..." (*PU*, 4.9). In another place, *śruti* speaks of the Self as "one which eats the fruit of divergent tastes" (*ŚU*, 4.6). These texts, says Sureśvara, are *anuvādas, i.e.* restatements, of our wrong notions about the Self, which have to be corrected. What *śruti* purports to convey by sublating the wrong notions about the Self is: "That (Self) which we think of as agent and enjoyer (*kartā* and *bhoktā*) is non-agent and non-enjoyer (*akartā* and *abhoktā*)."

[74]

इममर्थं दृष्टान्तेन बुद्धौ आरोहयति।

स्थाणुः स्थाणुरितीवोक्तिर्न नृबुद्धिं निरस्यति ।
व्यनुवादात् तथैवोक्तिर्भ्रान्तिं पुंसो न बाधते ॥ ७४ ॥

This point can be brought home by an example.

The repeated utterance, "Post, post", does not remove the wrong notion of man in the absence of the restatement [of the wrong notion]. In the same way, the statement [about the real nature of the Self] does not sublate the person's erroneous notion [about it in the absence of the restatement of the wrong notion about it]. (74)

[75]

यस्मात् श्रोतृप्रसिद्धानुवाद्येव त्वमिति पदम्, तस्मात् उद्दिश्यमानस्थत्वात् दुःखित्वादेरविवक्षितत्वमेव। विधीयमानत्वे हि सति विरोधप्रसङ्गः, न तु विधीयमानानूद्यमानयोः, इति। स्वप्रधानयोर्हि पदयोर्विरोधाशङ्का, सामान्यालिङ्गितत्वात् तयोः, न विपर्यये।

अनालिङ्गितसामान्यौ न जिहासितवादिनौ ।
व्युत्थितौ तत्त्वमौ तस्मादन्योन्याभिसमीक्षणौ ॥ ७५ ॥

Since the word "thou" only recalls what is already known to the hearer, subjection to suffering, etc., which belong to the subject term, are not intended to be conveyed at all.

Indeed, only if they were predicated [of the subject], there would be contradiction [with the import of the *śruti* text]; but there cannot be any contradiction between what is restated and what is predicated. Surely, there is scope for contradiction between two words both of which are principal, since they retain their primary general meanings; but it is not so, when this is not the case.

Since the two words "that" and "thou" do not purport to convey what is to be given up, they do not retain their primary general meanings. Therefore, transcending [the incompatible elements contained in their primary meanings], they show their mutual expectancy. (75)

In the *śruti* text, "*tat tvam asi*," "*tvam*" is the subject term (*uddeśya*) and "*tat*" is the predicate term (*vidheya*). The primary meaning of the word "*tvam*" is the *jīva* who is subject to suffering and who is, therefore, a *saṁsārin*. The primary meaning of "*tvam*" which is already known is not what the *śruti* text intends to convey. In other words, it is not *vidheya*. On the contrary, what it intends to convey is that the *jīva*, being Brahman itself, is not a sufferer and is, therefore, an *asaṁsārin*. Restating the suffering nature of the *jīva* it says that what is cognized as a sufferer is a non-sufferer just as in the case of mistaking a post for a man we say that what is perceived as a person is a post. The *śruti* text means: "You, who are a sufferer, are that Brahman, the non-sufferer." The *asaṁsāribrahmarūpa* which is *vidheya* sublates the *saṁsārijīvarūpa* which is merely restated, because what is predicated as something new is stronger than what is merely restated. So, if we carefully consider the meanings of the two words "*tvam*" and "*tat*", which are related as subject and predicate, we find that there is no contradiction between them.

Let us now examine the issue, argues Sureśvara, from the standpoint of the grammatical coordination between the two words "*tvam*" and "*tat*". Consider, for instance, a sentence like this: "A cow is a horse" ("*gauḥ aśvaḥ*"). Since the two words "*go*" and "*aśva*" do not give up their primary general meanings (*svavācya-sāmānyārtha*), grammatical coordination between them is untenable. But in the case of "*tat*" and "*tvam*", grammatical coordination is not in jeopardy as the two words give up their pri-

mary general meanings which are *avivakṣita* (not intended to be conveyed), and convey, by qualifying each other as *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*, the intended meaning which serves to remove the *saṁsāritva* of the *jīva* and the *pārokṣya* of Brahman. The meaning of verse (75) is: 'The two words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" are *na jihāsitavādinau*, *i.e.* do not convey the ideas of mediacy and transmigratory nature which are to be given up, for these ideas are opposed to the import of the sentence; they are, therefore, *anāliṅgitasāmānyau*, *i.e.* they do not retain their primary general meanings such as mediacy and transmigratory nature; *vyutthitau*, they are freed from their primary meanings; *anyonyābhisamīkṣaṇau*, they remain mutually expectant for the purpose of conveying the import.'

[76]

अपास्तसामान्यार्थत्वात्, अनुवादस्थत्वात्, विधीयमानेन च सह विरोधात्, दुःखित्वादेरस्तु कामं जिहासितार्थयोरसंसर्गः। यथोपन्यस्तदोषविरहात्, तत्त्वमर्थयोः संसर्गोऽस्तु नीलोत्पलवदिति चेत्, नैवमप्युपपद्यते। तस्मात्।

तदर्थयोस्तु निष्ठात्मा द्वयपारोक्ष्यवर्जितः।
नाद्वितीयं विनात्मानं नात्मा नित्यदृशा विना ॥ ७६ ॥

It may be argued: "Since the primary general meanings of the two words ["*tat*" and "*tvam*"] are discarded, and since the sense of subjection to suffering, etc. [signified by "*tvam*"] is of the nature of restatement and comes into conflict with what is predicated, let there be no relation between the [primary] meanings of these two words, which have to be given up. However, there could be relation between the [implied] meanings of "*tat*" and "*tvam*", as in the case of the "blue lotus", since the defect [of conflict between the meanings of subject and predicate terms] mentioned above cannot arise [in this manner of synthesizing the implied meanings of the two words]." This too, we reply, is untenable. Hence we say.

The meanings of the two words ["*tat*" and "*tvam*"] terminate in the Self which is devoid of both duality and mediacy. The non-duality [of Brahman] is not possible without [the identity of Brahman with] the Self. The Self cannot be [eternal] without the eternal consciousness (*i.e.* Brahman). (76)

Though the words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" are in grammatical co-ordination, it is not possible to construe the sense of oneness from their primary meanings which contain incompatible elements not amenable to synthesis. The sense of immediacy and transmigratoriness conveyed by "*tvam*" is incompatible with the sense of mediacy and non-transmigratoriness signified by "*tat*". But why should we not construe, the critic argues, the sense of oneness-with-relation (*abheda-saṁsarga*) from the implied meanings of these two words which are in grammatical coördination as in the case of the "blue lotus"? Taking into consideration the grammatical coordination between the two words "blue" and "lotus" in the sentence "*nīlaṁ utpalam*" and the relation of the qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva-sambandha*) between the meanings of these two words, we say that this sentence denotes an object characterized not only by "*utpalatva*" (lotusness), but also by "*nīlatva*" (blueness); it means: "The object which is a lotus is blue." Here we have *abheda-saṁsarga*, oneness-with-relation. In the same way, why should we not say that, since the words "*tvam*" and "*tat*" signify through implication the immediate consciousness and the non-dual reality, the sentence denotes the reality which is characterized by non-duality and immediacy (*advitīyo'sau aparokṣaḥ pratyagātmā*)?

Sureśvara rejects the above argument in verse (76). What holds good in the case of "*nīlam utpalam*" does not hold good in "*tat tvam asi*" since the distinction of substance and attribute is not possible in the case of the non-dual reality. The *śruti* text has its import in the Self which is by its very nature non-dual and immediate. The word "*tat*" signifies through implication non-dual Brahman. Unless the Self is identical with Brahman, the latter cannot be non-dual. The word "*tvam*" signifies through implication the inward Self. Unless Brahman is identical with the Self, the latter cannot be the eternal immediate consciousness. It means that "*tvam*" and "*tat*" denote Brahman-Ātman, *i.e.* the

reality which is bereft of distinctions and relations. If so, the text "*tat tvam asi*" does not lend itself to be interpreted in terms of *abheda-saṁsarga* (oneness-with-relation), but only in terms of *svarūpābheda* (oneness-in-itself).

[77]

अत्राह— "किमिह जिहासितम्, किं वा उपादित्सितम् ?" इति। उच्यते। प्रत्यगात्मार्थाभिधायिनस्त्वंपदात्, उभयं प्रतीयते "अहं दुःखी", "प्रत्यगात्मा" च। तत्र च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽहं दुःखीत्यनेन अभिसम्बन्ध आत्मयाथात्म्यानवबोधहेतुक एव। अतोऽहमर्थः अनर्थोपसृष्टत्वात्, अज्ञानोत्थत्वाच्च हेय इति प्रत्यक्षतोऽवसीयते। "तदर्थे किं हेयम्, किं वा उपादेयमिति नावध्रियते"। तत इदमभिधीयते।

पारोक्ष्यं यत्तदर्थे स्यात् तद्धेयमहमर्थवत् ।
प्रतीचेवाहमोऽभेदः पारोक्ष्येणात्मनोऽपि मे ॥ ७७ ॥

Here one may ask: "What aspect [of the meaning of 'thou'] has to be rejected and what aspect of it has to be accepted?" We reply as follows. From the word "thou" which signifies the inward Self, a twofold sense is known — the sense of "I am a sufferer" as well as the sense of "I am the inward Self." The relation of the inward Self with the notion of "I am a sufferer," is caused by the ignorance of the real nature of the Self alone. Hence, it is quite obvious that the "I" has to be rejected because it is connected with evil and also because it is a product of *ajñāna*. Again, one may ask: "It is not known as to what aspect [of the meaning of 'that'] has to be rejected and what aspect of it has to be accepted." So the following is said.

Mediacy which is a part of the meaning of "that" has to be rejected just as the "I" [which is a part of the meaning of "thou"] has to be rejected. Just as the "I" is identified with the inward Self [due to ignorance], even so my supreme Self is identified with mediacy. (77)

The word "*tvam*" signifies the "I" which is characterized by suffering and other qualities as well as the inward Self. Of these two aspects of its meaning, the former has to be rejected because of its association with suffering, etc. and also because of its being unreal. Since the sense of inward consciousness, which is the other aspect of its meaning, is the import of the *śruti* text, it has to be retained. In the same way, the sense of mediacy, omniscience, etc. which is one aspect of the meaning of "*tat*" has to be rejected, while the sense of non-duality, of being the witness, conveyed by it has to be retained.

[78]

" कथं पुनस्तदर्थोऽद्वितीयलक्षणः प्रत्यगात्मोपाश्रयं सद्वितीयत्वं दुःखित्वं निरन्वयम् अपनुदतीति ? " उच्यते । न च एतयोर्निवर्तकनिवर्त्यभावं वयं ब्रूमः । कथं तर्हि ? त्वमर्थे प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रागनवबुद्धाद्वितीयता साऽनेनावबोध्यते । अतोऽनवबोधनिरासेन तदुत्थस्य सद्वितीयत्वस्य त्वमर्थस्थस्य, परोक्षत्वस्य च तदर्थस्थस्य निरसनात्, न वैयधिकरण्यादिचोद्यस्य अवसरोऽस्तीति। तदिदमभिधीयते।

तत्त्वमर्थेन सम्पृक्तो नानात्वं विनिवर्तयेत् ।
नापरित्यक्तपारोक्ष्यं त्वं तदर्थं सिसृप्सति ॥ ७८ ॥

Again, one may ask: "How can non-duality which is the meaning of 'that' remove without any residue the sense of having a second and being subject to suffering conveyed by the word 'thou'?" We reply as follows. We do not say that these two words are related as the remover and the removed. What then? The sense of non-duality which was not known earlier in respect of the inward Self signified by "thou" is predicated of it by "that". So, since by the removal of ignorance, what has been caused by it, *viz.* the sense of having a second which is included in the meaning of "thou" as well as the sense of mediacy which is included in the meaning of "that" is removed, there is no scope for the defects such as the two words having different denotations mentioned by the critic. This is stated as follows.

"That," when related to the meaning of "thou," removes plurality. Similarly, "thou" will have no relation with the meaning of "that" which is not divested of mediacy. (78)

Qualities such as subjection to suffering and having-a-second, *i.e. duḥkhitva* and *sadvitīyatva*, are associated with the inward Self which is signified by "*tvam*". Brahman which is signified by the word "*tat*" is associated with qualities such as mediacy and non-transmigratoriness, *i.e. pārokṣya* and *asaṁsāritva*. When each word conveys its own meaning, how can the knowledge of the meaning of "*tat*", asks the critic, lead to the removal of the duality, etc., which form part of the connotation of "*tvam*"? The cognition of shell, we know, does not remove the rope-snake illusion. Similarly, the comprehension of the real nature of what is signified by "*tat*" cannot, the critic holds, remove the false notions about the inward Self. Since the two words have different connotations, they must refer to different objects (*vaiyadhikaraṇya*). If it be said, with a view to avoid the difficulty of having different denotations, that the word "*tat*" conveys the same meaning imparted by "*tvam*", then there will arise, the critic argues, the defect of *punarukti*; since what is sought to be conveyed can be imparted by one word, the second word will become useless (*padāntara-vaiyarthya*). Also, it is not possible to have a sentence with one word (*ekapadavākya*) by dropping the other word on the ground of its being superfluous. In view of these difficulties, it has to be said, the critic says, that each word has its own connotation; consequently, the denotations of these two words must be different.

This argument is not satisfactory. When the non-dual-Brahman-nature is predicated of the subject term, it removes the ignorance about the latter; and when the ignorance about the latter (*i.e.* the Self) is removed, the wrong notions caused by it get removed. When one understands the inward Self to be Brahman from the *mahāvākya*, the mediacy of Brahman automatically gets removed. Neither the two words, nor their meanings are related as the remover and the removed. Though the two words have different connotations, they denote one and the same entity; and so there is no defect of *vaiyadhikaraṇya*.

[79]

"कस्मात् पुनः कारणात् तदर्थोऽद्वितीयलक्षणः त्वमर्थेन प्रत्यगात्मना अपृथगर्थः सन् अविद्योत्थं सद्वितीयत्वं निहन्तीति ?" उच्यते। विरोधात्। तदुच्यते।

संसारिताद्वितीयेन पारोक्ष्यं चात्मना सह।
प्रासङ्गिकं विरुद्धत्वात् तत्त्वंभ्यां बाधनं तयोः॥ ७९॥

"How is it, then," one may ask, "that the meaning of 'that,' which is the non-dual Brahman and which is not different from the inward Self which is signified by 'thou,' destroys the notion of having-a-second caused by ignorance?" The reply is that it is because of contradiction. This is explained as follows.

Since transmigratoriness is opposed to non-duality, and since mediacy is opposed to [the immediacy of] the Self, the removal of these two (i.e. transmigratoriness and mediacy) takes place necessarily from the two words "that" and "thou". (79)

Sureśvara considers a different objection in the *sambandhokti* and rejects it. "What is the import of the present *śruti* text ?" asks the critic. If the sense of oneness is the import of the text, then the removal of transmigratoriness cannot be its import. If the latter too is its import, then there will be the defect of sentence-split (*vākyabheda*) as the sentence is not notionally one. This objection, says Sureśvara, is of no avail. The text purports to convey the oneness of Brahman-Ātman. Since transmigratoriness and mediacy go contrary to the import of the text, they are negated by it. If the immediate Self is the non-dual Brahman itself, then the transmigratoriness ascribed to the Self stands contradicted by the non-dual nature of Brahman; similarly, the mediacy of Brahman stands contradicted by the immediacy of the Self.

[80]

तत्त्वमर्थयोस्तु बाधकत्वेऽन्यदपि कारणम् उच्यते।

अज्ञातपुरुषार्थत्वाच्छ्रौतत्वात् तत्त्वमर्थयोः ।
स्वमर्थमपरित्यज्य बाधकौ स्तां विरुद्धयोः ॥ ८० ॥

Yet another reason is given to show why the meanings of "that" and "thou" set aside [what is opposed to them].

Since what is signified by "that" and "thou" is the good of human life not already known and is the import of *śruti*, their meanings [which qualify each other] sublate what is opposed to them, without giving up their meanings. (80)

If the import of the text and the sense of transmigratoriness, etc. are opposed to each other, why should it be said that the former sublates the latter, and not *vice versa*? Sureśvara answers this question in verse (80). He gives three reasons to show why the import of the *śruti* text alone sublates what is opposed to it. First of all, what *śruti* conveys is not already known. Secondly, it teaches the highest good sought after by human beings. Thirdly, it is the import of the *śruti* text.

[81]

एवं तावद् यथोपक्रान्तेन प्रक्रियावर्त्मना न प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरैः विरोधगन्धोऽपि सम्भाव्यते। यदा पुनः सर्वप्रकारेणापि यतमाना नैवेमं वाक्यार्थं सम्भावयामः, प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरविरोधत एव, तस्मिन्नपि पक्षे उच्यते।

प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धं चेद् वाक्यमर्थं वदेत् क्वचित् ।
स्यात्तु तद्दृष्टिविध्यर्थं योषाग्निवदसंशयम् ॥ ८१ ॥

Thus, according to the method of inquiry which has been followed here, no conflict whatsoever with other sources of knowledge such as perception arises. However, if someone holds, "In spite of all efforts, we do not get at this import of the text only because of conflict with other sources of knowledge such as perception," the following is said in connection with this standpoint.

If the text in some places conveys a meaning which is opposed to *pramāṇas* such as perception, it is surely for the purpose of enjoining meditation like the sentence, "Women is the [sacrificial] fire." (81)

The question of scripture *v.* other sources of knowledge is taken up here.

Strictly speaking, the implied meaning of the text "That thou art" does not come into conflict with what is conveyed by other *pramāṇas*. While perception tells us that the *jīva* is an agent and an enjoyer at the *vyāvahārika* level, *śruti* tells us that the *jīva* is a non-agent and a non-enjoyer from the *pāramārthika* standpoint. Because of the difference in the standpoint there is no conflict between the teaching of *śruti* and the evidence of perception. However, if one interprets the text as enjoining meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) on the assumption that there is conflict between them, then one should not expect the text to convey the knowledge of the highest reality, as its import is in enjoining meditation and not in revealing the truth. This, however, is not desirable, and so it is wrong to say that the text is *prasaṅkhyāna-vidhiparam* and not *kevalavastuparam*.

Reference has been made in the second line of verse (81) to a *śruti* text (*CU*, 5.8.1.) which occurs in the context of the teaching of the evolution of the libation for the purpose of meditation. Though the woman is not the sacrificial fire, still for the purpose of meditation one should think so; and so it is a case of "*atasmin tadbuddhi*". When the *śruti* text does not purport to convey the knowledge of the reality and thereby remove the primal ignorance, the source of all evil, it becomes useless (*ānarthakya*).

[82]

यदा तु तत्त्वमस्यादि वाक्यं सर्वप्रकारेणापि विचार्यमाणं न क्रियां कटाक्षेणापि वीक्षते, तदा प्रसङ्ख्यानादिव्यापारो दुस्सम्भाव्य इति। तदुच्यते।

वस्त्वेकनिष्ठं वाक्यं चेत् न तस्य स्यात् क्रियार्थता।
वस्तुनो ह्येकरूपत्वाद् विकल्पस्याप्यसम्भवः ॥ ८२ ॥

Since *śruti* texts such as "That thou art," though considered from all points of view, have nothing whatsoever to do with action, it is not possible to show that they enjoin action such as meditation. This is explained as follows.

If the sentence has its purport only in the existent reality, then it does not have its purport in action. Since the reality is of one nature, there is no possibility of alternatives [thereto]. (82)

Is it possible to maintain that this *śruti* text plays the dual role of enjoining *prasaṅkhyāna* as well as revealing the reality? Sureśvara says: "no". It is wrong to say that the text "That thou art" imparts the knowledge of the existent reality through meditation (*prasaṅkhyānadvāreṇa-vastuniṣṭhatvam*). If we examine the text by applying the sixfold criteria such as *upakrama-upasaṁhāra*, we find that it has its purport in the identity of Brahman-Ātman and not in action. The immutable existent reality is fit enough only to be known. Being immutable and ever-existent, it cannot be accomplished through meditative action.

Further, every object is what it is: it does not admit of different predications (*vikalpa*) simultaneously or successively. The object in front cannot be a post and a man at the same time, or a post at one time and a man at another time. In the same way, the immutable reality cannot be ever-existent (*nityasiddha*) as well as attainable through meditative action (*upāsanāsādhya*) simultaneously or successively.

[83]

भिन्नविषयत्वाच्च न प्रमाणान्तरविरोधः। कथम्? उच्यते।

अपूर्वाधिगमं कुर्वत् प्रमाणं स्यान्न चेन्न तत् ।
न विरोधस्ततो युक्तो विभिन्नार्थावबोधिनोः ॥ ८३ ॥

Further, because of the difference in the subject matter, there is no conflict with another *pramāṇa*. If it is asked, "How?" we reply as follows.

What produces a new knowledge is a *pramāṇa*. What does not do this is not a *pramāṇa*. So there is no conflict [between *śruti* and other *pramāṇas*] as they give knowledge of different objects. (83)

In verse (81) conflict between *śruti* and other *pramāṇas* was accepted for the sake of argument; and on the basis of this assumption the standpoint of those who interpret the *śruti* text as enjoining meditation was examined.

Sureśvara now argues that the question of conflict between *śruti* and other sources of knowledge does not arise as they deal with different subject matter. A *pramāṇa* to justify its claim must produce a knowledge which is not otherwise obtained through another source of knowledge. The scope of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa* is restricted to Brahman-Ātman which is outside the purview of perception and other sources. If the *śruti* text conveys what is already known, it will be no better than an *anuvāda-vākya* such as "Fire is the antidote for cold" for which no validity is accorded.

[84]

य एवमपि भिन्नविषयाणां विरोधं वक्ति, सोऽत्रापि विरोधं ब्रूयात्।

नायं शब्दः कुतो यस्माद्रूपं पश्यामि चक्षुषा ।
इति यद्वत्तथैवायं विरोधोऽक्षजवाक्ययोः ॥ ८४ ॥

If anyone still speaks of conflict between *pramāṇas* which have different subject matter, let him speak of conflict here also.

"This is not sound." "Why?" "Because I see colour with my eyes." Like this is the conflict between what is conveyed by perception and *śruti*. (84)

Just as there is no conflict between the auditory sense which apprehends sound and the visual sense which apprehends colour, even so there is no conflict between perception which apprehends external objects and the *śruti* text which comprehends the inward Self.

[85]

प्रमाणानां सतां न विरोधः श्रोत्रादीनामिव भिन्नविषयत्वात्। ययोश्चाभिन्नविषयत्वं तयोराखुनकुलयोरिव प्रतिनियत एव बाध्यबाधकभावः स्यात्। अतस्तदुच्यते।

प्रत्यक्षं चेन्न शाब्दं स्याच्छाब्दं चेदक्षजं कथम्।
प्रत्यक्षाभासः प्रत्यक्षे ह्यागमाभास आगमे ॥ ८५ ॥

There is no conflict between two sources of knowledge which are valid, since they have different subject matter like the auditory sense, etc. [which have different subject matter]. However, if they have the same subject matter, then they are necessarily related as the sublated and the sublator like the rat and the mongoose. So this is stated as follows.

If a thing is known through perception, then it is not known [or sublated] by verbal testimony. Again, if an object is known through verbal testimony, how can it be known [or sublated] by perception? [If a thing is cognized] by perception, [then what cognizes it differently must be] pseudo-perception. [In the same way, if an object is revealed] by scripture, [then, what reveals it differently must be] pseudo-scripture. (85)

Since each *pramāṇa* has its own subject matter and is authoritative in respect of what it conveys, the so-called conflict is not between one *pramāṇa* and another *pramāṇa*, but between a *pramāṇa* and a pseudo-*pramāṇa*, which are related as the sublator and the sublated. If the shell which is in front is perceived as shell, then it is valid perception; but if it is perceived as silver, then it is pseudo-perception. Here, since both the cognitions relate to the same object, they conflict with each other. Both of them cannot be valid, since they are related as the sublator and the sublated; and if one is true, the other must be false. The silver-cognition which is sublated is pseudo-perception, whereas the shell-cogni-

tion which sublates it is a valid one. This is how we have to resolve the apparent conflict between two *pramāṇas*, be it between perception and scripture, or between perception and inference.

[86]

न च प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तन्याय इह सम्भवति, शब्दादीनां प्रत्येकं प्रमाणत्वात्। अत आह।

स्वमहिम्ना प्रमाणानि कुर्वन्त्यर्थावबोधनम्।
इतरेतरसाचिव्ये प्रामाण्यं नेष्यते स्वतः ॥ ८६ ॥

Since verbal testimony, etc. are each one of them *pramāṇas*, the inferential argument containing *pratijñā*, *hetu*, and *dṛṣṭānta* cannot be brought in here [for refuting *śruti*], [or, the principle of mutual dependence applicable to *pratijñā*, *hetu*, and *dṛṣṭānta* does not apply here]. So the following is said.

Pramāṇas, by their own strength, convey the knowledge of their respective objects. If they depend on one another [in doing their work], the independent validity [of each *pramāṇa*] is not cared for. (86)

Since the intrinsic validity of each *pramāṇa* is accepted, the dependence of one *pramāṇa* on another is no more tenable than the conflict between them. We have already stated that there is no conflict between the teaching of the *mahāvākya* and perception, since the former teaches the *asaṁsāritva* of the *jīva* from the *pāramārthika* standpoint, while the latter speaks of its *saṁsāritva* from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint. Consequently, the teaching of scripture cannot be set aside on the ground that it stands contradicted by perception or inference.

Consider, for example, the following inference:

Pratijñā : The sentence "That thou art" is invalid.

Hetu : Because it conveys what is opposed to perception.

Udāharaṇa: All sentences which convey what is opposed to perception are invalid, *e.g.* the sentence, "The sacrificial post is the sun."

The above inference consists of three propositions: *pratijñā* is the proposition to be proved; *hetu* is the proposition which states the reason; and *udāharaṇa* is the proposition which states the invariable relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, supported by an example (*dṛṣṭānta*). The above argument is untenable. First of all, it is wrong to say that the meaning of the sentence "The sacrificial post is the sun" (*āditya yūpaḥ*), which is cited as an example, comes into conflict with perception. We know that the word "sun" signifies an object to which a cow cannot be tied. There is also in the sequel the sentence: "The cow is tied to the sacrificial post." So we have to say that the sentence "*āditya yūpaḥ*" is invalid, not because it comes into conflict with perception, but because it comes into conflict with the supplementary sentence (*śeṣi-vākya-virodhāt aprāmāṇyam*). As for the *hetu* mentioned in the argument, we have already pointed out that what is stated by the *śruti* text is not contradicted by perception. Since each *pramāṇa* has intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇyāt*), it conveys the knowledge of its object without seeking coherence with, or the assent of, another *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇāntara-saṁvāda anapekṣatvena*). If coherence with, or concurrence of, another *pramāṇa* is required for validating one *pramāṇa*, then it will lead to the fallacy of infinite regress, as the second *pramāṇa* has to be validated by the third, and so on.

Jñānottama in his commentary suggests another explanation for "*pratijñā-hetu-dṛṣṭānta-nyāya*." Since *pratijñā*, etc. are parts of inference, they are mutually dependent. But the *pramāṇas* such as perception, inference, and verbal testimony are not thus mutually dependent, because every one of them functions on its own independently of others. If they were mutually dependent, they would not only lose their intrinsic validity, but also would be treated collectively as one *pramāṇa*, which is absurd.

[87]

न च सुखदुःखादिसम्बन्धोऽवगत्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैः गृह्यते, येन वरोधः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरुद्भाव्यते। कथम् ? शृणु।

दुःखितावगतिश्चेत् स्यान्न प्रमीयेत सात्मवत् ।
कर्मण्येव प्रमा न्याय्या न तु कर्तर्यपि क्वचित् ॥ ८७ ॥

The connection between the Self which is of the nature of consciousness and pleasure, pain, etc. is not comprehended by the sources of knowledge such as perception. If that were the case, then the question of conflict with perception and other sources of knowledge could be raised. If it is asked "Why?", then listen.

If misery, etc. are inherent in the Self, they cannot be known in the same way as the Self cannot be known. It is proper to speak of knowledge in respect of the object alone; but nowhere is there knowledge of the subject. (87)

An object can be known, but not the subject. If misery, etc. are qualities of the Self which is the subject, then they cannot be known, because the Self in which they are supposed to be inherent is not known. Inasmuch as they are known, they must be different from the Self. The Self which is the subject cannot know itself; nor is it known by anything else. It is not, therefore, an object of knowledge.

[88]

अभ्युपगमेऽपि च प्रसङ्ख्यानशतेनापि नैव त्वं सम्भावितदोषान्मुच्यसे। अत आह।

प्रमाणबद्धमूलत्वाद् दुःखित्वं केन वार्यते।
अग्न्युष्णवन्निवृत्तिः चेन्नैरात्म्यं ह्येति सौगतम् ॥ ८८ ॥

And, even if it be admitted [that the Self is connected with pain, etc.] you will not be free from the defects that would arise even by a hundred meditations. So the following is said.

If the suffering nature of the Self is supported by a *pramāṇa*, how could it be removed like the heat of fire? If it could be removed, it would, indeed, be the extinction of the Self as in Buddhism. (88)

What is proved by a *pramāṇa* is real; and what is real can never be removed. If it is proved that the Self, being connected with suffering, is in bondage, then the bondage of the Self can never be removed even by a hundred acts of *prasaṅkhyāna* or by any other means. The attempt to remove the heat of fire will result in the extinction of fire; even so the attempt to free the Self from suffering, etc. will result in the extinction of the Self, a position not different from that of the Buddhists, if subjection to suffering is of the nature of the Self.

[89]

अथ मतम्।

निराकुर्यात् प्रसङ्ख्यानं दुःखित्वं चेत् स्वनुष्ठितम्।
प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धत्वात् कथमुत्पादयेत् प्रमाम् ॥ ८९ ॥

Then there is another view.

If it be said that well-performed meditation can remove the suffering nature [of the Self], how could it give rise to valid knowledge, since what it conveys is opposed to perception and other sources of knowledge? (89)

The votary of *prasaṅkhyāna* may argue in a different way. According to this argument, *prasaṅkhyāna* removes the suffering nature of the Self by generating a knowledge which is opposed to the one revealed by perception, etc. This argument is not satisfactory. Meditation which is mere concentration of mind is not a *pramāṇa*; it cannot, therefore, produce knowledge at all. Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that meditation is a *pramāṇa*, how could it remove the suffering nature of the Self, since what it conveys goes contrary to the evidence of perception and other sources of knowledge?

[90 - 91]

ननु—"प्रसङ्ख्यानं नाम तत्त्वमस्यादिशब्दार्थान्वयव्यतिरेकयुक्तिविषयबुद्ध्याम्रेडनमभिधीयते। तच्च अनुष्ठीयमानं प्रमितिवर्धनया परिपूर्णां प्रमितिं जनयति, न पुनरैकाग्र्यवर्धनयेति, यथाऽशेषाशुचिनीडे स्त्रीकुणपे कामिनीति निर्वस्तुकः पुरुषायासमात्रजनितः प्रत्यय इति।" तन्न। यतः।

अभ्यासोपचयाद्बुद्धेर्यत् स्यादैकाग्र्यमेव तत् ।
न हि प्रमाणान्यभ्यासात् कुर्वन्त्यर्थावबोधनम् ॥ ९० ॥

अभ्यासोपचिता कृत्स्नं भावना चेन्निवर्तयेत् ।
नैकान्तिकी निवृत्तिः स्याद् भावनाजं हि तत्फलम् ॥ ९१ ॥

It may be argued: 'It is said that meditation is the repeated application of the mind to the idea which is conveyed by sentences such as "That thou art" and which has been made intelligible by the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka.* When it is practised, it produces complete knowledge by strengthening the valid cognition, and not by increasing the concentration of the mind. It is not like the imaginary notion of a man — the notion that the corpse of a woman full of filth is a lovely woman — which arises because of his own mental exertion.' This cannot be accepted, for:

From the accumulation of repetition, what takes place is the concentration of mind. Indeed, *pramāṇas* do not reveal their objects as a result of repetition. (90)

If it be said that meditation based on the accumulation of repetition removes the entire bondage, we reply that it cannot be the final removal, because it is the result produced by meditation. (91)

An objection of the advocate of *prasaṅkhyāna* stated in the *sambandhokti* is refuted in verses (90) and (91). The contention of the opponent here is that meditation gives rise to knowledge as it forms part of the discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana.* What is known from the hearing (*śravaṇa*) of the text must be examined through the various kinds of reasoning (*manana*); and the repeated meditation (*nididhyāsana*) on the sense of the text gives rise to the desired knowledge. *Śruti* itself, says the opponent, refers to meditation as the means to Self-realization when it says (*BU*, 2.4.5.) that the Self should be seen—that it should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon (*ātma vā are draṣṭavyaḥ, śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*). Further, repeated meditation, he argues,

leads to the attainment of Brahman that one aims at after departing from the body as stated in the text (*CU*, 3.14.1), "According as his volition is in this world, so does he become on departing from here."

The above argument, says Sureśvara, is untenable. First of all, the advocate of *prasaṅkhyāna* is mistaken in his assessment of the role and utility of the discipline of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*. The scope of the first two in the discipline is restricted to the removal of doubt (*asambhāvanā* = *samśaya*) about the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya* respectively. One may doubt whether the *Upaniṣadic* text which is the *pramāṇa* purports to teach Brahman or some other entity. This doubt about the *Upaniṣad*, which is called *pramāṇagata-sandeha*, is removed by the hearing of the text. The doubt whether Brahman and the *jīva* are identical or not, which is called *prameyagata-sandeha*, is removed by rational reflection on the content of the *śruti* text. What is called *nididhyāsana* or repeated meditation is intended to keep off the wrong notions (*viparītabhāvanā* = *viparyaya*) such as "The pluralistic universe is real; the difference between Brahman and the *jīva* is real," which are opposed to the teaching of *śruti*, by developing concentration of the mind. In short, the discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana* is for the purpose of removing the obstacles, *viz.* doubts and wrong notions, that distract the mind and thereby hinder the origination of knowledge. As *śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana* are not *pramāṇas*, they cannot produce knowledge, though they are indirectly useful to the origination of knowledge. Secondly, so far as a *pramāṇa* is concerned, it does its work on its own without being pressed into service repeatedly. Given the necessary conditions for the rise of knowledge, the visual sense, for instance, straight away gives us the knowledge of colour without any need to resort to it again and again for the purpose of knowing colour. Finally, *prasaṅkhyāna* which is but a mental act cannot lead to the everlasting liberation, since whatever is achieved through action is perishable.

[92]

अपि चाह ।

दुःख्यस्मीत्यपि चेद्ध्वस्ता कल्पकोट्युपबृंहिता ।
स्वल्पीयोऽभ्यासजा स्थास्न्वी भावनेत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥ ९२ ॥

Moreover, the following has to be said.

If the notion of "I am a sufferer" accumulated during crores of aeons can be destroyed by meditation, what is the proof that the [contrary] conviction arising from meditation performed for a while be permanent? (92)

[93]

ननु शास्त्रात् स्थास्नुत्वं भविष्यति। नैवम्। यथावस्थितवस्तुयाथात्म्यावबोध-मात्रकारित्वात् शास्त्रस्य। न हि पदार्थशक्त्याधानकृच्छास्त्रम्। प्रसिद्धं च लोके।

भावनाजं फलं यत् स्याद् यच्च स्यात्कर्मणः फलम्।
न तत्स्थास्न्विति मन्तव्यं द्रविडेष्विव सङ्गतम् ॥ ९३ ॥

It may be argued: "Permanence there will be because of scripture." We reply: it is not so, because scripture can do the work of only revealing the real nature of the object as it is. Indeed, scripture cannot bestow any power on an object. And this is well-known in our life.

It should not be thought that the result of meditation as well as that of action is permanent like relation among the Dravidians. (93).

It may be argued that meditation produces a permanent result on the ground that the *śruti* text (*CU*, 8.15.1) declares that one who reaches *Brahma-loka* by practising *saguṇopāsanā* "does not return hither again" (*na ca punarāvartate*). This argument, says Sureśvara, is not satisfactory. It is well known that anything that is produced by action is perishable. And this is also confirmed by a text of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 1.2.12 which says: "*nāsti akṛtaḥ kṛtena*." What this text means is: "If there is nothing in this world which is not the result of *karma* and if everything which is a product of *karma* is perishable, then why should one resort to *karma*?" What is impermanent can never be made permanent by anything, not even by *śruti*. A *pramāṇa* can reveal an object as it is; it cannot transform the nature of the object by conferring a new power on it. So what is accomplished by *prasaṅkhyāna* cannot be ever-lasting. What, then, is the meaning of the *anāvṛtti*-

śruti text which says that one who has reached *Brahma-loka* does not return to the world of transmigratory existence? What is meant by this text is that one who has reached *Brahma-loka*, after attaining the saving knowledge, is finally liberated and there is no more *saṁsāra* to such a person.

[49]

यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपात्तमात्मनो दुःखित्वम्, तथापि तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थप्रत्यय एव बलीयान् इति निश्चयः, अव्यभिचारिप्रामाण्यवाक्योपात्तत्वात्, प्रमेयस्य च स्वत एव निर्दुःखित्वसिद्धेः। प्रत्यक्षादेस्तु सव्यभिचारित्वात्, सम्भावनायाश्च पुरुषपरिकल्पनामात्रावष्टम्भत्वाच्चेति।

निर्दुःखित्वं स्वतस्सिद्धं प्रत्यक्षादेश्च दुःखिता।
को ह्यात्मानमनादृत्य विश्वसेद् बाह्यमानतः ॥ ९४ ॥

Even if the suffering nature of the Self is known through *pramāṇas* such as perception, still it is certain that only the cognition which arises from texts such as "That thou art" is stronger, because it is obtained from texts which have invariable validity and also because it is known that the Self which is the cognitum is by its very nature devoid of suffering. On the contrary, perception, etc. are liable to err; also the supposition of the suffering nature [of the Self] rests merely on the imagination of the person.

Freedom from suffering is self-established. But the suffering nature [of the Self] is shown by perception, etc. Who will, indeed, accept the evidence of the external source disregarding the revelation of one's own Self? (94)

Sureśvara now resorts to *abhyupetyavāda*, *i.e.* a position which he assumes for the sake of argument, though it has already been rejected as untenable. It has already been stated that there cannot be conflict between two *pramāṇas*. Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that perception, contrary to what is conveyed by the *śruti* text, shows that the Self is subject to suffering, the testimony of *śruti*, argues Sureśvara, will hold good as *śruti* is stronger than perception and other *pramāṇas*. *Śruti* which *is apau-*

ruṣeya has invariable validity (*avyabhicāriprāmāṇya*); that is to say, it is always free from defects such as omission and commission which arise because of the association of the human factor. But perception and other *pramāṇas* have only variable validity (*vyabhicāriprāmāṇya*). It is well-known that we are occasionally misled by our senses and that our inferential arguments sometimes turn out to be fallacious. If even in one case we can be deceived by our senses and betrayed by our reasoning, there will always be doubt about their credibility. In short, connected as these *pramāṇas* are with the human factor, invariable validity can never be claimed for their evidences. So when it is a question of *śruti v.* other *pramāṇas*, the former which is stronger because of its *apauruṣeyatva* will sublate the latter.

There is yet another reason which goes to the support of *śruti*. That the Self is free from suffering is known to everyone through the experience of deep sleep. The Self which is self-luminous reveals its non-suffering nature (*nirduḥkhitva*) in deep sleep. By contrast to what is self-evident, the evidence of perception and other sources of knowledge is external. Of the evidences which are intrinsic and extrinsic, the former is stronger than the latter.

[95]

सम्बन्धार्थं एव ।

अपि प्रत्यक्षबाधेन प्रवृत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
"पराञ्चि खानी"त्येतस्माद् वचसो गम्यते श्रुतेः ॥ ९५ ॥

What has been stated in the *sambandhokti* [of the previous verse] is now supported.

Further, that the *śruti* text reveals the Self by sublating perception is known from the utterance, "The senses which are outgoing..." (95)

The text quoted in the verse is from the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 2.1.1. It says: "The self-evident Lord destroyed the outgoing senses. Therefore, one sees the outer things and not the inward Self."

[96]

अभ्युपगम्यैवमुच्यते, न तु प्रमाणं सत् प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुध्यत इत्यसकृदवोचाम। यत्रापि वाक्यप्रत्यक्षयोर्विरोधाशङ्का तत्रापि पुरुषमोहवशादेव सा जायते, न तु परमार्थत इति। अत आह।

प्रमां चेज्जनयेद्वाक्यं प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधिनीम्।
गौणीं प्रत्यक्षतां ब्रूयान्मुख्यार्थासम्भवाद् बुधः॥ ९६॥

This has been stated for the sake of argument. However, we have already stated many times that one *pramāṇa* does not come into conflict with another *pramāṇa*. Wherever there is the supposition that there is conflict between *śruti* and perception, there it arises because of the delusion of the person alone; there is really no conflict [between them]. So the following is said.

If the scriptural sentence produces knowledge which is opposed to what is conveyed by perception, etc., a wise man should say that what is conveyed by perception is secondary, since the primary sense is not possible. (96)

Strictly speaking, there is no need for *abhyupetyavāda* as there cannot be any conflict between two *pramāṇas*. In the present case the conflict between *śruti* and perception is only apparent and not real. The characteristic of suffering belongs to the internal organ and not to the immutable Self which is of the nature of the self-luminous consciousness. Though the internal organ alone is subject to changes such as pain, a person, due to ignorance, illicitly transfers them to the Self and says that the Self is subject to suffering and other characteristics. So, the ascription of suffering to the Self cannot be in the primary sense, but only in the secondary sense (*gauṇī*). While *śruti* says that the Self which is identical with Brahman is not subject to suffering, perception reveals the characteristic of suffering which belongs to the internal organ. There is, therefore, no conflict between them since they have different referents.

[97]

तस्यार्थस्य सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुदाहरणम्।

अग्निस्सम्यगधीतेऽसौ जहासोच्चैश्च मञ्चकः ।
यथा तद्वदहंवृत्त्या लक्ष्यतेऽनर्हयापि सः ॥ ९७ ॥

For the easy understanding of this point, the following examples are given.

Just as we say, "That fire recites well," "The cot laughed aloud," so also the Self is implied by the "I"-sense, though unfit it is [to do so]. (97)

Referring to a student who is reciting the *Veda*, we say, "The fire recites well." Here the word "*agni*" primarily refers to fire which is luminous, and secondarily to a student who is bright. Similarly, the word "*mañcaka*" primarily refers to a cot and secondarily to a person in the cot, and so there is the usage, "The cot laughed aloud," which means that the person in the cot laughed aloud. In the same way the word "*aham*" primarily refers to the ego and secondarily to the inward Self.

[98]

"कस्मात् पुनः कारणात् साक्षादेवात्मा नाभिधीयते किमनया कल्पनयेति ?" तत्राह ।

त्वमित्येतद्विहायान्यत् न वर्त्मात्मावबोधने ।
समस्तीह त्वमर्थोऽपि गुणलेशेन वर्तते ॥ ९८ ॥

"Why is it," it may be asked "that the Self is not directly expressed [by a word]? What is the reason for resorting to indirect indication [of it]?" To this we reply as follows.

There is no other way of conveying the knowledge of the Self except through the word "thou". Here even the word "thou" is competent to signify [the Self] on the basis of some similarity. (98)

Sureśvara considers and rejects an objection which can be formulated as follows: "Is there a word which directly signifies the Self or not? If the former, there is no need to resort to the

secondary sense for the purpose of signifying the Self. If the latter, the Self can never be indirectly indicated." Some explanation of the second alternative is necessary to see the force of the argument. The opponent holds the general principle that what is primarily signified by a word alone can be secondarily signified by another word (*svapadavācyasyaiva anyapadalakṣyatvam*). For example, the bank of a river, which is directly signified by the word "*tīra*" is secondarily signified by another word "*gaṅgā*" in the well-known expression "*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*". The contention of the opponent is that the bank admits of secondary signification by a word only because of its being an object of primary signification by another word. If there is no word by which the bank is directly denoted, then it can never be the object of indirect indication. Since the Advaitin maintains that there is no word by which the Self can be directly signified, the opponent concludes that the Self can never be the object of indirect indication.

Sureśvara rejects the above argument on the ground that the principle on which it is based is untenable. Primary signification by a word is not the *sine qua non* of secondary signification by another word, for the latter is possible without the former. On the contrary, relation with the primary sense of a word, according to Sureśvara, is the *sine qua non* of secondary signification. In other words, wherever there is *lakṣyatva*, *e.g.*, the river-bank or the Self, there is *mukhyārthasambandha*. The river-bank is secondarily signified by the word "*gaṅgā*" because of its relation with the primary meaning of the word "*gaṅgā*". In the same way, the Self is secondarily signified by the words "thou" and "I" because of its relation with the primary meaning of these two words. But the principle held by the opponent, *viz.* wherever there is *lakṣyatva* there must be *vācyatva*, breaks down in the case of the Self, though it holds good in the case of the river-bank. Since relation with the primary sense, *i.e mukhyārthasambandha*, is invariably present in all cases of secondary signification, the former, the Advaitin maintains, is the *sine qua non* of the latter.

An empirical object which possesses class feature (*jāti*), or quality (*guṇa*), or an object which is involved in action (*kriyā*), or an object which possesses relation (*sambandha*) can be expressed by a word. Or, an object can be signified by a conventional word (*rūḍhi*) used only with reference to it. For example, an object which possesses the class feature, *viz.* cowness, is signified by the

word "*go*". An object which possesses the quality, *viz.* white colour, is spoken of as "*śuklaḥ*". Similarly, we call a person a "*pācakaḥ*" as he performs the act of cooking. One who possesses wealth, *i.e.* one who has relation with wealth, is called a "*dhanī*". An object which provides space is conventionally called "*ākāśa*". So there are reasons such as the class feature, quality, action, relation, and conventional usage for the application of words to objects. Since the Self does not possess class feature, or quality, or relation, and is not involved in any action, it cannot be directly signified by a word. Nor is conventional usage possible for a thing which transcends the empirical order. It is for this reason that *śruti* says (*TU*, 2.4.1) that the Self is "that from which speech returns." However, it can be secondarily signified by the words "I" and "thou", because the primary sense of these words is the knower (*pramātā*), and the Self, being its witness, is connected with it. So Sureśvara maintains that, though the Self cannot be directly signified by a word, it can be indirectly indicated by "I" and "thou".

Sureśvara mentions the word "*tvam*" in the verse in a suggestive way. The word "*aham*" too must be included in this context. The primary meaning of these two words is the knower (*pramātā*). These two words signify the Self not only through *guṇa-vṛtti*, but also through *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*. See II, 55 for the explanation of *guṇa-vṛtti*.

[99]

कस्मात् पुनर्हेतोर्हि अहमित्येतदपि गुणलेशेन वर्तते, न पुनः साक्षादेवेति ? विधूतसर्वकल्पनाकारणस्वाभाव्यादात्मनः। अत आह।

व्योम्नि धूमतुषाराभ्रमलिनानीव दुर्धियः।
कल्पयेयुस्तथा मूढाः संसारं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥ ९९ ॥

Again, why is it that the word "I" signifies [the Self] only on the basis of some similarity, but not directly? The answer is that the nature of the Self is such that it is free from the reasons for the use of words. Therefore, the following is said.

Just as the dull-witted people superimpose smoke, mist, cloud, and dirt on the sky, even so the ignorant superimpose [the reasons for the use of words signifying] transmigratory existence on the inward Self. (99)

Since the words "I" and "thou" are used only with reference to the Self, why should we not, asks the critic, use these words to directly signify the Self? The answer is that the nature of the Self is such that it does not admit the use of words for the purpose of signifying it. That it is free from *jāti*, *guṇa*, etc., which are the reasons for the use of words, has already been stated.

[100 - 101]

ननु सर्वकल्पनानामप्यात्मन्यत्यन्तासम्भवे समानेऽहंवृत्तौ कः पक्षपाते हेतुः, येन वृत्त्यन्तराणि विधूयाहंवृत्त्यैव आत्मा उपलक्ष्यत इति। उच्यते।

चिन्निभेयमहंवृत्तिः प्रतीचीवात्मनोऽन्यतः।
पूर्वोक्तेभ्यश्च हेतुभ्यस्तस्मादात्माऽनयोच्यते ॥ १०० ॥

वृत्तिभिर्युष्मदर्थाभिर्लक्ष्यते चेद्दृशिः परः।
अनात्मत्वं भवेत् तस्य वितथं च वचः श्रुतेः ॥ १०१ ॥

It may be argued: "If all characteristics without any distinction whatsoever are totally untenable in the Self, what is the reason for this partiality in respect of the "I"-mode such that, discarding all other modes, it is held that the Self is secondarily indicated by the "I"-mode alone?" The reply is as follows.

This "I"-mode is like consciousness. It is as if inward to all other objects different from the Self. For the reasons already stated, the Self is, therefore, [indirectly] signified by this [word]. (100)

If the supreme consciousness were to be indirectly indicated by the words which signify external objects, then it would become the not-Self. Also, the utterance of *śruti* would be futile. (101)

There are two important reasons to show why the Self can be indirectly signified by "I" as well as by "thou" and not by any other word. The "I" refers to the internal organ which, carrying the reflection of consciousness, has become *cinmaya*, full of consciousness. The internal organ is permeated by consciousness in the same way as a red-hot iron is pervaded by heat throughout. Since it is *like* consciousness, it can indirectly signify the Self. Secondly, the internal organ which is directly signified by the "I" is inward to everything else different from the Self. Just as the Self is inward to everything else, even so the internal organ is inward to everything else, excepting of course the Self. So the "I" which directly signifies the internal organ which is not only proximate to, but also carries the reflection of, the Self is specially competent to indirectly signify it. That is why it was stated earlier (II, 56) that the "I" does not exist without the Self and that so long as we speak of the Self in our daily life we refer to it as "*aham*".

If, on the contrary, it be said that even words such as "body", "pot", and so on, which primarily signify external objects which are not-Self can secondarily signify the inward Self, then the latter, being the implied sense of these words, must be connected with the not-Self, primarily signified by them; consequently it would be not-Self. For example, the river-bank which is the implied sense of the word "*gaṅgā*" by virtue of its connection with the primary sense of the word, *viz.* the stream, which is not-Self, is treated as not-Self. The same must be the case if the Self were to be the implied sense of words such as pot, which primarily signify objects which are not-Self. In that case, *śruti* texts such as "I am Brahman," "That thou art," which seek to convey the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman by identifying "*aham*" and "*brahman*," or "*tat*" and "*tvam*" would be rendered useless. Consequently, the attainment of liberation by getting the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman must be ruled out.

[102]

यथोक्तेन ।

अनेन गुणलेशेन ह्यत्यहंकर्तृकर्मया ।
लक्ष्यतेऽसावहंवृत्त्या नाञ्जसाऽत्राभिधीयते ॥ १०२ ॥

As stated earlier:

That [Self] is secondarily signified by the "I"-mode, which is at once both the subject and the object, due to some similarity. It is not directly signified [by the "I"]. (102)

[103]

" नाञ्जसाऽत्राभिधीयत इति को हेतुः " इति चेत् ।

षष्ठीगुणक्रियाजातिरूढयः शब्दहेतवः ।
नात्मन्यन्यतमोऽमीषां तेनात्मा नाभिधीयते ॥ १०३ ॥

If it be asked, "What is the reason for saying that it is not directly signified?" [we reply as follows].

The reasons for the use of words [for signifying objects] are relation, quality, action, class feature, and convention. Not one of these exists in the Self. So the Self is not directly signified by a word. (103)

[104]

यदि शब्दोऽभिधानाभिधेयत्वसम्बन्धाङ्गीकारेण नात्मनि वर्तते, कथं शब्दात् "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इति सम्यग्बोधोत्पत्तिः? उच्यते ।

असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा निरुपायमुपेयते ।
आत्मत्वकारणाद्विद्मो गुणवृत्त्या विबोधिताः ॥ १०४ ॥

It may be asked: "If words cannot be applied to the Self through the relation of the word and its meaning, then how does the right knowledge, 'I am Brahman,' arise from words?" We reply as follows.

Through a means which is false, that [Self] which transcends all means is attained. We know that it is secondarily signified through similarity because of its self-luminous nature. (104)

Sureśvara maintains that it is quite possible to convey the knowledge of the Self even though the Self cannot be directly expressed by a word as there is no *vācya-vācaka-sambandha* between the Self and a word. We do indicate the far-away moon by saying that it is at the tip of a particular branch of a tree (*śākhā agre candraḥ*), while the truth is that there is no connection between the moon and the tip of the branch. Also, by drawing a line (*rekhā*) on a paper, we say that it expresses a certain sound (*varṇa*) even though the same sound can be expressed by a different line in another language. Here is a case of a real sound being communicated through unreal or false lines (*rekhābhiḥ satyavarṇāḥ*). In the same way the real Self which is *nirupāyam, i.e.* that for which there is no means capable of directly expressing it (*sākṣād-upāyarahitam*), can nevertheless be indirectly indicated by unreal or false means. Though the "I"-sense is not real, it can indirectly signify the Self.

The second line of verse (104) is intended to answer a fresh objection. The critic argues that only what is known through another *pramāṇa* can be the object of secondary signification. In the well-known example of "*gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*," the river-bank is the object of secondary signification as it is already known through another *pramāṇa*, say perception. The difficulty in the case of the Self is that it is not *pramāṇāntara-siddha, i.e.* it is not already known through another *pramāṇa*. If so, how could it be, the critic argues, secondarily indicated by a word? Though it is necessary to insist that an object should have already been known if it is to be secondarily signified by a word, there is no need to stipulate that it should have already been known through another *pramāṇa*. It is enough if the object is *siddha*; it need not be *pramāṇāntarasiddha*. In other words, the principle that holds good here is: "*siddhasya lakṣyatvam*" and not "*pramāṇāntara-siddhasya-lakṣyatvam.*" The Self is always known because of its self-luminous nature. So everyone knows it. Or, as Śaṅkara puts it (*BG*, 2. 18), it does not remain unknown to anyone (*na hi ātmā nāma kasyacit aprasiddho bhavati*). So there is no difficulty in the Self being an object of secondary signification.

[105 - 106]

" कथं पुनरभिधानमभिधेयेनानभिसम्बद्धं सदनभिधेयेऽर्थे प्रमां जनयति ? " इति । शृणु , यथानभिसम्बद्धमप्यनभिधेयेऽर्थेऽविद्यानिराकरणमुखेन बोधयतीत्याह ।

शयानाः प्रायशो लोके बोध्यमानाः स्वनामभिः ।
सहसैव प्रबुध्यन्ते यथैवं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥ १०५ ॥

न हि नाम्नास्ति सम्बन्धो व्युत्थितस्य शरीरतः ।
तथापि बुध्यते तेन यथैवं तत्त्वमित्यतः ॥ १०६ ॥

Again, it may be asked: "How can a word, being unrelated to its meaning, produce knowledge about what is not signified [by a word]?" We reply: "Listen as to how a word, even though unrelated to its meaning, awakens a person to that which is not signified, through the removal of ignorance [in respect of that thing]."

Just as in the world those who are asleep are generally awakened at once [when called] by their names, even so [is a person awakened to] the inward Self. (105)

Indeed, for one who has transcended the body [in sleep] there is no relation with the name [by which he is called]. Even then, just as he is awakend by it, even so is a person awakened to the reality [by the *śruti* text]. (106)

The critic now turns his attention from means-end relation discussed in verse (104) to the relation between a word and its meaning. Though a false means which is not really related to an end may nevertheless lead to it, how can a word whose relation with its meaning is not known to a person, the critic asks, make him understand what it signifies? Sureśvara's answer is that it does in some cases. Consider the following case. In order to awaken a person who is fast asleep, someone shouts uttering his name: "O! Devadatta, get up." These words do not reach him because he is asleep. A person who is asleep is one who has transcended his body (*śarīrāt vyutthitaḥ*); he is, therefore, one who does not identify himself with the body and the senses (*dehendriya-abhimāna-rahitaḥ*). So a person who is asleep not only does not hear his name uttered by another, but also does not remember the relation between the name and the named, *i.e.* between the word and its meaning. The difficulty here is that there is a vicious circle. If only he is awake, he can hear the word, *i.e.* his name, uttered by

another, and if only he hears the word, he will wake up. However, considering that the word uttered by another has the desired effect of awakening him from sleep we have to say, Sureśvara maintains, that a person who is asleep is awakened by a word, even though the relation between the word and its meaning is not remembered by him at that time (*asmaryamāṇa-sambandhasyaiva bodhakatvaṁ suṣuptau aṅgīkartavyam*). In the same way, even though a person does not grasp the relation between the Upaniṣadic word and its meaning, he is awakened to the truth by the word of the scripture.

What has to be emphasized here is that there is relation between a word and its meaning (or the name and the named) and that one should have the knowledge of this relation for knowing what the word of the name signifies. However, even though there is no relation between a word and what is implied by it, one is able to know what is implied by it without the knowledge of the ralation between the word and its implied sense. There is, for example, relation between the word "*gaṅgā*" and its primary sense, *viz*. the stream; but there is no relation between this word and the river-bank which is its implied sense. However, the word "*gaṅgā*", through *vācya-vācakasambandha*, is capable of giving rise to the knowledge of the river-bank without coming into direct relation with it. In the same way, even though the words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" primarily refer to what is conditioned (*śabala*) — consciousness conditioned by *māyā* in the one case and consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* in the other case — through *vācyavācaka-sambandha*, they are capable of secondarily signifying the one unconditioned reality. So knowledge of *vācya-vācaka-sambandha* is required only in respect of knowing what is primarily signified by a word and not in respect of what is secondarily signified by it (*vācakaśabdasya vācye eva sambandhajñānāpekṣā, na lakṣye*).

[107]

यथा च ।

बोधाबोधौ नभोऽस्पृष्ट्वा कृष्णधीनीडगौ यथा ।
बाध्येतरात्मकौ स्यातां तथेहात्मनि गम्यताम् ॥ १०७ ॥

Moreover, it is like this.

Just as there are right and wrong cognitions, related as the sublator and the sublated, about the ether which is the object of the blue cognition, without affecting the ether in any way, even so in respect of the Self [there are right and wrong cognitions, related as the sublator and the sublated, without affecting the Self in anyway]. (107)

Verse (107) is intended to answer a different objection from the opponent. Since the Self, the sole reality, is the substratum of both knowledge and ignorance, it must, the opponent argues, be mutable (*nivartya-nivartaka ajñāna-jñānāśrayatvāt ātmanaḥ savikāra-tvam prāptam*). This argument, says Sureśvara, cannot be accepted. Consider the case of ether (*ākāśa*). We know that ether, being formless (*amūrta*), has no colour; nevertheless, we perceive it as blue. While the former is a right cognition (*bodha*), the latter is an erroneous cognition (*abodha*). Though these two cognitions, related as the sublator and the sublated respectively, are about ether, they do not in any way affect it; they do not, that is to say, bring about any change in it. The same is the case with regard to the Self about which we have the right cognition, *viz.* that it is free from bondage, and also the erroneous cognition, *viz.* that it is subject to bondage. These two cognitions do not in any way affect the Self any more than the cognitions about ether.

[108-109]

"असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा" इत्युपश्रुत्य अतिविस्मितो महता सम्भ्रमेण कश्चिच्चोदयति ।

नासन्नुपायो लोकेऽस्ति परमार्थविनिश्चये ।
नासल्लिङ्गाद्धि बाष्पादेः कश्चिदग्निं प्रपद्यते ॥ १०८ ॥

इत्येवं चोदयेद्योऽपि जोषयेत्तं घटादिना ।
सदसद्भ्यां विभक्तोऽसौ पर्यायश्च न चानयोः ॥ १०९ ॥

Hearing the statement, "Through a means which is false," someone, being greatly surprised, raises the following objection in utter confusion.

In ordinary experience what is false is not the means for determining what is real, for no one attains fire by inferring it from mist, etc., which are false reasons. (108)

One who objects in this way may be pleased by [the examples of] pot, etc. It (*i.e.* pot) is different from the real and the non-real. Nor can these [latter] be successively [predicated of it]. (109)

While the objection of the opponent is stated in verse (108), the reply thereto is given in verse (109). Holding that what is false (*mithyā*) cannot lead to successful or fruitful activity, the opponent cites the example of *bāṣpa-dhūma*, *i.e.* mist which is mistaken for smoke, in support of his contention. A person, let us say, mistakes mist for smoke, infers fire thinking that he has perceived smoke, and is disappointed when he does not find fire in that place. In this case, *bāṣpa-dhūma* is a false means, because there is no smokeness (*dhūmatva*) in the mist; consequently, it does not lead to successful activity. What is true of *bāṣpa-dhūma*, the opponent argues, is true of scripture and the preceptor. According to Advaita, everything other than Brahman-Ātman is false; and so both the scripture and the preceptor, being different from Brahman-Ātman, are false. If so, how could they be the means, asks the opponent, to the attainment of the right knowledge?

The above argument of the opponent cannot be accepted. First of all, the contention that what is false (*mithyā*) cannot lead to successful practical activity is wrong. Advaita holds the view that the entire world of objects, which is different from Brahman-Ātman, though false (*mithyā*), is practically useful. Only what is *tuccha*, *i.e.* what is totally non-existent, is not practically useful. The empirical world comprising objects such as pot, cloth, and so on is not *tuccha* or *asat*. That is why Sureśvara says in his reply that objects such as pot which are practically useful in spite of their falsity (*mithyātva*) provide the answer to the objection of the opponent and that the latter should, therefore, be pleased with the examples such as pot. It should be borne in mind that the objects of the empirical world, according to Advaita, are not real (*sat*) because they are subject to sublation (*bādhyamānatvat*); they are, that is to say, sometimes present and sometimes absent; and objects which are present and absent, which come and go, are not

real. They are not non-real (*asat*) either, inasmuch as they are cognized (*pratīyamānatvāt*). If we say that they are non-existent, they become *pratiyogin* of *abhāva*; and that which is the *pratiyogin* of *abhāva* cannot be *asat*. So the objects of the empirical world are not *asat*. They cannot be characterized as both real and non-real at the same time, since "real" and "non-real" which are related as contradictory cannot be predicated of the same thing at the same time. Nor can they be predicated of one and the same thing in succession (*paryāyaḥ = kramaḥ*), because that which is real can never become non-real at any time and *vice versa*. In view of these difficulties, the objects of the empirical world, Sureśvara maintains, have to be characterized as different from *sat* and *asat*, *i.e.* *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, which is only another term for *mithyā*, for what is false. What cannot be called *sat* or *asat* is said to be indescribable as *sat* and *asat* (*sadasadbhyām-anirvacanīya*). It follows that the objects of the empirical world, though false, have practical utility.

The example of *bāṣpa-dhūma* cited by the opponent is not apt. If one does not find fire after inferring it from *bāṣpa-dhūma*, it is not because of the falsity (*asatyatvāt = mithyātvāt*) of the *hetu*, but because of the absence of *vyāpti* (*avyāptatvāt*) between the *hetu* and *sādhya*. What is *mithyā* or *asatya*, *e.g.* the reflection of an object, can show the truth and be practically useful, whereas what is said to be *satya*, *i.e.* empirically real, *e.g.* the mist, may not lead to successful activity, even though it is used as *hetu* in an inference in which there is no *vyāpti* between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*.

[110]

एवं कुचोद्यमुन्मूल्य अथेदानीं प्रकृतमभिधीयते। प्रकृतं च अनभिधेये कथमभिधाश्रुतिरविद्याध्वंसि आत्मनि ज्ञानं जनयतीति। तत्रैव कारणान्तरमुच्यते।

अतिदुस्थोऽप्रबोधोऽत्र ह्यात्मैवास्य प्रबुद्धता।
निमित्तमात्राद् व्येत्येषा नासाग्रे बदरं यथा ॥ ११० ॥

Thus, after rooting out a bad objection, the main topic is taken up. And, the main topic is: How does the assertive

śruti text destroy ignorance and produce knowledge of the Self which cannot be named? Regarding this, another reason is stated [to show how it can do so].

Here, the ignorance [about the Self] is very precarious. Indeed, it is only in appearance. This [ignorance] drops off, like the *badara* fruit kept on the tip of the nose, just for the reason [that *śruti* reveals the nature of the Self]. (110)

It was stated earlier that the *śruti* text is capable of conveying the knowledge of the Self, which destroys ignorance, even though there is no *vācya-vācaka-sambandha* between the scriptural word and the Self. Sureśvara now points out that *avidyā*, being insecure, easily falls flat in the same way as a *badara* fruit (fruit of the jujube), which is very insecure when it is balanced on the tip of the nose, easily falls down. Sureśvara says that *avidyā* is *atidussthaḥ*, very insecure or precarious because it manifests and functions only when there is no inquiry into the nature of the Self (*avicārita-daśāyāmeva pratīyamānatvāt*). It is of the nature of an appearance (*prabuddhataiva ātmā = pratītireva śarīram*). It has no reality of its own apart from that of the Self. So long as there is no inquiry, it reigns supreme; once there is inquiry, it goes away. Since the Self is ever-existent and self-luminous by its very nature, one should be reminded of the nature of the Self in order to remove the ignorance which veils it as it were. This is exactly what *śruti* does.

[111]

अनुदितानस्तमितकूटस्थबोधमात्रस्वाभाव्यात् आत्मनो दुस्सम्भाव्योऽविद्या-सद्भाव इति चेत्, न। अविद्याप्रसिद्ध्यैव तत्सद्भावसिद्धेः, उलूकनिशा-वत्, इत्यत इदमुच्यते।

अहो धाष्ट्र्यमविद्याया न कश्चिदतिवर्तते।
प्रमाणं वस्त्वनादृत्य परमात्मेव तिष्ठति ॥ १११ ॥

If it be said that, since the Self is of the nature of the immutable consciousness which neither rises nor sets, the existence of *avidyā* is not possible at all, [we say] it is not so,

because its existence is known by the mere experience of it, like the night [experienced] by the owl [even during the day-time].

Oh, no one is beyond the impudence of *avidyā*. Disregarding *pramāṇa* and the reality, it exists as if it were the supreme Self. (111)

It has already been stated that the content as well as the locus of *avidyā* is the Self (see the *sambandhokti* at the commencement of Chapter III). Since everyone experiences *avidyā*, it is *prasiddha*; and this itself is the proof for its existence. With a view to show how *avidyā* exists and functions even though the Self, the sole reality, is the ever-existent and never-changing consciousness, Sureśvara gives the example of *ulūka-niśā,* the night of the owl. What is proved as day-time on the basis of *pramāṇa* and reasoning is night to the owl. Just as the owl experiences night even in the day-time, even so we experience *avidyā* even though what really exists is the Self, the ever-shining immutable consciousness for which there is neither rising nor setting (*anudita-anastamita-kūṭastha-avabodha*). Since none escapes the clutches of *avidyā*, Sureśvara marvels at its audacity. In short, *avidyā* is *prasiddha*, but not *pramāṇa-siddha.*

[112]

यस्मादविद्याप्रसिद्ध्यैव अविद्यासद्भावसिद्धिः, अतः आत्मवस्तुवृत्तानुरोधेन न कथञ्चनापि तत्सम्भावनाप्यस्ति; यत आह।

ज्ञानं यस्य निजं रूपं क्रियाकारकवर्जितम् ।
सम्भावनाप्यविद्यायास्तत्र स्यात् केन हेतुना ॥ ११२ ॥

Since we say that *avidyā* exists on account of its being experienced, it follows that it can in no way be justified at all, considering the nature of the Self. So the following is said.

By what reason can the possibility [of the existence] of *avidyā* in that [Self], which is of the nature of knowledge and which is devoid of the factors of action, be justified? (112)

Sureśvara says that, if we consider the nature of the Self, it will be obvious that, though *avidyā* is *prasiddha*, it does not *really* exist at all. The mere experience of it does not prove that it is real (*vāstava=paramārtha*) any more than the experience or cognition of the rope-snake proves that the rope-snake is real.

That the existence of *avidyā* in the Self is inconceivable is brought out by Sureśvara in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika* (4.3.75) as follows:

> "*svato buddhaṁ svataḥ śuddhaṁ svato muktaṁ nirātmikā*
> *avicārit asaṁsiddhiravidyā āliṅgate katham.*"

[113]

सोऽयम् एवमनुदितानस्तमितावगतिमात्रशरीर आत्मापि सन्, अविचारितप्रसिद्धाविद्यामात्रव्यवहित एव अतथैवेक्ष्यते यतः, अतः।

अनुमानादयं भावाद् व्यावृत्तोऽभावमाश्रितः ।
ततोऽप्यस्य निवृत्तिः स्याद् वाक्यादेव बुभुत्सतः ॥ ११३ ॥

Even though the Self is of the nature of mere consciousness which never rises and sets, it is seen differently from what it is, since it is veiled by *avidyā* which exists due to want of inquiry. Hence, the following.

This [Self] which is differentiated from the existent [body] through reasoning appears to be non-existent. The removal of this [false notion about the Self] takes place from the *śruti* text itself in respect of one who is desirous of knowing. (113)

Owing to ignorance, the gross and the subtle body which are existent (*bhāva*) are mistaken for the Self. When the Self is differentiated from them through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, one may hastily conclude that it is non-existent (*abhāva*) on the ground that what is different from the existent must be non-existent. But this conclusion is wrong. When the Advaitin argues that the Self is different from the body, because it is the seer and that which is the seer is different from the seen, it does not follow

that the Self is *abhāva*. One arrives at such a wrong conclusion by not knowing the nature of the Self. It is not enough to know that the Self is different from the body. One should also know what it is. So long as the nature of the Self is not known, one will be tempted to think of it as non-existent (*abhāva*). When the inquirer is placed in this predicament, the *śruti* text comes to his rescue by revealing the nature of the Self. Knowing that the Self is real, knowledge, and bliss, he is able to realize that it is not a negative entity, *i.e.* something non-existent, even though it is different from the existent body.

[114]

भाववदभावादपि निवृत्तिरनुमानादेव किमिति न भवतीति चेत्, शृणु।

न व्यावृत्तिर्यथा भावाद् भावेनैवाविशेषतः ।
अभावादप्यभावत्वाद् व्यावृत्तिर्न तथेष्यते ॥ ११४ ॥

If it be asked why reasoning itself cannot achieve the differentiation [of the Self] from the non-existent, as it does from the existent, then listen.

Just as [the Self as something existent] cannot be distinguished from the existent [body], since they are not different at all as existent objects, even so it cannot be distinguished from the non-existent [through reasoning], since it is [viewed] as non-existent (*i.e.* as what-is-different-from-the-body). (114)

If the Self could be differentiated from the body which is *bhāva* by means of reasoning, it could be differentiated, the opponent argues, from *abhāva* also through reasoning itself as follows: "The Self is not *abhāva*, because it is seen (*dṛśyatvāt*), and whatever is seen is not *abhāva*, *e.g.* the body." It means that there is no need, according to the opponent, to depend upon the *śruti* text for the purpose of differentiating the Self from *abhāva*. This argument, Sureśvara says, is untenable. Some explanation is necessary to follow Sureśvara's line of reasoning. The body is something existent, *i.e. bhāva*. If the Self is also *bhāva*, then there is nothing to distinguish it from the body, for they do not differ

at all as *bhāva-padārthas*. This is what Sureśvara conveys in the first line of verse (114). However, it is differentiated from the body through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* on the basis of the distinction between the seer and the seen as stated earlier. Reference has already been made to the different kinds of *anvaya-vyatireka* reasoning (see the explanatory notes to III.1). Let us now consider the second line of verse (114). According to the Advaitin, though the Self is different from the body, it is not *abhāva*. The opponent, however, thinks that it must be *abhāva*, because (1) the body is *bhāva*, (2) the Self is different from the body which is *bhāva*, (3) what is different from *bhāva* must be *abhāva*, and so (4) the Self must be *abhāva*. If it is proved as *abhāva* by means of reasoning, then how could it be, asks Sureśvara, differentiated from *abhāva* by reasoning? If the Self as "what-is-different-from-the-body", *i.e.* as *dehavilakṣaṇa*, is negative, then it cannot be differentiated from *abhāva*, because there is nothing to distinguish one *abhāva* from another *abhāva*. The real position is that the Self is different from both *bhāva* and *abhāva* (*bhāvābhāva-vilakṣaṇa*); and this can be known only through the *śruti* text which teaches the identity of Brahman and the Self.

The inferential argument which has been given to prove that "the Self is not *abhāva*, because it is seen" is fallacious as the *hetu* is unproved.

[115]

यतो नानुमानेन व्याविद्धाशेषक्रियाकारकफलात्मनि स्वाराज्ये अभिषेक्तुं शक्यते, तस्मात् ।

अविद्यानिद्रया सोऽयं प्रसुप्तो दुर्विवेकया ।
भावाभावव्युदासिन्या श्रुत्यैव प्रतिबोध्यते ॥ ११५ ॥

Since one cannot be enthroned in the kingdom of Self-sovereignty which is devoid of the entire [aggregate of] action, factors of action, and the fruits of action through reasoning, therefore [the following is said].

One who is well asleep due to ignorance, which cannot be removed through discrimination [arising from any other

pramāṇa], is awakened by *śruti* alone, which discards both the existent and the non-existent. (115)

[116]

अत्राह, "अनुदितानस्तमितविज्ञानात्ममात्रस्वरूपत्वात्, दुस्सम्भाव्या अविद्या" इति। नैतदेवम्। कुतः ? यत आह।

कुतोऽविद्येति चोद्यं स्यात् नैव प्राग्घेत्वसम्भवात् ।
कालत्रयापरिच्छित्तेः न चोर्ध्वं चोद्यसम्भवः ॥ ११६ ॥

Now it may be argued: "Since the Self is of the nature of knowledge alone which neither rises nor sets, *avidyā* is impossible." But this is not so. If it be asked, "Why?" we reply [as follows].

Before [the rise of knowledge] the question, "How is *avidyā* possible?" cannot arise at all, because there is no reason [for raising this question]. And after [the rise of knowledge], there is no possibility for the question, because its existence is denied in the three periods of time. (116).

Before the rise of the knowledge of the Self, *i.e.* when a person is ignorant about the nature of the Self, he cannot raise this question at all, because only when he knows that the Self which is the only reality is of the nature of knowledge, he could see the incompatibility between knowledge and ignorance. Being ignorant of the nature of the Self, he could not raise the question about the presence of *avidyā* vis-a-vis the Self which is *jñānasvarūpa*. Also, it is absurd to ask this question when the person concerned, who is in the state of ignorance, is experiencing *avidyā*. Nor could he raise this question after the rise of the saving knowledge. Once the knowledge dawns on him, he realizes the absence of *avidyā* in the Self in all the three periods of time — past, present, and future.

[117]

यस्मात् तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमेव आत्मनोऽशेषामविद्यां निरन्वयामपनुदति, तस्मात्।

अज्ञातममनादृत्य प्रमाणं सदसीति ये ।
बुभुत्सन्तेऽन्यतः कुर्युस्तेऽक्ष्णापि रसवेदनम् ॥ ११७ ॥

Inasmuch as sentences such as "That thou art" destroy without remainder the entire ignorance about the Self, therefore the following [is said].

Those who, ignoring the most certain *pramāṇa*, (*viz.* the *śruti* text) which says, "You are Being," seek to know it from other means, may as well attain the knowledge of taste through the visual sense. (117)

The knowledge of the Self can be obtained only through the *śruti* texts such as "*tat tvam asi*" and not through *prasaṅkhyāna* and other means. Just as the visual sense cannot give rise to the knowledge of taste, even so *prasaṅkhyāna* and other means cannot give rise to the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman.

[118]

एवमप्रतिहताम् "अहं ब्रह्म" इति प्रमां तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं कुर्वदपि न प्रतिपादयतीति चेदभिमतम् , न कुतश्चनापि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । अत आह ।

इदं चेदनृतं ब्रूयात् सत्यामवगतावपि ।
न चान्यत्रापि विश्वासो ह्यवगत्यविशेषतः ॥ ११८ ॥

If it is the view that, even though *śruti* texts such as "That thou art" convey the uncontradicted knowledge, "I am Brahman," they do not give rise [to such knowledge], then this knowledge cannot be obtained from any other source. Therefore, the following is said.

If, in spite of getting the knowledge [from the *śruti* text], a person should say that it is false, then he cannot have faith in other sources as well, because there is no difference in knowledge at all [whatever be the source]. (118)

Knowledge has intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇyam*) both in respect of its origin (*utpattau*) and ascertainment (*jñaptau*). First

of all, the very conditions under which it arises account for its validity. Secondly, even as it arises, it is *believed* to be valid without requiring verification by some other knowledge. It means that all knowledge is presumably valid, whatever be the *pramāṇa* from which it arises. When the import of the *śruti* text such as "*tat tvam asi*" is known through the clarification of the words therein, one gets the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman from the text. This knowledge is not only valid even as it arises from the sentence, but is also believed to be valid as soon as it arises. These two aspects of knowledge constitute what is called the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge (*svataḥprāmāṇya-vāda*). If one does not accept the validity of knowledge produced by the *Vedānta* texts, then one will not accept the validity of knowledge generated by the entire *Veda* as well as by other *pramāṇas* such as perception. Thus, it amounts to the abandonment of the self-validity of knowledge.

[119]

न च उपादित्सितात् वाक्यार्थात् वाक्यार्थान्तरं कल्पयितुं युक्तम्। यस्मात्।

न चेदनुभवोऽतः स्यात् पदार्थावगतावपि ।
कल्प्यं विध्यन्तरं तत्र न ह्यन्योऽर्थोऽवगम्यते ॥ ११९ ॥

[Disregarding] the [given] meaning of the sentence, which is desirable, it is not proper to suggest another meaning [for it]. This being the case, [we say the following].

If the purport does not arise from it (*i.e.* from the sentence) even after knowing the meanings of the words, it might be construed as an injunction. But no other meaning could be construed here. (119)

The opponent argues that he does not reject the validity of the *Vedānta* texts. On the contrary, he maintains that they have to be made subsidiary to injunctive texts which enjoin meditation on the Self. It means, according to him, that the assertive text, "I am Brahman," must be interpreted to mean: "One must meditate, 'I am Brahman'." Sureśvara rejects this argument for

two reasons. First of all, there is no justification for ignoring the direct meaning conveyed by the assertive text. If one does not get the import of the proposition even after understanding the meanings of the words therein, then one would be justified in going in for another meaning by construing it along with an injunctive text. However, one does get the purport intended to be conveyed by the sentence in the context. Secondly, in the context (*prakaraṇa*) in which "*tat tvam asi*" occurs, there is no injunction at all. To ignore what is directly conveyed by the text and to suggest what is not stated and called for by it leads to the double fallacy of *śrutahāni* and *aśrutakalpanā*.

[120-121]

न च यथाभिमतोऽर्थो यथोक्तेन न्यायेन नावसीयते। कोऽसौ न्याय इति? आह।

नामादिभ्यो निराकृत्य त्वमर्थं निष्परिग्रहः ।
निस्स्पृहो युष्मदर्थेभ्यः शमादिविधिचोदितः ॥ १२० ॥

भङ्क्त्वा चान्नमयादींस्तान् पञ्चानात्मतयार्गलान् ।
अहं ब्रह्मेति वाक्यार्थं वेत्ति चेन्नार्थ ईहया ॥ १२१ ॥

It cannot be said that the desired meaning cannot be obtained [from the text] by following the method of reasoning as stated earlier. If it be asked, "What is that method of reasoning?" we reply.

If a person, who is devoid of possessions, who is free from desires for external objects, and who observes self-control, etc. as enjoined, having differentiated [the Self], which is signified by "I", from "name", etc., and having destroyed the five sheaths such as the sheath of food, which are hindrances [to Self-realization] inasmuch as they appear as the Self, realizes "I am Brahman," which is the import of the *śruti* text — to such a person through effort [such as *prasaṅkhyāna*], nothing is to be gained. (120-121)

Sureśvara explains the method of reasoning which helps the eligible person to attain the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman from the *śruti* text. The eligible person is *niṣparigrahaḥ*, one who is free from the sense of "mine". He is also *nisspṛhaḥ*, one who is devoid of desires for external objects referred to by the term "*yuṣmad*". Also, he is one who is in possession of the prescribed qualities such as *śama*, *dama*, etc. Such a person, following the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, is able to differentiate the Self from *nāma* (name), *vāk* (speech), *manas* (mind), *saṅkalpaḥ* (will), *cittam* (thought), *dhyānam* (contemplation), *vijñānam* (understanding), *balam* (strength), *annam* (food), *āpaḥ* (water), *tejaḥ* (heat), *ākāśaḥ* (ether), *smaraḥ* (memory), *āśā* (hope), and *prāṇa* (life-breath), as Nārada did following the instruction given to him by Sanatkumāra (See *CU*, 7. 1-15).

The five sheaths — the sheaths of food, vitality, mind, intellect and bliss — which are mistaken for the Self are hindrances that stand in the way of Self-realization. The eligible person is able to differentiate the Self from the five sheaths, which are not-Self. Since they cover or veil the Self, Sureśvara characterizes them as *argalāḥ* (= bolts) which are obstacles. Since the eligible person apprehends the import of the *śruti* text following the method of reasoning stated above, there is no need of *prasaṅkhyāna* and other efforts.

[122]

न चेदेवम् उपगम्यते वाक्यस्य प्रमाणस्य सतोऽप्रामाण्यं प्राप्नोति । तदाह।

यदर्थं च प्रवृत्तं यद्वाक्यं तत्र न चेच्छ्रुतम् ।
प्रमामुत्पादयेत् तस्य प्रामाण्यं केन हेतुना ॥ १२२ ॥

If this is not admitted, the *śruti* text which is a *pramāṇa* will cease to be a *pramāṇa*. So, it is said.

If a sentence which intends to convey a certain sense does not produce the knowledge when it is heard, by what reason can it be accorded validity? (122)

[123]

अथ मन्यसे ।

जानीयाच्चेत् प्रसङ्ख्यानात् शब्दस्सत्यवचाः कथम् ।
पारोक्ष्यं शब्दो नः प्राह प्रसङ्ख्यानात्त्वसंशयम् ॥ १२३ ॥

Now, you may think [like this]:

If it be said that [the immediacy of the Self] is known from *prasaṅkhyāna*, then how can verbal testimony, [we ask], be true utterance? The opponent replies: "To us, verbal testimony [produces] mediate knowledge; but from *prasaṅkhyāna*, certain knowledge [is obtained]." (123)

The first line of the verse contains the objection of the *prasaṅkhyānavādin* as well as the rejoinder to it by the *siddhāntin*; and the second line contains the reply thereto by the former.

The advocate of *prasaṅkhyāna* maintains that, though the *Vedānta* texts are authoritative, still they cannot produce direct and immediate knowledge of the Self, since a sentence, secular or scriptural, by its very nature can convey only a relational and mediate knowledge (*saṁsṛṣṭa-parokṣa-jñāna*), and the immediate knowledge of the Self can be obtained only through *upāsanā* or *prasaṅkhyāna, i.e.* through meditation on the mediate knowledge obtained from the *Upaniṣads*. See the summary of the *prasaṅkhyānavāda* of Maṇḍana and its criticism in the explanatory notes to I. 67 (pp. 66-88).

[124]

न च युक्तिशब्दावृत्तिलक्षणात् प्रसङ्ख्यानात् यथावत्प्रतिपत्तिर्भविष्यतीति सम्भावयामः । यस्मात् ।

युक्तिशब्दौ पुराप्यस्य न चेदकुरुतां प्रमाम् ।
साक्षादावर्तनात् ताभ्यां किमपूर्वम्फलिष्यति ॥ १२४ ॥

We cannot accept the tenability of the view that the knowledge of the reality as it is will arise from *prasaṅkhyāna* which consists of the repetition of both the reasoning and the verbal testimony. This being the case [we say],

If the reasoning and the verbal testimony do not produce immediate knowledge [of the Self] to him even earlier, what new result will accrue by their repetition? (124)

Sureśvara refutes the standpoint of the *prasaṅkhyānavādin* in this verse. A person, let us say, has mediate knowledge of the fire in a distant mountain through verbal testimony and inference. But he will not get immediate knowledge of it even though he repeats the verbal testimony and the inference any number of times. The same logic, says Sureśvara, holds good even with regard to the *Vedānta* texts. If it were the case that the *śruti* texts like "*tat tvam asi*" can give us only mediate knowledge of the Self, then immediate knowledge of the Self can never be obtained from them by the process of mere repetition (*āvṛtti*) of these texts.

[125]

अथैवमपि प्रसङ्ख्यानमन्तरेण प्राणान् धारयितुं न शक्नोषीति चेत्, श्रवणादावेव सम्पादयिष्यामः। कथम् ?

प्रसङ्ख्याने श्रुतावस्य न्यायोऽस्त्वाम्रेडनात्मकः ।
ईषच्छ्रुतं सामिश्रुतं सम्यक् श्रुत्वावगच्छति ॥ १२५ ॥

If it be said that you cannot live without *prasaṅkhyāna*, we will provide a place for it only in respect of hearing, etc. How?

Let the principle of repetition [which operates] in *prasaṅkhyāna* find a place in respect of the hearing of the text. A person [fully] understands after perfectly hearing what was partially- and half-heard. (125)

The important question here is whether *prasaṅkhyāna* should be admitted before or after the rise of right knowledge. To Sureśvara the problem is about the place of *prasaṅkhyāna* rather than about its need. He never denies the importance of it in the scheme of discipline leading to liberation. He maintains that, if *prasaṅkhyāna* has to be accommodated in the scheme of discipline, then we could certainly find a place for it in the context of *śravaṇa* and *manana* of the texts. The texts which are heard a little (*īṣat*-

śrutam) as well as half-heard (*sāmiśrutam*) must be perfectly heard through repetition; and when the hearing becomes perfect, the right knowledge dawns. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 4.1.1-2, points out that, while a single hearing of the text will do in the case of those who are well-advanced, repetition of the texts is necessary in the case of those who, not being spiritually advanced, are rooted in the idea of the body and the senses; and the repetition should be continued till the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman dawns. However, there is no scope for repetition after obtaining the right knowledge from *śravaṇa* and *manana*.

[126]

ननु प्रसङ्ख्यानविधिम् अनभ्युपगच्छतः पारमहंसी चर्या बौद्धादिचर्यावत् अशास्त्रपूर्विका प्राप्नोति, ततश्चारूढपतितत्वं स्यात्*, अशेषकर्मणां च निवृत्तिः न प्राप्नोतीति। उच्यते।

त्वमर्थस्यावबोधाय विधिरप्याश्रितो यतः।
तमन्तरेण ये दोषाः तेऽपि नायान्त्यहेतवः॥ १२६॥

It may be argued, "If the injunction about *prasaṅkhyāna* is not accepted, then the conduct of the supreme renunciate, like that of the Buddhist and others, will not have the sanction of scripture. Consequently this will result in the state of spiritual lapse. Also, one cannot be free from the entire *karmas*." We reply as follows.

Since injunction has also been accepted for understanding the meaning of "thou", the defects alleged to arise in the absence of injunction do not take place for want of causes. (126)

The *sambandhokti* contains a fresh objection from the advocate of *prasaṅkhyāna*. He argues first of all that the conduct of one who does not resort to *prasaṅkhyāna* after renouncing the scripture-enjoined *nitya-naimittika-karmas* will not be different from that

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* **आरूढपतितत्वं न स्यात्** (H)

of the Buddhists and others who do not accept scripture. Though scripture has enjoined the performance of *nitya-naimittika-karmas*, the spiritual aspirant who seeks liberation renounces, according to Advaita, these *karmas* and pursues the discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana* without, however, accepting *prasaṅkhyāna* which has been enjoined. Should he accept meditative practice, there would be justification for his renouncing *nitya-naimittika-karmas*, as the two cannot be practised at the same time. When he does not practise either of them and since there is nothing else for observance by a follower of scripture, his conduct which is *aśāstrīya*, *i.e.* which is not scripture-based is reprehensible like that of those who are not the followers of scripture. And this, the opponent argues, would lead to a second defect. A *mumukṣu* who does not, after giving up *nitya-naimittika-karmas*, practise meditation which has been enjoined suffers spiritual lapse, *i.e.* he will be *ārūḍha-patitaḥ*. Thirdly, if he does not accept the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna*, he cannot escape from the performance of scripture-enjoined-*karmas*: that is to say, there is no *karma-nivṛtti* for him. If, on the contrary, he accepts *prasaṅkhyāna* and practises it, then since his mind is constantly absorbed in the meditative practice, he would not be in a position to perform *nitya-naimittika-karmas*; and so there is scope for *sarva-karma-sannyāsa* for him. Since these difficulties would arise because of the non-acceptance of *prasaṅkhyāna*, the opponent insists on the acceptance of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

This argument of the *prasaṅkhyānavādin* is not acceptable to Sureśvara. First of all, the Advaitin accepts that scripture enjoins the discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana* for the purpose of getting the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. There is the well-known *śruti* text (*BU*, 2.4.5) which says: "The Self, my dear Maitreyī, should be realized — should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon." The *mumukṣu* accepts the injunction of *śravaṇa*, etc. for knowing the meaning of "*tvam*". As a necessary preliminary to the practice of hearing, etc., renunciation of all *karmas* has been enjoined. A *śruti* text (*BU*, 4.4.23) lays down the following discipline the pursuit of which would result in *vividiṣā-sannyāsa*, *i.e.* renunciation of all actions for getting the knowledge of the Self: "Therefore, he who knows it as such becomes self-controlled, calm, withdrawn into himself, enduring and concentrated, and sees the Self in his own self; he sees all as the Self." Śaṅkara in his commentary on this passage says that "*śāntaḥ*" means desisting from the activities of the external organs, that

"*dāntaḥ*" means being averse to the desires of the internal organ, that "*uparataḥ*" means being free from all desires, that "*titikṣuḥ*" means being indifferent to the pairs of the opposites, and that "*samāhitaḥ*" means attaining one-pointedness by the dissociation from the movements of the organs and the mind. Such a person must necessarily be a *sannyāsin* whose goal is Self-knowledge. In the context of the combination of the practice of *sarvakarma-sannyāsa* and the discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana*, Śaṅkara observes (*US*, 18. 222-223): "The renunciation of all actions in order to know the meaning of the word 'thou' becomes the means (to Self-knowledge) according to the teaching, 'controlling the external and internal organs.' One should know the inward Self, the meaning of the word 'thou', in the aggregate of the body and the organs. One then knows the pure Self as all. And that is the import of the sentence." So *sarvakarma-sannyāsa* is required for the practice of the discipline of *śravaṇa*, etc. which has to be continued until one attains Self-realization. It means that there is no scope for the alleged defects mentioned by the *prasaṅkhyānavādin*, since the scripture-sanctioned conduct of the renunciate is for the pursuit of hearing, etc. enjoined by scripture itself.

CHAPTER IV

[1]

पूर्वाध्यायेषु यद्वस्तु विस्तरेणोदितं स्फुटम् ।
सङ्क्षेपतोऽधुना वक्ष्ये तदेव सुखवित्तये ॥ १ ॥

Now, I will state briefly for the sake of easy understanding what was stated elaborately and clearly in the previous chapters. (1)

It has been stated in the first chapter that knowledge alone which arises from the *Vedānta* texts destroys the ignorance of the ever-existent Self and that *karma* is useful to the attainment of liberation only indirectly. The reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* was set forth and elaborated in the second chapter for the purpose of discriminating the Self and the not-Self as a prelude to the understanding of the meaning of "*tvam*". The method of construing the meaning of the *mahāvākya*, "*tat tvam asi*," and the dawning of the immediate knowledge of the Self from the text itself without requiring the help of any other means such as *prasaṅkhyāna* thereafter were elucidated in the third chapter. In the present chapter Sureśvara will show how his teaching originates from the authoritative and hallowed tradition of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara by quoting passages from their works.

[2]

सङ्क्षेपविस्तराभ्यां हि मन्दोत्तमधियां नृणाम् ।
वस्तूच्यमानम् एत्यन्तःकरणं तेन भण्यते ॥ २ ॥

Indeed, what is stated briefly as well as elaborately gets into the minds of the slow-witted and intelligent persons. Hence, [a brief exposition] is attempted. (2)

The exposition which is elaborate and is scattered over cannot be easily comprehended by a dull-witted person. Sureśvara summarises his teaching with a view to help the mediocre.

[3]

आत्माऽनात्मा च लोकेऽस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतः ।
सिद्धस्तयोरनात्मा तु सर्वत्रैवात्मपूर्वकः ॥ ३ ॥

The Self and the not-Self are well-known through perception and other sources of knowledge in our daily life Of these two, the not-Self, however, is always dependent on the Self. (3)

The not-Self such as pot is known through perception: it is *dṛśya*, what is seen. But what is seen presupposes a seer (*draṣṭṛ*); and the Self is the seer. Therefore, the two categories, the Self and the not-Self, are well-known as the seer and the seen.

[4]

अनात्मत्वं स्वतस्सिद्धं देहाद्भिन्नस्य वस्तुनः ।
ज्ञातुरप्यात्मता तद्वन्मध्ये संशयदर्शनम् ॥ ४ ॥

That objects external to the body are not-Self is self-evident. In the same way, that the knower is the Self is also self-evident. There is doubt in respect of what is in the middle [between them]. (4)

There is a general principle that what is doubtful must be inquired into. There is no doubt with regard to external things such as pot, which are objects of perception. There is, therefore, no need for inquiry about them. Also, there is no doubt whether the "I", the knower, exists or not. I know myself as the knower different from the external objects which are known and also I know that I exist. However, there is doubt with regard to the knower, which is said to be the Self: one wants to know *which* is the knower or the seer in the mind-sense-body complex. Janaka is the best Upaniṣadic spokesman to raise this doubt seeking

clarification from Yājñavalkya. When the latter told him that the Self is the light through the help of which one sits, goes out, works, and returns, Janaka asks Yājñavalkya (*BU*, 4.3.7), "Which is the Self?" He wants to know *which* the Self is among the body, the sense-organs, the vital force, and the mind.

[5]

असाधारणांस्तयोर्धर्मान् ज्ञात्वा धूमाग्निवद्बुधः ।
अनात्मनोऽथ बुद्ध्यन्तान् जानीयादनुमानतः ॥ ५ ॥

Having known the uncommon characteristics of each of these two [categories], a wise man should, then, know the objects ending with the intellect as not-Self through inference in the same way as one knows the fire from smoke. (5)

Grossness (*sthūlatva*), being of the nature of what is seen (*dṛśyatva*), materiality (*jaḍatva*), appearance and disappearance (*āgamāpāyitva*), inconstancy (*vyabhicaratsvarūpatva*) — these are the uncommon or distinctive characteristics of the not-Self. The opposite characteristics — subtlety (*sūkṣmatva*), being of the nature of the seer (*dṛgrūpatva*), immateriality (*ajaḍatva*), the unchanging eternality (*kūṭasthanityatva*) — are associated with the Self. On the basis of these two sets of opposite characteristics, a wise man, after discriminating the Self from the not-Self, should know through inferential and other reasonings that all external objects including the intellect are not-Self.

[6]

इदमित्येव बाह्येऽर्थे ह्यहमित्येव बोद्धरि ।
द्वयं दृष्टं यतो देहे तेनायं मुह्यते जनः ॥ ६ ॥

External objects are known only as "this". The knower, is, indeed, known as "I". Since both ways of knowing are seen in respect of the body [etc.], people are deluded. (6)

Sureśvara explains here why there is doubt with regard to the mind-sense-body complex which is in the middle (*madhye saṁśaya-darśanam*), as stated in verse (4). While external objects such as the table and the tree are always known and identified as "this" (*idam*), *e.g.* "This table ...," the knower is always referred to, and identified, as "I" (*aham*). But in the case of the body, the senses, and the mind, we use both the notions, "this" and "I". We refer to the body as "this body" (*idam śarīram*). Though we do not say, "I am the body," (*aham dehaḥ*), we do say, "I am a man" (*aham manuṣyaḥ*), "I am stout" (*aham sthūlaḥ*), and so on, identifying ourselves with the bodily characteristics such as "manness," "stoutness," etc. The same is the case with regard to the senses and the mind. It means that, since both the notions, "this" and "I", are used with regard to the body, the senses, and the mind, there is the doubt whether any of these is the Seer-self.

[7 - 8]

"केन पुनर्न्यायेन आत्मानात्मनोरश्वमहिषयोरिव विभागः क्रियते ?" इति । उच्यते ।

न्यायः पुरोदितोऽस्माभिरात्मानात्मविभागकृत् ।
तेनेदमर्थमुत्सार्य ह्यहमित्यत्र यो भवेत् ॥ ७ ॥

विद्यात्तत्त्वमसीत्यस्माद् भावाभावदृशं सदा ।
अनन्तरमबाह्यार्थं प्रत्यक्स्थं मुनिरञ्जसा ॥ ८ ॥

It may be asked: "By what principle is the distinction between the Self and the not-Self made as [it is made] between a horse and a buffalo?" The reply is as follows.

The principle which differentiates the Self from the not-Self has already been stated by us. That, indeed, which remains in the "I" after the "this" aspect is discarded by this principle, that which always reveals the existent and the non-existent, that which has nothing inside and nothing outside, and that which is inward — a discerning person should know that directly from the sentence, "That thou art." (7-8)

The reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* is the principle by which the Self is differentiated from the not-Self. The fourfold form of this reasoning has already been explained. See the explanatory notes to III. 1, p. 225. What is called the "I" or the ego contains two aspects — the "this" aspect (*idam aṁśaḥ*) and the "not-this" aspect (*anidam aṁśaḥ*). While the former aspect shows that the "I" or the ego is what is seen and is external and material, the latter aspect stands for consciousness reflected in the ego. Sureśvara says that by the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* one should discard the "this" aspect from the "I"; and what is left over, *viz.* consciousness, which is the eternal witness to what is present as well as to what is absent (*bhāvābhāva-ubhaya-sākṣin*), which is inward, and which is one and homogeneous such that there is nothing inside or outside it, should be known directly from the *śruti* text, "*tat tvam asi*," itself.

[9]

"उच्यतां तर्हि कया तु परिपाट्या वाक्यार्थं वेत्ति" इति। उच्यते। अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम्।

त्यक्तकृत्स्नेदमर्थत्वात् त्यक्तोऽहमिति मन्यते।
नावगच्छाम्यहं यस्मान्निजात्मानमनात्मनः ॥ ९ ॥

[If it be asked:] "Then, let the method by which the meaning of the sentence has to be understood be stated," we reply that it is by the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*.

[A seeker after liberation] thinks, "I have been eliminated, since the entire not-Self [with which I identified myself] has been discarded [by the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*]; the reason for this is that I do not know my real Self apart from the not-Self." (9)

Not knowing the Self in him, a person looks upon the mind-sense-body complex as the Self and identifies himself with it. When he is called upon to reject the body, the senses, and the mind as not-Self by following the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, he thinks that he too has been discarded as he does not know the real Self in him, for what he thought of as the Self has been

shown to be the not-Self. When he is thus driven to a situation of self-extinction, he is desirous of knowing the real Self and asks: "Who am I?" To him who is desirous of knowing the Self, the *śruti* text declares: "That thou art." It means that apart from the help that one gets from the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* one requires revelation by *śruti* to realize the identity of the Self and Brahman.

[10]

अथ शरीरादिबुद्धिपर्यन्तः स सर्वोऽनात्मैवेति प्रमाणात् विनिश्चित्य किमिति बुभुत्सातो नोपरमते? शृणु।

अनुच्छिन्नबुभुत्सश्च प्रत्यग्घेतोरनात्मनः।
दोलायमानचित्तोऽयं मुह्यते भौतवन्नरः ॥ १० ॥

It may be asked: "Why is it that a person does not put an end to his inquiry, after knowing from the *pramāṇa* that all objects from the body to the intellect are not-Self?" Listen.

This person whose desire to know the inward [Self] apart from the not-Self has not come to an end, and whose mind is vascillating, remains deluded like one possessed. (10)

[11]

" अविलुप्तविज्ञानात्मन आत्मत्वादेव नित्यसान्निध्यात्, बुभुत्सुः किमिति न प्रतिपद्यते ? " इति। यस्मात्।

यैरद्राक्षीत् पुरात्मानं यमनात्मेति वीक्षते।
दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारमात्मानं तैः प्रसिद्धैः प्रमित्सति ॥ ११ ॥

[It may be asked:] "Since the Self which is of the nature of eternal consciousness, on account of being the Self [of the enquirer], is always in proximity [to him], why is it that

the person who is desirous of knowing it does not know it?" It is for this reason.

What he knows [now] as not-Self, he saw that earlier as the Self by [the sense-organs]; and he desires to know the Self which is the seer of the sight by the well-known [sense-organs].

Earlier, *i.e.* before knowing the distinction between the Self and the not-Self, he saw the mind-sense-body complex as the Self through perception and other *pramāṇas*. Now, *i.e.* after knowing the distinction between the Self and the not-Self, he knows it to be the not-Self. The Self is the basis of all *pramāṇas*; it is the source of all knowledge. That is why it is spoken of as the seer of the sight. If anyone attempts to know the Self by the well-known *pramāṇas* through which he knew earlier the mind-sense-body complex, he will not be successful. Though the Self is closest to the enquirer, it is not seen by him, as he proceeds to find it through wrong means.

[12]

" कस्मात् पुनर्हेतोः पराचीनाभिः शब्दाद्यवलेहिनीभिः बुद्धिभिः, आत्मानम् अनात्मवन्न वीक्षते ? " इति। उच्यते।

चक्षुर्न वीक्षते शब्दम् अतदात्मत्वकारणात्।
यथैवं भौतिकी दृष्टिः नात्मानं परिपश्यति ॥ १२ ॥

It may be asked: " Why does he not see the Self , as he sees the not-Self, by the out-going cognitions which apprehend sound and other objects?" The reply is as follows.

Just as the visual sense does not perceive sound, because it is derived from a different element [whose quality is colour], even so the physical vision does not see the Self. (12)

Sureśvara emphasizes here the limitation of each *pramāṇa*. The sense-organs are competent to perceive external objects such as sound; but they cannot perceive the inward Self. In order to

drive home this point, Sureśvara refers to the limitation of each sense-organ. Each sense-organ is capable of perceiving the quality of that element alone of which it is derived. While the auditory sense can perceive sound alone, since it is derived from *ākāśa* whose quality is sound, even so the visual sense can perceive colour alone, since it is composed of *tejas* whose quality is colour. In other words, the visual sense cannot perceive sound, and the auditory sense cannot perceive colour, The same principle holds good with regard to other sense-organs. It follows that the Self which is not material does not fall within the scope of the cognition or vision of the sense-organs which are material.

[13]

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणस्वाभाव्यानुरोधेन तावत् तददर्शनकारणमुक्तम्। अथ प्रमेय-स्वाभाव्यानुरोधेन प्रतिषेध उच्यते।

धीविक्रियासहस्राणां हानोपादानधर्मिणाम् ।
सदा साक्षिणमात्मानं प्रत्यक्त्वान्नाहमीक्षते ॥ १३ ॥

Considering the nature of *pramāṇas* such as perception, the reason for the non-perception of the Self has been stated. Now, considering the nature of the object (*i.e.* the Self) to be known, we deny [the possibility of knowing it through perception, etc.].

The ego cannot see the Self which is always the witness to the thousand modifications, favourable as well as unfavourable, of the intellect, because the Self is inward. (13)

The nature of perception and other *pramāṇas* is such that they are not competent to reveal the Self. In the same way, the Self, because of its inwardness, is not amenable to perception and other *pramāṇas*.

[14]

"क्व पुनरियं विवेकबुद्धिः, किमात्मनि उतानात्मनि?" इति। "किञ्चातः?" "यद्यात्मनि कूटस्थत्वव्याघात अनात्मदर्शित्वात्। अथानात्मनि,

तस्याप्यचैतन्यात् न विवेकसम्बन्ध इति।" उच्यते, "दाह्यदाहकतैकत्र" इत्युक्तपरिहारात्।

बुद्धावेव विवेकोऽयं यदनात्मतया भिदा।
बुद्धिमेवोपमृद्नाति कदलीं तत्फलं यथा॥ १४॥

[It may be asked :] "Is this discriminating cognition located in the Self or in the not-Self?" "What does it matter?" "If it is in the Self, then it contradicts the immutability [of the Self], for the reason that the Self perceives the not-Self. If, on the other hand, it is in the not-Self, the latter cannot have any relation with discrimination, since it is insentient." We reply that this [objection] has already been answered by saying " The burnt object and the burning agent exist together in the same place."

This discrimination, by which [the intellect] is differentiated [from the Self] as not-Self, takes place in the intellect alone. It destroys the intellect itself in the same way as the [plantain] fruit destroys the plantain tree. (14)

The *sambandhokti* contains an objection which Sureśvara answers by recalling what was stated in III. 59. If one should discriminate the Self from the not-Self on the basis of the differentiation between the seer and the seen, the question arises: "Wherein is this discriminating cognition (*vivekabuddhi*) located?" Since the Advaitin accepts only two categories, the Self and the not-Self, this question has to be answered with reference to them. The critic is of the view that the Advaitin is trapped whatever be the answer. The Advaitin cannot say that this discriminating cognition arises in the Self. If the not-Self is perceived by the Self, it means that the latter undergoes modification in accordance with the not-Self that is presented to it (*anātmākāra-jñāna-pariṇāmāśrayatvāt*), a position detrimental to the immutable nature of the Self. So the Advaitin, the critic holds, cannot say that the *vivekabuddhi* arises in the Self. The other alternative too is not tenable, because the not-Self which is material is incapable of this discriminating cognition. Consequently, the Advaitin, the critic concludes, cannot account for the *vivekabuddhi* on the basis of which alone he draws the distinction between the Self and the not-Self.

Sureśvara recalls the example, mentioned earlier, of the burning piece of wood in order to answer the above objection. Just as the burning capacity of the fire is superimposed on the wood, even so revelation or illumination which is the very nature of the Self is superimposed on the internal organ, which is material. The modification which the internal organ undergoes when it is in contact with the not-Self is illuminated by the Self. Since it is very difficult to distinguish the internal organ from the consciousness which is reflected therein in the same way as it is difficult to distinguish the wood from the fire in the case of the burning wood, the modification of the internal organ is falsely ascribed to the immutable Self or consciousness. It follows that the Self or consciousness does not undergo any modification whatsoever. Nor has the internal organ by itself the power of knowing, because it is material. The truth is that the discriminating cognition arises in the intellect, not when it is left alone, but only when it is associated with the Self or consciousness.

[15]

सोऽयमतत्त्वे तत्त्वदृक् ।

अनुमानप्रदीपेन हित्वा सर्वाननात्मनः ।
संसारैकावलम्बिन्या तदभावं धियेप्सति ॥ १५ ॥

Such a one [who makes use of the discriminating cognition] sees the real in the unreal.

Having rejected the entire not-Self through the light of inference, one desires to achieve the removal of that [dualistic world of bondage] through the [discriminating] intellect which is dependent on [the dualistic world of] bondage alone. (15)

Sureśvara emphasizes here the inadequacy of reasoning as a means to achieve the goal, *viz.* the removal of the world of duality which is bondage and the need for revelation by *śruti*.

It is true that reasoning through the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* helps one to discriminate the Self from the not-Self. However,

even this discriminating cognition which brings out the difference (*bheda*) as well as opposition (*itaretarābhāva*) between the Self and the not-Self is illusory (*atattva = bhrānti*) inasmuch as it is also a cognition of difference subsisting on duality which is bondage. This discriminating cognition (*vivekadhī*) which itself is supported by duality which is bondage, cannot remove duality. Hence the need for the saving knowledge which can be obtained through the *mahāvākya* alone after one goes through the exercise of reasoning.

[16]

योऽयमन्वयव्यतिरेकजो विवेकः आत्मानात्मविभागलक्षणः, अनात्मस्थः, स्थाणौ संशयावबोधवत् प्रतिपत्तव्यः, अयथावस्तुस्वाभाव्यात्, मृगतृष्णिकोदकप्रबोधवदिति। अत आह।

संसारबीजसंस्थोऽयं तद्धिया मुक्तिमिच्छति ।
शशो निमीलनेनेव मृत्युं परिजिहीर्षति ॥ १६ ॥

This cognition of the differentiation between the Self and the not-Self, which arises from the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* rests in the not-Self (*i.e.* ignorance). It should be understood like the doubtful cognition of the post and the erroneous cognition of the mirage as water, because it is not the knowledge of the reality as it is.

This person desires to attain liberation through the cognition which is embedded in the seed of bondage. He is like a hare which desires to overcome death by closing its eyes. (16)

Though the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* helps one to differentiate the Self from the not-Self, it cannot by itself be the means to liberation for the reason that it shows the Self as different from the not-Self and that it is, therefore, the knowledge of difference (*bheda-jñāna*). That is why Sureśvara says that this discriminating cognition is *anātmasthaḥ*, *i.e.* rests in ignorance which is not-Self, *saṁsārabījasaṁsthaḥ*, *i.e.* rests in ignorance which is the seed of transmigratory existence. Since this discriminating cognition does not reveal the impartite, non-dual Self, it is no

better than doubt or error. When a person doubts whether the object in front is a post or a man (*sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā*), it means that he does not know its real nature. In the same way, when a person mistakes mirage for water, he does not, it is obvious, know the real nature of the object in front. It is also the case in respect of one who has differentiated the Self from the not-Self without knowing the *asādhāraṇa-svabhāva* of the Self, *i.e.* the unique nature of the Self. Such a person cannot attain liberation through this discriminating cognition, which is still ignorance.

[17]

अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने श्रुत्युदाहरणम्।

इममर्थं पुरस्कृत्य श्रुत्या सम्यगुदाहृतम् ।
"यच्चक्षुषे"ति विस्रब्धं " न दृष्टे "रिति च स्फुटम् ॥ १७ ॥

With a view to strengthen this idea, the following *śruti* texts are given as illustration.

Keeping this idea in view, it has been well illustrated by *śruti* when it says firmly and clearly, "That which is not seen by the eye," and "You cannot see the seer of seeing." (17)

The two passages cited from the *Kena Upaniṣad,* 1.7, and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 3.4.2 respectively show that the Self cannot be known through *pramāṇas* such as perception which, supported by *ajñāna,* function in the realm of duality.

[18]

बुद्ध्यन्तमपविद्ध्यैवं को न्वहं स्यामितीक्षितुः ।
श्रुतिस्तत्त्वमसीत्याह सर्वमानातिगामिनो ॥ १८ ॥

To one who, having rejected all objects up to the intellect, is desirous of knowing, "Who am I?" *śruti*, which is competent to reveal what is beyond other *pramāṇas,* says, "That thou art." (18)

Sureśvara sums up the entire teaching of Chapter III in this verse.

[19]

एष सङ्क्षेपतः पूर्वाध्यायत्रयस्यार्थ उक्तः। सोऽयं न्याय्योपि वेदान्तार्थः शास्त्राचार्यप्रसादलभ्योऽपि अनपेक्षितशास्त्राचार्यप्रसादः अनन्यापेक्षसिद्ध-स्वभावत्वात् कैश्चित् श्रद्दधानैर्न प्रतीयते। तेषां सङ्ग्रहार्थम् अभिमत-प्रामाण्योदाहरणम्।

भगवत्पूज्यपादैश्च उदाहार्येवमेव तु।
सुविस्पष्टोऽस्मदुक्तोऽर्थः सर्वभूतहितैषिभिः ॥ १९ ॥

Thus, the teaching of the three earlier chapters has been summarised. This teaching of the *Vedānta*, though intelligible in the light of reasoning, has to be obtained through scripture and the grace of the preceptor. However, it exists independently of scripture and the grace of the preceptor, because its nature is such that it exists on its own independently of others. Still, it is not accepted by those who have faith [in scripture and preceptor, if it is not supported by them]. For the sake of their acceptance, illustrative passages from the recognized authority will be cited [in the sequel].

What we have stated has been very clearly illustrated by the revered Teacher of worshipful feet, the well-wisher of all beings. (19)

Though the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* may be shown to be intelligible and tenable by means of reasoning, still its final import, *viz.* the identity of Brahman-Ātman, can be known only through scripture which has to be understood with the help, guidance, and grace of a preceptor. That the nature of the Self which is identical with Brahman can be known only by *śruti* is brought out when Yājñavalkya declares (*BU*, 3.9.26) that the Self is the Person taught in the *Upaniṣads* (*aupaniṣadam puruṣam*). Another *śruti* text (*KU*, 1.2.9) says that "the knowledge of the Self... cannot be obtained through reasoning." The need for a

preceptor is emphasized by *śruti* when it says (*CU*, 6.14.2) that "one who has a teacher does know" the truth. Though one requires both scripture and a teacher for the purpose of obtaining the saving knowledge, it does not follow from this that the Self which one knows from scripture when taught by an authentic preceptor is dependent on them. The Self which is ever-existent and self-luminous exists on its own independently of both scripture and preceptor. That is why Sureśvara says in the *sambandhokti* that the Self *per se* is characterized by *anyāpekṣasiddha-svabhāva*. It means that the role of both scripture and teacher consists only in removing the ignorance about the ever-existent Self. Sureśvara points out that he will cite authoritative passages from the revered Teacher, Śaṅkara, in support of what he has said for the benefit of those who are inclined to accept a teaching only when it is shown to be supported by an accepted authority.

[20]

"किं परमात्मन उपदेशः, उत अपरमात्मनः ?" इति। "किञ्चातः ?" "यदि परमात्मनः, तस्योपदेशमन्तरेणैव मुक्तत्वात् निरर्थक उपदेशः। अथ अपरमात्मनः तस्यापि स्वत एव संसारस्वभावत्वात् निष्फल उपदेशः।" एवमुभयत्रापि दोषवत्त्वादत आह।

" अविविच्योभयं वक्ति श्रुतिश्चेत्स्याद्ग्रहस्तथा " ।
इति पक्षमुपादाय पूर्वपक्षं निशात्य च ॥ २० ॥

[It may be asked:] "Is this teaching for the supreme Self, or for the lower self?" "What does it matter?" "If it is for the supreme Self, the teaching is useless, because it is already free even without the teaching. If, on the contrary, it is for the lower self, the teaching is equally useless, because it is by its very nature bound." Thus, since both the alternatives are defective, the following is said.

"If it be said that *śruti* addresses one who does not discriminate between the two (*i.e.* the Self and the "I"), then, it is acceptable:" — following such a position, the *prima facie* view is refuted [by Śaṅkara]. (20)

After paraphrasing in the *sambandhokti* an objection which Śaṅkara refers to in his *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Sureśvara quotes the first line of verse (78) beginning with "*avivicya*" which contains the answer to the objection. This is for the purpose of confirming what he said earlier in IV. 14 by way of answer to the objection stated in the *sambandhokti* beginning with "*kva punariyaṁ vivekabuddhiḥ.*" The point which both Śaṅkara and Sureśvara want to drive home is that the scriptural teaching, "*tat tvam asi,*" is neither for the pure Self which is ever-free, nor for the mere internal organ which is material; on the contrary, it is for the individuated self, *i.e.* for the Self which has put on the mask of the "I" as a result of the false identification with the internal organ (*adhyasya antaḥkaraṇakañcukam paridhāya ahamiti vyavasthitam pratyagātmānam uddiśya*). See *sambandhokti* to III. 60 for the expression "*ahaṁkañcukam paridhāya.*"

[21]

तच्चेदम् अविवेकात् स्वतो विविक्तात्मने "तत्त्वमसि" इत्युपदिष्टम्।

युष्मदस्मद्विभागज्ञे स्यादर्थवदिदं वचः ।
यतोऽनभिज्ञे वाक्यं स्याद्बधिरेष्विव गायनम् ॥ २१ ॥

And, this teaching, "That thou art," is imparted to one who, by himself, has discriminated the Self from the not-Self, but who is still ignorant.

This utterance is meaningful to one who has known the distinction between the Self and the not-Self; for, in the case of one who is ignorant [of this distinction] this sentence will be like music before deaf persons. (21)

Once again Sureśvara reiterates the need for both the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* and scriptural instruction. The *śruti* text is meaningful only in the case of a person who has already discriminated the Self from the not-Self through the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka.* If the *śruti* text is uttered to one who is ignorant of this distinction, it will be like music before deaf persons. It means that the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* is necessary; but it is not sufficient, since the person is still ignorant about the real nature of the Self. And his ignorance can be removed only by the knowledge conveyed by the *śruti* text, "That thou art."

[22]

"तस्य च युष्मदस्मद्विभागविज्ञानस्य का युक्तिरुपायभावं प्रतिपद्यते ?" शृणु ।

" अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ हि पदार्थस्य पदस्य च ।
स्यादेतदहमित्यत्र युक्तिरेवावधारणे " ॥ २२ ॥

[It may be asked:] "What is the reasoning which serves as the means for the knowledge of the distinction between the Self and the not-Self?" Listen.

"Indeed, for ascertaining the meaning of the word 'I' in the present case, reasoning alone in the form of *anvaya-vyatireka* as applied to the words and their meaning will do." (22)

The above verse quoted by Sureśvara is from *US*, 18.96. See the explanatory notes given earlier in III. 1, pp. 224-225.

[23-24]

"कथं तौ युक्तिरिति ?" अत्राह ।

" नाद्राक्षमहमित्यस्मिन् सुषुप्तेऽन्यन्मनागपि ।
न वारयति दृष्टिं स्वां प्रत्ययं तु निषेधति " ॥ २३ ॥

" एवं विज्ञातवाच्यार्थे श्रुतिलोकप्रसिद्धितः ।
श्रुतिस्तत्त्वमसीत्याह श्रोतुर्मोहापनुत्तये " ॥ २४ ॥

"How does this reasoning [show the distinction between the Self and the not-Self]? The reply is as follows.

"[By the statement], 'I did not see anything at all in that state of sleep,' one does not deny one's own consciousness [in that state], but denies only the cognition [of objects in that state]." (23)

"Thus, to one who has understood the meaning of the word through *śruti* as well as through the worldly experi-

ence [of sleep], the *Śruti* text says, 'That thou art,' for the purpose of removing the delusion of the hearer." (24)

The above two verses are from *US*, 18.97 and 18.99 respectively.

The meaning which is sought to be conveyed in verse (23) is as follows. A person who wakes up from sleep and recollects his experience of sleep says: "I did not see anything whatsoever then." This recollection proves that, though there were no cognitions of objects, external or internal, at that time, there was the Self or consciousness as the witness to the absence of these cognitions. It follows that, while the Self is invariably present in all the three states of experience, the not-Self is variable, because it is sometimes present and sometimes absent. Here the variety of *anvaya-vyatireka* reasoning known as "*anuvṛtta-vyāvṛttānvaya-vyatireka*" is made use of for the purpose of discriminating the Self from the not-Self.

In verse (24) it is pointed out that to a person who has clarified the meaning of the word "*aham*" through *lokaprasiddhi*, *i.e.* through the worldly experience of sleep which confirms the presence of consciousness in that state, and through *śrutiprasiddhi*, *i.e.* through scriptural texts such as "In that state (of sleep) the person becomes self-illumined" (*BU*, 4.3.9), "Verily, when there (in the state of sleep) he does not see, he is, verily, seeing, though he does not see, for there is no cessation of the seeing of a seer because of the imperishability (of the seer)" (*BU*, 4.3.23), *śruti* instructs "That thou art" for the purpose of removing his ignorance about the Self.

[25]

तत्र त्वमिति पदं यत्र लक्षणया वर्तते सोऽर्थ उच्यते ।

"अहंशब्दस्य या निष्ठा ज्योतिषि प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सैवोक्ता सदसीत्येवं फलं तत्र विमुक्तता" ॥ २५ ॥

Then, what is conveyed by the word "thou" through secondary sense is stated [as follows].

"That which is signified by the word 'I', *viz.* the inward Self which is self-luminous — that itself is conveyed by the text, 'You are that Being.' Thus, the result is liberation." (25)

The above verse is from *US*, 18. 101. The words, "*aham*" and "*tvam*" signify through secondary sense "consciousness". The secondary meaning of Brahman or Being is not different from the secondary meaning of "I" and "thou".

[26-30]

अन्यच्चान्वयव्यतिरेकोदाहरणम्। तथा।

" छित्त्वा त्यक्तेन हस्तेन स्वयं नात्मा विशेष्यते।
तथा शिष्टेन सर्वेण येन येन विशेष्यते " ॥ २६ ॥

" विशेषणमिदं सर्वं साध्वलङ्करणं यथा।
अविद्याध्यस्तमतः सर्वं ज्ञात आत्मन्यसद् भवेत् " ॥ २७ ॥

" तस्मात्त्यक्तेन हस्तेन तुल्यं सर्वं विशेषणम्।
अनात्मत्वेन तस्माज्ज्ञो मुक्तः सर्वविशेषणैः " ॥ २८ ॥

" ज्ञातैवात्मा सदा ग्राह्यो ज्ञेयमुत्सृज्य केवलः।
अहमित्यपि यद्ग्राह्यं व्यपेताङ्गसमं हि तत् " ॥ २९ ॥

" दृश्यत्वादहमित्येष नात्मधर्मो घटादिवत्।
तथान्ये प्रत्यया ज्ञेया दोषाश्चात्माऽमलो ह्यतः " ॥ ३० ॥

Also, another example for *anvaya-vyatireka* reasoning is given. It is thus.

"Just as the Self itself is not qualified by an arm which has been cut off and thrown away, even so it is not qualified by any of the remaining things by which it is [wrongly thought to be] qualified." (26)

"It is reasonable that all these, like ornaments, are qualifications of the Self superimposed on it through ignorance. When the Self is known, they turn out to be unreal." (27)

"So, all the qualifications are similar to the arm (cut off and) thrown away, as they are not-Self. Therefore, the knowing Self is free from all the qualifications." (28)

"After rejecting what is known, one should accept the Self which is always the knower, free from all qualifications. Indeed, what is known as "I" is also like the part of the body cut off." (29)

"What is called the "I" is not an attribute of the Self, because it is seen like objects such as pot. In the same way, all other mental modes and impurities [are not the attributes of the Self]. So, the Self is, indeed, free from impurities." (30)

The five verses quoted above are from *US*, 6.1, 6.3, 6.2, 6.4, and 15.16 respectively. The distinction between the Self and the not-Self is brought out through *dṛg-dṛśyānvaya-vyatireka* and *sākṣi-sākṣyānvaya-vyatireka.*

[31-33]

सर्वन्यायोपसङ्ग्रहः ।

" नित्यमुक्तत्वविज्ञानं वाक्याद्भवति नान्यतः ।
वाक्यार्थस्यापि विज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतिपूर्वकम् " ॥ ३१ ॥

" अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पदार्थस्स्मर्यते ध्रुवम् ।
एवं निर्दुःखमात्मानम् अक्रियं प्रतिपद्यते " ॥ ३२ ॥

" सदेवेत्यादिवाक्येभ्यः प्रमा स्फुटतरा भवेत् ।
दशमस्त्वमसीत्यस्माद् यथैवं प्रत्यगात्मनि " ॥ ३३ ॥

The summary of the entire reasoning [is now given].

"The knowledge that the Self is ever-free arises from the sentence, and not from any other source. And, the apprehension of the import of the sentence takes place through remembering the meaning of the words." (31)

"The meanings of the words are surely understood through the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*. Thus, one knows the Self which is free from suffering and action." (32)

"Just as knowledge arises from the sentence, 'You are the tenth,' even so the knowledge of the Self imparted by sentences such as 'Being alone' becomes immediate [when a teacher utters the sentence, 'That thou art.']" (33)

The three verses quoted above are from *US*, 18.190-192. The enquirer who is desirous of liberation obtains first of all *mediate* knowledge of Brahman-Ātman from sentences such as "Being alone, my child, was this in the beginning" (*CU*, 6.2.1), and "Brahman is real, knowledge, infinite" (*TU*, 2.1.1). Then resorting to the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka*, he discriminates the Self from the not-Self, clarifies the meanings of words, and finally obtains the immediate knowledge (*sphuṭatarā pramā* = *aparokṣa pramā*) of Brahman-Ātman from the *mahāvākya*, "That thou art."

[34 - 35]

वीक्षापन्नस्योदाहरणम् ।

" नवबुद्ध्यपहाराद्धि स्वात्मानं दशपूरणम् ।
अपश्यन् ज्ञातुमेवेच्छेत् स्वमात्मानं जनस्तथा " ॥ ३४ ॥

" अविद्याबद्धचक्षुष्ट्वात् कामापहृतधीः सदा ।
विविक्तं दृशिमात्मानं नेक्षते दशमं यथा " ॥ ३५ ॥

The enquirer who is desirous of knowing is illustrated.

"Just as a person whose mind has been overwhelmed by the number 'nine' is desirous of knowing [the tenth man]

without seeing himself as completing the ten, even so is the person who is desirous of knowing the Self [though forgetful about it]." (34)

"As in the case of the tenth man, a person does not see the Self which is of the nature of knowledge and which always remains separate [from objects], as his vision is obstructed by ignorance and as his intellect is captivated by desires." (35)

The two verses quoted above are from *US*, 18.174-175. The nature of the enquirer who is desirous of knowing the Self is brought out here. Sureśvara emphasizes here that what he stated earlier in III.53, III.64, and III.65 has the support of Śaṅkara.

[36-37]

सोऽयमेवम् अविद्यापटलावगुण्ठितदृष्टिः सन् कथमुत्थाप्यत इत्याह।

यथा स्वापनिमित्तेन स्वप्नदृक्प्रतिबोधितः ।
करणं कर्म कर्तारं स्वाप्नं नैवेक्षते स्वतः ॥ ३६ ॥

अनात्मज्ञस्तथैवायं सम्यक् श्रुत्यावबोधितः ।
गुरुं शास्त्रं तथा मूढं स्वात्मनोऽन्यं न पश्यति ॥ ३७ ॥

How this person whose vision is concealed by the veil of ignorance is awakened is explained [in the sequel].

Just as a person who sees a dream, when awakened from sleep [by frightful dream-objects], does not see the agent, the object, and the instrument connected with the dream, even so the person who is ignorant of the Self, when properly awakened by *śruti*, sees nothing else — neither the teacher, nor the scripture, nor himself as ignorant [as he was before] — than the Self. (36-37)

There is a radical transformation when a person moves from the state of ignorance to that of knowledge in the same way as there is a radical transformation when a person moves from the dream state to the waking state. There are two important ques-

tions to be answered in the context of such a transition: (1) What is the ontological status of *śruti* as well as of the teacher who awakens an ignorant one to the truth? (2) Does the enlightened man, the man of wisdom, perceive plurality as he did before enlightenment? Sureśvara answers these two questions in verses (36) and (37) by citing the example of a person who wakes up from dream. A person who is in the dream state perceives various objects such as a thief, a tiger, and so on, which are all projections of his own *avidyā*. Distinctions such as the agent (*kartā*), the instrument (*karaṇam*), and the object (*karma*), do take place in dream experience: that is to say, the person who is in the grip of dream thinks that he is the agent of action, that there are objects external to him which he perceives, and that there are instruments of action different from him. But when he is awakened from dream by the frightful objects, such as a thief or a tiger, which are his own projections, he no more sees those objects involving the distinction of agent, object, and instrument. It should be borne in mind that the transition from the dream state to the waking state has been effected by the dream-objects which are illusory (*mithyā*) and that all that was seen in that state has disappeared. The same logic, Sureśvara says, holds good when an ignorant person becomes enlightened. In the state of ignorance, he makes all kinds of distinctions such as scripture, teacher, and so on, due to *avidyā*. And he is awakened to the truth by the scripture and the teacher, which are projections of his *avidyā*. When the truth of Brahman-Ātman is known, he does not perceive plurality in the form of scripture and its teaching, the teacher and the taught; he does not even perceive the ignorant one (*mūḍha*) in him as he was before. Since the distinctions of *śruti*, *ācārya*, etc. are projections of *avidyā*, the Advaitin holds the view that *śruti*, etc. are ontologically *mithyā*; and so the acceptance of these distinctions is not detrimental to the thesis of non-duality. At the same time, *śruti*, etc. are capable of awakening the person concerned to the truth. However, when the truth is known, there is no more the experience of plurality, no more the distinctions of scripture, teacher, and so on, to the enlightened man. On the basis of the distinction between the state of ignorance and the state of knowledge, Gauḍapāda says (*MK*, 1.18): "If anyone has ever imagined the manifold ideas (such as the teacher, the taught, etc.) they would disappear. This explanation is for the purpose of teaching. When the truth is known duality ceases to be."

[38]

"स किं सकलसंसारप्रविविक्तमात्मानं वाक्यात् प्रतिपद्यते उत नेति?" इति। अत्र ब्रूमः, कूटस्थावगतिशेषमात्रत्वात् प्रतिपत्तेः। अत आह।

दण्डावसाननिष्ठः स्याद् दण्डसर्पो यथा तथा।
नित्यावगतिनिष्ठं स्याद् वाक्याज्जगदसंशयम् ॥ ३८ ॥

[It may be asked:] "Does this enlightened man know from the scriptural sentence the Self as different from the entire world of bondage or not?" To this we reply that he knows that the immutable consciousness alone is what remains.

Just as the snake imagined in a stick ends up in the stick [when the stick is known], even so the world surely ends up in the eternal consciousness [when the Self is known] from the scriptural sentence. (38)

The objection raised by the opponent in the *sambandhokti* places the Advaitin, who claims that the Self is known through the *śruti* text, between the two horns of a dilemma. The opponent asks: "Is the Self known as different from the world or as not different from the world? If the former, the thesis of non-dualism has to be abandoned, for the world exists in addition to the Self. If the latter, there is the danger of the Self becoming cosmic (*saprapañca*), for we have to speak of "the Self-with-the-world." Both the alternatives, the opponent points out, are unacceptable to the Advaitin. Sureśvara maintains that this argument is of no avail as there is a third alternative which has not been envisaged by the opponent. Consider the case of mistaking a stick for a snake and then realizing that the object in front is only a stick and not a snake. By the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* it can be shown that the stick-snake is not real. Since the stick-snake suffers sublation, it is not a real entity in addition to the stick. Nor can it be dismissed as non-real. What is non-real can never be cognized. However, the fact is that the stick-snake was cognized, though what was cognized has been sublated subsequently. So we have to say that the stick-snake is different from the real and the non-real (*sādasad-vilakṣaṇam* = *bhāvābhāva-*

vilakṣaṇam). When the stick in front is cognized as stick, what remains is the stick alone: there is no snake different from it to be reckoned as real in addition to, or along with, it. Sureśvara maintains that the same logic holds good in the case of the realization of the Self as the sole reality. Just as the illusory snake gets eliminated as neither real nor non-real through the process of reasoning resulting in the perception of the bare stick, even so the elimination of the world as neither real nor non-real through the process of reasoning culminates, when *śruti* is taken advantage of, in the realization of the bare Self, the immutable consciousness alone (*kūṭasthāvagatiśeṣamātratvam*).

[39]

कुत एतत् ? यस्मात् ।

पश्यन्निति यदाहोच्चैः प्रत्यक्त्वमजमव्ययम् ।
अपूर्वानपरानन्तं त्वमा तदुपलक्ष्यते ॥ ३९ ॥

How is this? It is for this reason.

The Self, inward, unborn, and imperishable, which *śruti* emphatically speaks about as "seeing", is infinite, without an earlier and without a later. It is this that is implied by the word "thou". (39)

The word "*paśyan*" which Sureśvara uses at the beginning of verse (39) recalls the *śruti* text (*BU*, 4.3.23) which brings out the nature of the Self in deep sleep. The text reads: "Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) it does not see, it is, verily, seeing, though it does not see, for there is no cessation of the seeing of the seer, because of the imperishability (of the seer). There is not, however, a second, nothing else separate from it that it could see." The words "*apūrva*" and "*anapara*" which occur in the second line of the verse recall another *śruti* text (*BU*, 2.5.19) which says that "This Brahman is without an earlier and without a later, without an inside and without an outside." "*Apūrvam*" means *kāraṇarahitam*, *i.e.* without a cause. "*Anaparam*" means *kāryarahitam*, *i.e.* without an effect. This Brahman which has neither cause nor effect, which is identical with the inward Self,

is infinite (*anantam*) in the absolute sense of the term. It is, therefore, one and non-dual. It is this reality that is secondarily signified by the term "*tvam*".

[40]

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थविज्ञानेनैव बाध्यते। यस्मात्।

अस्माद्यदपरं रूपं नास्तीत्येव निरूप्यते।
अन्यथाग्रहणाभावाद्बीजं तत्स्वप्नबोधयोः ॥ ४० ॥

[*Avidyā*] is sublated only by the knowledge which arises from sentences such as "That thou art." This being the case, [the following is said].

That there is no other [world of duality] besides this [Self in the state of sleep] is alone established, because there is no mis-apprehension [in that state]. However the cause of both dream and waking [exists in that state]. (40)

The *sambandhokti* is by way of answer to a possible objection by the opponent. If the Self to which everyone has access in the state of deep sleep exists as non-dual, without a second, in that state, where is the need, the opponent asks, for the knowledge of the *śruti* text? This question is the result of a misunderstanding of the nature of deep sleep. The *śruti* text (*BU*, 4.3.23) cited in the course of the explanation of the previous verse refers to the absence of the apprehension of duality at that time (*anyathāgrahaṇa abhāva*). The world of duality alone is denied by it when it says that there is no second entity to the Self such that it could be seen by the latter. It does not, however, deny the existence of *avidyā* at that time. The primal ignorance which is the seed (*bījam*) of both dream and sleep, *i.e.* which is the cause of empirical existence, can be destroyed only by the knowledge produced by the scriptural texts such as "That thou art."

[41 - 42]

अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने उदाहरणम्।

"कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।
प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिद्ध्यतः" ॥ ४१ ॥

"अन्यथागृह्णतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः ।
विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्नुते" ॥ ४२ ॥

With a view to strengthen this idea, [the following passages are quoted] for illustration.

"These two, *viz.* Viśva and Taijasa, are said to be bound by cause and effect. But Prājña is bound by cause alone. These two (*i.e.* cause and effect) do not exist in the Turīya." (41)

"Dream belongs to one who mis-apprehends, and sleep to one who does not know the reality. When these two errors are removed, one attains the state of the Turīya." (42)

The two verses quoted above by Sureśvara are from Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, I. 11 and I. 15 respectively.

Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña are the names given to the Self in the waking, dream, and deep sleep states respectively. In the waking and dream states there is not only non-apprehension of the real (*agrahaṇa*), but also mis-apprehension of what is not real (*anyathāgrahaṇa*). Mis-apprehension presupposes non-apprehension. When a person mis-apprehends the rope as the snake, it is because of the non-apprehension of the rope as the rope. Since mis-apprehension is not possible without non-apprehension, the latter is said to be the cause and the former, the effect. It follows that Viśva and Taijasa are conditioned by both cause and effect. In other words, the non-dual reality is not only not known in the waking and dream states, but the world of plurality is also perceived. But Prājña, *i.e.* the Self in deep sleep is conditioned by cause alone: that is to say, there is non-apprehension of the real alone in deep sleep without the perception of duality. It means that, even though there is no world of duality in deep sleep, there is *avidyā* at that time — *avidyā* which is responsible for both the dream and waking states. Non-apprehension and mis-apprehen-

sion are the two phases of *avidyā*. Gauḍapāda characterizes non-apprehension of the real as "sleep" (*nidrā*) and mis-apprehension of the real as "dream" (*svapna*). It must be borne in mind that here "sleep" and "dream" are used in a metaphysical sense. While non-apprehension of the real is common to all the three states — waking, dream, and sleep, mis-apprehension of the real as the world of plurality is the special characteristic of the dream and waking states alone. So dream and waking states may be clubbed together as constituting one class on the basis of *anyathā-grahaṇa*, which is their unique feature. By correlating the three states of experience and the metaphysical sleep and dream, we could say that in what is ordinarily called the waking state there are both "sleep" and "dream", *i.e.* non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of the real, that in the state of dream, there is "sleep" also, and that in the state of deep sleep, there is "sleep" alone. A person realizes the Self, what is contextually called the Turīya or the Fourth, only when he overcomes, through the help of the *śruti* text, both the phases of *avidyā*.

[43 - 44]

तथा भगवत्पादीयमुदाहरणम् ।

" सुषुप्ताख्यं तमोऽज्ञानं बीजं स्वप्नप्रबोधयोः ।
आत्मबोधप्रदग्धं स्याद्बीजं दग्धं यथाऽभवम् " ॥ ४३ ॥

एवं गौडैर्द्राविडैर्नः पूज्यैरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः ।
अज्ञानमात्रोपाधिस्सन्नहमादिदृगीश्वरः ॥ ४४ ॥

The same idea can be illustrated by a text of the revered Teacher.

"What is called sleep, or darkness, or ignorance, is the seed of the waking and dream states. When it is completely burnt by [the fire of] Self-knowledge, it is [no more potent] like a burnt seed." (43)

Thus, this idea that the supreme Self, with *ajñāna* alone as its adjunct, becomes the witness of the ego, etc. has been

taught by a Gauḍa (*i.e.* Gauḍapāda) and a Drāviḍa (*i.e.* Śaṅkara) worshipped by us. (44)

[45]

तत्रान्यथाग्रहणवत् अन्यथाग्रहणबीजमग्रहणम् अनात्मधर्म एवेत्याह।

इदं ज्ञानमहं ज्ञाता ज्ञेयमेतदिति त्रयम् ।
योऽविकारो विजानाति परागेवास्य तत्तमः ॥ ४५ ॥

Now, we say that, like mis-apprehension, non-apprehension which is the cause of mis-apprehension is an attribute of the not-Self.

The darkness (*i.e.* ignorance) is but external to the immutable Self which reveals the three factors, *viz.* "This is cognition," "I am the cognizer," and "This is the cognized." (45)

It was stated earlier that *avidyā* which is the root cause of transmigratory existence can be removed only by the knowledge produced by the *śruti* text. The opponent now argues that *avidyā* whose existence is referred to by the *śruti* text (*e.g.* *Ṛg-Veda*, X. 129.3) is said to be the potency of the supreme Being. There is, for example, a text (*ŚU*, 6.8) which says: "His great power is said to be manifold, indeed." If it is the power of the supreme Being, it cannot, the opponent maintains, be removed by knowledge, or by anything whatsoever. This argument cannot be accepted. *Avidyā* or *māyā* which functions through its two aspects, *viz. agrahaṇa* and *anyathāgrahaṇa* or what we commonly call *āvaraṇa* and *oikṣepa*, is but external (*parāgeva = bahireva*) to the Self. Just as *anyathāgrahaṇa*, *i.e.* mis-apprehension, is a characteristic of *avidyā*, even so *agrahaṇa*, *i.e.* non-apprehension, which is the cause of mis-apprehension, is a characteristic of *avidyā*. Mind and the external objects are the products of *avidyā*. What is commonly called *vṛtti-jñāna*, *i.e.* modal cognition, is a characteristic of the internal organ. It is the internal organ which is the cognizer when it carries the reflection of the Self or consciousness. All objects which are *jñeya* are projections of *māyā-avidyā*. Sureśvara remarks that the three-fold distinction of cognition, cognizer, and cognized (*jñātṛ-jñāna-*

jñeya-vibhāga) which is revealed by the Self without undergoing any change whatsoever belongs to the realm of *avidyā* which is external to the Self. *Avidyā* which is material and which is also witnessed by the Self cannot be associated with the latter either as its power or attribute. It is true that *śruti* speaks about *māyā-avidyā* as the power of the supreme Being. The difficulty here is that what is material can be neither the power (*śakti*) nor the attribute (*dharma*) of the non-material Self. If so, why does *śruti*, one may ask, speak of it as the potency of the supreme Being? Power requires a locus (*āśraya*); and the Self, we have already said, is the locus of *avidyā*. Since *avidyā* is dependent on the Self both for its existence and cognition, it is spoken of as the potency of the Self (*ātmaśaktivyapadeśaśca asya sattā-pratītyoḥ tatparatantratvādeva iti bhāvaḥ*).

[46]

यत एतदेवम्, अतस्तस्यैव बीजात्मनस्तमसः, चित्तधर्मविशिष्टस्य स्वकार्यद्वितीयाभिसम्बन्धो, न त्वविकारिण आत्मन इत्याह दृष्टान्तेन।

रूपप्रकाशयोर्यद्वत् सङ्गतिर्विक्रियावतः ।
सुखदुःखादिसम्बन्धश्चित्तस्यैवं विकारिणः ॥ ४६ ॥

This being the case, it is only ignorance, qualified by the attributes of the mind, that is related to duality which is its projection, but not the immutable Self. And this idea is conveyed through an example.

Just as colour and light come into relation [with the visual sense] which is subject to change, even so pleasure and pain come into relation with the mind alone which is subject to change. (46)

[47]

तदेतदन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां दर्शयिष्यन्नाह।

सम्प्रसादेऽविकारित्वादस्तं याते विकारिणि ।
पश्यतो नात्मनः किञ्चिद् द्वितीयं स्पृशतेऽण्वपि ॥ ४७ ॥

With a view to convey the same idea by the reasoning of *anvaya-vyatireka* the following is said.

When the mutable mind sets in the state of sleep, no second entity whatsoever touches at all the seeing Self, because the latter is immutable. (47)

With a view to convey the non-relational nature of the Self in all the three states of experience (*avasthā-traya*) Sureśvara first of all takes up the state of sleep and shows how the Self remains untouched by a second entity in sleep (*samprasāde = suṣuptisamaye*), since the mind, as the mind, is not functioning at that time. That the Self has no relation with a second entity even in the dream and waking states will be shown in the following verse.

[48]

सोऽयं कूटस्थज्ञानमूर्तिरात्मा।

यथा प्राज्ञे तथैवायं स्वप्नजागरितान्तयोः ।
पश्यन्नप्यविकारित्वाद् द्वितीयं नैव पश्यति ॥ ४८ ॥

This Self is of the nature of immutable consciousness.

As in the case of sleep, so also in the states of dream and waking, the Self, though seeing, never sees a second entity, because it is immutable. (48)

[49]

एवं ज्ञानवतो नास्ति ममाहंमतिसंश्रयः ।
भास्वत्प्रदीपहस्तस्य ह्यन्धकार इवाग्रतः ॥ ४९ ॥

For one who has the knowledge [of the Self] thus, there is no sense of "I" and "mine", in the same way as there is no darkness in front for one who is carrying a lighted lamp in his hand. (49)

Sureśvara points out in this verse the fruit that accrues to one who knows the Self as immutable in all the three states of ex-

perience. While the Self as the witness (*sākṣin*) is immutable, the internal organ which carries the reflection of consciousness and which is the cognizer (*pramātā*) is mutable. The sense of "I" and "mine" are the characteristics of the internal organ, and one who knows the Self as unrelated to the internal organ, a product of *avidyā*, is indeed free from the sense of "I" and "mine".

[50]

तत्र दृष्टान्तः ।

आ प्रबोधाद्यथाऽसिद्धिर्द्वैतादन्यस्य* वस्तुनः ।
बोधादेवमसिद्धत्वं बुद्ध्यादेः प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥ ५० ॥

Here is an example.

Just as before enlightenment the Self which is different from [the world of] duality is not known, so after enlightenment of the Self, intellect, etc. are not known. (50)

The state prior to enlightenment is now contrasted with the state after enlightenment. Before enlightenment, a person carries on his daily life as if the world of duality alone is real; and he is forgetful of the Self. After enlightenment, the world of duality comprising the distinction of cognition, cognizer, and cognized ceases to be, and the person remains as the non-dual Self.

[51]

स एष विद्वान् हानोपादनशून्यम् आत्मानम् आत्मनि पश्यन् —

सर्वमेवानुजानाति सर्वमेव निषेधति ।
भेदात्मलाभोऽनुज्ञा स्यान्निषेधोऽतत्स्वभावतः ॥ ५१ ॥

This man of enlightenment, seeing within himself the Self, not subject to acceptance or rejection, [conducts himself as follows].

[This man of enlightenment] accepts everything and rejects everything. Acceptance is admission of the world of

* यथा सिद्धिर्द्वैतादन्यस्य (H)

duality [from the empirical standpoint], and rejection is [its denial] on account of its not being real. (51)

To the man of enlightenment the only reality that exists is the Self. Since it is ever-existent, the question of acquiring or accepting it as if it is something new does not arise. Since it constitutes his very nature, it cannot be rejected or abandoned: the Self, that is to say, is *hānopādāna-śūnyam.* Such a person, Sureśvara says, accepts and rejects everything. How is this possible?

If one keeps in mind the distinction between *tattva-dṛṣṭi* and *vyavahāra-dṛṣṭi*, *i.e.* the distinction between the perspective of reality and that of the empirical world, one will notice that there is no inconsistency in Sureśvara's position. Since the man of enlightenment knows the truth, he rejects the world of plurality as non-real. A person who knows the shell is no more deceived by the appearance of silver therein, and is in a position to speak of the shell-appearing-as-silver; even so the man of wisdom knows that it is Brahman-Ātman which appears as the world of plurality. It means that he accepts the pluralistic universe as an appearance, *i.e.* as empirically real. Since "acceptance" of everything and "rejection" of everything are from two different standpoints, Sureśvara should not be accused of blowing hot and cold at the same time.

[52]

सर्वस्योक्तत्वात् उपसंहारः ।

परमार्थात्मनिष्ठं यत् सर्ववेदान्तनिश्चितम् ।
तमोऽपनुद्धि यज्ज्ञानं* तदेतत्कथितं मया ॥ ५२ ॥

Since everything has been stated, we come to the conclusion.

The knowledge of the real Self, which has been ascertained as the purport of the entire *Vedānta* and which destroys the darkness of ignorance, has been stated by me. (52)

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* तमोपनुद्धियां ज्ञानं (H)

[53]

एतावदिहोक्तम् ।

नेहात्मविन्मदन्योऽस्ति न मत्तोऽज्ञोऽस्ति कश्चन ।
इत्यजानन् विजानाति यस्स ब्रह्मविदुत्तमः ॥ ५३ ॥

So much has been stated here.

"Here, there is no other knower of the Self than I; there is no other ignorant person than I" — he who realizes thus without knowing it [through subject–object distinction] is the best among the knowers of Brahman. (53)

Advaita holds that Brahman-Ātman which is of the nature of consciousness is the sole reality and that the threefold distinction of cognition, cognizer, and cognized is superimposed on it, though it is really devoid of it. If Brahman-Ātman is known as such-and-such, *i.e.* as what is devoid of all distinctions, even then, one may argue, it becomes an object of knowledge with the result that the subject-object distinction is inescapable (*vṛttijñānāt karma-kartṛ-vibhāgena jñāyate*). With a view to rule out this possibility, Sureśvara uses the expression "*ajānan vijānāti.*" It means that a person *vijānāti*, *i.e.* realizes the Self, *ajānan*, without knowing it as an object of modal cognition (*vṛtti jñānena karmatvena ajānan*). The point to be noted here is that the Self, though known, is not known as an object of knowledge in the sense in which material objects such as a table and a tree are known as objects of knowledge. When the mind ceases to be active and is withdrawn, "when the mind is no more the mind", as Gauḍapāda would put it (*manoso hi amanībhāve*, *MK*, 3. 31), when the mind becomes tranquil, there arises the impartite mental mode (*akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti*) in which consciousness shines of its own accord. Nothing more than the appropriate *vṛtti* is required for knowing the Self. While *vṛtti* as well as consciousness is required for knowing the objects of the world, appropriate *vṛtti* alone is required for knowing the Self. So the Self is not known as an object of knowledge involving the subject-object distinction through *vṛtti-jñāna*. It is this idea that Sureśvara conveys by the term "*ajānan*". The Self which is ever-existent consciousness does not

require the help of anything else to reveal it, because everything other than consciousness is material, and what is material can never reveal consciousness. That is why the Advaitin says that consciousness is self-luminous (*svaprakāśā*). It is this idea that Gauḍapāda conveys when he says (*MK*, 3. 35) that "the birthless is known through the birthless" (*ajena ajam vibudhyate*). Śaṅkara reiterates it in his own way when he says (*US*, 18. 205) that "the Witness-self is known by itself." One who realizes the Self as the sole reality and remains as the non-dual Self is the best among the knowers of Brahman-Ātman.

[54]

"एवमात्मानं ज्ञात्वा किं प्रवर्तितव्यम्, उत निवर्तितव्यम्, आहोस्वित् मुक्तप्रग्रहता ?" इति। उच्यते।

ज्ञेयाभिन्नमिदं यस्माज्ज्ञेयवस्त्वनुसार्यतः ।
न प्रवृत्तिं निवृत्तिं वा कटाक्षेणापि वीक्षते ॥ ५४ ॥

[The opponent asks:] "Thus having known the Self, should he perform the deeds [enjoined by scripture], or abstain from them? Or, is he free from all restraints?" We reply as follows.

Since this [knowledge], not being different from what is known, is in conformity with the known reality, [the man of wisdom] does not even glance at the path of action or that of renunciation. (54)

With a view to explain how a man of enlightenment would behave, Sureśvara introduces in the *sambandhokti* a question by the opponent. The question is whether a *jñānin*, the man of wisdom, should perform the scripture-stipulated duties of *varṇa* and *āśrama*, or whether he should abstain from them, or whether he could act according to his whims and fancies without any restriction whatsoever.

The saving knowledge which a person attains constitutes the very nature of Brahman. The question of *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti* does not arise with regard to Brahman which is ever-free from action

(*nityanivṛttakarmaṇaḥ tasya na pravṛttiḥ, na vā nivṛttiḥ*). So a person who attains the saving knowledge which is not different from Brahman and remains as Brahman is free from the paths of action and renunciation. How could a person, who would not violate the moral restrictions even before enlightenment when he was striving for it, be morally lax after enlightenment?

[55]

कुत एतज्ज्ञेयाभिन्नमिति ? यतः ।

प्रागात्मबोधाद्बोधोऽयं बाह्यवस्तूपसर्जनः ।
प्रध्वस्ताखिलसंसार आत्मैकालम्बनः श्रुतेः ॥ ५५ ॥

[It may be asked:] "How is this [knowledge] not different from its object?" It is for this reason.

Before the attainment of Self-knowledge, this knowledge is directed to external objects. But after the destruction of the entire world of bondage through *śruti*, the Self alone is its support. (55)

Since we are drawn towards external objects in our state of ignorance, we look outward and perceive only external objects. But when the entire world of duality ceases to be, when everything has become the Self, the saving knowledge which one has attained cannot be different from the Self. By contrasting the state of *vidyā* with the state of *avidyā*, the *śruti* text (*BU*, 2.4.14) says: "For, where there is duality as it were, there one smells another, there one sees another... Where, verily, everything has become the Self, then by what and whom should one smell, then by what and whom should one see ..." So in the state of knowledge, what remains is the Self alone which is not different from knowledge.

[56 - 59]

एवम् अवगतपरमार्थतत्त्वस्य न शेषशेषिभावः, तत्कारणस्य उत्सारितत्वात् इत्याह ।

वास्तवेनैव वृत्तेन निरुणद्धि यतो भवम् ।
निवृत्तिमपि मृद्नाति सम्यग्बोधः प्रवृत्तिवत् ॥ ५६ ॥

सकृदात्मप्रसूत्यैव निरुणद्ध्यखिलं भवम् ।
ध्वान्तमात्रनिरासेन न ततोऽन्यान्यथामतिः ॥ ५७ ॥

देशकालाद्यसम्बन्धाद्* देशादेर्मोहकार्यतः ।
नानुत्पन्नमदग्धं वा ज्ञानमज्ञानमस्त्यतः ॥ ५८ ॥

सम्यग्ज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टमोहतत्कार्यरूपिणः ।
सकृन्निवृत्तेर्बाध्यस्य किं कार्यमवशिष्यते ॥ ५९ ॥

Thus, for one who has known the highest reality, there is no subservience to scriptural injunction, because the cause thereof has been removed. This is what is stated.

Since right knowledge, by revealing the reality as it is, destroys transmigratory existence, it removes the path of abstinence also in the same way as [it removes] the path of action. (56)

[This knowledge], even as it arises once, destroys the entire transmigratory existence by removing ignorance completely. Mis-apprehension does not exist as something separate from it, [and so it is also removed at the same time]. (57)

Since place and time are the effects of delusion (*i.e.* ignorance), [the Self] is not related to place and time; and so there is no knowledge which is unoriginated and there is no ignorance which is not yet burnt. (58)

What remains to be done by a person who has burnt ignorance and its effects through the fire of right knowledge, inasmuch as what has to be sublated has been removed at once? (59)

* देशकालाद्यसम्बद्धाद् (H)

In verses (56) to (59) Sureśvara points out that the man of enlightenment who is free from *avidyā* and its effects is no more subject to scriptural prohibitions than he is to scriptural injunctions.

First of all, when a person has attained the saving knowledge and remains as the Self, which constitutes his essential nature, he is free not only from *pravṛtti-dharma*, but also from *nivṛtti-dharma*, because the Self *per se* is *pravṛtti-nivṛtti-śūnya-vastu*. Secondly, if there were time lag between the rise of knowledge and the complete removal of ignorance, one might argue that there is the need to observe scriptural prohibitions in the interval, as mis-apprehension and its latent impressions of the beginningless *avidyā* might persist for sometime until the disappearance of *avidyā* without a vestige. But there is no time lag at all between the rise of knowledge and the removal of ignorance. Just as darkness is removed by the light of the sun even as it arises, even so the darkness of ignorance in its entirety is *at once* removed by the light of knowledge the moment it dawns. What is called mis-apprehension (*anyathāmati* = *mithyājñāna*) is the effect of *avidyā*, and so it is not different from it (*na tato anyā anyathāmatiḥ*). When *avidyā* is removed, it is removed *in toto*; and mis-apprehension and its latent impressions, too, disappear along with *avidyā*. So, there is no scope for *nivṛtti-vidhi*, *i.e.* scriptural prohibition, after the rise of the saving knowledge. Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that the nature of the Self is such that, what holds good in the case of the removal of the ignorance about particular objects which are limited as well as material, does not hold good in the case of the Self. It is well-known that, when knowledge of a particular object, say a pot, arises from a *pramāṇa*, it removes the ignorance about that particular object alone. It does not, however, remove the ignorance about other pots or other objects. Every particular object is conditioned or limited by place and time; and *pramāṇa-jñāna* as it arises is capable of removing the ignorance of a particular space-time-limited-object alone — space, time, and the object, all being the projections of *avidyā*. The Self, on the other hand, is self-luminous knowledge by its very nature. It is untouched by *avidyā*. Consequently, it is not limited by place (*deśa*) and time (*kāla*), which are products of *avidyā*. Inasmuch as the Self is both unlimited and self-luminous, when the Self is known, there is no ignorance which is yet to be burnt or removed

(*adagdham ajñānam*); and if there is no more ignorance, there is no more any need for the origination of knowledge (*ajñānāntara-nivṛt-taye apekṣitam-anutpannam jñānāntaram nāsti*). So, since whatever has to be sublated has been removed by the right knowledge at once as soon as it has dawned, the man of enlightenment is not bound by scriptural prohibitions any more he is by scriptural injunctions.

[60]

वास्तवेनैव वृत्तेन अविद्यायाः प्रध्वस्तत्वात् न किञ्चिदवशिष्यत इत्युक्तः परिहारः। अथापरः साम्प्रदायिकः।

निवृत्तसर्पः सर्पोत्थं यथा कम्पं न मुञ्चति।
विध्वस्ताखिलमोहोऽपि मोहकार्यं तथात्मवित् ॥ ६० ॥

We have answered the question [whether the man of enlightenment is subservient to scriptural injunction] by saying that, since *avidyā* has been destroyed by the knowledge of the real alone, there remains nothing to be done. Now, another traditional point of view will be stated.

Just as the trembling caused by the illusory snake does not leave the person even though [the illusion of] the snake has been removed, even so the effect of delusion (*i.e. avidyā*) does not leave the knower of the Self even though the entire delusion has been destroyed. (60)

A question about the conduct of the man of wisdom was raised in the *sambandhokti* to verse (54). The question was whether a *jñānin*, *i.e.* a *brahmavit*, a knower of Brahman, would be governed by scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, or whether he would behave according to his likes. Sureśvara answered this question by saying that, since the man of enlightenment has no sense of "I" and "mine" and has no more identification with the mind-sense-body complex after the destruction of *avidyā*, there remains nothing to be accomplished by him by following scriptural injunctions and prohibitions and that moral laxity is inconceivable in his case. The man of enlightenment who has realized the Self and who remains as the Self is no more embodied, even though he is living, since wrong knowledge which is the cause of

embodiment has been removed. In the words of Śaṅkara: "The embodiedness of the Self is caused by wrong conception and so the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive" (*tasmāt mithyāpratyaya-nimittatvāt saśarīratvasya, siddham jīvatopi viduṣo'śarīratvam* — Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4). It is wrong to think that a person becomes disembodied only after death. Since wrong knowledge alone is the cause of embodiment, a person becomes bodiless the moment the cause of embodiment is removed. Therefore, since the man of enlightenment is free from the mind-sense-body complex, the question of his following the paths of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* does not arise.

Sureśvara says in the *sambandhokti* to verse (60) that there is another traditional answer to the same question. Though the knower of Brahman (*brahmavit*) is not bound by the aggregate of mind-sense-body and is, therefore, disembodied from his own perspective, yet from the *vyāvahārika* perspective the body which has been sublated as false continues for sometime till the exhaustion of *prārabdha-karma* through experience (*bādhitopi saṁsāraḥ prārabdha-karma-phala-bhogaparyantam anuvartate*). Sureśvara drives home the point by calling our attention to the experience of fear and trembling which continue for sometime even after the removal of the illusion of the snake by the knowledge of the object in front as rope. The continuance of fear and trembling for sometime after the sublation of the illusion of snake is called *bādhitānuvṛtti*. In the same way, the continuance of the mind-sense-body complex after the sublation of *avidyā* by the knowledge of the Self is a case of *bādhitānuvṛtti*. It may be noted that there is no incompatibility between the continuance of the mind-sense-body complex and liberation. It is true that bondage and liberation are antithetical. If a person is bound, we cannot say that he is liberated at the same time, because bondage and liberation cannot be predicated of the same person at the same time. The continuance of the mind-sense-body complex itself is not bondage. On the contrary, *attachment* to this aggregate is bondage. The knower of the Self, by virtue of the knowledge he has attained, has no attachment to the mind-sense-body aggregate. Though he is free, still there is the continuance of the body for him till the *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted through experience. Such a person who is the liberated-in-life plays the role of a preceptor (*ācārya*) and is

engaged in action of his own accord for the sake of *lokasaṅgraha*, *i.e.* for the preservation of the world-order, for social service, without the sense of "I" and "mine". What Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 4.1.15 is worth quoting here: "The knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active destroys all works by sublating wrong knowledge; but wrong knowledge — comparable to the appearance of a double moon — lasts for some time even after it has been sublated, owing to the impression it has made. Moreover, it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of the knower of Brahman continues to exist for sometime or not. For how can one contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman — vouched for by his heart's conviction — and at the same time continuing with the body?"

Jñānottama in his commentary remarks that, after answering the question first from the standpoint of *sadyomukti*, Sureśvara proceeds to answer it from the standpoint of *jīvanmukti*. It should be borne in mind that, whatever be the mode of answer, the man of enlightenment is not required to act according to scriptural injunctions and prohibitions.

[61]

यतः प्रवृत्तिबीजमुच्छिन्नं, तस्मात्।

तरोरुत्खातमूलस्य शोषेणैव यथा क्षयः।
तथा बुद्धात्मतत्त्वस्य निवृत्त्यैव तनुक्षयः ॥ ६१ ॥

Since the seed of further action has been destroyed, therefore [we say the following].

Just as the destruction of an uprooted tree takes place only through the process of withering away, even so the destruction of the body of the one who has known the Self takes place only through the removal [of *prārabdha-karmā*]. (61)

Consider the case of a tree which has fallen down when its root system has been cut off. The tree in its fallen condition is

visible to others and continues for sometime in its fallen condition till it is completely withered away. In the same way, the body of the enlightened man is visible to others and continues in its fallen condition for sometime after its root cause, *viz. avidyā*, has been cut off. The body of the enlightened man is due to *prārabdha-karma*, *i.e.* karma-in-action. *Prārabdha-karma* will continue till it is exhausted through enjoyment in the same way as the potter's wheel, though the stick through which it is rotated has been removed, continues to revolve for some time till the momentum responsible for its revolution gets exhausted. It may be noted that from the perspective of the knower of Brahman the body which he is tenanting is only *prātibhāsika,* no more than an appearance.

[62]

अथालेपकपक्षनिरासार्थमाह।

बुद्धाद्वैतसतत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं यदि।
शुनां तत्त्वदृशां चैव को भेदोऽशुचिभक्षणे ॥ ६२ ॥

Now, in order to refute the view that the knower of Brahman is free from sin [even if he performs sinful act], the following is said.

If a person who has realized the non-dual reality could behave as he liked, then what is the difference between a dog and the seer of truth in respect of eating what is prohibited? (62)

It is wrong to think that, since the sin of action will not touch the man of wisdom (*jñāninaḥ karmalepāsambhavāt*), the latter could act as he likes. "*Yatheṣṭācaraṇa*" is licentiousness in action. Action according to one's likes flouting moral restraints is inconceivable in the case of the knower of Brahman. Just because we say that the enlightened man is not bound by rules, it does not follow that he will flout moral principles.

[63 - 64]

"कस्मान्न भवति ?" यस्मात्।

अधर्माज्जायतेऽज्ञानं यथेष्टाचरणं ततः ।
धर्मकार्ये कथं तत्स्याद् यत्र धर्मोऽपि नेष्यते ॥ ६३ ॥

प्रत्याचक्षाण आहातो यथेष्टाचरणं हरिः ।
"यस्य सर्वे समारम्भाः" "प्रकाशं चे"ति सर्वदृक् ॥ ६४ ॥

[It may be asked:] "Why is it not possible?" It is for the following reason.

From demerit arises ignorance; and from the latter, unrestrained conduct. How is unrestrained conduct possible in the state which is the result of merit, wherein even righteousness is not desired? (63)

So, the omniscient Hari who has repudiated unrestrained conduct has said, "He whose all works," and "Light." (64)

Sureśvara explains why unrestrained conduct, licentiousness in action, is not possible in the case of the knower of Brahman. First of all, he shows the link between *adharma*, *i.e.* demerit, and *yatheṣṭācaraṇa*. Demerit is the cause of *ajñāna*, which in its turn is the cause of unrestrained conduct. On the contrary, knowledge or enlightenment is the result of *dharma*, *i.e.* merit, acquired in the course of many births. The state of enlightenment is such that the *brahmavit*, the knower of Brahman, does not even pursue righteousness as he has no desire therefor. If he would not desire even virtue in that state, how could he, asks Sureśvara, be guilty of unrestrained conduct? Nor is it possible to say that the latent impressions of unrestrained deeds performed in the previous lives would make him morally lax. The state of enlightenment, it must be borne in mind, cannot be easily attained. It is a consummation of moral endeavour, sinless life, and spiritual perfection. It can be attained, as the Lord says (*BG*, 6.45), by none but "a *yogin* who strives with assiduity, purged of sins and having become perfected in the course of many births." It means that self-indulgence or uncontrolled conduct is out of question in the previous lives of a *brahmavit*; if so, there are no latent impressions

caused by uncontrolled deeds, which could make him stray from the straight path. It is, therefore, absurd to say that a *brahmavit* would indulge in morally reprehensible conduct after attaining enlightenment.

In verse (64) Sureśvara refers to two passages of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, which speak about the state of life of the man of wisdom. The first one (*BG*, 4.19) says: "He whose all works are devoid of desires and purposes, and whose actions have been burnt by the fire of wisdom, him the wise call a sage." The other one (*BG*, 14.22) says: "He (*i.e.* the liberated one) dose not hate the presence of light, activity, and delusion. Nor does he long for them, if absent." Light (*prakāśa*), activity (*pravṛtti*), and delusion (*moha*) are due to *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* respectively. The *brahmavit*, *i.e.* the liberated person, who has transcended the three *guṇas*, neither hates them nor longs for them.

[65]

तिष्ठतु तावत् सर्वप्रवृत्तिबीजघस्मरं ज्ञानम्, मुमुक्ष्ववस्थायामपि न सम्भवति यथेष्टाचरणम्। तदाह।

" यो हि यत्र विरक्तः स्यान्नासौ तस्मै प्रवर्तते।
लोकत्रयविरक्तत्वान्मुमुक्षुः किमितीहते " ॥ ६५ ॥

Apart from the state of knowledge destructive of the cause of all activities, even in the state of the longing for liberation unrestrained conduct does not take place. This is stated as follows.

"A person does not try to attain anything in which he has lost interest. Why should a person longing for liberation make any effort at all, as he has lost interest in all the three worlds?" (65)

The verse quoted by Sureśvara is from *US*, 18.231. By means of *a fortiori* argument Sureśvara wants to show that the *brahmavit*, who is liberated, is free from uncontrolled conduct. If even the seeker of liberation (*mumukṣu*) is not self-indulgent, one can argue *a fortiori* that a person who is liberated (*muktaḥ*) cannot be self-indulgent.

[66]

तत्र दृष्टान्तः ।

" क्षुधया पीडयमानोऽपि न विषं ह्यत्तुमिच्छति ।
मिष्टान्नध्वस्ततृड् जानन् नामूढस्तज्जिघत्सति" ॥ ६६ ॥

In this context the following example [may be given].

"Indeed, no one likes to eat poison even if tormented by hunger. So, none but an idiot will knowingly wish to eat it when his hunger has been appeased by eating sweet-meats." (66)

The verse quoted here is from *US*, 18. 232.

[67]

यतोऽवगतपरमार्थतत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं न मनागपि घटते, मुमुक्षुत्वेऽपि च तस्मात् ।

रागो लिङ्गमबोधस्य चित्तव्यायामभूमिषु ।
कुतः शाड्वलता तस्य यस्याग्निः कोटरे तरोः ॥ ६७ ॥

Since unrestrained conduct is not at all possible in the case of one who has known the ultimate reality and also in the case of one who is the seeker of liberation, therefore [we say the following].

Desire for objects which fatigue the mind is the index of ignorance. How can a tree which has fire in the hollow of its trunk grow with green foliage? (67)

Sureśvara brings out the incompatibility between *rāga* and *bodha*, *i.e.* desire and knowledge, by means of an example. Just as green foliage is impossible in a tree which has fire in the hollow of its trunk, even so knowledge is impossible in the case of a person who has desire.

[68]

"सकलपुरुषार्थसमाप्तिकारिणोऽस्यात्मावबोधस्य कुतः प्रसूतिः ?" इति। उच्यते ।

अमानित्वादिनिष्ठो यो यश्चाद्वेष्ट्रादिसाधनः ।
ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तस्य न बहिर्मुखचेतसः ॥ ६८ ॥

[It may be asked:] "When does this knowledge of the Self, which brings about the fulfilment of all human ends, originate?" We reply as follows.

To him who is established in virtues such as humility and who practises the discipline such as non-enmity, knowledge originates, but not to one whose mind is turned outward. (68)

It should not be thought that clarification of the meanings of the terms, "*tat*" and "*tvam*", alone will do for attaining the saving knowledge of Brahman-Ātman identity. The spiritual discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana*, of which the clarification of the meanings of the terms used in the *mahāvākya* and the application of the various kinds of reasoning of *anvaya-vyativeka* form a part, should be preceded by moral discipline. The pursuit of the former without the latter will be fruitless. The moral discipline is so designed as to help the seeker after liberation turn his mind inward. Sureśvara refers, in a suggestive way, to some of the virtues which the seeker after liberation should cultivate, as taught in the scripture. Two passages from the *Bhagavad-gītā*, 13.7 and 12.13, are relevant in this context. The first one emphasizes the importance of virtues such as "humility, modesty, innocence, patience, service of the teacher, purity, steadfastness, self-control," as they are conducive to the origination of Self-knowledge. The second one alluded to by Sureśvara elucidates the conduct of the *sannyāsin* exemplifying several virtues indispensable for the attainment of the saving knowledge. It says: "He who hates no single being, who is friendly and compassionate to all, who is free from attachment and egoism, to whom pain and pleasure are equal, who is enduring, ever content and balancced in mind, self-controlled and possessed of firm conviction, whose thought and

reason are directed to Me, he who is (thus) devoted to Me, is dear to Me."

[69]

"उत्पन्ने आत्मविज्ञाने किम् अविद्याकार्यत्वात् प्रवृत्तिवत् निवृत्त्यात्मक-आमानित्वादयो निवर्तन्त उत न ?" इति। नेति ब्रूमः। "किं कारणम् ?" निवृत्तिशास्त्राविरुद्धस्वाभाव्यात् परमात्मनः, न तु नियोगवशात्। "कथं तर्हि ?" शृणु।

उत्पन्नात्मप्रबोधस्य त्वद्वेष्टृत्वादयो गुणाः।
अयत्नतो भवन्त्यस्य न तु साधनरूपिणः॥ ६९॥

[It may be asked:] "When the knowledge of the Self has arisen, do the negative virtues such as absence of conceit cease like the positive ones, since they [too] are the products of *avidyā*, or do they not cease?" We reply, "They do not cease." "What is the reason?" It is because of the fact that the nature of the Self is such that it is not opposed to scripture which enjoins the cultivation of negative virtues, and not because of any scriptural injunction [requiring the cultivation of these negative virtues]. "How is this?" Listen.

But, in the case of one who has attained the knowledge of the Self, virtues such as non-enmity make their appearance spontaneously. They are no longer the means [for an end]. (69)

The problem whether the man of enlightenment comes under the control of *nivṛtti-śāstra*, *i.e.* scripture which enjoins the cultivation of negative virtues, is once again taken up and answered in the *sambandhokti*. The opponent argues that, if the negative virtues such as non-enmity are the means to Self-knowledge, which a *sādhaka*, who is in the state of *avidyā*, must cultivate, they must cease to exist after the attainment of knowledge inasmuch as all virtues, positive and negative, are products of *avidyā* which is antithetical to *vidyā*. Something as a means is required for the sake of an end. When the end has been achieved, the means *qua* means must cease to be. Therefore, the opponent

maintains that, if these negative virtues continue even after the attainment of knowledge, it must be because of scriptural injunction; and so the *brahmavit* is subject to *nivṛtti-śāstra*. Sureśvara rejects this argument. He maintains that these virtues continue to exist in the enlightened man. And their continuance, he argues, is not because of the force of the *nivṛtti-śāstra*, but because of the fact that the nature of the Self is such that it is not opposed to the teaching of the *nivṛtti-śāstra*. Not being a *sādhaka*, the man of enlightenment does not cultivate these virtues as a means to an end. On the contrary, these virtues have become so natural to him that they manifest themselves spontaneously without any effort (*ayatnataḥ*) on his part. What serves as the means to the *sādhaka* becomes an ornament to the *siddha*.

[70]

यत एतदेवम् , अतः ।

इमं ग्रन्थमुपादित्सुरमानित्वादिसाधनः ।
यत्नतः स्यान्न दुर्वृत्तः प्रत्यग्धर्मानुगो ह्ययम् ॥ ७० ॥

This being so, it follows.

A person who wants to study this work should, with effort, cultivate virtues like humility and should avoid bad conduct, for this work seeks to convey the knowledge of the Self as it is. (70)

The discipline expected of one who wants to study this book and be profited by it is stated by Sureśvara in this verse.

[71]

न दातव्यश्चायं ग्रन्थः ।

नाविरक्ताय संसारात् नानिरस्तैषणाय च ।
न चायमवते देयं वेदान्तार्थप्रवेशनम् ॥ ७१ ॥

This work should not be imparted [to those who are not qualified].

To one who has not developed dispassion to the worldly life, who has not given up desire, and who does not practise restraint, this introduction to the meaning of the *Vedānta* should not be given. (71)

Here Sureśvara indirectly suggests the duty of a teacher (*ācārya-niyama*).

[72]

ज्ञात्वा यथोदितं सम्यग् ज्ञातव्यं नावशिष्यते ।
न चानिरस्तकर्मेदं जानीयादञ्जसा ततः ॥ ७२ ॥

Having properly known what has been stated [in this work] there remains nothing to be known. So, one who has not renounced actions cannot rightly understand it. (72)

[73]

निरस्तसर्वकर्माणः प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ।
निष्कामा यतयः शान्ता जानन्तीदं यथोदितम् ॥ ७३ ॥

The ascetics who are calm and desireless, who have renounced all actions, and whose minds are turned inward understand this teaching as it has been taught. (73)

[74]

श्रीमच्छङ्करपादपद्मयुगलं संसेव्य लब्ध्वोचिवान्
ज्ञानं पारमहंस्यमेतदमलं स्वान्तान्धकारापनुत् ।
मा भूदत्र विरोधिनी मतिरतः सद्भिः परीक्ष्यं बुधैः
सर्वत्रैव विशुद्धये मतमिदं सन्तः परं कारणम् ॥ ७४ ॥

Having properly served the lotus feet of Śrī Śaṅkara and having obtained from him this pure knowledge of the highest ascetics capable of destroying one's inner darkness, I have conveyed [this teaching]. Let there be no hostility [to this view]. Let this be examined by the wise and the good. This view is for all-round purification. The wise are the ultimate authority. (74)

[75]

सुभाषितं चार्वपि नामहात्मनां
दिवाकरो नक्तदृशामिवामलः ।
प्रभाति भात्येव विशुद्धचेतसां
निधिर्यथापास्ततृषां महाधनः ॥ ७५ ॥

What is well-spoken and pleasing does not illumine the minds of the ignoble, in the same way as the pure sun does not shine to the animals of the night. But it is certainly illuminating to men of pure minds, even as the golden treasure shines to those who have renounced their desire for wealth. (75)

[76]

विष्णोः पादानुगां यां निखिलभवनुदं शङ्करोऽवाप योगात्
सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मसंस्थं मुनिगणसहितं सम्यगभ्यर्च्य भक्त्या ।
विद्यां गङ्गामिवाहं प्रवरगुणनिधेः प्राप्य वेदान्तदीप्तां
कारुण्यात्तामवोचं जनिमृतिनिवहध्वस्तये दुःखितेभ्यः ॥

Just as Śaṅkara (Śiva) obtained through His power of *yoga* the *Gaṅgā* which emanates from the feet of Viṣṇu and which purifies the entire world, even so Śaṅkara obtained through his power of *yoga* the knowledge which reveals the abode of Viṣṇu and which destroys the entire world of bondage. Having duly worshipped with devotion the omni-

scient Śaṅkara, who is ever-established in Brahman, who is surrounded by a host of sages, I obtained from him, a treasure of excellent qualities, the knowledge revealed by the *Vedānta*, even as Bhagīratha obtained from Śaṅkara (Śiva) the *Gaṅgā* spoken about in *śruti;* and I have declared it out of compassion for the benefit of the suffering people so that the course of innumerable births and deaths may be put an end to. (76)

[77]

वेदान्तोदरवर्ति भास्वदमलं ध्वान्तच्छिदस्मद्धियो
दिव्यं ज्ञानमतीन्द्रियेऽपि विषये व्याहन्यते न क्वचित् ।
यो नो न्यायशलाकयैव निखिलं संसारबीजं तमः
प्रोत्सार्याविरकार्षीद् गुरुगुरुः पूज्याय तस्मै नमः ॥ ७७ ॥

I offer obeisance to the revered Teacher of teachers who, by the stick of reasoning alone, removed the ignorance which is the seed of the entire transmigratory existence and who revealed to us the knowledge, bright and pure, which abides in the interior of the *Vedānta*, which destroys the darkness in our intellects, which is self-luminous, and which is nowhere sublated inasmuch as it reveals the super-sensible reality. (77)

[78]

सम्बन्धोक्तिरियं साध्वी प्रतिश्लोकमुदाहृता ।
नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धेर्ज्ञात्वेमां व्याख्याताऽसौ भवेद्ध्रुवम् ॥ ७८ ॥

The *sambandhokti* (*i.e.* the prose elucidation which explains the link between the verses) which is attached to every verse is good. After studying it, one may, undoubtedly, become a commentator on the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. (78)

INDEX I

Index of Verses of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*

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About the Book

The *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* of Sureśvara is an independent work on Advaita, terse in style, but profound in thought and authoritative in its pronouncements. It is a compendium of the essence of the entire *Vedānta*. Exemplifying the principle of the unity of theory and practice, it establishes the nature of Brahman-Ātman, the sole reality, which is free from qualities, specifications, and actions, and the way to realize it through knowledge. It is a book both for the beginner and the specialist interested in Advaita. Its author, Sureśvara, respectfully called *Vārtikakāra* in the Advaita tradition, was a direct disciple of Śaṅkara. A spokesman of Śaṅkara, he has been frequently quoted as an authority by many teachers of Advaita noted for their doctrinal exposition and dialectical skill. Though next only to Śaṅkara, he has been provided a prominent place in the galaxy of Vyāsa and Śaṅkara.

This volume contains the text of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* in *Devanāgarī*, English translation of the text, and annotation, followed by four indices.

About the Author

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